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Abstract
Authenticated Encryption (AE) is a symmetric key cryptographic primitive that ensures
confidentiality and authenticity of processed messages at the same time. The research
of AE as a primitive in its own right started in 2000.
The security goals of AE (such as NAE, MRAE, OAE, RAE or the RUP) were captured
in formal definitions in the tradition provable security, where the security of a scheme is
formally proven assuming the security of an underlying building block. The prevailing
syntax moved to nonce-based AE with associated data (which is an additional input that
gets authenticated, but not encrypted). Other types of AE schemes appeared as well,
e.g. ones that supported stateful sessions.
Numerous AE schemes were designed; in the early years, these were almost exclusively
blockcipher modes of operation, most notably OCB in 2001, CCM in 2003 and GCM in
2004. At the same time, issues were discovered both with the security and applicability
of the most popular AE schemes, and other applications of symmetric key cryptography.
As a response, the Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability,
and Robustness (CAESAR) was started in 2013. Its goals were to identify a portfolio
of new, secure and reliable AE schemes that would satisfy the needs of practical applic-
ations, and also to boost the research in the area of AE. Prompted by CAESAR, 57
new schemes were designed, new types of constructions that gained popularity appeared
(such as the Sponge-based AE schemes), and new notions of security were proposed
(such as RAE). The final portfolio of the CAESAR competition should be announced in
2018.
In this thesis, we push the state of the art in the field of AE in several directions. All of
them are related to provable security in one way or another.
We propose OMD, the first provably secure dedicated AE scheme that is based on
a compression function. We further modify OMD to achieve nonce misuse-resistant
security (MRAE). We also propose another provably secure variant of OMD called pure
OMD, which enjoys a great improvement of performance over OMD.
Inspired by the modifications that gave rise to pure OMD, we turn to the popular
Sponge-based AE schemes and prove that similar measures can also be applied to the
keyed Sponge and keyed Duplex (a variant of the Sponge), allowing a substantial increase
of throughput without an impact on security.
We then address definitional aspects of AE. We critically evaluate the security notion of
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OAE, whose authors claimed that it provides the best possible security for online schemes
under nonce reuse. We challenge these claims, and discuss what are the meaningful
requirements for online AE schemes. Based on our findings, we formulate a new definition
of online AE security under nonce-reuse, and demonstrate its feasibility.
We next turn our attention to the security of nonce-based AE schemes under stretch
misuse; i.e., when a scheme is used with varying ciphertext expansion under the same
key, even though it should not be. We argue that varying the stretch is plausible,
and formulate several notions that capture security in presence of variable stretch. We
establish their relations to previous notions, and demonstrate the feasibility of security
in this setting.
We finally depart from provable security, with the intention to complement it. We
compose a survey of universal forgeries, decryption attacks and key recovery attacks on
3rd round CAESAR candidates.
Keywords: Authenticated Encryption, Provable Security, Misuse Resistance, CAE-
SAR competition, Compression Function, Sponge Construction, Full-state Absorption,
Online Authenticated Encryption, Variable Tag Length, Cryptanalysis
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Abstrakt
Authentifizierte Verschlu¨sselung (AE, aus dem englischen “Authenticated Encryption”)
ist ein symmetrisches Kryptosystem das gleichzeitig Vertraulichkeit, Authentizita¨t und
Integrita¨t sicherstellt. Die Forschung an AE als einer eigensta¨ndigen Verschlu¨sselungsart
begann im Jahr 2000.
Die Sicherheitsziele von AE wurden in formalen Definitionen in der Tradition der be-
weisbaren Sicherheit festgehalten (wie zum Beispiel MRAE, OAE, RAE oder die RUP-
Begriffe). Die vorherrschende Syntax wurde zu Nonce-basierender AE mit zugeho¨rigen
Daten verschoben. Die zugeho¨rige Daten sind eine zusa¨tzliche Eingabe, die authenti-
fiziert, aber nicht verschlu¨sselt wird. Andere Arten von AE-Schemata erschienen, zum
Beispiel diejenigen, die Sitzungen unterstu¨tzten.
Zahlreiche AE-Schemata wurden entworfen; in den Anfangsjahren waren dies fast
ausschließlich Betriebsmodi von Blockchiffren. Beispiele solchen Betriebsmodi sind OCB
aus dem Jahr 2001, CCM vorgestellt im Jahr 2003 und GCM von 2004. Gleichzeitig
wurden Probleme mit der Sicherheit und Anwendbarkeit der beliebtesten AE-Schemata
und anderen Anwendungen der Kryptographie mit symmetrischen Schlu¨sseln entdeckt.
Im Jahr 2013 wurde der CAESAR Wettbewerb (aus dem englischen “Competition
for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness”) gestartet. Sein
Ziel war es, ein Portfolio neuer, sicherer, praktischer und zuverla¨ssiger AE-Schemata zu
identifizieren. Auf Anregung von CAESAR wurden 57 neue Schemata entworfen, neue
Konstruktionen, die an Popularita¨t gewannen (wie die sogenannten Sponge-basierten
AE-Systeme), erschienen, und neue Sicherheitsbegriffe (wie RAE) wurden vorgeschlagen.
Das endgu¨ltige Portfolio des CAESAR-Wettbewerbs sollt im Jahr 2018 bekannt gegeben
werden.
In dieser Arbeit treiben wir den Stand der Technik in dem Gebiet der AE in mehreren
Richtungen voran. Alle pra¨sentierten Ergebnisse beziehen sich auf die eine oder andere
Weise auf die nachweisbare Sicherheit.
Wir schlagen OMD vor, das erste beweisbar sichere dedizierte AE-Schema, das auf
einer Komprimierungsfunktion basiert. Wir modifizieren OMD weiter, um Nonce Miss-
brauch-Widerstandsfa¨higkeit zu erreichen. Wir schlagen auch eine andere beweisbar
sichere OMD-Variante vor, die eine deutliche Verbesserung der Leistung gegenu¨ber OMD
bietet.
Inspiriert von den Modifikationen, die zu “pure OMD” gefu¨hrt haben, beweisen wir,
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dass a¨hnliche Maßnahmen auch auf den beliebten “keyed Sponge” und “keyed Duplex”
(eine Variante der Sponge-konstruktion) angewendet werden ko¨nnen, die ihre Leistung
verbessern, ohne Auswirkungen auf die Sicherheit zu haben.
Wir bewerten dann den Sicherheitsbegriff OAE kritisch. Seine Authoren behaupteten,
dass OAE die bestmo¨gliche Sicherheit fu¨r Online-Schemata unter Nonce-Wiederverwen-
dung bietet. Wir stellen diese Behauptung in Frage und formulieren eine neue Definition
der Online-AE-Sicherheit unter Nonce-Missbrauch-Widerstandsfa¨higkeit.
Wir lenken dann unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf die Sicherheit von Nonce-basierten AE-
Schemata unter “Stretch Missuse.” Wir argumentieren, dass “Stretch Missuse” plausibel
ist und formulieren mehrere Begriffe, die Sicherheit bei “Stretch Misuse” erfassen.
Wir verlassen schließlich die beweisbare Sicherheit, um sie zu erga¨nzen. Wir stellen
eine U¨bersicht der universellen Fa¨lschungen, Entschlu¨sselungsangriffen und Brute-Force-
Angriffen auf Kandidaten in der dritten Runde CAESARs zusammen.
Schlu¨sselwo¨rter: Authentifizierte Verschlu¨sselung, Beweisbare Sicherheit, CAESAR
Wettbewerb, Vollzustandsabsorption, Missbrauch-Widerstandsfa¨higkeit, Sponge, Kom-
primierungsfunktion, Online Authentifizierte Verschlu¨sselung, Variable Tagla¨nge, Kryp-
toanalyse
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Introduction
The subject of this thesis lies in the field of cryptography. The word cryptography
originates from the Greek words kryptos (meaning “hidden”) and graphein (meaning “to
write”) [Mer09]. This etymology fittingly describes the goal of ancient cryptography:
to ensure confidentiality of information when facing an adversary who may eavesdrop
on the channel through which the information is being sent. This had been its only
goal from the time of ancient “secret codes” and ciphers that appeared in the Hebrew,
Egyptian, Mesopotamian or Greek cultures, all the way to the early 20th century, when
the arts1 of cryptography and cryptanalysis suddenly gained a lot more importance, due
to the invention of radio communication [Kah96].
In 1945, Claude Shannon wrote the paper titled “A Mathematical Theory of Crypto-
graphy” [Sha45] (the paper was publicly disclosed in 1949 [Sha49]), which is arguably
one of the cornerstones of cryptography as a scientific discipline. In it, Shannon presen-
ted the first mathematical model of cryptosystems coupled with a formal definition of
their security. Shannon’s work focused on secrecy, i.e., confidentiality [Sti95, Bau01].
Some 35 years later, another fundamental goal of modern cryptography received formal
treatment when G. J. Simmons presented his theory for ensuring authenticity (i.e., cor-
rect determination of the origin) of information [Sim84]. Closely related to authenticity,
and sometimes conflated with it, is the goal of ensuring integrity of information, i.e.,
preventing information from being maliciously modified by an adversary.
Originally, all of cryptographic work was done in the symmetric key setting: for
example, to enforce confidentiality of their communication, two parties, call them Alice
and Bob, first exchange a secret value, called secret key. Alice then applies a symmetric
encryption scheme that maps each message (also called plaintext) to a ciphertext using
the secret key, such that only a person in possession of the same secret key will be able
to extract the original messages from the ciphertexts. An example of an early symmetric
encryption primitive is the Data Encryption Standard [Des77].
This changed when Diffie and Hellman introduced the concept of public key crypto-
1Cryptography could not yet be considered a science.
1
graphy in their seminal paper from 1976 [DH76], which eliminated the need for cum-
bersome exchange of secret keys. Soon after, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman designed the
first public key cryptosystem [RSA78].
In 1982, Goldwasser and Micali proposed the notion of semantic security for public
key cryptosystems [GM82], which captured a strong but natural form of confidentiality
protection in a precise, formal definition. They further proposed the first probabilistic
cryptosystem and proved that it is semantically secure under the assumption that the
problem of deciding quadratic residuosity (in a specific type of rings of modular integers)
is hard. Thus they laid foundations of the rigorous research methods called provable
security.2 In 1997, Bellare, Desai, Jokipii and Rogaway extended the provable security
treatment to symmetric encryption [BDJR97].
In the last four decades, cryptography has evolved significantly. On one hand, the way
cryptography is used changed: while at the beginning of the 20th century, the almost
exclusive users of cryptography were military and intelligence agencies, today everyone
is (unknowingly) using cryptography, which is ubiquitous in modern technology [KL14].
On the other hand, the field of cryptography itself grew and developed. The list of goals
cryptography now seeks to achieve has grown considerably, well beyond the fundamental
trilogy of confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. Today it is extended by privacy,3
non-repudiation, unpredictability, or fair termination, just to name a few.
Even though there are so many different security goals to pursue, and despite the
fact that the public key cryptography is more convenient to set up, the symmetric key
cryptographic primitives that ensure confidentiality, authenticity and integrity are still
among very active research topics of modern cryptography, mainly because of their
relevance to practice.
Before authenticated encryption. Achieving confidentiality and authenticity/in-
tegrity4 by symmetric key primitives belongs to the most fundamental, and oldest topics
in cryptography. They were traditionally studied and achieved separately.
Confidentiality has mainly been achieved with help of streamciphers and blockciphers.
Streamciphers are inspired by the one-time pad.5 A streamcipher, such as RC4 or
ChaCha [Ber08], takes a fixed-size secret key and a fixed-size, non-repeating initialisa-
tion vector (a nonce) as inputs, and generates a pseudorandom string of (practically)
arbitrary length that is used to “mask” a message, typically by the means of bitwise
XOR. A blockcipher maps a fixed-size plaintext and a fixed-size secret key to a fixed-
size output block. The most notable example for a blockcipher is AES [DR02, Pub01].
To act on arbitrary length messages, blockciphers are typically used in so-called modes
2We note that there are some controversies regarding the interpretation and practical relevance of
provable security. We touch upon this in Chapter 10.
3In this single case, we do not mean confidentiality, but rather the ability of a user to control the
spread of information about themselves.
4From this point, we merge the authenticity and integrity into a single goal, as one is almost never
useful without the other. We refer to the joint goal interchangeably by authenticity or integrity.
5Which was proven perfectly secure by Shannon [Sha45].
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of operation, such as the CTR mode or CBC mode [Dwo01], which use a blockcipher as
a blackbox subroutine to construct more general encryption schemes.
The authenticity of messages has typically been achieved with help of Message Authen-
tication Codes (MACs). A MAC produces a fixed-size, hard-to-predict authentication
tag as a function of a secret key and a message. MACs were most often constructed
as modes of operation of blockciphers (e.g., the CBC-based MACs [BKR00, Dwo16]),
but also other primitives such as compression functions [BCK96] or possibly stream-
ciphers [CW77, WC81].
Confidentiality and authenticity were also captured by separate security notions. Con-
fidentiality was formalized in several notions, most notably the Left-or-Right, or Real-or-
Random indistinguishability [BDJR97]; informally, both of them imply that an adversary
who can ask for encryptions of messages of his/her choice cannot tell if the ciphertexts
he/she is getting back truly encrypt his/her inputs. The security of MACs was captured
by the notions of unforgeability and pseudo-random function [BKR00]; the former re-
quires that an adversary which can ask for tags of arbitrary messages cannot produce a
fresh, valid message-tag pair, while the latter is a stronger notion that requires that the
given MAC “behaves” as a random function.
Unlike in the theoretical work, such a clear separation of confidentiality and authenti-
city seldom occurs in practice. In most conceivable applications, one will need to ensure
confidentiality in conjunction with authenticity (and integrity). In the absence of a
systematic treatment, users of cryptography had to resort to ad-hoc measures, such as
inserting redundancy into plaintexts and encrypting them with some encryption scheme,
to achieve the two said properties. These failed more often than not.
The best example of such a failure is perhaps the Wired Equivalent Privacy protocol
(WEP) used by the 802.11 wireless network standard. Here, the Cyclic Redundancy
Check (a linear function of the plaintext) had been appended to the plaintext, and
the resulting string was encrypted with the streamcipher RC4. The integrity protec-
tion of this construct was completely void, as demonstrated by Borisov, Goldberg and
Wagner [BGW01]. Another such failure was the CBCC scheme, which appended to a
message the XOR-sum of all its blocks, and applied the CBC mode to the result. This
one was shown to be flawed by Menezes, van Oorschot, and Vanstone [MvOV96].
Even combining a secure encryption scheme with a secure MAC was not sure to yield
a secure result. Canvel, Hiltgen, Vaudenay and Vuagnoux showed that an unfortunate
interaction between a MAC and the padding used for the CBC mode allowed an ad-
versary to compromise the confidentiality of plaintext in practical attacks on SSL and
IPSec [Vau02, CHVV03].
Authenticated encryption. The unsatisfied need for a tool that would simultan-
eously provide both confidentiality and authenticity was picked up by the research com-
munity in 2000; Katz and Yung [KY00] and independently Bellare with Rogaway [BR00]
stated the first formal security notions for what is today called authenticated encryption
(AE). In that same year, Bellare and Namprempre formally analysed the security of
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generic composition, showing that given a secure probabilistic encryption scheme and a
secure MAC, the Encrypt-then-MAC construction will yield a secure AE scheme.
In 2001, Jutla proposed IACBC and IAPM [Jut01], the first two provably secure ded-
icated AE schemes. In the same year, Rogaway, Bellare, Black and Krovetz designed
OCB [RBBK01], one of the most popular dedicated AE schemes. In 2002, Rogaway put
forward the syntax and security notion for nonce-based authenticated encryption with as-
sociated data, an additional input to the encryption algorithm that should be authentic-
ated along with the message, but not encrypted [Rog02]. This syntax and security notion
have become the most popular design target so far. Several other dedicated AE schemes
followed soon after, most notably the Counter with CBCMAC (CCM) [WHF03b] and
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [MV04]. All of the early AE schemes of importance were
designed as blockcipher modes of operation.
Simultaneously with this burst of research activity, authenticated encryption also en-
joyed a quick deployment in real-world applications. CCM appears in IEEE 802.11i,
IPsec ESP and IKEv2, while GCM appears in NIST SP 800-38D. ISO/IEC 19772:2009
defines six AE schemes (five dedicated AE designs and one generic composition method).
However, soon after the first wave of dedicated AE schemes, a series of new prob-
lems with (some of) those schemes and with the applications of symmetric crypto-
graphy in general were discovered. Complaints about the security and/or applicability
of CCM [RW03] and GCM [Jou06, Fer05, Saa12, IOM12] were raised and a collection
of failures of symmetric cryptography was documented by Bernstein [Ber14b]. Rogaway
and Shrimpton pointed out that most of the existing nonce-based AE schemes com-
pletely collapse if nonces get misused (i.e., repeated) and defined nonce-misuse resistant
security as a solution for this [RS06b].
CAESAR competition. All these shortcomings indicated the need for further re-
search in the field of authenticated encryption. To both boost the research, and to
provide solutions for these problems, the Competition for Authenticated Encryption:
Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR) was launched in 2013. It’s official
goal was to “identify a portfolio of authenticated ciphers that (1) offer advantages over
AES-GCM and (2) are suitable for widespread adoption” [Ber14a]. The final portfolio
was supposed to be identified in three rounds, each taking about a year.
The candidates submitted to CAESAR were required to comply with the specified
syntax,6 to ensure authenticity of all non-key inputs, and to protect confidentiality of
the plaintext and so-called “secret message number.” [Ber14a]. Each candidate was also
required to clearly indicate the amount of data that can be securely processed with a
single secret key, and whether the candidate
1. required that the nonce (“public message number” in CAESAR) never repeats, or
6This was essentially an extension of the syntax for nonce-based AE by Rogaway, optionally augmen-
ted by a “secret message number”. It must be noted that the addition of the secret message numbers
was not received very well [NRS13].
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2. is nonce-misuse resistant in the sense defined by Rogaway and Shrimpton, or
3. “provides some intermediate level of robustness against message-number reuse, in
which case [the candidate] must specify what that level of robustness is.”
The boost in research activity was immediate: 57 candidates were submitted to the first
round of CAESAR. Out of these, 9 candidates were withdrawn by their designers during
the first round, mostly due to the discovery of serious flaws [Viz16]. The remaining
48 designs showed a great diversity of low-level primitives, construction paradigms and
targeted security notions. There were:
• 21 blockcipher-based schemes,
• 3 designs based on (dedicated) tweakable blockciphers,
• 7 designs based on previously existing streamciphers,
• 9 “Sponge”-based schemes,
• 3 modes of cryptographic permutations (not based on the Sponge),
• a single candidate based on a keyed compression function,
• 3 candidates based on a dedicated primitive that did not fall into any of the,
previous categories
• a single candidate not based on any symmetric key primitive [Viz16].
While the prevailing construction type were by far blockcipher modes of operation, we see
that a good number of other constructions based on different primitives appeared as well.
Among these, the most popular were the schemes inspired by the Sponge construction.
The Sponge is a mode of operation for a keyless cryptographic permutation, originally
designed for cryptographic hashing.
The most frequently targeted security notion among the 48 candidates was the (ba-
sic) security of nonce-based AE defined by Rogaway [Rog02], and 5 candidates tar-
geted the nonce-misuse resistant security [RS06b]. Another security notion that was
very popular among the 1st round CAESAR candidates was the then-newly-defined no-
tion of online misuse resistant AE (OAE), targeted by 4 submissions. Security notions
prompted by the discussions around the start of CAESAR competition were the Robust
AE security [HKR15] and the security of AE under the release of unverified plaintext
(RUP) [ABL+14a]. Most 1st round candidates were supported by proofs in (in the sense
of provable security), but there were also those who only made claims accompanied with
direct cyptanalysis.
In July 2015, 29 candidates advanced to the 2nd round of CAESAR. All candidates
were allowed to introduce updates, two submissions were merged into a single one based
on the suggestion of the committee (CLOC and SILC), and two candidates merged into
a single submission at the end of the second round (and formed COLM). In March 2018,
7 finalists were announced.
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Outline of the thesis. The work that resulted in this dissertation started together
with the CAESAR competition, and finished shortly before the CAESAR finalists were
announced; the author of the thesis was thus fortunate to participate in this second
big wave of research in authenticated encryption—probably even the bigger of the two.
Thanks to this, the author was able to work on several exciting topics which are not
all closely related to one another, but which can all be labelled as topics in (or related
to) provable security. As a result, the material contained in this thesis is quite diverse.
The covered results are therefore presented in three parts, each of them dedicated to a
different aspect of research on AE.
In Part I, we discuss construction of AE schemes. In Part II we switch from designing
schemes to definitional work and propose new security models. In Part III, we depart
further away from provable security and focus on cryptanalysis.
We introduce the notation and the general security model used in the thesis in Chapter 2.
We also cover some low-level symmetric key primitives and the pre-CAESAR notions of
AE security in the same chapter.
Part I. The first three chapters in this part are dedicated to compression function-
based authenticated encryption. In Chapter 3, we introduce Offset Merkle-Damg˚ard
(OMD), the first dedicated AE scheme based on a keyed compression function, and a
2nd round CAESAR candidate. We propose two misuse-resistant variants of OMD in
Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we introduce pure OMD, which folds the processing of associ-
ated data into the main encryption-core of the original OMD scheme. In these chapters,
we give descriptions of the proposed schemes, and prove their security. For OMD and
pure OMD, we discuss their performance, as indicated by results from experimental
measurements. We also briefly consider OMD from the perspective of the CAESAR
competition.
We then turn to sponge-based AE schemes in Chapter 6, and propose algorithmic
modifications to the Sponge and Duplex constructions that allow to greatly increase the
throughput of the said constructions. We prove that the proposed modifications do not
impact security, and demonstrate how this is beneficial for sponge-based AE.
Part II. In Chapter 7, we critically examine the security notion of Online AE [FFL12]
that claims to imply nonce misuse resistance for AE schemes with online encryption.
We point out several flaws and shortcomings due to which, in our opinion, the notion
does not deliver on the intuition that it promises to capture. We propose an alternative,
a security definition called OAE2, which comes as close to nonce misuse resistance as it
is possible for online AE schemes. We demonstrate the feasibility of OAE2 security by
constructing a secure instance.
We keep to the definitional work in Chapter 8. We consider a new type of misuse:
varying the ciphertext expansion of a nonce-based AE scheme with a single key. We
investigate implications of this misuse on security of nonce-based AE schemes and present
plausible attacks which apply to many existing schemes, even if they apply some heuristic
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countermeasures. We then proceed to formalizing the security of nonce-based AE with
variable ciphertext expansion, and establish the relations between our newly proposed
notions and the previously existing ones. We demonstrate that our notion of security is
achievable by presenting a secure scheme.
Part III. We attempt to complement the results of provable security in Chapter 9 by
making a survey of actual security of all 3rd round CAESAR candidates, CCM and GCM
to nonce-misuse and attacks with high data complexity. In the process, we describe a
few new attacks. Our result is an overview that compares attacks in terms of their
impact, complexity, and type of adversarial powers. It provides fine-grained information
on “robustness” of CAESAR candidates beyond what is indicated by their claims.
Finally, we conclude in Chapter 10 and state open problems.
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Chapter2
Preliminaries
This chapter introduces the notations and definitions used in the rest of this thesis. In
Section 2.1, we introduce basic concepts and notations used throughout this dissertation.
In Section 2.2, we briefly discuss the formal treatment we apply analysing the security
of cryptographic constructions. In Section 2.3 we formally define several cryptographic
primitives and their security. In Section 2.4 we formally define syntax of schemes for
authenticated encryption, and define several notions of security for such schemes.
2.1 Notations
Sampling, sets and integers. We let a ←$ S denote sampling a random variable
S and storing the result in the variable a. If S is a finite set, we denote by a ←$ S
sampling an element of S uniformly at random. For a finite set S, we let |S| denote its
cardinality.
We let N denote the set of all natural numbers {0, 1, 2, . . .} and N+ the set of all
positive natural numbers N\{0}. For any two pairs of integers (i, j), (i′, j′) ∈ N, we say
that (i′, j′) < (i, j) if either i′ < i, or if i′ = i and j′ < j. We say that (i′, j′) ≤ (i, j)
if (i′, j′) < (i, j) or if (i′, j′) = (i, j). In other words, we use lexicographic ordering to
determine ordering of integer-tuples.
Binary strings. All strings are binary strings, i.e. strings over the alphabet {0, 1}.
We let |X| denote the length of a string X. We let ε denote the empty string of length
0. We let {0, 1}∗ denote the set of all strings of arbitrary finite lengths (s.t. ε ∈ {0, 1}∗),
we let {0, 1}∞ denote the set of all infinite strings and we let {0, 1}n denote the set
of all strings of length n for a non-negative integer n. We further let {0, 1}≤n denote⋃n
i=0{0, 1}i, the set of all strings of length equal or smaller than n, and we identify
{0, 1}<n with {0, 1}≤n−1 for n ≥ 2. We also let {0, 1}≥n denote the set of all strings of
at least n bits
⋃∞
i≥n{0, 1}i.
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Concatenation and substrings. We denote the concatenation of two strings X and
Y by X‖Y , or by XY if the meaning of the notation is clear from the context. For an
m-bit string X = X[m− 1] · · ·X[0] we let X[i · · · j] = X[i] · · ·X[j] denote a substring of
X, for m − 1 ≥ i ≥ j ≥ 0; by convention we let X[i · · · j] = ε if i < 0 and X[i · · · j] =
X[i · · · 0] if j < 0. We further let left` (X) = X[(m − 1) . . . (m − `)] denote the `
leftmost bits of X and rightr (X) = X[(r − 1) . . . 0] the r rightmost bits of X, such that
X = leftχ (X) ‖right|X|−χ (X) for any 0 ≤ χ ≤ |X|.
Length of blockwise common prefix. Given two strings X,Y , let
llcpb (X,Y ) = max
i≥0
{i : lefti·b (X) = lefti·b (Y )}
denote the length of the longest common prefix between X and Y in b-bit blocks. For
a string X and a non-empty set of strings {Y1, . . . , Yn} let
llcpb (X;Y1, . . . , Yn) = max {llcpb (X,Y1) , . . . , llcpb (X,Yn)} .
Encodings, number of trailing zeros and partitioning of strings. For a non-
negative integer i ∈ N let 〈i〉m denote the binary representation of i as an m-bit string.
For a string X = X[m − 1] · · ·X[0], let int(X) = ∑m−1i=0 X[i]2i denote the non-negative
integer represented by X.
Let ntz(i) denote the number of trailing zeros (i.e., the number of rightmost bits
that are zero) in the binary representation of a positive integer i. E.g. ntz(7) = 0
and ntz(12) = 2. Let bn denote the string obtained by concatenating n copies of a bit
b ∈ {0, 1}.
For X ∈ {0, 1}∗ let X1‖X2 · · · ‖Xm b← X denote partitioning X into blocks such that
|Xi| = b for 1 ≤ i ≤ m−1 and |Xm| ≤ b; let m = |X|b denote length of X in b-bit blocks
(i.e., |X|b = d|X|/be).
XOR and binary shifts. For two strings X and Y with |X| = |Y |, we let X &Y
denote the result of the bitwise and operation applied to X and Y .
For two strings X and Y , with |X| ≤ |Y |, let the notations X ⊕Y and Y ⊕X both
denote the bitwise xor ofX and left|X| (Y ). Clearly, ifX and Y have the same length then
X ⊕Y matches the usual bitwise xor. For any string X, this implies X ⊕ ε = ε⊕X = ε.
For a string X, let Xn = right|X|−n (X) ‖0n denote the left-shift operation, where
the n leftmost bits are discarded and the n vacated rightmost bits are set to 0. We
let Xn = 0n‖left|X|−n (X) denote the (unsigned) right-shift operation where the n
rightmost bits are discarded and the n vacated leftmost bits are set to 0. We letXs n =
(left1 (X))
n ‖left|X|−n (X) denote the signed right-shift operation where the n rightmost
bits are discarded and the n vacated left bits are filled with the original leftmost bit
(which is considered as the sign bit); for example, 1001100 s 3 = 1111001. If the
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leftmost bit of X is 0 then we have X s n = X  n.
Finite fields. For a positive integer n, let GF(2n) denote the Galois Field with 2n
elements. An element α in GF(2n) is represented as a formal polynomial α(X) =
αn−1Xn−1 + · · ·+ α1X + α0 with binary coefficients.
We can assign an element α ∈ GF(2n) to an integer i ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1} in the natural
way. A natural assignment of an element α exists for any string s ∈ {0, 1}n. With an
abuse of notation, we sometimes refer to the elements of GF(2n) directly by strings in
{0, 1}n, or integers in {0, . . . , 2n − 1}, if the context does not allow ambiguity.1
The addition “⊕” and multiplication “·” of two field elements in GF(2n) are defined as
usual. For the representation of GF(2256) we use the polynomial P256(X) = X
256+X10+
X5 +X2 +1, and for GF(2512) we use the polynomial P512(X) = X
512 +X8 +X5 +X2 +1
as the modulus used in the field multiplications.
We note that from the perspective of implementation, it is easy to multiply an arbit-
rary field element α by the element identified with 2 (i.e., X). For example, in GF(2256)
using P256(X) the doubling
2 operation can be described as follows:
2 · α =
{
α 1 if left1 (α) = 0
(α 1)⊕ 024510000100101 if left1 (α) = 1 (2.1)
= (α 1)⊕((αs 255) & 024510000100101) (2.2)
The error symbol. The special symbol ⊥ signifies either an error or that the value
of a variable or a function at some input is undefined.
Arrays and vectors. An array S stores associations (X,Y ) between elements of a
set of indices X ∈ D and a set of values Y ∈ R. An array S can also be thought of
as function S : D → R ∪ {⊥} that can be dynamically modified. We assume all the
standard operations over the arrays: efficient random read and write access, and adding
or removing elements.
We denote by S ← array(D) initializing S to an empty array with the set of indices D.
An empty array contains no association. Given an array S and some X ∈ D for which
an association with some Y was stored in S, we let S[X] = Y . If no association was
stored for X, we let S[X] = ⊥ by convention. This means that for an empty array S,
S[X] = ⊥ for all X ∈ D. Given an array S, we let |S| denote the number of associations
stored in S, i.e., the number of X ∈ D such that S[X] 6= ⊥. We assume that the memory
needed to store S is equal to γ · log(|D|) · |{X ∈ D | S[X] 6= ⊥}| for some constant γ.
We conflate vectors with lists, i.e., we do not understand a vector as an element of a
vector space in the algebraic sense, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Given a set R, a
1We adopt this rather abusive notation because it is very common in the works on AE and tweakable
blockciphers.
2We note that here doubling does not mean “adding an element to itself” but the multiplication by
the GF(2n)-element that can be represented by the integer 2, i.e., the formal polynomial α(X) = X.
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vector V ∈ R∗ is simply a tuple that contains a non-negative number of ordered elements
of R. We let |V | denote the number of elements in the vector V . We let Λ denote the
empty vector with |Λ| = 0 for any R. For a vector V , we let V [i] denote the ith element
of V for 1 ≤ i ≤ |V |, and we let V [i..j] denote the vector (V [i], V [i + 1], . . . , V [j]) for
1 ≤ i < j ≤ |V |. We let V [i . . . i] = V [i] by convention. For i ≥ j we let Λ = V [i..j] by
convention. For a vector V ∈ R∗ and an element X ∈ R, we let V ‖X denote the vector
(V [1], . . . , V [|V |], X).
Functions, permutations and injections. For a bijective function pi : S → S, we
denote its inverse by pi−1 : S → S, i.e., for all s ∈ S we have pi−1(pi(s)) = s.
For a finite set S, we let Perm(S) denote the set of all permutations of S. For a
positive n, we let Perm(2n) = Perm({0, 1}n).
For a set D and a finite set R, we let Func(D,R) denote the set of all functions from
D to R, and if D = R, we simply use Func(D) instead of Func(D,D). In particular,
we let Func(D, 2n) = Func(D, {0, 1}n), and Func(2m, 2n) = Func({0, 1}m, {0, 1}n), and
Func(2n) = Func({0, 1}n) for positive integers m and n.
For two finite sets D and R with |D| ≤ |R|, we let Inj(D,R) denote the set of all
injective functions from D to R. In particular, we let Inj(2m, 2n) = Inj({0, 1}m, {0, 1}n)
for positive integers m and n with m ≤ n.
For a positive integer τ , we let Inj(τ) denote the set of all τ -expanding injections, i.e.,
the set of functions f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ s.t. for all M ∈ {0, 1}∗ we have |f(M)| = |M |+τ
and for all M 6= M ′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ we have f(M) 6= f(M ′).
We additionally define so called “tweakable” version of the set of permutations and
the set of functions. For a set T and a finite set S, we let P˜erm(T ,S) denote the set
of all functions f : T × S → S such that for all T ∈ T , f(T, ·) is a permutation of
S. In particular, we let P˜erm(T , 2n) = P˜erm(T , {0, 1}n) for a positive integer n. For a
pi ∈ P˜erm(T ,D), we let piT(X) = pi(T, X).
A set of functions from D to R tweaked by T is identical to Func(T × D,R). We
define the corresponding notation nevertheless, as it will be useful in Chapters 3, 4
and 5. For a set T and two positive integers m,n, we let F˜unc(T , 2m, 2n) stand for
Func(T × {0, 1}m, {0, 1}n), such that we treat the elements of the domain T × {0, 1}m
as tweak-message pairs. For an f˜ ∈ F˜unc(T , 2m, 2n), we let f˜T(X) = f˜(T, X).
Note that for a f˜ ∈ F˜unc(T , 2m, 2n), we can interpret pi = (piT(·))T∈T as a collection
of functions indexed by T. This interpretation will be used in particular if the notation
F˜unc(T , 2m, 2n) appears.
Algorithms and oracles. We letA O1(·),...,Or(·) denote that an algorithmA has black-
box access to algorithms O1, . . . ,Or such that it can feed inputs to and observe corres-
ponding outputs of each Oi for i = 1, . . . , r. We call O1, . . . ,Or the oracles of A . When
A runs Y ← Oi(X) with an input X, we say that A makes a query to Oi, or that A
queries Oi with X. We call Y response to A ’s query.
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We let A O1(·),...,Or(·)(X) ⇒ a denote the event that an algorithm A that is fed an
input X and that has black-box access to oracles O1, . . . ,Or outputs the value a.
We let S ←$ S : A O1(·),...,Or(·)() denote sampling the variable S according to S, and
then running A with its oracles, such that the variable S is implicitly accessible by the
oracles, and may or may not be given to A .
We note that this simple notation will only be used if A ’s oracles are simple enough
to leave no room for ambiguity. For more complex scenarios, the interaction between an
adversary and a set of oracles will be treated explicitly using the game-playing framework
defined in Section 2.2.
2.2 Security Framework
In this section, we briefly discuss the approach we adopt for the formal treatment of
security analyses in this thesis.
Model of computation. Unless stated otherwise, all algorithms are understood to
be executed in the same, fixed RAM model of computation, and represented using the
same algorithm encoding. By convention, the time complexity of an algorithm A is the
worst-case running time of A plus the size of the description of A.
Concrete security. We apply the concrete security-treatment [BDJR97] when defin-
ing and analysing security of cryptographic primitives, as opposed to the asymptotic
security treatment that is usual for public-key cryptography. We analyse the security of
cryptographic constructions against adversaries whose resources (time complexity, data
complexity etc.) are parameterized, and the upper bounds on the adversarial advantage
are expressed as concrete functions of these parameters. Loosely speaking, adversarial
advantage is a measure of how likely it is that an adversary is able to “break” a scheme,
the meaning of “breaking” being scheme-dependent.
The reason for applying the concrete security treatment is twofold. Primarily, there
is only a (small) finite number of instances of virtually any symmetric key construction.
In particular, the security level guaranteed by these instances cannot be scaled at whim,
which makes asymptotic security analysis meaningless. The concrete security analysis
also gives a much more tangible assessment of a construction’s actual level of resilience
to attacks.
Indistinguishability. When formally defining the meaning of security for a crypto-
graphic primitive, it is often convenient to do so through the black-box indistinguishab-
ility of a construction Π (that realizes the given primitive) from an idealized version of
the primitive, i.e., a reference object with the same input/output interface.
The idealized version of the primitive (call it Π¯) usually possesses a perfect version
of the security properties that we would like Π to have. We then evaluate Π’s security
through an experiment, where we give an adversary A oracle access to either Π keyed
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with a random K (sampled from the corresponding key space K), or to Π¯ selected from
the distribution Π¯ associated to the idealized object. Depending on the primitive, the
adversary has access to one or more oracles, and its goal is to distinguish whether it is
interacting with Π or Π¯. That is, A outputs a single bit at the end of its interaction
with the oracles. We (typically) measure the (in)security of Π as an expression of the
form
Pr[K ←$ K : A ΠK ⇒ 1]− Pr[Π¯←$ Π¯ : A Π¯ ⇒ 1]
(where we are abusing the notation slightly), called the adversarial advantage.
The harder it is for an adversary to distinguish the actual keyed construction Π from
the idealized version Π¯, the more faithfully Π approximates the ideal reference Π¯, and
the smaller the advantage. Informally speaking, if the adversarial advantage is low for all
possible adversaries whose computational resources (running time, memory complexity,
the data complexity of the oracle queries) are limited by some reasonable upper bound,
we say that Π is secure.
We note that if the idealized reference object Π¯ is chosen appropriately, any valid
attack that can be mounted with black-box access to Π can be turned into a black-
box distinguisher. The absence of efficient distinguishers then necessarily implies the
absence of any other efficient attacks. The tricky part of this approach is the choice of
an appropriate reference object.
The concept of indistinguishability will be used to define the security of most of the
cryptographic primitives in this thesis.
Adversarial powers. When analysing security of certain primitives, we consider ad-
versaries who are given privileges of varying potency.
For primitives such as blockciphers, encryption-only schemes or authenticated encryp-
tion schemes, the adversary A may only be allowed to query the encryption algorithm.
In that case, we say that A mounts a chosen plaintext attack (CPA). If the adversary
can query both the encryption and the decryption algorithm, we say that it mounts a
chosen ciphertext attack (CCA).
When choosing a set of “reasonable” adversaries for defining security of a primitive,
we distinguish two cases. If we only consider adversaries that run in time that is limited
by some constant t, we talk about computational security, as the primitive in question
is only expected to resist attackers with a limited amount of computational power. Un-
less indicated otherwise, an adversary should always be assumed to be computationally
restricted.
If we allow adversaries to run in unrestricted (but finite) time, we talk about infor-
mation-theoretic security. We refer to such computationally unrestricted adversaries as
information-theoretic adversaries.
We note that when considering an information-theoretic adversary, it can be assumed
to be deterministic without loss of generality (for a simple proof see the paper by Chen
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and Steinberger [CS14]).
Game-playing framework. We use the game-playing methodology [BR06] to define
security of cryptographic primitives and to conduct provable security analysis.
A game is an algorithm that consists of a collection of procedures; it describes a
security experiment. An adversary A is a possibly randomized algorithm, that is left to
interact with one or more procedures of the game called oracles. A game is executed in
three phases.
First, a procedure called initialize is executed to set up the game and produce an
initial input for A . Then A is run with this input and left to interact with the oracles
defined by the game. At the end of this interaction, A produces an output value. This
value is passed to a procedure called finalize which then produces the final output of the
game.
Overloading the notation, we let A G ⇒ a denote the event that the finalize procedure
outputs the value a when running a game G with an adversary A .
If the initialization procedure is a dummy algorithm with no instructions, we may omit
it completely. Similarly, if the finalization procedure is not specified, then we default to
a dummy procedure that simply forwards the output of the adversary.
To describe the games, we will often use pseudo code, similar to that proposed by
Bellare and Rogaway [BR06]. If the game is simple enough so that there is no risk of
ambiguity, we dispense with the pseudo code and describe the game using simple “math-
ematical” notation. An example of the latter are the security definitions in Section 2.3.
The fundamental lemma of game-playing. We can apply the fundamental lemma
of game-playing when we wish to upper-bound the quantity
Pr[A G1 ⇒ a]− Pr[A G2 ⇒ a]
for an adversary A and two games G1 and G2 that are identical-until-bad.
We call two games G1 and G2 identical-until-bad if the two games are syntactically
identical except when a boolean flag bad (which exists in both of them) is set to true.
More precisely, G1 and G2 are identical-until-bad if their code is the same except inside
if -blocks that always set the flag bad to true if entered. The fundamental lemma says
that the advantage that an adversary can obtain in distinguishing a pair of identical-
until-bad games is at most the probability that its execution sets bad in one of the games
(either game will do).
Lemma 2.1 (Fundamental lemma of game-playing [BR06]). Let G1 and G2 be identical-
until-bad games, let a be any value, and let A be an adversary. Then we have
Pr[A G1 ⇒ a]− Pr[A G2 ⇒ a] ≤ Pr[A Gi sets bad],
where i ∈ {1, 2} and where A Gisets bad denotes the event that the flag bad is set to true
when the procedure finalize of Gi is called.
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Coefficient-H technique When analysing the indistinguishability of two games X
and Y such that the oracles of X have identical interfaces with the oracles of Y , we can
make use of the Patarin’s Coefficient-H technique [Pat08a]; more precisely, a revisited
formulation of it by Chen and Steinberger [CS14].
Consider a fixed information-theoretic adversary A , which is w.l.o.g. deterministic,
and whose goal is to distinguish the two games X and Y . Then we typically seek an
upper bound for the quantity
∆A (X;Y ) =
∣∣Pr [A X ⇒ 1]− Pr [A Y ⇒ 1]∣∣ .
A ’s interaction with any of the two games X or Y can be summarized in a transcript
τ . A transcript is an ordered collection of A ’s oracle queries and the corresponding
responses A received back form the oracles.
Given the game X and the adversary A , we can define the random variable DAX as
the transcript produced when we run A X . We define the random variable DAY similarly.
The domain of both DAX and D
A
Y is the set of all possible transcripts that A can produce
when interacting with either X or Y . The probability distribution of DAX is defined over
the random coins of X (recall that A is deterministic), and similarly, the distribution
of DAY is defined over the coins of Y .
A transcript τ is called Y -attainable if Pr
[
DAY = τ
]
> 0, meaning that it can occur
during the interaction of A with Y . The Coefficient-H technique states the following
(for the proof of which we refer to Chen and Steinberger [CS14]).
Lemma 2.2 (Coefficient-H Technique [Pat08a, CS14]). Consider a fixed deterministic
adversary A . Let T = Tgood∪Tbad be a partition of the set of all Y -attainable transcripts
T . If there exists an ε such that for all τ ∈ Tgood,
Pr
[
DAX = τ
]
Pr
[
DAY = τ
] ≥ 1− ε,
then ∆A (X;Y ) ≤ ε+ Pr
[
DAY ∈ Tbad
]
.
The two partitions of T are labelled as Tgood and Tbad to increase the intuitiveness of
the proof. The transcripts in Tgood are “good” in the sense that they give us a high value
of Pr [DX = τ ]/Pr [DY = τ ] and thus small ε while the “bad” transcripts from Tbad fail
to do so.
We further note that in place of the game X we usually have a cryptographic construc-
tion, and in place of Y its idealized reference. Therefore, we often refer to the former as
the “real world” and to the latter as the “ideal world”.
2.3 Low-Level Primitives
In this section, we define the syntax and security of low-level cryptographic primitives
that will be used in the remaining chapters.
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Blockciphers. Blockciphers are one the most common building blocks of other sym-
metric primitives. A blockcipher allows to encrypt bitstrings of fixed size, so called
blocks, into ciphertexts of the same size, in an invertible way.
A blockcipher is a pair of deterministic algorithms B : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and
B−1 : K×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n such that B maps a secret key K ∈ K and a plaintext block
X ∈ {0, 1}n to a ciphertext block B(K,X) ∈ {0, 1}n, and such that for every K ∈ K
and X ∈ {0, 1}n we have
B−1(K,B(K,X)) = X.
That is, B must be efficiently invertible.3
We let BK(X) = B(K,X) and similarly B
−1
K (X) = B
−1(K,X). We call n, a positive
integer, the blocksize of B and K, a finite set, the key space of B. We note that we
typically have K = {0, 1}k for some positive integer k. We further note that the required
invertibility of B implies that for every K ∈ K, both B(K, ·) and B−1(K, ·) are necessarily
permutations of {0, 1}n. We use B to denote both the blockcipher and its encryption
algorithm.
We quantify the security of a blockcipher through the notion of computational in-
distinguishability from a random permutation (RP). The intuition behind this notion
is the following. When keyed with a secret key, the blockcipher (with a blocksize of n
bits) must necessarily be a permutation of {0, 1}n. An ideal blockcipher should behave
completely “random” beyond this constraint. To an adversary who only sees the keyed
blockcipher as a black box, the best possible blockcipher will look identical to a random
permutation of {0, 1}n.
Definition 2.3 ((S)PRP security). Given a blockcipher B : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and
an adversary A that has black-box access to B, we define the advantage of A in breaking
the security of B in a chosen plaintext attack as
AdvprpB (A ) = Pr
[
K ←$ K : A BK(·) ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
pi ←$ Perm(2n) : A pi(·) ⇒ 1
]
.
If the advantage AdvprpB (A ) ≤  for every adversary A with running time and query
complexity bounded by t and q respectively, we say that B is a (, t, q)-secure pseudoran-
dom permutation (PRP).
For an adversary A that has black-box access to B and B−1, we define the advantage
of A in breaking the security of B in a chosen ciphertext attack as
AdvsprpB (A ) = Pr
[
K ←$ K : A BK(·),B−1K (·) ⇒ 1
]
−Pr
[
pi ←$ Perm(2n) : A pi(·),pi−1(·) ⇒ 1
]
.
If the advantage AdvsprpB (A ) ≤  for every adversary A with running time bounded by
t, and encryption and decryption query complexity bounded by qe and qd respectively, we
say that B is a (, t, qe, qd)-secure strong pseudorandom permutation (SPRP).
3We note that this notation is slightly abusive as B−1 is not an inverse of B in the strictest sense.
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Remark 1. We note that we may simply measure the adversarial resources by q = qe+qd
for SPRP security.
Tweakable blockciphers Tweakable blockciphers are an extension of blockciphers
that adds an extra input: the tweak [LRW02]. Changing the tweak with the same key in
a tweakable blockcipher should mimic the effects of re-keying it with independent keys.
A tweakable blockcipher is a pair of efficient deterministic algorithms B˜ : K × T ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and B˜−1 : K × T × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, such that B˜ maps a secret
key K ∈ K, a tweak T ∈ T and a plaintext block X ∈ {0, 1}n to a ciphertext block
B˜(K,T,X) ∈ {0, 1}n, and such that for every K ∈ K, T ∈ T and X ∈ {0, 1}n we have
B˜
−1
(K,T,B(K,T,X)) = X.
That is, B˜ must be efficiently invertible.
We let B˜
T
K(X) = B˜K(T,X) = B(K,T,X) and similarly B˜
−1
K
T (X) = B−1K (T,X) =
B−1(K,T,X). We call n, a positive integer, the blocksize of B˜, we call K, a finite set,
the key space of B˜, and we call T , a finite set, the tweak space of B˜. Again, we typically
have K = {0, 1}k for some positive integer k. Similarly to blockciphers, the invertibility
implies that for every K ∈ K and T ∈ T , both B˜(K,T, ·) and B˜−1(K,T, ·) are necessarily
permutations of {0, 1}n. We use B˜ to denote both the tweakable blockcipher and its
encryption algorithm.
We measure the security of a tweakable blockcipher through its computational indis-
tinguishability from a random tweakable permutation.
Definition 2.4 ((S)TPRP security). Given a tweakable blockcipher B˜ : K×T ×{0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n and an adversary A that has black-box access to B˜, we define the advantage of
A in breaking the security of B˜ in a chosen plaintext attack as
Advp˜rp
B˜
(A ) = Pr
[
K ←$ K : A B˜K(·,·) ⇒ 1
]
−Pr
[
pi ←$ P˜erm(T , 2n) : A pi(·,·) ⇒ 1
]
.
If the advantage Advp˜rp
B˜
(A ) ≤  for every adversary A with running time and query
complexity bounded by t and q respectively, we say that B˜ is a (, t, q)-secure tweakable
pseudorandom permutation (TPRP).
For an adversary A that has black-box access to B˜ and B˜
−1
, we define the advantage
of A in breaking the security of B˜ in a chosen ciphertext attack as
Advs˜prp
B˜
(A ) = Pr
[
K ←$ K : A B˜K(·,·),B˜−1K (·,·) ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
pi ←$ P˜erm(T , 2n) : A pi(·,·),pi−1(·,·) ⇒ 1
]
.
If the advantage Advs˜prp
B˜
(A ) ≤  for every adversary A with running time bounded by t,
and encryption and decryption query complexity bounded by qe and qd respectively, we say
that B˜ is a (, t, qe, qd)-secure strong tweakable pseudorandom permutation (STPRP).
Remark 2. We note that we may simply measure the adversarial resources by q = qe+qd
for STPRP security.
20
Preliminaries
Pseudorandom functions. Another frequently used tool in symmetric cryptography
is a keyed function that maps inputs from a (potentially infinite) domain D to a set of
fixed-size strings.
A keyed function is an efficient algorithm F : K×D → {0, 1}n that maps a secret key
K and an input X to an output string F (K,X). We call K, a finite set, the key space
of F and require that n is a positive integer. If D = {0, 1}m with m > n, we call F a
compression function. We let FK(X) = F (K,X).
We quantify the security of keyed functions through their indistinguishability from a
random function (RF) of the same signature. Intuitively, a good keyed function should
produce outputs that look “random” and independent of the inputs. We note that the
distribution of a “uniformly” chosen function F : D → {0, 1}n is meaningful even if the
domain D is not finite; for every preimage X ∈ D, the distribution of the image F (X)
is independent and uniform in {0, 1}n.
Definition 2.5 (PRF security). Given a keyed function F : K × D → {0, 1}n and an
adversary A that has black-box access to F , we define the advantage of A in breaking
the security of F as
AdvprfF (A ) = Pr
[
K ←$ K : A FK(·) ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
f ←$ Func(D, 2n) : A f(·) ⇒ 1
]
.
If the advantage AdvprfF (A ) ≤  for every adversary A with time complexity, query
complexity and data complexity (in bits) of all its queries limited by t, q and σ respectively,
we say that F is a (, t, q, σ)-secure pseudorandom function (PRF).
Remark 3. We note that the accounting of resources for PRF security of keyed functions
may differ slightly from what we stated in Definition 2.5. In particular, we may measure
data complexity in blocks of bits rather than bits (e.g. for blockcipher-based construction),
or we may add other resource parameters (such as maximal length of any query).
Tweakable keyed functions While it is possible to define the security of a tweakable
PRF, the security notion would completely overlap with the notion of a PRF. This is
because the idealized reference object, a “tweakable” random function, is the same as a
random function from the set of function whose domain is augmented by a set of tweaks.
However, we sometimes refer to keyed functions (and random functions with the same
signature) as“tweakable” to emphasize that their domains are of the form T ×D for some
sets T andD and their inputs logically consist of“tweaks”T ∈ T and“data”X ∈ D. For a
tweakable keyed function F : K×(T ×D)→ R, we let F TK(X) = FK(T,X) = F (K,T,X).
RP-RF switch. One of the best known results in provable security says that a PRP
secure blockcipher is also a provably secure PRF with the same signature, albeit with a
birthday-bounded loss of security [BR06]. This is formalized in Lemma 2.6, where we
only focus on the information-theoretic part of the problem.
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Lemma 2.6 (RP-RF switch). Let n be a positive integer, and let A be an information
theoretic adversary that makes no more than q queries. Then
Pr
[
pi ←$ Perm(2n) : A pi(·) ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
f ←$ Func(2n) : A f(·) ⇒ 1
]
≤ q
2
2n+1
.
Almost universal and almost XOR universal hash functions. Both almost uni-
versal and almost XOR universal hash functions (AXU) are keyed functions that pos-
sesses certain statistical properties.
An -almost universal hash function is a keyed function H : K ×M → {0, 1}n with
M ⊂ {0, 1}∗ that maps a key K and a string M to a hash H(K,M), such that the
distribution of hashes (defined over the randomness of the key) is almost uniform. That
is, we have for every M ∈M and every h ∈ {0, 1}n that
Pr [K ←$ K : H(M) = h] ≤ .
An ′-AXU hash function is a keyed function H ′ : K′×M′ → {0, 1}n′ withM′ ⊂ {0, 1}∗
that maps a key K ′ and a string M ′ to a hash H ′(K ′,M ′), such that the distribution of
xors of hashes (defined over the randomness of the key) is almost uniform. That is, we
have for every M ′1 6= M ′2 ∈M′ and every h′ ∈ {0, 1}n
′
that
Pr
[
K ′ ←$ K′ : H ′(M ′1)⊕H ′(M ′2) = h′
] ≤ ′.
We note that a keyed function can be -almost universal and ′-AXU at the same time
for two (potentially different) smallest values  and ′.
2.4 Authenticated Encryption
In this section, we state the definition of the most common syntax and security notions
of AE schemes.
Syntax. We follow the four-input syntax for AE schemes with associated data as
defined by Rogaway [Rog02]. A scheme for authenticated encryption (AE) with asso-
ciated data (AD) is a triple Π = (K, E ,D). The key space K is a set endowed with a
probabilistic distribution, and E and D are two efficient, deterministic algorithms. If K is
finite and it is not said otherwise, we assume the distribution is uniform. The encryption
algorithm E : K×N ×A×M→ C maps a key K ∈ K, a nonce4 N ∈ N , AD A ∈ A and
a plaintext (or a message) M ∈M to a ciphertext C ∈ C. The sets N , A, M and C are
respectively called nonce space, AD space, message space, and ciphertext space. They
are all subsets of {0, 1}∗.5 The decryption algorithm D : K × N × A × C → M× {⊥}
maps a key K ∈ K, a nonce N ∈ N , AD A ∈ A and a ciphertext C ∈ C to either a
4We understand the term “nonce” as a value that ought not to repeat, but may (and if it does, it is
considered a misuse of the “nonce”).
5It may seem unfair that only the key space gets to be included in Π explicitly, while the nonce, AD
and message spaces do not. Perhaps it is because K is the equivalent of the key generator algorithm.
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plaintext M ∈ M, or to the distinguished symbol ⊥ used to signal an authentication
error. We let
EN,AK (M) = EK(N,A,M) = E(K,N,A,M) and DN,AK (C) = DK(N,A,C) = D(K,N,A,C).
To avoid pathological corner-cases, we require for every M ∈ {0, 1}∗ that if M ∈ M
then M ′ ∈M for all M ′ ∈ {0, 1}|M |. We also require that for all K ∈ K, N ∈ N , A ∈ A
and M ∈ M, the ciphertext expansion (a.k.a. stretch) is positive and only depends on
the AD and the length of the plaintext, i.e., |E(K,N,A,M)| = |M |+λ(A, |M |) for some
function λ : A× N→ N.
We note that in most cases, the ciphertext expansion is a non-negative constant τ ,
i.e., we have λ(A,m) = τ for any (A,m). We will assume that the stretch is equal to
a non-negative constant τ unless explicitly stated otherwise. We further note that the
ciphertext C is often composed of a core ciphertext C ′ that encrypts the message and
an authentication tag T , i.e., E(K,N,A,M) = C ′‖T with |C ′| = |M | and |T | = τ .
We finally require that Π meets the correctness requirement: for every K ∈ K, N ∈ N ,
A ∈ A and M ∈ M, we must have D(K,N,A, E(K,N,A,M)) = M . In other words,
any valid ciphertext must always decrypt correctly.
As we will almost exclusively discuss AE schemes that can process associated data
in this thesis, we will refer to AE schemes with associated data simply as AE schemes.
In the case that a message-only AE scheme will be considered, this will be made clear
explicitly.
Security of nonce-based AE schemes. A secure nonce-based AE scheme provides
strong confidentiality and authenticity guarantees, as long as the user of the scheme
ensures that each call to the encryption algorithm is done with a unique nonce. There are
two security definitions for nonce based AE schemes that formalize this intuition. They
can be seen as two variants of the same notion however, as they are shown equivalent
(see Lemma 2.9).
In both of these security notions, the requirement about the freshness of the nonces is
modelled as an assumption about the adversary, who is thought to be nonce-respecting. A
nonce-respecting adversary is any algorithm that, given oracle access to a keyed instance
of a scheme Π, uses a fresh nonce with each query to the encryption oracle it makes. We
stress that the adversary is free to repeat nonces in decryption queries.
Two-requirement nonce-based AE security. The original two-requirement variant
formalized by Rogaway [Rog02] consists of two standalone definitions. The confidenti-
ality of a scheme Π is captured through indistinguishability of ciphertexts from random
strings in a CPA by a nonce-respecting adversary, formalized in games priv-R and
priv-I defined in Figure 2.1.
The authenticity is formalized as integrity (unforgeability) of ciphertexts, where an
adversary plays the game auth defined in Figure 2.1 and its goal is to find a new
ciphertext tuple that decrypts correctly.
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Definition 2.7 (PRIV and AUTH AE security [Rog02]). Given a nonce-based AE
scheme Π = (K, E ,D) with a constant ciphertext expansion τ and an adversary A ,
we define the advantage of A in breaking the confidentiality of Π in a chosen plaintext
attack (with help of the games priv-R and priv-I in Figure 2.1) as
AdvprivΠ (A ) = Pr[A
priv-RΠ ⇒ 1]− Pr[A priv-IΠ ⇒ 1].
We define the advantage of an adversary A ′ in breaking the authenticity of Π in a chosen
ciphertext attack (wit help of the game auth in Figure 2.1) as
AdvauthΠ (A
′) = Pr[A ′authΠ forges]
where “A ′ forges” denotes the event that the Dec oracle returns a value different from
⊥.
If AdvprivΠ (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A whose running time is limited by t, and
whose query complexity and data complexity (in bits) in all queries is limited by q and
σ respectively then we say that Π is a (, t, q, σ)-PRIV secure nonce-based AE scheme.
If AdvauthΠ (A
′) ≤ ′ for all adversaries A ′ whose running time is limited by t′, and
whose encryption and decryption query complexity is bounded by q′e and q′d respectively,
and whose data complexity (in bits) in all queries is limited by σ′ then we say that Π is
a (′, t′, q′e, q′d, σ
′)-AUTH secure nonce-based AE scheme.
Remark 4. We note that the accounting of resources of an adversary against an AE
scheme may slightly differ from what we state in the security definitions. For example we
may count the total number of queries q = qe+qd only, or keep track of data complexities
in encryption and decryption queries separately. We may also measure the data com-
plexities in blocks of bits rather than bits, or introduce new parameters, such as maximal
lengths of queries.
This applies to all definitions of AE security in this section.
All-in-one nonce-based AE security. The second variant of the nonce-based AE
security notion captures both confidentiality and authenticity of the scheme in a single
all-in-one security definition [RS06b]. The notion is based on the indistinguishability
of the real scheme from a pair of oracles that idealize the security properties of AE, a
random-strings oracle for encryption queries, and an always-reject oracle for decryption
queries. This is formally defined by the games nae-R and nae-I in Figure 2.2.
Definition 2.8 (NAE security [RS06b]). Given a nonce-based AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D)
with a constant ciphertext expansion τ and an adversary A , we define the advantage of
A in breaking the AE security of Π in a chosen ciphertext attack (with help of the games
nae-R and nae-I in Figure 2.2) as
AdvnaeΠ (A ) = Pr[A
nae-RΠ ⇒ 1]− Pr[A nae-IΠ ⇒ 1].
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proc initialize priv-RΠ
K ←$ K
X ← ∅
proc Enc(N,A,M)
if N ∈ X then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {N}
C ← E(K,N,A,M)
return C
proc initialize priv-IΠ
X ← ∅
proc Enc(N,A,M)
if N ∈ X then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {N}
C ←$ {0, 1}|M |+τ
return C
proc initialize authΠ
K ←$ K
X ← ∅, Y ← ∅
proc Enc(N,A,M)
if N ∈ X then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {N}
C ← E(K,N,A,M)
Y ← Y ∪ {(N,A,C)}
return C
proc Dec(N,A,C)
if (N,A,C) ∈ Y then
return ⊥
return D(K,N,A,C)
Figure 2.1 – Two-requirement definition of NAE security for a scheme Π =
(K, E ,D) with ciphertext expansion τ .
If AdvnaeΠ (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A whose running time is limited by t, and whose
encryption and decryption query complexity is bounded by qe and qd respectively, and
whose data complexity (in bits) in all queries is limited by σ, then we say that Π is an
(, t, qe, qd, σ)-secure nonce-based AE scheme.
Equivalence of the all-in-one and two-requirement nonce-based AE notions.
Rogaway and Shrimpton, who introduced the all-in-one definition of AE security, proved
that the PRIV+AUTH security is equivalent with the NAE security. That is, if both
the PRIV advantage and the AUTH advantage is small for all reasonable adversaries,
then necessarily must also be the NAE advantage, and similar inequalities apply in the
opposite direction. This is expressed formally in Lemma 2.9.
Lemma 2.9 (Corollary of Propositions 8 and 9 [RS06b]). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be a
nonce-based AE scheme, and A be an adversary that runs in time t and asks qe and qd
encryption and decryption queries, respectively, that have a total data complexity of σ
bits. Then we have
AdvnaeΠ (A ) ≤ AdvprivΠ (B) + AdvauthΠ (C )
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proc initialize nae-RΠ
K ←$ K
X ← ∅, Y ← ∅
oracle Enc(N,A,M)
if N ∈ X then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {N}
C ← E(K,N,A,M)
Y ← Y ∪ {(N,A,C)}
return C
oracle Dec(N,A,C)
if (N,A,C) ∈ Y then
return ⊥
return D(K,N,A,C)
proc initialize nae-IΠ
X ← ∅
oracle Enc(N,A,M)
if N ∈ X then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {N}
C ←$ {0, 1}|M |+τ
return C
oracle Dec(N,A,C)
return ⊥
Figure 2.2 – All-in-one definition of NAE security for a scheme Π = (K, E ,D) with
ciphertext expansion τ .
for some B that runs in time bounded by t + γ1 · (qe + σ) for a positive constant γ1
and asks qe queries of no more than σ bits, and some C that runs in time bounded by
t+γ2 ·(qe+qd+σ) for a positive constant γ2 and asks qe and qd encryption and decryption
queries, respectively, of no more than σ bits in total.
Let further B′ be an adversary that runs in time t′1, asks q encryption queries that
have a total data complexity of σ′e bits, and C ′ be an adversary that runs in time t′2 and
asks q′e and q′d encryption and decryption queries, respectively, that have a total data
complexity of σ′ bits. Then we have
AdvprivΠ (B
′) ≤ AdvnaeΠ (A ′1) and AdvauthΠ (C ′) ≤ AdvnaeΠ (A ′2)
for some A ′1 that runs in time bounded by t′1 + γ′1 · (q′ + σ′e) for a positive constant γ′1
and asks q′ encryption queries of no more than σ′e bits in total, and some A ′2 that runs
in time bounded by t′2 + γ′2 · (q′e + q′d + σ′) for a positive constant γ′2 and asks q′e and q′d
encryption and decryption queries, respectively, of no more than σ′ bits in total.
Nonce misuse-resistant AE security. In 2006, Rogaway and Shrimpton pointed out
that while simple and generally reasonable, the requirement that nonces do not repeat
for encryption queries cannot always be met in practice [RS06b]. This may happen
e.g. due to an erroneous implementation, a looping counter, insufficient entropy when
using a random value as the nonce, or when cloning a virtual machine with a long-term
symmetric key. A nonce repetition meant a complete loss of security for all nonce-based
AE schemes at the time.
Rogaway and Shrimpton proposed to design AE schemes that achieve the NAE se-
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curity with unique nonces, and that only suffer the unavoidable loss of security when
the nonces repeat; that the ciphertexts repeat whenever the full triple of inputs is re-
peated. This intuition is formalized in the security notion of nonce misuse-resistant AE
(MRAE) using the games mrae-R and mrae-I in Figure 2.3. These two games are
almost identical to those used to define NAE security (see Definition 2.8), except that
now the adversary can repeat nonces, but is forbidden to repeat a triple (N,A,M), for
which it knows the reply trivially.
Definition 2.10 (MRAE security [RS06b]). Given a nonce-based AE scheme Π =
(K, E ,D) with a constant ciphertext expansion τ and an adversary A , we define the
advantage of A in breaking the nonce misuse-resistant AE security of Π in a chosen
ciphertext attack (with help of the games mrae-R and mrae-I in Figure 2.3) as
AdvmraeΠ (A ) = Pr[A
mrae-RΠ ⇒ 1]− Pr[A mrae-IΠ ⇒ 1].
If AdvmraeΠ (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A whose running time is limited by t, and
whose encryption and decryption query complexity is bounded by qe and qd respectively,
and whose data complexity (in bits) in all queries is limited by σ then we say that Π is
a (, t, qe, qd, σ)-secure MRAE scheme.
proc initialize mrae-RΠ
K ←$ K
X ← ∅, Y ← ∅
oracle Enc(N,A,M)
if (N,A,M) ∈ X then
return ⊥
C ← E(K,N,A,M)
X ← X ∪ {(N,A,M)}
Y ← Y ∪ {(N,A,C)}
return C
oracle Dec(N,A,C)
if (N,A,C) ∈ Y then
return ⊥
return D(K,N,A,C)
proc initialize mrae-IΠ
X ← ∅
oracle Enc(N,A,M)
if (N,A,M) ∈ X then
return ⊥
C ←$ {0, 1}|M |+τ
X ← X ∪ {(N,A,M)}
return C
oracle Dec(N,A,C)
return ⊥
Figure 2.3 – Nonce misuse-resistant AE (MRAE) security game for a scheme
Π = (K, E ,D) with ciphertext expansion τ .
Rogaway and Shrimpton pointed out that an MRAE scheme can alternatively be
characterized as a pseudo-random injection (PRI) with constant stretch that is tweaked
by the nonce and the associated data.
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Informally, the best possible instance of an MRAE scheme would realize an independ-
ent random injective mapping from {0, 1}m to {0, 1}m+τ for every m s.t. {0, 1}m ⊆ M
and for every nonce N ∈ N and AD A ∈ A. The injectivity is required for the correct-
ness of the decryption, and the encryption should otherwise be random. We can then
measure the security of an actual MRAE scheme through its indistinguishability from a
tweakable random injection with the same signature.
Definition 2.11 (PRI security [RS06b]). Given a nonce-based AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D)
with a constant ciphertext expansion τ and an adversary A , we define the advantage of
A in breaking the pseudo-random injection security of Π in a chosen ciphertext attack
(with help of the games pri-R and pri-I in Figure 2.4) as
AdvpriΠ (A ) = Pr[A
pri-RΠ ⇒ 1]− Pr[A pri-IΠ ⇒ 1].
If AdvpriΠ (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A whose running time is limited by t, and whose
encryption and decryption query complexity is bounded by qe and qd respectively, and
whose data complexity (in bits) in all queries is limited by σ then we say that Π is a
(, t, qe, qd, σ)-secure PRI.
proc initialize pri-RΠ
K ←$ K
oracle Enc(N,A,M)
return E(K,N,A,M)
oracle Dec(N,A,C)
return D(K,N,A,C)
proc initialize pri-IΠ
for N,A ∈ N ×A do
fN,A ←$ Inj(τ)
oracle Enc(N,A,M)
return fN,A(M)
oracle Dec(N,A,C)
if ∃M ∈M s.t. fN,A(M) = C then
return M
else
return ⊥
Figure 2.4 – Pseudo-random injection (PRI) security game for a scheme Π =
(K, E ,D) with ciphertext expansion τ .
Rogaway and Shrimpton showed that with growing stretch τ , the notions of MRAE
and PRI converge. This is because the MRAE notion is aspirational, in the sense that it
is impossible for an AE scheme that meets the correctness requirement to have an MRAE
advantage of 0; the ciphertexts cannot be uniform because of the necessary injectivity
of encryption, and valid ciphertext tuples must exist (so it is impossible to reject every
possible adversarial forgery attempt).
This intuition is formally stated in Lemma 2.12. We note that the quantitative differ-
ence between the MRAE and the PRI advantage vanishes with increasing τ . The larger
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τ , the less likely we are observe collisions in random strings with length ≥ τ and the less
likely it is to find an image of a random injection.
Lemma 2.12 (Theorem 7 [RS06b]). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be a nonce-based AE scheme,
with stretch τ and A be an adversary that asks qe and qd encryption and decryption
queries, respectively, so q = qe + qd queries in total. Let further s = minM∈M(|M |) be
the length of the shortest possible plaintext. Then we have∣∣∣AdvmraeΠ (A )−AdvpriΠ (A )∣∣∣ ≤ q222+τ+1 + 4 · qd2τ .
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Part I
Constructions

Chapter3
OMD: a Compression Function-based
Scheme for Authenticated Encryption
This chapter is dedicated to Offset Merkle-Damg˚ard (OMD), which is the first dedicated
scheme for authenticated encryption based on a compression function.
The work presented in this chapter is a result of joint work with Simon Cogliani, Diana-
Stefania Maimut, David Naccache, Rodrigo Portella do Canto, Reza Reyhanitabar and
Serge Vaudenay which was published in SAC 2014 [CMN+14].
The implementations presented in Section 3.7 were developed by Robin Ankele and
Ralph Ankele [AA14], Johan Droz [Dro15], and Martin Georgiev [Geo15] as parts of
student projects (co-)supervised by the author of this thesis.
Organization of the Chapter. We start with a brief overview of the related work
in Section 3.1 and a summary of the contribution in Section 3.2.
We introduce OMD in Section 3.3. We give a description of OMD in Section 3.4 and
discuss OMD as a candidate in the CAESAR competition in Section 3.5. We give the
security analysis of OMD in Section 3.6 and discuss its performance in Section 3.7.
3.1 Related Work
OMD follows the four-input syntax for nonce-based AE schemes with associated data
by Rogaway [Rog02] (see Section 2.4).
The security notion targeted by OMD is the nonce-based AE security proposed by
Rogaway [Rog02] (see Section 2.4). The core of the encryption in OMD is inspired by the
Merkle-Damg˚ard hash construction [Dam89, Mer89], while the use of whitening offsets
is mainly inspired by OCB [RBBK01, Rog04a, KR11]. The recommended instances of
OMD are based on the compression functions of the standard hash functions SHA256
and SHA512 [oST12]. The assumption that when keyed, the compression functions of the
SHA2-family are secure PRFs is not unprecedented; for example Bellare uses a similar
33
assumption on SHA1 to prove the security of NMAC and HMAC [Bel06a].
3.2 Contribution
In this chapter, we present a novel, dedicated AE scheme called Offset Merkle-Damg˚ard,
a mode of operation for a keyed compression function. OMD competed in the CAESAR
competition and finished as a second round candidate.
We show that OMD is NAE secure, assuming the underlying compression function is a
secure PRF. We also investigate the performance of optimized software implementations
of OMD.
To our best knowledge, OMD is the first AE scheme based on a (keyed) compression
function; this work adds compression functions to the list of low-level primitives that
can be used to construct practical and secure AE schemes. We thus contribute to
cryptographic diversity, which helps to limit the global impact of devastating attacks.
Beyond demonstrating the mere feasibility of AE based on compression functions,
the instances of OMD based on the compression functions of SHA256 and SHA512
also provide a large quantitative security margin while delivering a decent performance,
especially on high-end CPU’s with suitable instruction extension sets.
3.3 Offset Merkle-Damg˚ard
Offset Merkle-Damg˚ard (OMD) is a nonce-based AE scheme. Unlike the majority of
other AE schemes (that were designed before and during the CAESAR competition),
which are either blockcipher-based or permutation-based, OMD is designed as a mode of
operation for a compression function. The motivation for using a compression function
as a low-level primitive is manifold:
1. the cryptographic community has spent more than two decades on public research
and standardization activities on hash functions resulting to development of a rich
source of secure and efficient compression functions;
2. the standard SHA family of algorithms is heavily employed in many of the most
common cryptographic applications and one can easily use off-the-shelf, highly
optimized implementations of these functions [GYG12, GCG12];
3. Intel has recently introduced new instruction extensions that support performance
acceleration of SHA-1 and SHA-256 on next-generation processors [GGY+13];
4. having a set of AE schemes based on a large number of different primitives con-
tributes to cryptographic diversity, which we feel is of importance, as an almost
exclusive use of a single primitive can have catastrophic consequences if the security
of that primitive collapses;
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5. we believe that having a diverse set of AE schemes, based on different primitives,
can be interesting from a practical viewpoint, providing the opportunity to choose
among the AE algorithms based on what primitives have already been available
and implemented on the platform of choice and to reuse such implementations.
We designed OMD to be provably secure, keeping several functional features, as well as
performance in mind. Some of the interesting features of OMD, and its instantiations
OMD-sha256 and OMD-sha512, are as follows:
Provable Security in the Standard Model. OMD achieves its security goals (con-
fidentiality and authenticity) provably, based on the assumption that its underlying
keyed compression function is a PRF, an assumption which is among the well-known
and widely-used ones [Bel06b]. From a theoretical point of view this is an advantage
compared to permutation-based AE schemes whose security proofs are done in the ideal
permutation model, and thus have no formal ties with the security of the cryptographic
permutation that they actually use.
High Quantitative Security Level. When implemented with an off-the-shelf com-
pression function such as those of the standard SHA family [oST12], OMD can achieve
much higher security level compared to AES-based schemes. The proven security of
OMD-sha256 and OMD-sha512 falls off in about σ
2
2256
and σ
2
2512
, respectively, where σ
is the total number of calls to the compression function. In comparison, for the same
key size and tag size, the proven security of all the standardized blockcipher-based AE
schemes using AES (e.g. all five dedicated schemes specified in ISO/IEC 19772:2009)
falls off in about σ
′2
2128
where σ′ is the total number of calls to AES. We note that it is
possible to get blockcipher-based AE schemes with (high) beyond birthday-bound se-
curity, but the existing schemes with beyond birthday-bound security have a degraded
efficiency [Iwa06, LPRM07, Iwa08, LST12].
Online. OMD encryption is online; that is, it outputs a stream of ciphertext as a
stream of plaintext arrives with a constant latency and using constant memory. After
receiving an indication that the plaintext is over, the final part of ciphertext together
with the tag is output. OMD decryption is internally online: one can generate a stream
of plaintext bits as the stream of ciphertext bits comes in, but no part of the plaintext
stream will be returned before the whole ciphertext stream is decrypted and the tag is
verified to be correct.
Flexible Parameters. OMD-sha256 can support any key length up to 256 bits, tag
length up to 256 bits, and nonce length up to 255 bits. OMD-sha512 can support any
key length up to 512 bits, tag length up to 512 bits, and nonce length up to 511 bits.
These upper bounds on the parameters’ length will satisfy the required security level
of almost any imaginable application today and well beyond. The lower bounds on the
parameters’ lengths should be selected based on the specific security level sought by an
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application; for instance, most applications would not use keys shorter than 128 bits,
tags shorter than 32 bits and nonces shorter than 64 bits.
3.4 Description
OMD is has two parameters; to instantiate it, one must specify a keyed compression
function F : K× ({0, 1}n×{0, 1}m)→ {0, 1}n and fix a tag length τ ≤ n. For simplicity,
we assume that the key space is K = {0, 1}k. We require that m ≤ n. We let OMD[F, τ ]
denote the OMD mode of operation using the keyed compression function FK and the
fixed tag length τ . We note that assuming the input of F to be composed of pairs of n-bit
and m-bit blocks (most often chaining and data blocks) is without loss of generality, as
a keyed compression function with a monolithic message domain {0, 1}m+n can be used
as one with a structured domain without loss of security.
At the first glance, imposing m ≤ n may look odd as compression functions usually
have a larger data block length than its output (chaining) block length, but we note
that in practice, the compression functions of standard hash functions (e.g. SHA-1 or
the SHA-2 family) are keyless. Therefore one needs to use k bits of their b-bit data
block to get a keyed function. So, there will be no waste in each call to the compression
function if m = n and b = n + k; for example, when the key length is 256 bits and the
compression function of SHA-256 is used.
An overview. An instance OMD[F, τ ] has a key space K = {0, 1}k, and can work
with any AD space A ⊆ {0, 1}≤(m+n)·2n−4 and any message space M ⊆ {0, 1}≤m·2n−4 .
We let `max = maxX∈A∪M(|X|m) denote the upper bound on the maximum number of
blocks in any input to the encryption algorithm. The nonce space is the set of ν-bit
strings N = {0, 1}ν for an integer 1 ≤ ν < n.1
The encryption algorithm of OMD[F, τ ] inputs four arguments (a secret key K, a
nonce N , associated data A, a message M), and outputs a tagged ciphertext C = C‖T ∈
{0, 1}|M |+τ . The decryption algorithm of OMD[F, τ ] takes as input four arguments (a
secret key K, a nonce N , associated data A, a tagged ciphertext C‖T ), and either
outputs the whole message M ∈ {0, 1}|C|−τ at once, or an error message (⊥) in case of
an authentication error.
Internally, the encryption algorithm splits the message M in blocks M1, . . . ,M`
m←
M and processes them using a sequence of chained calls to F similar to the Merkle-
Damg˚ard construction for hashing [Dam89, Mer89]. The main differences with this hash
construction are that:
• the intermediate chaining values are used as keystream bits for encryption,
• (a part of) the input is masked with key-dependent whitening offsets upon every
call to F (hence the name).
1In theory, OMD[F, τ ] can be used with a nonce space N = {0, 1}<n, but we prefer N = {0, 1}ν for
simplicity.
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The AD processing is inspired by a Wegman-Carter MAC [CW77, WC81] that uses F to
compute an almost XOR universal hash of the AD, and masks the hash with the partial
tag computed in the message processing.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the encryption algorithm of OMD[F, τ ]. The decryption al-
gorithm is straightforward to derive. It is almost the same as the encryption algorithm,
except for a tag comparison (verification) at the end of the decryption process. A formal
algorithmic description of OMD[F, τ ] is provided in Figure 3.2.
In the rest of this chapter, when partitioning a string C into blocks of m bits, such
that |C| 6≡ m (mod m), we denote the final (incomplete) block interchangeably with C`
and C∗; i.e. C = C1‖ · · · ‖C` or C = C1‖ · · · ‖C`−1‖C∗.
Computing the masking values. As seen from the description of OMD in Figure 3.1,
before each call to the underlying keyed compression function we xor a masking value
denoted as ∆N,i,j (the top and middle parts of Figure 3.1) or ∆¯i,j (the bottom part of
Figure 3.1) to the input of F . The purpose of these masks is to randomize each call to
F ; in Section 3.6 it will be shown that they in fact allow to extend the domain of F . In
the following, we describe how these masks are generated.
There are different ways to compute the masking values to satisfy both the security
and efficiency criteria [Rog04a, CS08, KR11]. We use the method used in OCB3 [KR11].
In the following, all multiplications are in GF(2n).
Initialization. In a one-time initialization phase, we compute the derived key L∗,
and an array of L∗-dependent values L[0], . . . , L[dlog2(`max)e]. The initial key-
dependent value is defined as L∗ = FK(0n, 0m). We then let L[0] = 4 · L∗, and
L[i] = 2 · L[i− 1] for i ≥ 1. We note that the values L[i] can be preprocessed and
stored (for a fast implementation) in a table of dlog2(`max)e entries, where `max is
the bound on the maximum number of blocks in any message or AD. Alternatively,
(if there is a memory restriction) they can be computed on-the-fly for i ≥ 1. It is
also possible to precompute and store some values and then compute the others
as needed on-the-fly.
Masking sequence for processing the message. We compute the masks ∆N,i,j for
every query. We define the initial mask ∆N,0,0 = FK(N‖10n−1−ν , 0m). Then for
i ≥ 1 we let
∆N,i,0 = ∆N,i−1,0 ⊕ L[ntz(i)], and
∆N,i,1 = ∆N,i,0 ⊕ 2 · L∗, and
∆N,i,2 = ∆N,i,0 ⊕ 3 · L∗.
Masking sequence for processing the associated data. We likewise compute the
masks ∆¯i,j for every query. We define ∆¯0,0 = 0
n and let for i ≥ 0:
∆¯i,0 = ∆¯i−1,0 ⊕ L[ntz(i)], and
∆¯i,1 = ∆¯i,0 ⊕ L∗ .
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Figure 3.1 – The encryption algorithm of OMD[F, τ ] using a keyed compression
function FK : ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m)→ {0, 1}n and a fixed tag length τ , where m ≤ n. We
refer the reader to Section 2.1 regarding the convention for the xor operation.
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1: algorithm Initialize(K)
2: L∗ ← FK(0n, 0m)
3: L[0]← 4 · L∗
4: for i← 1 to dlog2(`max)e do
5: L[i] = 2 · L[i− 1]
6: end for
7: return
8: end algorithm
1: algorithm HASHK(A)
2: b← n+m
3: A1‖A2 · · ·A`−1‖A` b← A
4: Ta ← 0n
5: ∆← 0n
6: for i← 1 to `− 1 do
7: ∆← ∆⊕ L[ntz(i)]
8: Left← Ai[b− 1 · · ·m]
9: Right← Ai[m− 1 · · · 0]
10: Φ← FK(Left⊕∆,Right)
11: Ta ← Ta ⊕ Φ
12: end for
13: if |A`| = b then
14: ∆← ∆⊕ L[ntz(`)]
15: Left← A`[b− 1 · · ·m]
16: Right← A`[m− 1 · · · 0]
17: Φ← FK(Left⊕∆,Right)
18: Ta ← Ta ⊕ Φ
19: else
20: ∆← ∆⊕ L∗
21: Apad ← A`‖10b−|A`|−1
22: Left← Apad[b− 1 · · ·m]
23: Right← Apad[m− 1 · · · 0]
24: Φ← FK(Left⊕∆,Right)
25: Ta ← Ta ⊕ Φ
26: end if
27: return Ta
28: end algorithm
1: algorithm EK(N,A,M)
2: if ν > n− 1 then
3: return ⊥
4: end if
5: M1‖M2 · · ·M`−1‖M` m←M
6: ∆← FK(N‖10n−1−ν , 0m)
7: H ← 0n
8: ∆← ∆⊕ L[0]
9: H ← FK(H ⊕∆, 〈τ〉m)
10: for i← 1 to `− 1 do
11: Ci ← H ⊕Mi
12: ∆← ∆⊕ L[ntz(i+ 1)]
13: H ← FK(H ⊕∆,Mi)
14: end for
15: C` ← H ⊕M`
16: if |M`| = m then
17: ∆← ∆⊕ 2 · L∗
18: Te ← FK(H ⊕∆,M`)
19: else
20: ∆← ∆⊕ 3 · L∗
21: Mpad ←M`‖10m−|M`|−1
22: Te ← FK(H ⊕∆,Mpad)
23: end if
24: Ta ← HASHK(A)
25: T ← (Te ⊕ Ta)[n− 1 · · ·n− τ ]
26: C← C1‖C2‖ · · · ‖C`‖T
27: return C
28: end algorithm
1: algorithm DK(N,A,C)
2: if ν > n− 1 or |C| < τ then
3: return ⊥
4: end if
5: C1‖C2 · · ·C`−1‖C`‖T m← C
6: ∆← FK(N‖10n−1−ν , 0m)
7: H ← 0n
8: ∆← ∆⊕ L[0]
9: H ← FK(H ⊕∆, 〈τ〉m)
10: for i← 1 to `− 1 do
11: Mi ← H ⊕ Ci
12: ∆← ∆⊕ L[ntz(i+ 1)]
13: H ← FK(H ⊕∆,Mi)
14: end for
15: M` ← H ⊕ C`
16: if |C`| = m then
17: ∆← ∆⊕ 2 · L∗
18: Te ← FK(H ⊕∆,M`)
19: else
20: ∆← ∆⊕ 3 · L∗
21: Mpad ←M`‖10m−|M`|−1
22: Te ← FK(H ⊕∆,Mpad)
23: end if
24: Ta ← HASHK(A)
25: T ′ ← (Te ⊕ Ta)[n− 1 · · ·n− τ ]
26: if T ′ = T then
27: return M ←M1‖M2‖ · · · ‖M`
28: else
29: return ⊥
30: end if
31: end algorithm
Figure 3.2 – Definition of OMD[F, τ ], using a keyed compression function F : K ×
({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m)→ {0, 1}n with K = {0, 1}k and m ≤ n, and tag length τ ≤ n.
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3.5 OMD in CAESAR Competition
OMD competed as one of the 57 candidates in the CAESAR competition. It entered
the second round, among the 29 second round candidates, and did not advance to the
third round. As for all other candidates, a set of concrete instances had to be proposed
for OMD. Moreover, both reference, hardware and software implementations needed to
be provided for each of these instances.
Recommended instances of OMD. We recommend to instantiate OMD with the
compression functions of the SHA-256 and SHA-512 hash functions from NIST FIPS
PUB 180-4 [oST12].
Our primary recommendation to instantiate OMD is called OMD-sha256, and uses
the underlying compression function of SHA-256 [oST12]. This is intended to be the
appropriate choice for implementations on 32-bit machines. The compression function
of SHA-256 is a map sha-256 : {0, 1}256 × {0, 1}512 → {0, 1}256. It takes a 256-bit
chaining block X and a 512-bit message block Y as input, and it outputs a 256-bit
digest Z, i.e. let Z = sha-256(X,Y ).
To use OMD with sha-256, we use the first 256-bit argument X for chaining values
as usual. In our notation (see Figure 3.1) this means that n = 256. We use the 512-bit
argument Y (the message block in sha-256) to input both a 256-bit message block and the
key K which can be of any length k ≤ 256 bits. If k < 256 then let the key be K||0256−k.
That is, we define the keyed compression function FK : {0, 1}256 × {0, 1}256 → {0, 1}256
needed in OMD as FK(H,M) = sha-256(H,K||0256−k||M) .
The parameters of OMD-sha256 are as follows:
• The message block length in bits is m = 256.
• The key length in bits can be 80 ≤ k ≤ 256; but k < 128 is not recommended. If
needed, we pad the key K with 0256−k to make its length exactly 256 bits.
• The nonce (public message number) length in bits can be 96 ≤ ν ≤ 255. We always
pad the nonce with 10255−ν to make its length exactly 256 bits.
• The associated data block length in bits is 2n = 512.
• The tag length in bits can be 32 ≤ τ ≤ 256; but it must be noted that the selection
of the tag length directly affects the achievable security level (see Section 3.6).
Our secondary recommendation to instantiate OMD is called OMD-sha512, and uses
the underlying compression function of SHA-512 [oST12]. This is intended to be the
appropriate choice for implementations on 64-bit machines. The compression function of
SHA-512 is a map sha-512 : {0, 1}512×{0, 1}1024 → {0, 1}512. On input a 512-bit chaining
block X and a 1024-bit message block Y , it outputs a 512-bit digest Z = sha-512(X,Y ).
To use OMD with sha-512, we use the first 512-bit argument X for chaining values as
usual. In our notation (see Figure 3.1) this means that n = 512. We use the 1024-bit
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argument Y (the message block in sha-512) to input both a 512-bit message block and the
key K which can be of any length k ≤ 512 bits. If k < 512 then let the key be K||0512−k.
That is, we define the keyed compression function FK : {0, 1}512 × {0, 1}512 → {0, 1}512
needed in OMD as FK(H,M) = sha-512(H,K||0512−k||M).
The parameters of OMD-sha512 are set as follows:
• The message block length in bits is m = 512.
• The key length in bits can be 80 ≤ k ≤ 512; but k < 128 is not recommended. If
needed, we pad the key K with 0512−k to make its length exactly 512 bits.
• The nonce (public message number) length in bits can be 96 ≤ ν ≤ 511. We always
pad the nonce with 10511−ν to make its length exactly 512 bits.
• The associated data block length in bits is 2n = 1024.
• The tag length in bits can be 32 ≤ τ ≤ 512; but it must be noted that the selection
of the tag length directly affects the achievable security level (see Section 3.6).
For both compression functions, we propose named instances that further fix all the
remaining parameters. These are listed in Table 3.1. The motivation for the choice of
these combinations of parameters is the following. For the key length, we require at least
128 bits, scaling up to the maximal length allowed by each compression function. The
nonce length starts at 96 bits, which means 296 distinct nonces. This should suffice for
any imaginable application. However, longer nonces are considered too, which can be
convenient in some situations, e.g. if the nonce consists of a device-specific prefix and a
counter. Choosing the tag length means making a trade-off between security level and
efficiency. We therefore provide a relatively broad scale of tag lengths, allowing to tune
this trade-off to fit the application. We do not, however, recommend tags shorter than
64 bits.
Instance Comp. func. Key len. Nonce len. Tag len.
omdsha256k128n96tau128 sha-256 128 96 128
omdsha256k128n96tau64 sha-256 128 96 64
omdsha256k128n96tau96 sha-256 128 96 96
omdsha256k192n104tau128 sha-256 192 104 128
omdsha256k256n104tau160 sha-256 256 104 160
omdsha256k256n248tau256 sha-256 256 248 256
omdsha512k128n128tau128 sha-512 128 128 128
omdsha512k256n256tau256 sha-512 256 256 256
omdsha512k512n256tau256 sha-512 512 256 256
Table 3.1 – Named instances of OMD and the values of paramters associated to
each instance. The instances are ordered from the primary recommendation to the least
recommended instance.
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Software and hardware implementations. We provide a reference implementa-
tion in the C language for both OMD-sha256 and OMD-sha512. Two optimized im-
plementation for the x86 64 architecture were provided both OMD-sha256 and OMD-
sha512. Optimized implementations for the ARM and MIPS architectures were addi-
tionally provided for OMD-sha256. The software implementations are further discussed
in Section 3.7.
Hardware implementations of OMD-sha256 for the Virtex 6, Virtex 5, Stratix IV and
Stratix V FPGA families [Die16] were designed by William Diehl [DG17].
3.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we prove upper bounds on the PRIV and AUTH adversarial advantage
for OMD, reducing its security to the security of the underlying compression function
as a PRF. We first show that OMD instantiated with a random function provides near-
optimal security (because of the `max in the authenticity bound), and then use a sequence
of standard hybrid arguments to relate this result to the security of an actual instance.
The formal statement about the security of OMD can be found in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. Fix n ≥ 1 and τ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n}. Let F : K×({0, 1}n×{0, 1}m)→ {0, 1}n
be a keyed function, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n. Let A be a CPA adversary that runs in time t,
makes qe encryption queries that induce no more than σe n calls to F in total, such that
no individual input (AD or message) is more that `max m-bit blocks long. Let further A ′
be a CCA adversary that runs in time t′, makes q′e encryption queries and q′d decryption
queries that induce no more than σ′ calls to F in total, such that no individual input is
more that `′max m-bit blocks long. Then
AdvprivOMD[F,τ ](A ) ≤ AdvprfF (B) +
3σ2e
2n
AdvauthOMD[F,τ ](A
′) ≤ AdvprfF (B′) +
3σ2
2n
+
qd`max
2n
+
qd
2τ
for some B that makes 2 · σe queries and runs in time t+ γ · n · σ for some constant γ,
and B′ that makes 2 · σ′ queries and runs in time t′ + γ′ · n · σ′ for some constant γ′.
OMD[F, τ ] OMD[F˜ , τ ] OMD[R˜, τ ]
Lemma 3.4 Lemma 3.3
Lemma 3.2
Figure 3.3 – An overview of the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof. The proof is obtained by the combing Lemmas 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, as illustrated in
Figure 3.3.
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Generalized OMD using a Random Function. Figure 3.4 shows the OMD[R˜, τ ]
scheme, which is a generalization of OMD[F, τ ] that replaces F and the masking offsets
by a tweakable random function R˜ ←$ F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n). The tweak space T consists
of five mutually exclusive sets of tweaks; namely, T = N × N× {0} ∪ N × N× {1} ∪
N ×N×{2} ∪ N×{0} ∪ N×{1}. These sets correspond to the sets of labels we used
to define the offsets in OMD[F, τ ]. These labels now take on the role of tweaks. More
precisely, a call to F masked with ∆N,i,j is replaced by a call to R˜
N,i,j and a call to F
masked with ∆¯i,j is replaced by a call to R˜
i,j .
Lemma 3.2. Let OMD[R˜, τ ] be the scheme shown in Figure 3.4. Let A be an informa-
tion theoretic CPA adversary that makes qe encryption queries such that they induce no
more than σe n calls to F in total, and such that no individual input (AD or message) is
more that `max blocks long. Let further A ′ be an information theoretic CCA adversary
that makes q′e encryption queries and q′d decryption queries such that they induce no
more than σ′ calls to F in total, and such that no individual input is more that `′max
blocks long. Then
Advpriv
OMD[R˜,τ ]
(A ) = 0,
AdvauthOMD[R˜,τ ](A
′) ≤ qd`max
2n
+
qd
2τ
.
Proof. The proof of the privacy bound is straightforward. The adversary A asks (en-
cryption) queries (N1, A1,M1) · · · (N qe , Aqe ,M qe) where all Nx values (for 1 ≤ x ≤ qe)
are distinct, as the adversary A is nonce respecting. Referring to Figure 3.4, this means
that we are evaluating the function R˜Nx,i,j on a single input for each (Nx, i, j), hence
the images that the adversary sees (i.e. Cx for 1 ≤ x ≤ qe) are independent uniformly
random values.
The authenticity bound can be shown by a straightforward, but lengthy case analysis.
First we consider the single-decryption-query case where an adversary A ′′ only makes
one decryption (verification) query, and then we use the generic result of Bellare et
al. [BGM04] to get a bound against any adversary A ′ that makes multiple (say qd)
verification queries.
The adversary A ′′ makes encryption queries (N1, A1,M1) · · · (N qe , Aqe ,M qe). We
let M i = M i1 · · ·M i`i or M i = M i1 · · ·M i`i−1M i∗ denote the message blocks and Ai =
Ai1 · · ·Aiai or Ai = Ai1 · · ·Aiai−1Ai∗ be the associated data blocks in the ith query. Let
Ci = Ci‖T i be the ciphertext returned to A ′′ upon query (N i, Ai,M i). That is, we
use superscripts to indicate query numbers and subscripts to denote the block indices
in each query. We additionally let Hxi denote the chaining value that is fed to R˜
Nx,i+1,0
along with Mxi for i = 1, . . . , ` − 1. The value H` is fed to RN
x,`,j for j ∈ {1, 2} and
H0 = 0
n. A special case occurs if |Mx| = 0; then H1 is fed to RNx,0,2 along with the
string 10m−1.
Let (N,A,C) be the forgery attempt by A ′′, where N ∈ {0, 1}ν is the nonce, A =
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Figure 3.4 – The OMD[R˜, τ ] scheme using a tweakable random function R˜ ←$
F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n) (i.e. R˜ : T × ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m)→ {0, 1}n ).
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A1 · · ·Aa or A = A1 · · ·Aa−1A∗ is the associated data, C = C‖T is the ciphertext where
C = C1 · · ·C` (with |Ci| = m for 1 ≤ i ≤ `) or C = C1 · · ·C`−1C∗ (with |Ci| = m for
1 ≤ i ≤ `− 1 and |C∗| < m), and T = (Te⊕Ta)[n− 1 · · ·n− τ ] ∈ {0, 1}τ is the tag. Let
M = M1 · · ·M` or M = M1 · · ·M`−1M∗ denote the corresponding putative plaintext,
internally computed by the decryption algorithm.
In order to forge successfully, A ′′ must find the first τ bits of T = Te⊕Ta where
Te = R˜
〈N,x,y〉(final input) and Ta = HashR˜(A). By “final input” we mean H`‖M` or
H`‖M∗‖10m−|M∗|−1 when |C| 6= 0, in which case the final tweak used to generate Te will
be 〈N, `, 1〉 or 〈N, `, 2〉 respectively (depending on whether the final block is a full block
or not); otherwise (i.e. for empty message) the “final input” will be H1‖10m−1 and hence
the final tweak used to generate Te will be 〈N, 1, 2〉. In the following, we consider an
empty message to have an “incomplete final block”. We have the following disjoint cases:
Case 1: N /∈ {N1, · · ·N qe}. The adversary has to find a correct T that is the first
τ bits of the value R˜〈N,x,y〉(final input)⊕Ta but has not seen any image under
R˜〈N,x,y〉(·), hence the probability that the A ′′ can succeed in doing this is 2−τ .
In all the following cases, we will have N = N i for some 1 ≤ i ≤ qe. We can ignore all
but the ith query, as the replies to those queries are computed with nonces N i
′ 6= N ,
and thus they are independent of the alleged forgery N,A,C.
Case 2: N = N i, |C| 6= |Ci|, and one of |C| and |Ci| is a non-zero multiple of m but the
other is not. Even ifA ′′ knows Ta, computing the correct T requires guessing τ bits
of an image under R˜〈N,x,y〉, which we show to not have been evaluated throughout
the game. Consider the case that |Ci| is non-zero a multiple of m but |C| is not;
then x = ` or x = 1 (if |C| = ` = 0) and y = 2, so A ′′ must guess the first τ bits
of the value R˜〈N,x,2〉(final input)⊕Ta but has seen no image under R˜〈N,x,2〉(·). In
the case when |C| is a non-zero multiple of m but |Ci| is not, x = ` and y = 1
so A ′′ must guess the first τ bits of the value R˜〈N,`,1〉(final input)⊕Ta, but it has
seen no image under R˜〈N,`,1〉(·). Therefore, the probability that the adversary can
succeed in guessing T is 2−τ .
Case 3: N = N i, |C| 6= |Ci|, and either both |C| and |Ci| are non-zero multiples of m or
none of them is. If both |C| and |Ci| are non-zero multiples of m then |C| 6= |Ci|
means that ` 6= `i, it can be easily seen that in this case even if the adversary
knows Ta it must still guess the first τ bits of the value R˜
〈N,`,1〉(final input) (see
Figure 3.4) while it has seen no image of this function; the probability to succeed
in guessing T is clearly 2−τ .
Now, let’s consider the case that neither |C| nor |Ci| is a non-zero multiple of m;
then |C| 6= |Ci| means that we have three sub-cases: (3a) ` = 1 and `i = 0 or
vice-versa (3b) other cases when ` 6= `i and 0 < `, `i, (3c) ` = `i but |C∗| 6= |Ci∗|.
We address the case (3a) last.
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(3b) It can be seen the adversary must guess the first τ bits of the random function
R˜〈N,`,2〉 while has seen no image of this function; the chance to do so is clearly
2−τ .
(3c) The adversary must guess the first τ bits of R˜〈N,`,2〉(H∗‖(M∗‖10m−|M∗|−1))
while it has only seen (τ bits of) a single image of this function for one different
domain point, namely (H i∗‖(M i∗‖10m−|M
i∗|−1)); the probability to succeed in
this case is again 2−τ . (Note that |M∗| = |C∗| and |M i∗| = |Ci∗|. Using
10∗ padding for processing messages whose length is not a multiple of m is
essential for this part.)
(3a) This case is similar to the case (3c); Both Te and T
i
e are produced by R˜
N,1,2
but necessarily by different inputs, due to the use of injective padding.
Case 4: N = N i, |C| = |Ci|, and A 6= Ai. We consider two subcases: (4a) where
|A| 6= 0 and (4b) where |A| = 0.
(4a) Let’s assume that we even provide A ′′ with the correct value of Te which will
only make it’s job easier. Then the adversary’s task will reduce to guessing
a correct value for the first τ bits of Ta. The only relevant information that
the adversary has is the first τ bits of T ia. We show that even if the whole T
i
a
is given to the adversary, the chance to correctly guess the first τ bits of Ta
is still 2−τ . This is done by a simple sub-case analysis:
1. if only one of |A| and |Ai| is a multiple of n + m then it is easy to see
(from Figure 3.4) that the probability to guess the first τ bits of Ta is
still 2−τ ;
2. if a 6= ai then again from Figure 3.4 we can see that the probability to
guess the first τ bits of Ta is 2
−τ ;
3. otherwise, we have a = ai and either both |A| and |Ai| are multiple of
n + m or neither of them is a multiple of n + m. These two cases are
similar. Let’s consider the first one. As we have A 6= Ai then it must be
the case that for some j we have Aj 6= Aij . So, the jth value xored to
Ta , i.e. R˜
〈j,0〉(Aj) is a fresh n-bit random value; hence the adversary’s
chance to guess the first τ bits of Ta is 2
−τ .
(4b) in order for the forgery attempt (N, ε, C‖T ) to succeed, A ′′ must find the
value of T = Te[n − 1 · · ·n − τ ] produced as R˜N i,`i,j . The only image under
this function that has been computed in the whole game is T ie . However, the
adversary has no information about T ie , as the distribution of T i = T ie ⊕T ia
is uniform and independent of T ie due to T
i
a that is unknown to A
′′. So, the
probability that the adversary can correctly guess the first τ bits of Te =
R˜〈N,`,j〉(final input) for j = {1, 2} is 2−τ . (Note that j = 1 when |C| is a
multiple of m and j = 2 when |C| is not a multiple of m).
Case 5: N = N i, A = Ai, and |C| = |Ci| = `m is a multiple of m. Let’s assume that
we provide A ′′ with the correct value Ta = T ia. We further assume that C 6= Ci
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as otherwise any T 6= T i will be incorrect and rejected. Therefore, we may assume
that Cj 6= Cij for some 1 ≤ j ≤ `. Now referring to (the top of) Figure 3.4 it is
easy to see that if C` 6= Ci` then the probability that the adversary can correctly
guess the value of T is 2−τ ; otherwise there are two cases: (1) if H` 6= H i` the
chance that T is correct is 2−τ ; (2) if the event H` = H i` happens then adversary
can simply use T = T i. However, for this to occur, there must be a 1 ≤ j ≤ `− 1
such that H ij‖M ij 6= Hj‖Mj but H ij+1 = Hj+1. This happens with probability at
most `2−n by union bound, noting that |Hi| = n So, the total success probability
in this case is bounded by 12τ +
`
2n .
Case 6: N = N i, A = Ai, and |C| = |Ci| is not a multiple of m. It is easy to see
from Figure 3.4 that the analysis of this case is the same as that of Case 5 and the
success probability of the adversary is bounded by 12τ +
`
2n .
Finally, using the result of Bellare et al. [BGM04] that reduces an adversary with mul-
tiple forgery attempts to an adversary that has a single forgery attempt, we bound the
probability of forgery by adversaries that make qd decryption (verification) queries by
qd
2τ +
qd`
2n .
Instantiating Tweakable RFs with PRFs. We replace the (tweakable) RF R˜ ∈
F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n) in OMD with a (tweakable) PRF F˜ : K × T × ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m)→
{0, 1}n. We note that whether we interpret a part of the input to either R˜ or F˜ as
a tweak or not, the notion of PRF security applies to both situations. The following
lemma states the classical bound on the security loss induced by this replacement step.
Lemma 3.3. Let R˜ : T ×({0, 1}n×{0, 1}m)→ {0, 1}n be a RF and F˜ : K×T ×({0, 1}n×
{0, 1}m) → {0, 1}n be a keyed function. Let A be a CPA adversary that runs in time
t, makes qe encryption queries that induce no more than σe n calls to F in total, such
that no individual input (AD or message) is more than `max blocks long. Let further A ′
be a CCA adversary that runs in time t′, makes q′e encryption queries and q′d decryption
queries that induce no more than σ′ calls to F in total, such that no individual input is
more that `′max blocks long. Then
Advpriv
OMD[F˜ ,τ ]
(A ) ≤ Advpriv
OMD[R˜,τ ]
(B) + Advprf
F˜
(C )
AdvauthOMD[F˜ ,τ ](A
′) ≤ AdvauthOMD[R˜,τ ](B
′) + Advprf
F˜
(C ′)
B and B′ are information theoretic adversaries that have the same resources (except for
time complexity) as A and A ′ respectively, and where C and C ′ make no more than σ
and σ′ queries respectively and run in time t + γ · n · σe and t′ + γ′ · n · σ′ respectively
with some constants γ, γ′.
Proof. We let Π stand for OMD. Starting from the definition of PRIV advantage, we
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have
Advpriv
Π[R˜,τ ]
(A ) = Pr
[
A priv-RΠ[R˜,τ] ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A priv-IΠ[R˜,τ] ⇒ 1
]
= Pr
[
A priv-RΠ[F˜ ,τ] ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A priv-RΠ[R˜,τ] ⇒ 1
]
+ Pr
[
A priv-RΠ[R˜,τ] ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A priv-IΠ[F˜ ,τ] ⇒ 1
]
,
where we simply add 0 = Pr
[
A
priv-R
Π[R˜,τ ] ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A
priv-R
Π[R˜,τ ] ⇒ 1
]
to the ad-
vantage. We have
Advprf
F˜
(C ) ≥ Pr
[
A priv-RΠ[F˜ ,τ] ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A priv-RΠ[R˜,τ] ⇒ 1
]
as an adversary C can be constructed using A as a subroutine; C uses its own oracle
and follows the code of the algorithms E and D to perfectly simulate the Enc and Dec
oracles for A . Then C outputs whatever A outputs. If C ’s oracle implements F˜K , then
C perfectly simulates priv-R
Π[F˜ ,τ ]
for A , while if C ’s oracle implements a truly random
function R˜, then C perfectly simulates priv-R
Π[R˜,τ ]
.
We further have that
Advpriv
Π[R˜,τ ]
(B) ≥ Pr
[
A priv-RΠ[R˜,τ] ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A priv-IΠ[F˜ ,τ] ⇒ 1
]
as an adversary B can use A by simply forwarding all A ’s queries and then output
whatever A outputs. Because the games priv-I
Π[F˜ ,τ ]
and priv-I
Π[R˜,τ ]
are identical,
the simulation of games for A will be perfect. The final bound is obtained by triangle
inequality.
A similar transition based on triangular inequality and almost identical reductions can
be applied to obtain the bound on AUTH advantage.
We next instantiate the (tweakable) PRF F˜ using a PRF F (with a smaller domain) by
means of masking a part of the input to F by an offset generated as a function of the
key and the tweak, as shown in Fig. 3.5. This method to tweak a PRF is essentially the
XE method [Rog04a], originally used to construct tweakable blockciphers. In OMD the
tweaks are of the form T = (α, i, j) where α ∈ N∪{ε}, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n−4 and j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. We
note that not all combinations are used; for example, if α = ε (empty) which corresponds
to processing of the associated data in Figure 3.1, then j 6= 2.
Lemma 3.4. Let F : K × ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m) → {0, 1}n be a keyed function with key
space K. Let F˜ : K × T × ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m) → {0, 1}n be defined by F˜ 〈T〉K (X,Y ) =
FK((X ⊕∆K(T)), Y ) for every T ∈ T ,K ∈ K, X ∈ {0, 1}n , Y ∈ {0, 1}m, and let
∆K(T) be the masking function of OMD as defined in Section 3.4. Let further A be an
adversary that runs in time t and makes q queries. Then we have
Advprf
F˜
(A ) ≤ AdvprfF (B) +
3q2
2n
for some B that runs in time t+ γ · q for a constant γ and makes 2q queries.
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Figure 3.5 – Constructing a tweakable PRF F˜
〈T〉
K : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n
using a PRF FK : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n. There are several efficient ways to
define the masking function ∆K(T) [Rog04a, CS08, KR11]; we use the method used in
OCB3 [KR11].
Proof. The proof is a simple adaptation of a similar result on the security of the XE
construction (to tweak a blockcipher) [KR11]. We sketch the main steps of the proof
and refer the reader to the original proof [Rog04a, KR11] for details. The key property
required for the proof to apply is that the masking function ∆K(T) must be a 2
−n-
uniform and 2−n-AXU hash. This is shown at the end of the proof.
As we use a PRF rather than PRP, our bound has two main terms. The first term is a
single birthday bound loss of 0.5q
2
2n to take care of the case that a collision might happen
when computing the initial mask ∆N,0,0 = FK(N‖10n−1−ν , 0m) using a PRF (F ) rather
than a PRP (as in the original proof [KR11]). The analysis of the remaining term (i.e.
2.5q2
2n ) is essentially the same as the corresponding part in the original proof [KR11],
but we note that in the context of our construction as we are directly dealing with
PRFs (unlike the original analysis [KR11] in which PRPs are used), the bound obtained
here does not have any loss terms caused by the switching (RP-RF) lemma. Therefore,
instead of the original 6q
2
2n bound [KR11] (from which
3.5q2
2n is due to using the switching
lemma) our bound has only 2.5q
2
2n .
We now show that the masking function ∆K(T ) = ∆K(α, i, j) is a 2
−n-almost universal
2−n-AXU hash; it outputs an n-bit mask such that the following two properties hold for
any fixed string H ∈ {0, 1}n:
1. Pr[∆K(α, i, j) = H] ≤ 2−n for any (α, i, j)
2. Pr[∆K(α, i, j)⊕∆K(α′, i′, j′) = H] ≤ 2−n for (α, i, j) 6= (α′, i′, j′)
where the probabilities are taken over random selection of the key.
The masking scheme of OMD is an adaptation of that used in OCB3 [KR11]. It is easy
to verify that it satisfies these two properties. Given a T = (α, i, j), the corresponding
mask is always computed as
∆K(T) = Nα⊕ 22 · γi · L∗⊕ jj,α · L∗ = Nα⊕(22 · γi⊕ jj,α) · L∗
where L∗ = FK(0n, 0m), γi is the ith codeword of the canonical Gray code, N = 0n if
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α = ε and Nα = FK(α‖10n−1−ν , 0m) otherwise, and
jj,α =

0 if j = 0
j + 1 if α 6= ε and j ∈ {1, 2}
1 if α = ε and j = 1.
The canonical Gray code is defined as γ0 = 0
n and γi = γi−1⊕ 2ntz(i) for i ≥ 1.
The 2−n-almost universal property of the masking scheme follows from the fact that
each mask ∆K(α, i, j) contains a non-zero multiple of uniformly distributed L∗, and for
α 6= ε the variable Nα is computed by evaluating FK on a non-zero input.
To verify the 2−n-AXU property, we perform a short case analysis. If α 6= α′, then ne-
cessarily α‖10n−1−ν 6= α′‖10n−1−ν and the two variables Nα and Nα′ are both uniformly
distributed and independent.
If α = α′, then we must have (i, j) 6= (i′, j′). For the canonical Gray code, we have
that for any i 6= i′ we have γi 6= γi, and for any i 0 ≤ int(γi) ≤ 2i. If i ≤ 2n−4,
then γi will have degree smaller or equal to n − 3 (as a polynomial), so 22 · γi will
always have the two least significant bits set to 0 (as the corresponding multiplication in
GF(2128) will never require a reduction). It follows that if (i, j) 6= (i′, j′), then necessarily
(22 · γi⊕ jj,α) 6= (22 · γi′ ⊕ jj′,α) and thus the collision of masks is impossible in this
case.
3.7 Performance
In this section, we briefly describe the performance of OMD in software. As a mandatory
part of the CAESAR submission, both reference and optimized implementations of OMD
needed to be presented.
The reference implementation. The reference implementations of OMD-sha256
and OMD-sha512 in C language were co-developed by the author of this thesis and
Simon Cogliani. The main objective of the reference implementation was portability
and readability of the code, thus both implementations are using a vanilla implementa-
tion of their respective SHA2 compression functions from OpenSSL [Fou18]. While not
being designed for speed, the reference implementations were used for comparison in the
benchmarks of the optimized implementations on various platforms.
Optimized implementation for x86 64 architecture. Because the CPUs by Intel
and AMD are the most common CPUs on high-end computers, the x86 64 architecture
was a natural target for the first optimized implementations of OMD.
The optimized implementations for this platform were developed by Ralph Ankele
and Robin Ankele during a student project [AA14], the implementation part of which
was supervised by the author of this thesis. Two of the implementations rely on the
extended instruction sets SSE4 and AVX1 [Cor], which both provide SIMD instructions
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that can be applied to four, or eight 32-bit integers at the same time, respectively
(AVX1 is an improvement of SSE4). The third implementation uses the announced
SHA-Extension [GGY+13], which provides hardware acceleration for the compression
functions of SHA1 and SHA256. Originally announced to be released in 2015 [GGY+13],
the extension first appeared in the Goldmont architecture in 2016 [Par16, Cor18].
All three optimized implementations share the same high-level structure. We recall
that `max = maxX∈A∪M(|X|m) denotes the upper bound on the maximum number of
blocks in any input to the encryption algorithm.
Precomputation. The values L∗ and L[i] for i = 1, . . . , dlog2(`max)e are precomputed
only once using a dedicated API call, and stored to be used by every encryption (or
decryption) query. This allows to partially amortize the computational cost of the
masking at the expense of memory. The required memory will grow logarithmically
with `max.
We note that a more aggressive precomputation is also possible, one where we
compute ∆¯i,0 for each i ≤ `max. This will further decrease the computational com-
plexity of individual encryption (or decryption) queries, but the required memory
will grow linearly with `max. This option was used for the measurements.
Instruction extensions. As the computationally heaviest component of OMD, the
speedup of the compression function sha-256 (or sha-512) will have the biggest
impact. For this, Ankele and Ankele took advantage of assembler implementations
of sha-256 (or sha-512) compression function that uses the advanced instructions
of the SSE4/AVX1 [GYG12, GCG12]. They additionally implemented OMD using
the SHA instruction extension set, but this implementation was never tested.
Compiler optimizations. In order to discover the maximal potential speed of OMD,
all software was compiled with the Ofast optimization flag of gcc. (This is equival-
ent to the O3 flag with some additional aggressive optimizations for floating point
operations).
Implementation tricks. Further measures that improve the performance, albeit mar-
ginally, were applied, such as loop unrolling, use of C macros, avoiding type con-
versions etc.
Ankele and Ankele performed experiments to asses the speedup obtained by the SSE4
and AVX1-based implementations relative to the reference implementation. The SHA
extension was not released in time for the optimized implementation to be tested and
benchmarked before OMD finished in CAESAR.
The experiments were conducted on a 64-bit 2.4GHz dual-core Intel Core i5-2415M
processor running Ubuntu 12.10. All implementations (including the reference imple-
mentation) were compiled with the gcc-4.7.2 (Ubuntu/Linaro 4.7.2-2ubuntu1) compiler,
using the Ofast flag.
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Ankele and Ankele measured the performance of the implementations in computa-
tional cycles spent per one byte of input data (the lower the better), such that the
length of input data was computed as a sum of the lengths of message and AD in bytes.
The time stamp counter of the CPU was read with the RDTSC instruction to compute
the total numbers of spent cycles.
The performance of each implementation was measured for messages of length from
128 bits to 4096 bits (with a step of 128 bits), each combined with AD of length from
0 bits to 4096 bits (with a step of 128 bits). To reduce noise during measurements (e.g.
from process context switches) Ankele and Ankele used the same method as Krovetz
and Rogaway [KR11] in their benchmarking of OCB3: for each measurement, take the
median of 91 average numbers of cycles, each obtained using 200 timings.
The comparison of the three implementations with empty AD for both OMD-sha256
and OMD-sha512 can be seen in Figure 3.6. The complete sets of measurements are
visualized in Appendix A.1.
We see that both the optimized implementation based on SSE4 and the one based
on AVX1 are about twice as fast as the reference, with the one based on AVX1 being
slightly faster. The gradual acceleration of the encryption with the increasing message
length occurs because there is a single call to the compression function to process the
nonce at the beginning of each query; the longer the query the better is this amortized.
Overall, the performance of OMD is not bad, however with more than 20 cycles per
byte for a message of 4096 bits, it cannot compete with e.g. OCB that performs under
1 cycle/byte.
Optimized implementation for the ARM architecture. We chose ARM as the
next target for an optimized implementation, due to its popularity in low-end devices,
such as smartphones.
The optimized implementation for this platform was developed by Johan Droz during
a student project [Dro15] supervised by the author of this thesis.
The optimized implementation was targeted at 32-bit ARM processors, and was de-
veloped and tested on an ARMv7 CPU. We therefore only optimized OMD-sha256. The
main ideas of the optimization are similar as for the x86 64 architecture:
Precomputation. Compute the L-values once and store them for use in encryption
(and decryption) queries.
Compression function in assembly. Optimize the computationally heaviest part of
OMD–the compression function. Targeting older ARM versions with no SIMD
instruction extensions, Droz provided a dedicated implementation of sha-256 in
ARM assembly without using any special intrinsics.
Droz benchmarked the optimized implementation on a Sony X-Peria M using a similar
experimental method as for the x86 64 platform, except this time, for each measurement
the minimum of 91 average timings obtained from 200 timings each was taken instead of
the mean. The optimized implementation peaked at about 70 cycles/byte for a message
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Figure 3.6 – The comparison of the x86 64-performance of the reference, the SSE4-
based, and the AVX1-based implementations of OMD-sha256 (top) and OMD-sha512
(bottom) on an Intel Core i5-2415M processor. The performance of the implementations
is measured in computational cycles spent per one byte of input data. The AD is empty.
The graphs are taken from [AA14]
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of 4096 bits. The same implementation with the assembly-based sha-256 replaced by
OpenSSL-based version reached about 82 cycles/byte. A comparison is depicted in
Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7 – The comparison of ARM-performance of the optimized implement-
ation of OMD-sha256 using the assembly implementation of sha-256 versus an imple-
mentation of sha-256 from OpenSSL on an ARMv7 processor. Performance is measured
in computational cycles spent per one byte of input data. The AD is 64 bytes long. The
graph is taken from [Dro15]
Optimized implementation for the MIPS architecture. An optimized imple-
mentation of OMD was also developed for the MIPS architecture, as another very com-
mon architecture used in embedded systems and networking devices.
The optimized implementation for this platform was developed by Martin Georgiev
during a student project [Geo15] supervised by the author of this thesis.
The optimized implementation was developed and tested on a Linksys WRT160NL
router equipped with a MIPS 24Kc V7.4 CPU with 32-bit registers. We therefore only
optimized OMD-sha256. The main elements of the optimization are the same as for the
previous architectures:
Precomputation. Compute the L-values once and store them for use in encryption
(and decryption) queries.
Compression function in assembly. Optimize the compression function. Georgiev
designed a dedicated implementation of sha-256 in MIPS assembly.
Georgiev benchmarked the optimized implementation using the same experimental
method as for the ARM architecture. Because there was no instruction that would allow
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to count clock cycles, the numbers of consumed cycles were estimated using the wall clock
and sufficiently many redundant measurements. The optimized implementation peaked
at about 270 cycles/byte for a message of 4096 bits. The same implementation with
the assembly-based sha-256 replaced by OpenSSL-based version peaked at about 580
cycles/byte. A comparison is depicted in Figure 3.8.
Figure 3.8 – The comparison of MIPS-performance of the optimized implement-
ation of OMD-sha256 using the assembly implementation of sha-256 versus an imple-
mentation of sha-256 from OpenSSL on a MIPS 24Kc V7.4 processor. The performance
of the implementations is measured in computational cycles spent per one byte of input
data. The AD is 20 bytes long. The graph is taken from [Geo15]
Comparison to other CAESAR candidates. The software performance of all first
and second round CAESAR candidates on several platforms (including x86 64) was
carried out by the SUPERCOP framework [lab08]. Only the optimized implementations
of OMD for x86 64 were submitted to the SUPERCOP benchmarking before OMD
finished in CAESAR. An independent software benchmarking of second round CAESAR
candidates on the same platform was done by Ankele and Ankele [AA16].
Based on the results from SUPERCOP [lab18], the optimized implementations of
OMD-sah512 peaked around 13 cycles/byte for queries with both message and AD of
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2000 bytes, and OMD-sha256 peaked around 17 cycles per byte in the same setting.
These results are slight improvements over the observations from the initial measure-
ments of Ankele and Ankele [AA14].
Compared to other candidates, the performance of OMD is not spectacular. The
fastest schemes in the competition achieve about 0.3 cycle/byte in ideal conditions.
When ordered by speed, OMD would be placed close to the middle of the list of all
first round CAESAR candidates. This is also confirmed by the results of Ankele and
Ankele [AA16].
The situation would be likely much improved if OMD implemented with the SHA
extension was included. Based on simulations performed by Ankele and Ankele [AA14],
we conjecture that its throughput would be twice higher than the throughput of the
currently fastest implementations of OMD-sha512.
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Chapter4
Misuse-Resistant Variants of OMD
In this chapter, we introduce MR-OMD and PMR-OMD, two nonce-misuse resistant
variants of the AE scheme OMD which are, respectively, sequential and fully paralleliz-
able.
The results presented in this chapter come from a joint work with Reza Reyhanitabar
and Serge Vaudenay which was published in ProvSec 2014 [RVV14].
Organization of the Chapter. We give a brief overview of the related work in
Section 4.1 and a summary of the contribution in Section 4.2.
In Section 4.3, we introduce MR-OMD. We give a description of MR-OMD in Sec-
tion 4.4, security analysis in Section 4.5 and very briefly discuss a parallelizable variant
of MR-OMD in Section 4.6.
4.1 Related Work
The security notion targeted by MR-OMD is the MRAE security by Rogaway and
Shrimpton [RS06b] (see Section 2.4). The PRF-then-encrypt paradigm used in MR-
OMD is inspired by the SIV construction from the same publication. Unlike SIV,
MR-OMD uses a single secret key. Other single-key MRAE-secure schemes preceding
MR-OMD are HBS [IY09b] and BTM [IY09a]. Compared to HBS and BTM which use
polynomial-based hashing, and need general finite field multiplications in their IV gener-
ation part, MR-OMD uses compression function-based hashing and only needs doubling
(multiplication by 2) operation in GF(2n). HBS and BTM also use the PRF-then-
encrypt paradigm. This general structure is described as one of the generic composition
methods (called “Scheme A4”) by Namprempre et al. [NRS14]. There is also another
subtle difference between the design of MR-OMD with those of SIV, HBS and BTM;
namely, while the latter schemes incorporate the nonce (if used) and the associated data
as parts of a vector-based header, our scheme treats the nonce and associated data as
different elements. As stated by Rogaway and Shrimpton [RS06b] “the MRAE goal is
conceptually different from the DAE goal, the former employing an IV and gaining for
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this a stronger notion of security. The header and the IV are conceptually different,
the one being user-supplied data that the user wants authenticated, the other being a
mechanism-supplied value needed to obtain a strong notion of security.”
4.2 Contribution
We present MR-OMD, a nonce-misuse resistant variant of the CAESAR candidate OMD,
and to our best knowledge the first compression function-based AE scheme that is nonce-
misuse resistant.
As a component of MR-OMD, we propose a new dedicated, compression function-
based PRF that efficiently processes a nonce, AD and a message, and is almost-fully
parallelizable.
4.3 Misuse-Resistant OMD
OMD is a nonce-based, single-pass mode of operation for authenticated encryption with
associated data. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first AE scheme and the only
CAESAR candidate that uses a compression function as its lower-level primitive. As
such, OMD has some promising features. Among them are provable security in the
standard model (based on the well-known PRF assumption on the compression function),
high bit-security level (127 bits and 255 bits for OMD-sha256 and OMD-sha512, respect-
ively), the ability to process the inputs in a single pass, and the ability to take advantage
of the Intel SHA instructions on Goldmont processors and later. [GGY+13, Par16]
However, the security of OMD fully relies on the assumption that implementations
always ensure correct use of the nonce, namely that the nonce never gets repeated in
the encryption queries. If a repetition of the nonces occurs, security will fully collapse.
Aiming at making OMD robust towards nonce reuse while reusing its components as
much as possible, we introduce two variants of OMD, called misuse-resistant OMD (MR-
OMD) and parallelizable misuse-resistant OMD (PMR-OMD). We target the maximal
possible level of robustness against repeated nonces, the MRAE security, so similar to the
previously known schemes in this category (e.g., SIV, HBS and BTM) our constructions
are necessarily two-pass. The main goals that motivated the design of MR-OMD are
the struggle to have a construction that is very similar to OMD (so that common code
and hardware can be reused) and to have an efficient, provably secure MRAE scheme at
the same time. The design of PMR-OMD further deviates from OMD, providing a fully
parallelizable variant, in contrast with OMD and MR-OMD which both have a serial
encryption algorithm.
In MR-OMD and PMR-OMD, the two passes are combined in a way that minimizes
the incurred additional cost: using a keyed compression function with (n+m)-bit input
and n-bit output, for processing a message M with associated data A, MR-OMD and
PMR-OMD only need |M |/(n + m) more calls to the compression function compared
to OMD, where |M | is the bit length of M . Noticing that the encryption pass in OMD
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requires 1 + |M |/m compression function calls, and considering m = n (as suggested in
OMD), the overhead incurred by the second pass in our two-pass variants is about 50%
of the encryption time for OMD. We note that the overhead is independent of A as it is
processed in the same way in both algorithms.
4.4 Description
MR-OMD is a compression function mode of operation for nonce-based AE. It has two
parameters, a keyed compression function F : K × ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m) → {0, 1}n with
the key space K = {0, 1}k and m ≤ n, and an IV length τ < n, which is the same as the
ciphertext expansion.
We let MR-OMD-F denote the MR-OMD mode of operation using a keyed compres-
sion function FK : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n with m ≤ n and an unspecified tag
length. We let MR-OMD[F, τ ]denote the MR-OMD mode of operation using the keyed
compression function FK and the IV of length τ .
An overview. An instance MR-OMD[F, τ ] has a key space K = {0, 1}k, any AD
space A ⊆ {0, 1}≤(m+n)·2n−5 and any message space M⊆ {0, 1}≤m·2n−5 . We let `max =
maxX∈A∪M(|X|m) denote the upper bound on the maximum number of blocks in any
single message or AD. We require that the nonce space N = {0, 1}ν for an integer
1 ≤ ν < n.
The encryption algorithm of MR-OMD[F, τ ] takes four input arguments (a secret
key K, a nonce N , associated data A, a message M) and outputs a ciphertext C =
IV||C ∈ {0, 1}|M |+τ . The ciphertext consists of an initialization vector (IV) and a core
ciphertext. The decryption algorithm of MR-OMD[F, τ ] inputs four arguments (a secret
key K, a nonce N , associated data A, a ciphertext IV||C) and either outputs the whole
corresponding M at once or an error message ⊥ in case of an authentication failure.
The encryption algorithm consists of two main components. First, a dedicated PRF
computes the IV as an image of all four inputs (K,N ,A,M). Then an encryption-only
subroutine encrypts M using K, the IV and M . The PRF-component processes AD and
the message in blocks of m+n bits, similarly as OMD does with the AD. The encryption-
only component is either the message-processing part of OMD itself (in MR-OMD), or
counter mode (in PMR-OMD). All calls to the keyed compression function are masked
by whitening offsets as in OMD, although we now use a different set of tweaks.
A schematic representation of the encryption algorithm of MR-OMD[F, τ ] is shown
in Figure 4.1. The decryption algorithm is very similar to the encryption algorithm,
except that the ciphertext is first decrypted using IV from the input and then the IV
from input is compared to IV′ computed over the nonce, AD and the decrypted message.
Figure 4.2 shows the algorithmic description of the encryption and decryption algorithms
of MR-OMD[F, τ ].
In the rest of this chapter, we use the following notation. For two strings X,Y s.t.
|X| ≥ |Y | we let both X ⊕msb Y and Y ⊕msbX denote the xor of X and Y padded on
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the right with zeroes, i.e. X ⊕Y ‖0|X|−|Y |.
Computing the masking values. Before each call to the underlying keyed compres-
sion function, we xor a masking offset to the input of F . Compared to OMD, the number
of disjoint sets of masks used in MR-OMD is higher. We use the following seven sets of
masking values:
• masks ∆N,i,j for j ∈ {0, . . . , 5} are used in the IV generation process,
• masks ∆¯IV,i are used in the encryption (and the decryption) process.
In the following, all multiplications are in GF(2n).
Initialization. As in OMD, we compute L∗ and an array of L-values as a function of
the key. We define L∗ = FK(0n, 0m), L[0] = 23 ·L∗, and L[i] = 2 ·L[i− 1] for i ≥ i.
As before, the L-values can be computed as a part of a one-time initialization and
stored in a table.
Masking sequence for IV generation. The masks ∆N,i,j are computed for every en-
cryption (or decryption) query. We define the two initial N -dependent masks
∆N,0,0 = FK(N ||10n−1−|N |, 0m) and ∆N,0,1 = FK(N ||10n−1−|N |, 0m) ⊕ L∗. Then,
for i ≥ 1 and j, j′ ∈ {0, . . . , 5} we let
∆N,i,j = ∆N,i−1,j ⊕ L[ntz(i)], and
∆N,i,j = ∆N,i,j′ ⊕ (〈j〉n ⊕ 〈j′〉n) · L∗.
Masking sequence for encryption. We compute the masks ∆¯IV,i for every query.
We define ∆¯IV,0 = FK(IV||10n−1−τ , 0m)⊕ 6 · L∗, and for i ≥ 1 we let
∆¯IV,i = ∆¯IV,i−1 ⊕ L[ntz(i)].
4.5 Security Analysis
We analyse the security of MR-OMD in two cases: (1) as a MRAE, considering ad-
versaries that are nonce-reusing; (2) in the case that adversaries are nonce-respecting.
As MR-OMD is designed as a nonce-misuse resistant scheme, we first focus on analysing
the security bounds in the nonce-misuse scenario. The corresponding result is stated in
Theorem 4.1. Clearly, an upper-bound for the MRAE advantage also upper-bounds the
NAE advantage of adversaries with the same resources. Intuitively, the latter could be
lower than the former. This is confirmed by Theorem 4.7.
IV-Based Encryption Schemes. We need to introduce so-called IV-based encryp-
tion schemes for the analysis of MR-OMD. The formalism is taken from Rogaway and
Shrimpton [RS06b].
An IV-based encryption scheme is a privacy-only scheme. An example of such a
scheme can be the CBC mode. Formally, an IV-based encryption scheme is a triplet
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Figure 4.1 – The encryption algorithm of MR-OMD[F, τ ] and PMR-OMD[F, τ ]
using a keyed compression function FK : ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m) → {0, 1}n with m ≤ n.
(Top) The process of generating the IV. (Bottom) The encryption process (upper part
for MR-OMD and lower for PMR-OMD). For operation ⊕msb see our convention in
Section 4.4.
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1: algorithm Initialize(K)
2: L∗ ← FK(0n, 0m)
3: L
(2)
∗ ← 2 · L∗
4: L
(4)
∗ ← 2 · L(2)∗
5: L
(6)
∗ ← L(4)∗ ⊕ L(2)∗
6: L[0]← 2 · L(4)∗
7: for i← 1, 2, · · · do
8: L[i] = 2 · L[i− 1]
9: end for
10: return
11: end algorithm
1: algorithm HASHK(N,A,M)
2: b← n+m
3: A1||A2 · · ·Aa−1||Aa b← A
4: M1||M2 · · ·Mt−1||Mt b←M
5: ΣA ← 0n; ΣM ← 0n
6: ∆M ← FK(N ||10n−1−|N|, 0m)
7: ∆A ← ∆M ⊕ L∗
8: for i← 1 to a− 1 do
9: ∆A ← ∆A ⊕ L[ntz(i)]
10: Left← Ai[b− 1 · · ·m]
11: Right← Ai[m− 1 · · · 0]
12: ΣA ← ΣA ⊕ FK(Left⊕∆A,Right)
13: end for
14: if |Aa| = b then
15: ∆A ← ∆A ⊕ L(2)∗
16: Left← Aa[b− 1 · · ·m]
17: Right← Aa[m− 1 · · · 0]
18: ΣA ← ΣA ⊕ FK(Left⊕∆,Right)
19: else if |A| > 0 then
20: ∆A ← ∆A ⊕ L(4)∗
21: A∗a ← Aa||10b−|Aa|−1
22: LeftA∗a[b− 1 · · ·m]
23: Right← A∗a[m− 1 · · · 0]
24: ΣA ← ΣA ⊕ FK(Left⊕∆A,Right)
25: end if
26: for i← 1 to t− 1 do
27: ∆M ← ∆M ⊕ L[ntz(i)]
28: Left←Mi[b− 1 · · ·m]
29: Right←Mi[m− 1 · · · 0]
30: ΣM ← ΣM ⊕ FK(Left⊕∆M ,Right)
31: end for
32: if |Mt| = b then
33: ∆M ← ∆M ⊕ L(2)∗
34: Left←Mt[b− 1 · · ·m]⊕ ΣA
35: Right←Mt[m− 1 · · · 0]
36: IV← FK(Left⊕∆M ,Right)
37: else
38: ∆M ← ∆M ⊕ L(4)∗
39: M∗t ←Mt||10b−|Mt|−1
40: Left←M∗t [b− 1 · · ·m]⊕ ΣA
41: Right←M∗t [m− 1 · · · 0]
42: IV← FK(Left⊕∆M ,Right)
43: end if
44: return IV[n− 1 · · ·n− τ ]
45: end algorithm
1: algorithm EK(N,A,M)
2: if |N | > n− 1 then
3: return ⊥
4: end if
5: M1||M2 · · ·M`−1||M` m←M
6: IV← HASHK(N,A,M)
7: ∆← FK(IV ||10n−1−τ , 0m)
8: ∆← ∆⊕ L[0]⊕ L(6)∗
9: H ← 0n
10: H ← FK(H ⊕∆, 〈τ〉m)
11: for i← 1 to `− 1 do
12: Ci ← H ⊕Mi
13: ∆← ∆⊕ L[ntz(i+ 1)]
14: H ← FK(H ⊕∆,Mi)
15: end for
16: C` ← H ⊕M`
17: C← IV||C1||C2|| · · · ||C`
18: return C
19: end algorithm
1: algorithm DK(N,A,C)
2: if |N | > n− 1 or |C| < τ then
3: return ⊥
4: end if
5: IV||C1||C2 · · ·C`−1||C` m← C
6: H ← 0n
7: ∆← FK(IV ||10n−1−τ , 0m)
8: ∆← ∆⊕ L[0]⊕ L(6)∗
9: H ← FK(H ⊕∆, 〈τ〉m)
10: for i← 1 to `− 1 do
11: Mi ← H ⊕ Ci
12: ∆← ∆⊕ L[ntz(i+ 1)]
13: H ← FK(H ⊕∆,Mi)
14: end for
15: M` ← H ⊕ C`
16: IV′ ← HASHK(N,A,M)
17: if IV′ = IV then
18: return M ←M1||M2|| · · · ||M`
19: else
20: return ⊥
21: end if
22: end algorithm
Figure 4.2 – Definition of MR-OMD[F, τ ] with a keyed compression function F :
K × ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m)→ {0, 1}n s.t. m ≤ n and a fixed IV length τ .
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Π = (K, E ,D) that consists of a key space K and two “efficient” deterministic algorithms,
where the encryption algorithm E takes a tuple (K, IV,M) as input, such that K ∈ K,
IV ∈ {0, 1}τ for some fixed positive τ and M ∈ {0, 1}∗. We call IV the initialization
vector. The notations E(K, IV,M), EK(IV,M) and E IVK (M) are used interchangeably.
We also assume that if C = E IVK (M), then we have |C| = |M |+ τ and C = IV||C; i.e. the
ciphertext reveals IV.
We define the advantage of an adversary A in breaking the $-privacy of Π as
Advpriv$Π (A ) = Pr
[
K ←$ K : A E$K(·) ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A $(·) ⇒ 1
]
with $(·) being a random string oracle that on input M returns a random string of length
|M | + τ and E$K returning E IVK with IV ←$ {0, 1}τ . It is assumed, that the adversary
never asks a query outside the proper message space of Π. Note that in the PRIV$
security game, the IV is chosen by the game.
Security in the case of nonce misuse. Theorem 4.1 states the MRAE security of
MR-OMD. The high-level structure of the proof is similar to the analyses of previous
MRAE schemes that follow the synthetic-IV (SIV) design paradigm [RS06b], such as
HBS [IY09b] and BTM [IY09a], but the details differ. We first prove the security in
the information-theoretic setting using (tweakable) random functions. To obtain the
information-theoretic security, we prove security of MR-OMD.HASH as a PRF and the
security of MR-OMD.E as a secure IV-based encryption scheme. Consequently, we prove
security of MR-OMD in the MRAE sense using the previous two results. A complexity-
theoretic security bound is then determined by instantiating the (tweakable) random
functions using the XE construction [Rog04a].
Theorem 4.1. Fix n ≥ 1 and τ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n}. Let F : K×({0, 1}n×{0, 1}m)→ {0, 1}n
be a keyed function, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n. Let A be a CCA adversary that runs in time t,
and makes qe encryption queries and qd decryption queries that induce no more than σ
calls to F in total. Then
AdvmraeMR-OMD[F,τ ](A ) ≤ AdvprfF (B) +
3.5σ2
2n
+
0.5q2e
2τ
+
qd
2τ
for some B that runs in time t+ γ · n · σ for some constant γ and makes 2 · σ queries.
Proof. The proof is obtained by combing Lemma 4.4, Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 with
Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.6.
Generalization of MR-OMD based on (tweakable) random functions. We
define the schemeMR-OMD[R˜, τ ], a generalization of MR-OMD[F, τ ] that uses a (tweak-
able) random function R˜ ←$ F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n) instead of the masked function F , as
depicted in figure 4.3. The tweak space T consists of seven mutually exclusive sets of
tweaks; namely, T = N × N× {0} ∪ N × N× {1} ∪ N × N× {2} ∪ N × N× {3} ∪
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Figure 4.3 – The scheme MR-OMD[R˜, τ ] using a (tweakable) random function R˜←$
F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n). (Top) The process of generating the IV. (Bottom) The encryption
process. For the operation ⊕msb see our convention in Section 4.4.
N × N × {4} ∪ N × N × {5} ∪ IV × N, where N = {0, 1}ν is the nonce space and
IV = {0, 1}τ is the set of IV-s.
Lemma 4.2. Let MR-OMD [R˜, τ ] be the MR-OMD scheme that uses tweakable RF R˜.
Let A be an adversary that makes no more than q queries that induce no more than σ
calls to R˜ in total. Then
Advprf
MR-OMD[R˜,τ ].HASH
(A ) ≤ 0.5σ
2
2n
.
Proof. We assume w.l.o.g. that the adversary does not repeat a query. Let q denote the
number of queries asked by the adversary, and let r denote the number of distinct nonces
among all the nonces in the q queries. We partition the queries into sets Q1, . . . ,Qr, so
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that for any two queries N,A,M ∈ Qi and N ′, A′,M ′ ∈ Qj we have N = N ′ if i = j and
N 6= N ′ otherwise. Let qi = |Qi| for i = 1, . . . , r, then we have q =
∑r
i=1 qi. For any 1 ≤
i ≤ r, we will denote the queries fromQi asQi = {(N i, Ai,1,M i,1), . . . , (N i, Ai,qi ,M i,qi)}.
We note that this means, that the adversary uses exactly r distinct nonces in all its
queries.
Let b = n+m. We will use notation Hτ
R˜
instead of MR-OMD[R˜, τ ].HASH throughout
the proof. First, we note that the HASH algorithm can be expressed as
Hτ
R˜
(N,A,M) = R˜Tfinal(h
R˜
(N,A,M))
with Tfinal ∈ T and where the function hR˜ ∈ Func(N ×A×M, n) is defined as
h
R˜
(N,A,M) 7→
(
R˜N,1,1(A1)⊕ . . .⊕ R˜N,a−1,1(Aa−1)⊕ R˜N,a−1,jA(A∗a)⊕
R˜N,1,0(M1)⊕ . . .⊕ R˜N,t−1,0(Mt−1)
)
⊕msbM∗t .
We claim that
AdvprfHτ
R˜
(A ) ≤ max

r∑
h=1
∑
1≤i<j≤qh
Pr
[
coll
((
Nh, Ah,i,Mh,i
)
,
(
Nh, Ah,j ,Mh,j
))]
with the maximum taken over the choice of r, q1, q2, . . . , qr and the choice of the queries
(N1,1, A1,1,M1,1), . . . , (N r,qr , Ar,qr ,M r,qr) such that their total length in blocks is limited
by σ, i.e.
∑r
i=1
∑qi
j=1
(|Ai,j |b + max (1, |M i,j |b)) ≤ σ. We let
coll
((
Nh, Ah,i,Mh,i
)
,
(
Nh, Ah,j ,Mh,j
))
denote the event that h
R˜
(
Nh, Ah,i,Mh,i
)
= h
R˜
(
Nh, Ah,j ,Mh,j
)
and |M | ≡ 0 (mod b)
iff |M ′| ≡ 0 (mod b).
In other words, we claim that the advantage AdvprfHτ
R˜
(A ) is bounded by the probability
of collision on the input to the final (tweakable) RF between two queries with the same
nonce (we apply the union bound to obtain the inequality) such that their messages
both have a complete final block, or none of them has.
The final call to the (tweakable) RF R˜Tfinal is independent from h
R˜
, because its tweak
Tfinal is not used anywhere in hR˜. Moreover, the final tweaks Tfinal and T
′
final of two
queries (N,A,M), (N ′, A′,M ′) will be distinct if N 6= N ′ or if |M | ≡ 0 (mod b) <
|M ′| ≡ 0 (mod b). Therefore, unless there is a collision on the output of h
R˜
among
queries that share the same nonce and have |M | ≡ 0 (mod b)⇔ |M ′| ≡ 0 (mod b), the
construction R˜{Tfinal}(h
R˜
(N,A,M)) behaves as a truly RF and cannot be distinguished
from such. This completes the proof of the claim.
Now, we proceed to bound the collision probability Pr
[
h
R˜
(N,A,M) = h
R˜
(N,A′,M ′)
]
for two fixed but arbitrary queries (N,A,M) and (NA′,M ′) by a case analysis. We let
a = |A|b, t = max(1, |M |b), a′ = |A′|b, t′ = max(1, |M ′|b).
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Case 1: |M | and |M ′| are both multiples of b and (w.l.o.g) |A| is a multiple of b and
|A′| is not. The collision on h
R˜
occurs, if h
R˜
(N,A,M) = h
R˜
(N,A′,M ′). Let
S(1)(N,A,M) = h
R˜
(N,A,M) ⊕ R˜N,a−1,jA(Aa) be a partial result of evaluating
h
R˜
(N,A,M). Given any two queries (N,A,M), (N,A′,M ′), a collision on h
R˜
is
then equivalent to
S(1)(N,A,M)⊕ R˜N,a−1,3(Aa) =S(1)(N,A′,M ′)⊕ R˜N,a′−1,5(A′a′)
R˜N,a
′−1,5(A′a′)⊕ R˜N,a−1,3(Aa) =S(1)(N,A′,M ′)⊕ S(1)(N,A,M)
The two tweaks used to process the last blocks of A and A′ come from mutually
exclusive sets, so the images produced from these two blocks will always be uniform
and independent. The probability of collision is then 1/2n.
Case 2: |M |, |M ′| are both multiples of b and |A|, |A′| are either both multiples of b, or
they both are not. In case that both A and A′ have an incomplete final block, we
can assume, that A ← A||10b−1−|A| mod b and A′ ← A′||10b−1−|A′| mod b. This does
not affect the probability of collision because the padding is injective, and because
the set of tweaks used to process final blocks of AD with full-length final block
(jA = 3) is mutually exclusive with the set of tweaks used to process final block of
messages with incomplete final block (jA = 5). Thus in the following sub-cases we
can w.l.o.g. assume that |A|, |A′| are multiples of b.
Case 2a: a 6= a′. W.l.o.g assume that a > a′. Similarly as in Case 1, we define
a partial evaluation of h
R˜
(A,M) that stops after the first a′ blocks of A as
follows:
S(2a)(N,A,M) 7→
(
R˜N,1,1(A1)⊕ . . .⊕ R˜N,a′,1(Aa′)⊕
R˜N,1,0(M1)⊕ . . .⊕ R˜N,t−1,0(Mt−1)
)
⊕msbM∗t .
The collision occurs if R˜N,a
′+1,1(Aa′+1)⊕ . . .⊕R˜N,a−1,jA(Aa) = hR˜(N,A′,M ′)
⊕ S(2a)(N,A,M). Again, this happens if a xor of outputs of multiple inde-
pendent RFs equals to a distinct value. The probability of finding a tuple of
RFs’ inputs producing this equality is 1/2n.
Case 2b: a = a′ and A 6= A′. Because A 6= A′, there must be an i, s.t. 1 ≤
i ≤ a and Ai 6= A′i. Again, we define a partial evaluation S(2b)(N,A,M) =
h
R˜
(N,A,M)⊕ R˜N,i,ji(Ai). The collision occurs if R˜N,i,ji(Ai)⊕ R˜N,i,ji(A′i) =
S(2b)(N,A,M) ⊕ S(2b)(N,A′,M ′). In other words, we have a collision if the
result of R˜N,i,ji(Ai)⊕ R˜N,i,ji(A′i) equals to a distinct value. Because Ai 6= A′i,
the probability of this event is 1/2n.
Case 2c: A = A′ and t 6= t′. W.l.o.g. assume that t > t′. Similarly as in Case
2a, we let S(2c)(N,A,M) be the partial result of h
R˜
(N,A,M) that stops after
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the first t′ blocks of M :
S(2c)(N,A,M) 7→
(
R˜N,1,1(A1)⊕ . . .⊕ R˜N,a−1,jA(Aa)⊕
R˜N,1,0(M1)⊕ . . .⊕ R˜N,t′,0(Mt′)
)
⊕msbM∗t .
If the collision occurs, we have R˜N,t
′+1,0(Mt′+1) ⊕ . . . ⊕ R˜N,t−1,0(Mt−1) =
S(2c)(N,A,M)⊕ h
R˜
(N,A′,M ′). The probability of this event is 1/2n.
Case 2d: A = A′, t = t′ and M,M ′ differ in blocks with index i, i < t. We let
S(2d)(N,A,M) = h
R˜
(N,A,M) ⊕ R˜N,i,0(Mi). Whenever the collision occurs
we have R˜N,i,0(Mi) ⊕ R˜N,i,0(M ′i) = S(2b)(N,A,M) ⊕ S(2b)(N,A′,M ′). By a
similar argument as in Case 2b, the probability of this collision is 1/2n.
Case 2e: A = A′, t = t′ and M,M ′ differ only in the last block. Then we have
h
R˜
(N,A,M) 6= h
R˜
(N,A′,M ′), so the probability of collision is 0.
Case 3: |M | and |M ′| are not multiples of b and (w.l.o.g) |A| is a multiple of b and
|A′| is not. This case is analogous to Case 1, the only difference is that both Mt
and M ′t will be padded before processing (which is of no consequence). By similar
argument as in Case 1, we conclude that probability of collision is 1/2n.
Case 4: |M |, |M ′| are not multiples of b and |A|, |A′| are either both multiples of b, or
they both are not. In case that both A and A′ have an incomplete final block, we
can assume, that A ← A||10b−1−|A| mod b and A′ ← A′||10b−1−|A′| mod b. This does
not affect the probability of collision (by the same argument as in Case 2). Thus in
the following sub-cases, we can assume that |A|, |A′| are multiples of b. As in previ-
ous case, we can also let M ←M ||10b−1−|M | mod b and M ′ ←M ′||10b−1−|M ′| mod b.
This effectively transforms this case into Case 2. We therefore list all the sub-cases
only briefly.
Case 4a: a 6= a′. The probability of collision is 1/2n, similarly as in Case 2a .
Case 4b: a = a′ and A 6= A′. The probability of collision is 1/2n, similarly as in
Case 2b .
Case 4c: A = A′ and t 6= t′. The probability of collision is 1/2n, similarly as in
Case 2c .
Case 4d: A = A′, t = t′ and M,M ′ differ in blocks with index i, i < t. The
probability of collision is 1/2n, similarly as in Case 2d .
Case 4e: A = A′, t = t′ and M,M ′ differ only in last block. The probability of
collision is 0, similarly as in Case 2e.
We deduce that for any two queries (N,A,M) and (N,A′,M ′) we have that
Pr
[
coll
((
Nh, Ah,i,Mh,i
)
,
(
Nh, Ah,j ,Mh,j
))]
≤ 1
2n
.
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Using this result, we can bound the advantage AdvprfHτ
R˜
(A ):
AdvprfHτ
R˜
(A ) ≤max

r∑
h=1
∑
1≤i<j≤qh
Pr
[
coll
((
Nh, Ah,i,Mh,i
)
,
(
Nh, Ah,j ,Mh,j
))]
≤max

r∑
h=1
∑
1≤i<j≤qh
1
2n
 ≤ max
{
r∑
h=1
q2h
2
· 1
2n
}
≤ 0.5σ
2
2n
with the maximum taken over the choice of r, q1, q2, . . . , qr and the choice of the queries
(N1,1, A1,1,M1,1), . . . , (N r,qr , Ar,qr ,M r,qr) such that their total length in blocks is limited
by σ, i.e.
∑r
i=1
∑qi
j=1
(|Ai,j |b + max (1, |M i,j |b)) ≤ σ. This completes the proof.
Before we proceed, we have to introduce a new notation. The purpose of this notation is
to make the security analysis more comprehensible. Consider the encryption algorithm
MR-OMD[R˜, τ ].EK(N,A,M). The algorithm can be split into two parts. First, it com-
putes IV = MR-OMD[R˜, τ ].HASHK(N,A,M). The second part comprises all the steps
after computing the IV. We will denote the second step as MR-OMD[R˜, τ ].E¯K(IV,M),
so that, if we simplify the notation, we have
EK(N,A,M) = E¯K(HASHK(N,A,M),M).
We define MR-OMD[R˜, τ ].D¯K(IV,M) in a similar manner.
Lemma 4.3. Let MR-OMD[R˜, τ ] be the MR-OMD scheme that uses tweakable RF R˜.
Let A be a CPA adversary that makes qe encryption queries. Then
Advpriv$
MR-OMD[R˜,τ ].E¯(A ) ≤
0.5q2e
2τ
Proof. For the sake of readability, we will use Π to refer toMR-OMD[R˜, τ ].E¯ throughout
this proof. We observe the advantage of the adversary A in two mutually exclusive cases:
Advpriv$Π (A ) = Adv
priv$|IVcoll
Π (A ) Pr [IVcoll] + Adv
priv$|¬IVcoll
Π (A ) Pr [¬IVcoll]
where IVcoll denotes the event, that there is a collision among IVs and:
Adv
priv$|IVcoll
Π (A ) = Pr
[
K ←$ K : A Π$K(·) ⇒ 1
∣∣∣IVcoll]− Pr [A $(·) ⇒ 1∣∣∣IVcoll]
Adv
priv$|¬IVcoll
Π (A ) = Pr
[
K ←$ K : A Π$K(·) ⇒ 1
∣∣∣¬IVcoll]− Pr [A $(·) ⇒ 1∣∣∣¬IVcoll]
First, consider the case that there is no collision on IVs. This implies, that all tweaks
(IVj , i) for 1 ≤ j ≤ qe used to encrypt the queried messages M1, . . . ,M qe are distinct and
thus all the images under the RFs R˜IVj ,i, used in the encryption queries, are uniform and
independent. Thus, all the ciphertexts C1, . . . ,Cqe the adversary A sees are independent
random strings. We deduce Adv
priv$|¬IVcoll
ΠK
(A ) = 0.
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We bound Adv
priv$|IVcoll
Π (A ) Pr [IVcoll] by the probability Pr [IVcoll]. We have
Pr [IVcoll] ≤
∑
1≤i<j≤qe
Pr[IVi = IVj] ≤
∑
1≤i<j≤qe
1
2τ
≤ 0.5q
2
e
2τ
We deduce Adv
priv$|IVcoll
Π (A ) ≤
0.5q2e
2τ
. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 4.4. Let MR-OMD[R˜, τ ] be the MR-OMD scheme that uses (tweakable) RF
R˜←$ F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n). Let A be a CCA adversary attacking MR-OMD[R˜, τ ]. Let qe
be the number of encryption queries and qd the number of decryption queries made by
A and let σ be the total number of calls to the underlying tweakable RF R˜ in all A ’s
queries. Then there exist adversaries B and C , such that
Advprf
MR-OMD[R˜,τ ].HASH
(C ) + Advpriv$
MR-OMD[R˜,τ ].E¯(B) ≥ Adv
mrae
MR-OMD[R˜,τ ](A )−
qd
2τ
where B asks at most qe queries and C asks at most q = qe + qd queries in total. Both
B and C are limited to a total number σ of calls to underlying tweakable RF R˜ in all
their queries.
Proof. For the sake of readability, we shall refer toMR-OMD[R˜, τ ] by Π throughout this
proof. The proof proceeds in two steps, similarly as the security analysis of SIV [RS06a].
In the first step, we start with the scheme Π¯, which is the same as Π, except that we
replace the algorithm Π.HASH by a random function ρ←$ Func(N ×A×M, {0, 1}τ ).
We still use the (tweakable) RF R˜ for Π.E¯ in Π¯, so the key space of Π¯ is
Func(N ×A×M, {0, 1}τ )× F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n)
and the key is formed by R˜, ρ. Let p¯ = AdvmraeΠ¯ (A ) with unchanged limits on resources
qe, qd, σ. We have
p¯ = Pr
[
A mrae-RΠ¯ ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A mrae-IΠ¯ ⇒ 1
]
=p¯1 + p¯2
with
p¯1 = Pr
[
A mrae-RΠ¯ ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A mrae-HΠ¯ ⇒ 1
]
p¯2 = Pr
[
A mrae-HΠ¯ ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A mrae-IΠ¯ ⇒ 1
]
where the game mrae-HΠ¯ is the same as mrae-RΠ¯, except the decryption oracle is
taken from mrae-IΠ¯, i.e. the decryption queries are always replied with ⊥.
We proceed by bounding the terms p¯1 and p¯2. To bound p¯2, we construct an adversary
B for attacking the priv$ security of Π¯.E¯ from A . B is equipped with its own oracle
e(·), which implements either Π¯.E¯ or the random bits oracle. We let B run A . On
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A ’s query (N,A,M) to the encryption oracle, B queries it’s own oracle e(·) with M
and returns the result to A . On any query from A to decryption oracle, B returns ⊥.
When A halts and outputs bit b, B stops and outputs b as well.
If e(·) = Π¯.E¯$
R˜
(·), then B simulates the game mrae-HΠ¯ correctly (the assumption,
that A does not repeat queries, is needed here). If e(·) = $(·), thenB correctly simulates
the game mrae-IΠ¯. We deduce p¯2 ≤ Advpriv$Π¯.E¯ (B).
To give a bound on p¯1, we shall reveal the tweakable RF R˜ to A . Clearly, an upper
bound of the advantage in this case will also be valid if A does not have R˜, since having
R˜ only makes the attack easier:
p¯1 = Pr
[
A mrae-RΠ¯ ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A mrae-HΠ¯ ⇒ 1
]
≤Pr
[
A (R˜)mrae-RΠ¯ ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A (R˜)mrae-HΠ¯ ⇒ 1
]
In this setting, A can only tell the difference between the two games, if the decryption
query returns something other than ⊥ (then A stops and outputs 1). This happens, if A
builds a query (A,C) to Π¯−1
R˜,ρ
, that successfully verifies and decrypts, and that happens
if IV = ρ(N,A,M) and M = Π¯.D¯
R˜
(IV,C). Recall that the adversary is assumed not
to query its decryption oracle with (N,A,C) if it had previously obtained C from an
encryption query (N,A,M). Having R˜, A can compute M = Π¯.D¯
R˜
(IV,C) for any pair
IV,C, but it never knows a pair IV, (N,A,M), s.t. IV = ρ(N,A,M) and (N,A,M) has
not been queried to the encryption oracle before. A is thus left to guess the correct
IV and the probability of producing a decryption query, that does not result in ⊥ is at
most 1/2τ . If we consider all queries made by A , we have p¯1 ≤ qd/2n. We then have
p¯ ≤ Advpriv$
Π¯.E¯ (B) + qd/2
τ .
At the beginning of the second step of the proof, we point out that
AdvmraeΠ (A ) = Pr
[
A mrae-RΠ ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A mrae-RΠ¯ ⇒ 1
]
+ p¯
as the games mrae-IΠ and mrae-IΠ¯ are identical. We construct an adversary C that
attacks Π.HASH as a PRF (keyed by a (tweakable) RF R˜), such that it uses A as a
subroutine. C is equipped with its own oracle r(·, ·, ·), which implements either Π.HASH
or a corresponding RF ρ. The adversary C picks R˜ ←$ F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n) and runs
A . On A ’s encryption query (N,A,M), C sets IV ← r(N,A,M), computes C ←
Π.E¯
R˜
(IV,M) and returns IV||C to A . When A asks a decryption query (N,A, IV||C),
C first computes M ← Π.D¯
R˜
(IV, C), then it returns M to A only if IV = r(N,A,M),
otherwise it returns ⊥. When A stops and outputs bit b, let B stop and output b.
It is easy to see, that if r = ρ, then C correctly simulates mrae-RΠ¯. It remains
to show, that if r = Π.HASH
R˜′ is the construction Π.HASH keyed by an independent
R˜′ ∈ F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n), the adversary C simulates the oracles Π
R˜∗(·, ·, ·),Π−1R˜∗(·, ·, ·) in
the game mrae-RΠ correctly for some R˜∗ ∈ FuncT (m+ n, n).
If we indeed have that r = Π.HASH
R˜′ , then the game for C has picked the RF
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R˜′ ←$ F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n), while C has picked the tweakable RF R˜←$ F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n)
independently. The construction of Π is such, that the set of tweaks Te = IV × N
used in Π.E¯ is disjoint with the set of tweaks Th = T \Te used in Π.HASH. For every
R,R′ ∈ FuncT (m+ n, n) there is some R∗ ∈ FuncT (m+ n, n) such that
R∗Te(·) = RTe(·) for all Te ∈ Te, and R∗Th(·) = R′Th(·)forallTh ∈ Th,
so the oracles simulated by C are equivalent with oracles Π
R˜∗(·, ·, ·),Π−1R˜∗(·, ·, ·). We let
R,R′ ↔ R∗ denote that three (tweakable) functions R,R′, R∗ ∈ F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n) have
the property just described. It remains to show, that the distribution of R˜∗ is uniform
assuming that R˜, R˜′ are distributed uniformly and independently in F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n).
We have
Pr
[
R˜∗ = R∗
]
=
∑
R,R′: R,R′↔R∗
Pr
[
R˜ = R, R˜′ = R′
]
=
∑
R,R′: R,R′↔R∗
(
1
2n·|T |·2m+n
)2
=
∣∣{R,R′|R,R′ ↔ R∗}∣∣ · ( 1
2n·|T |·2m+n
)2
=2n·|Th|·2
m+n · 2n·|Te|·2m+n ·
(
1
2n·|T |·2m+n
)2
=
1
2n·|T |·2m+n
so the distribution of R˜∗ is indeed uniform, and simulation of A ’s oracles is correct. We
deduce AdvmraeΠ (A ) ≤ p¯+ AdvprfΠ.HASH(C ). This concludes the proof.
Instantiating a (tweakable) RF with a PRF. The proof of Theorem 4.1 is com-
pleted in the same way as with OMD (Section 3.6). First, the (tweakable) RF R˜ is
replaced by a (tweakable) PRF F˜ : K × T × ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m) → {0, 1}n, where
K = {0, 1}k. This will increase the security bound as shown in Lemma 4.5.
Lemma 4.5. Let R˜←$ F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n) be a (tweakable) RF and F˜ : K×T ×({0, 1}n×
{0, 1}m)→ {0, 1}n be a (tweakable) PRF. Let A be a CCA adversary that runs in time
t, makes qe encryption queries and qd decryption queries that induce no more than σ
calls to F˜ in total. Then
AdvmraeMR-OMD[F˜ ,τ ](A ) ≤ Adv
mrae
MR-OMD[R˜,τ ](B) + Adv
p˜rf
F˜
(C )
for some information theoretic B that makes qe encryption queries and qd decryption
queries that induce no more than σ calls to R˜ in total, and some C that makes no more
than σ queries and runs in time t+ γ · n · σ for some constant γ.
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Proof. The proof of this lemma is very similar to the proof of the PRIV bound in
Lemma 3.3, we omit the details.
We instantiate the (tweakable) PRF F˜ from a PRF F (with a smaller domain) by
the means of xoring a mask to a part of the input of F , exactly as with OMD. The
tweaks in MR-OMD are either of the form T = (α, i, j) where α ∈ N , 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n−5 and
j ∈ {0, . . . , 5} or of the form T′ = (IV, i) with α ∈ IV, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n−5. We can have a
unified notation for all the tweaks as T = (α, i, j) where α ∈ N ∪ IV, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n−5 and
j ∈ {0, . . . , 5} if α ∈ N and j = 6 if α ∈ IV.
The transition from tweakable PRFs to PRFs with xor-masks being exactly the same,
we heavily rely on the security analysis from Section 3.6.
Lemma 4.6. Let F˜ : K × ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m) → {0, 1}n be a function family with key
space K. Let F˜ : K × T × ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m) → {0, 1}n be defined by F˜TK(X||Y ) =
FK((X ⊕∆(T))||Y ) for every T ∈ T ,K ∈ K, X ∈ {0, 1}n , Y ∈ {0, 1}m and let ∆K(T)
be the masking function of MR-OMD as defined in Section 4.4. Let A be an adversary
that runs in time t and makes q queries. Then
Advprf
F˜
(A ) ≤ AdvprfF (B) +
3q2
2n
for some B that runs in time t+ γ · n · q and makes 2 · q queries.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 3.4; we just
need to show that the masking function of MR-OMD ∆K(T) = ∆K(α, i, j) is also a
2−n-uniform 2−n-AXU hash.
It is easy to verify that it is the case. Compared to the masking function of OMD, the j-
component of the tweak input can now take values up to 6, and its binary representation
will thus have at most three non-zero least-significant bits. This is taken care of by the
fact that L[0] = 23 ·L∗ (instead of 22 ·L∗ as in OMD). Also, we impose i ≤ 2n−5 (instead
of i ≤ 2n−4 as in OMD), so for every unique (i, j), (23 · γi⊕〈j〉n) is a unique element of
GF(2n). Here γi is the i
th codeword of the canonical Gray code defined in the proof of
Lemma 3.4.
With this property, the rest of the analysis of Lemma 3.4 carries over and yields the
desired result.
Security in the Nonce-Respecting Case. Intuitively, one would expect that the
security bound in the nonce-respecting setting should be somewhat better than the one
in the nonce-reuse case. Theorem 4.7 gives a bound on the AE security of MR-OMD in
the nonce-respecting scenario, confirming this intuition.
Theorem 4.7. Fix n ≥ 1 and τ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n}. Let F : K×({0, 1}n×{0, 1}m)→ {0, 1}n
be a PRF, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n. Let A be a CCA adversary that runs in time t, and makes
qe encryption queries and qd decryption queries that induce no more than σ calls to F
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in total. Then
AdvnaeMR-OMD[F,τ ](A ) ≤ AdvprfF (B) +
3σ2
2n
+
0.5q2e
2τ
+
qd
2τ
for some B that makes no more than 2 · q queries and runs in time t+ γ ·n · σ for some
constant γ.
Proof. The steps to prove this theorem are almost the same as for Theorem 4.1. The
only difference is in the proof for the security of the HASH algorithm as a PRF. This
is easy to see, as HASH is the only component of MR-OMD where the nonce is used.
Lemma 4.8 gives the PRF security bound for HASH in the nonce-respecting setting.
The bound stated in Theorem 4.7 is obtained combining Lemma 4.8 with Lemma 4.4,
Lemma 4.3, Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.6.
Lemma 4.8. Let MR-OMD[R˜, τ ] be the MR-OMD scheme that uses (tweakable) RF R˜.
Let A be a nonce-respecting adversary that makes at most q queries that induce no more
than σ calls to R˜ in total. Then
Advprf
MR-OMD[R˜,τ ].HASH
(A ) = 0.
Proof. Recall the proof of Lemma 4.2: theMR-OMD[R˜, τ ].HASH behaves as a RF unless
there is a collision in the input to the final RF. This is because the final random function,
determined by the final tweak, may be the same for several messages.
Now, considering that adversaries are nonce-respecting, we have that for every query
(N i, Ai,M i), 1 ≤ i ≤ q made by the adversary the nonce is distinct, i.e. N i 6= N j if
i 6= j. Each query is processed using a subset of T , that is disjoint with tweak sets used
to process all the other queries. Therefore, when a query is processed, the final tweak is
always fresh (never used before) and the random function is independent from all others
so far. The distribution produced by MR-OMD[R˜, τ ].HASH is then identical with that
produced by a random function ρ←$ Func(N ×A×M, {0, 1}τ ).
4.6 Parallelizable MR-OMD
The MR-OMD scheme described in section 4.4 is designed to be substantially similar to
OMD, so that it is able to share a lot of common software/hardware with OMD, while
achieving stronger security goals than OMD itself. This similarity also implies that the
encryption (and decryption) in MR-OMD is kept serial as it is in OMD. However, we
notice that the two-pass construction (in contrast to OMD which is one-pass) also opens
up the possibility of having a parallelizable version of the encryption (and decryption)
algorithm.
The IV in MR-OMD is computed from both associated data and message using a
PRF. Thus, the encryption is always dependent on the whole query (via IV) and we no
longer need to apply the serial, chaining encryption of OMD. So, in specific applications
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where there are possibilities for parallel computation, we might want to modify MR-
OMD to exploit this fact. For this purpose, we propose PMR-OMD. PMR-OMD uses
the same algorithms Initialize and HASH as MR-OMD, but the encryption (and the
decryption) algorithm uses counter mode. Schematic visualisation can be found in Figure
4.1. This replacement will of course get us further from the original OMD, which may
be inconvenient in hardware implementations; however, in software implementations,
the parallel execution might be exactly what we want, especially for general purpose
CPUs with multiple cores. The PMR-OMD is almost fully parallelizable, with a single
bottleneck in the form of the call to the compression function when processing the final
message block in the HASH algorithm.
Security of PMR-OMD. The security bounds of PMR-OMD are exactly the same
as those of MR-OMD, both in the nonce-misusing and nonce-respecting settings. This is
because the proof of $-privacy of the counter mode is essentially the same as the one of
$-privacy of the original OMD encryption. The remaining components of MR-OMD (and
thus also the proofs) remain unchanged. We therefore omit the proofs of the following
theorems.
Theorem 4.9. Fix n ≥ 1 and τ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n}. Let F : K×({0, 1}n×{0, 1}m)→ {0, 1}n
be a keyed function, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n. Let A be a CCA adversary that runs in time t,
makes qe encryption queries and qd decryption queries that induce no more than σ calls
to F in total. Then
AdvmraePMR-OMD[F,τ ](A ) ≤ AdvprfF (B) +
3.5σ2
2n
+
0.5q2e
2τ
+
qd
2τ
for some B that runs in time t+ γ · n · σ for some constant γ and makes 2 · σ queries.
Theorem 4.10. Fix n ≥ 1 and τ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n}. Let F : K × ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m) →
{0, 1}n be a PRF, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n. Let A be a CCA adversary that runs in time t,
makes qe encryption queries and qd decryption queries that induce no more than σ calls
to F in total. Then
AdvnaePMR-OMD[F,τ ](A ) ≤ AdvprfF (B) +
3σ2
2n
+
0.5q2e
2τ
+
qd
2τ
for some B that makes no more than 2 · q queries and runs in time t+ γ ·n · σ for some
constant γ.
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Chapter5
Boosting OMD for Almost Free
Authentication of Associated Data
This chapter is dedicated to pure OMD (p-OMD) which is a variant of OMD that has
improved performance.
The work presented in this chapter is a result of joint work with Reza Reyhanitabar
and Serge Vaudenay which was published in FSE 2015 [RVV15].
Organization of the Chapter. We briefly discuss the related work in Section 5.1
and give a summary of the contribution in Section 5.2.
We introduce pOMD in Section 5.3, give its description in Section 5.4, give its security
analysis in Section 5.5, and discuss its performance in Section 5.6.
5.1 Related Work
The security notion targeted by p-OMD is the same as for OMD, NAE security [Rog02].
The integration of AD-blocks into the message processing core of OMD is inspired by
the BNMAC by Yasuda [Yas07]. The first version of the publication that introduced p-
OMD claimed that p-OMD preserved authenticity under nonce misuse. This claim was
refuted by Ashur and Mennink who then proposed two simplified variants of p-OMD,
one of which did achieve the desired misuse resistant property [AM16].
5.2 Contribution
We design p-OMD, a variant of OMD that integrates the AD processing into the core
encryption algorithm of OMD. The algorithmic modifications that transforms OMD to
p-OMD make the AD processing almost free in terms of spent computational time, and
we prove that they have no adverse impact on security.
75
We theoretically predict and then experimentally verify the speedup of p-OMD com-
pared to OMD.
5.3 Pure OMD
The original OMD scheme couples a single pass of the modified Merkle-Damg˚ard (MD)
iteration (in which the intermediate chaining values are xored with specially crafted
offsets) with the counter-based XOR MAC algorithm [BGR95] to process a message
and its associated data. In this chapter, we investigate the possibility of making al-
gorithmic improvements to the original OMD scheme, aiming at boosting its efficiency,
while preserving its security properties.
In particular, we provide a positive answer to the question “can we dispense with the
XOR MAC algorithm, and make the scheme based purely on Merkle-Damg˚ard?” We
show that there is a natural way (inspired by the work by Yasuda [Yas07]) to modify
OMD to make it more compact and efficient with respect to processing associated data.
Our new variant of OMD, called pure OMD (p-OMD), has the following features:
It inherits all desirable security features of OMD. We prove the security of
p-OMD under the same standard assumption (namely, pseudo-randomness of the com-
pression function) as used for OMD. Furthermore, the proven security bounds for p-OMD
are the same as those of OMD. This shows that the modifications we made to OMD, to
obtain the performance-boosted variant p-OMD, are without sacrificing any security.
It has a more compact structure and processing AD is almost free. The
p-OMD scheme dispenses with the XOR MAC algorithm and is solely based on the
(masked) MD iteration. This is achieved by absorbing the associated data blocks during
the core MD path rather than processing them separately by an additional algorithm.
To encrypt a message of ` blocks together with associated data of a blocks, OMD needs
`+a+2 calls to the compression function while p-OMD only requires max {`, a}+2 calls.
That is, for a typical case where ` ≥ a, p-OMD makes just `+ 2 calls independently of
the length of AD.
5.4 Description
The AE scheme p-OMD is a mode of operation that converts a keyed compression
function to an AEAD scheme. To instantiate p-OMD, one must first choose and fix
a keyed compression function F : K × ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m) → {0, 1}n and a tag length
τ ≤ n, such that the key space K = {0, 1}k for an integer k and m ≤ n. Let p-OMD[F, τ ]
denote p-OMD instantiated by fixing F and τ .
An instance p-OMD[F, τ ] has a key spaceK = {0, 1}k, an AD spaceA ⊆ {0, 1}≤(n)·2n−6
and a message space M ⊆ {0, 1}≤m·2n−6 . We let `max = maxX∈A∪M(|X|m) denote the
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upper bound on the maximum number of blocks in any single message or AD. We require
that the nonce space N = {0, 1}ν for an integer 1 ≤ ν < n.
An overview. The main design rationale behind p-OMD is the integration of AD pro-
cessing into the same MD path that processes the message. While the overall structure
of such design is rather simple, the combined processing of the message and associated
data blocks in p-OMD creates a not-so-small number of cases that occur during the
encryption due to the possible lengths (and relative lengths) of messages and AD, and
need to be treated and analyzed carefully.
Figure 5.1 shows an illustration of the encryption algorithm of p-OMD[F, τ ]. The
decryption algorithm can be straightforwardly derived from the encryption algorithm
with the additional verification of the authentication tag at the end of the decryption
process. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 provide a complete algorithmic description ofthe encryption
algorithm of pOMD.
In the following, we briefly explain the main components of pOMD in more detail.
Computing ∆N,i,j. As shown in Figure 5.1, before each call to the underlying com-
pression function F , we xor a (key-dependent) masking value ∆N,i,j to a part fo the
input, where N is the nonce, the i component is incremented at each call to the com-
pression function and the j component is changed when needed (according to a pattern
that will be detailed shortly). In the following, all multiplications are in GF (2n).
Precomputation. Unlike in OMD, we precompute an array of L∗ values. We let
L∗[0] = 0n, define L∗[1] = FK(0n, 0m) and let L∗[i] = i · L∗[1] for 2 ≤ i ≤ 15.
We let L[0] = 24 ·L∗[1] and L[j] = 2 ·L[j−1] for j ≥ 1. For a fast implementation,
the values L∗[i] and L[j] can be precomputed and stored in a table for 1 ≤ i ≤ 15
and 0 ≤ j ≤ dlog2(`max)e. Alternatively, (if there is a memory restriction) they
can be computed on-the-fly.
Note that all L∗[i] are linear functions of L∗[1]. Thus L∗[int(〈j〉4⊕〈j′〉4)] =
L∗[j]⊕L∗[j′] for any j, j′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 15} (with a slight abuse of notation).
Computation of the masking sequence. The masking values ∆N,i,j are computed
sequentially as follows. We define ∆N,0,0 = FK(N‖10n−1−ν , 0m). To increment i,
we let
∆N,i,j = ∆N,i−1,j ⊕L[ntz(i)]
for i ≥ 1 and any j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 15}. To switch j, we let
∆N,i,j = ∆N,i,j′ ⊕L∗[int(〈j〉4⊕〈j′〉4)]
for any j, j′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 15}. For details on how we get this compact relation based
on the Gray code sequence, we refer to Appendix A.2.
Encryption algorithm. To encrypt a message M ∈ M with associated data A ∈ A
using nonce N ∈ N and key K ∈ K, obtaining a ciphertext C = C‖T ∈ {0, 1}|M |+τ , we
carry out the following steps.
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Case A:ℓ > 0 and |A|n = ℓ+ 1. Let M¯ℓ =Mℓ||10
m−|Mℓ |−1 if |Mℓ| < m and M¯ℓ =Mℓ otherwise.
Case B:ℓ > 0 and |A|n < ℓ+ 1. Let M¯ℓ =Mℓ||10
m−|Mℓ |−1 if |Mℓ| < m and M¯ℓ =Mℓ otherwise.
Let A¯′a′ = A
′
a′ ||10
n−|A′
a′
|−1 if |A′a′ | < n and A¯
′
a′ = A
′
a′ otherwise.
Let A¯′a′ = A
′
a′ ||10
n−|A′
a′
|−1 if |A′a′ | < n and A¯
′
a′ = A
′
a′ otherwise.
Case C:ℓ > 0 and |A|n > ℓ+ 1. Let M¯ℓ =Mℓ||10
m−|Mℓ |−1 if |Mℓ| < m and M¯ℓ =Mℓ otherwise.
Let A¯∗a∗ = A
∗
a∗ ||10
n+m−|A∗
a∗
|−1 if |A∗a∗ | < n+m and A¯
∗
a∗ = A
∗
a∗ otherwise.
Case F
Case D: M = ε and |A| > n. Let A¯∗a∗ = A
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|−1 if |A∗a∗ | < n+m and A¯
∗
a∗ = A
∗
a∗ otherwise.
Obtaining the
final tag.
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Case E: M = ε and 0 < |A| ≤ n. Let A¯′ = A′||10n−|A
′
|−1
if |A′| < n and A¯′ = A′ otherwise.
n bits
Tag′
b b b
b b b
M = A = ε
Figure 5.1 – The encryption algorithm of p-OMD[F, τ ]. For the details on how
the parameters and masking offsets are computed consult the description in Section 5.4.
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1: algorithm Precompute(K)
2: L∗[0] = 0n
3: L∗[1]← FK(0n, 0m)
4: for i← 2 to 15 do
5: L∗[i] = i · L∗[1]
6: end for
7: L[0]← 24 · L∗[1]
8: for i← 1 to dlog2(`max)e do
9: L[i] = 2 · L[i− 1]
10: end for
11: return
12: end algorithm
1: algorithm EK(N,A,M)
2: if ν > n− 1 then
3: return ⊥
4: end if
5: PARTITION(A,M)
6: PAD(A′, A∗,M)
7: ∆← FK(N‖10n−1−ν , 0m)
8: ∆← ∆⊕L[0] . ∆N,1,0
9: H ← 0n; j ← 0
10: if a′ = 0 and ` = 0 then
11: SWITCH(∆, j, 3)
12: else if a′ = 0 then
13: SWITCH(∆, j, 1)
14: else
15: H ← H ⊕A′1
16: if a′ = 1 and a∗ > 0 then
17: SWITCH(∆, j, 2)
18: else if a′ = 1 and ` = 0 then
19: SWITCH(∆, j, 12 + jA + jM )
20: end if
21: end if
22: H ← FK(H ⊕∆, 〈τ〉m)
23: i← 2
24: if a′ > 1 then . stage 1
25: PROC1(M,A′, H,∆, i)
26: Ci−1 ← H ⊕Mi−1
27: H ← H ⊕A′i
28: ∆← ∆⊕L[ntz(i)]
29: if a∗ = 0 and i = `+ 1 then
30: SWITCH(∆, j, 4 + jA + jM )
31: H ← FK(H ⊕∆, M¯i−1)
32: else
33: H ← FK(H ⊕∆,Mi−1)
34: end if
35: i← a′ + 1
36: end if
37: if ` ≥ a′ then . stage 2
38: SWITCH(∆, j, 1)
39: PROC2(M,H,∆, i)
40: Ci−1 ← H ⊕Mi−1
41: ∆← ∆⊕L[ntz(i)]
42: SWITCH(∆, j, 8 + jA + jM )
43: H ← FK(H ⊕∆, M¯i−1)
44: else if a∗ > 0 then . stage 3
45: SWITCH(∆, j, 2)
46: PROC3(A∗, H,∆, i)
47: H ← H ⊕ leftn (A∗a∗)
48: ∆← ∆⊕L[ntz(i)]
49: SWITCH(∆, j, 12 + jA + jM )
50: H ← FK(H ⊕∆, rightm (A∗a∗))
51: end if
52: T ← H[n− 1 · · ·n− τ ]
53: C← C1‖C2‖ · · · ‖C`‖T
54: return C
55: end algorithm
Figure 5.2 – Description of the encryption algorithm of p-OMD[F, τ ]. stage
1 processes blocks of message and AD simultaneously (Cases A,B and C in Figure
5.1). stage 2 processes only message blocks (Case B in Figure 5.1 and the case when
we only have a message and no AD that is not illustrated). stage 3 processes only
double blocks of AD (Cases C and D in Figure 5.1). Note that the Cases E and F are
handled outside of the three stages. Subroutines PARTITION, PAD, SWITCH and
PROC1-3 are described in Figure 5.3. The subroutine PAD pads the final blocks of M
and A if necessary, and computes jM and jA which help determine the final value of j
for producing the tag.
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1: procedure PARTITION(A,M)
2: b← n+m
3: M1‖ . . . ‖M` m←M . (` = |M |m)
4: A′ ← left(`+1)·n (A)
5: A∗ ← right|A|−(`+1)·n (A)
6: A′1‖ . . . ‖A′a′ n←− A′ . (a′ = |A′|n)
7: A∗1‖ . . . ‖A∗a∗ b←− A∗ . (a∗ = |A∗|n+m)
8: end procedure
1: procedure PAD(A′, A∗,M)
2: if |M | mod m 6= 0 then
3: M¯` ←M`‖10m−|M`|−1
4: jM ← 1
5: else
6: M¯` ←M`
7: jM ← 0
8: end if
9: if |A′| mod n 6= 0 then
10: A′a′ ← A′a′‖10n−|A
′
a′ |−1
11: jA ← 2
12: else if |A∗| mod n+m 6= 0 then
13: A∗a∗ ← A∗a∗‖10n+m−|A
∗
a∗ |−1
14: jA ← 2
15: else
16: jA ← 0
17: end if
18: end procedure
1: procedure SWITCH(∆, j, jnew)
2: ∆← ∆⊕L∗(int(〈j〉4⊕〈jnew〉4))
3: j ← jnew
4: end procedure
1: procedure PROC1(M,A′, H,∆, i)
2: for r ← i to a′ do
3: Cr−1 ← H ⊕Mr−1
4: H ← H ⊕A′r
5: ∆← ∆⊕L[ntz(r)]
6: H ← FK(H ⊕∆,Mr−1)
7: end for
8: i← a′
9: end procedure
1: procedure PROC2(M,H,∆, i)
2: for r ← i to ` do
3: Cr−1 ← H ⊕Mr−1
4: ∆← ∆⊕L[ntz(r)]
5: H ← FK(H ⊕∆,Mr−1)
6: end for
7: end procedure
1: procedure PROC3(A∗, H,∆, i)
2: for r ← 1 to a∗ − 1 do
3: H ← H ⊕ leftn (A∗r)
4: ∆← ∆⊕L[ntz(i+ r − 1)]
5: H ← FK(H ⊕∆, rightm (A∗r))
6: end for
7: end procedure
Figure 5.3 – The subroutines of the encryption algorithm of p-OMD[F, τ ] (see
Figure 5.2).
Enc.: Partitioning the message and associated data. The inputs are partitioned
by PARTITION subroutine described in Figure 5.3. Let M1‖M2 · · · ‖M` m← M .
Let A′‖A∗ ← A where A′ ← left(`+1)·n (A) and A∗ ← right|A|−(`+1)·n (A).
Let A′1‖A′2 · · · ‖A′a′
n←− A′ and A∗1‖A∗2 · · · ‖A∗a∗ n+m←−−− A∗. The string A′ consists of
a′ ≤ `+ 1 n-bit blocks and these blocks will be simply absorbed into the chaining
variable during the message encryption. In a typical use case where the associated
data is shorter than the message, we will have A′ = A and A∗ = ε (Case A and
Case B in Figure 5.1). The string A∗ will be non-empty only if |A| > (` + 1)n,
in which case, while A∗ is being processed, there are no more message blocks to
encrypt. To maximize the efficiency, we partition the string A∗ into n + m-bit
blocks so that we can make use of the whole input to F (see Case C and Case
D in Figure 5.1).
Enc.: Processing the message and associated data. The message and associated
data blocks are processed by the modified Merkle-Damg˚ard iteration of F as shown
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in Figure 5.1. For every call to F , the n-bit input (chaining variable) is masked
by the value ∆N,i,j , where i starts with the value i = 1 at the first call to F
and is incremented for every call, and the j component is used to separate logical
parts in the encryption process, as well as different types of input arguments. An
appropriate use of the j component is essential for security.
Enc.: Selection of the j component in the index of ∆N,i,j. We use several val-
ues of j to separate the calls to the masked F in different contexts. We classify
the calls to the masked F to two types: (1) the final call to F which returns the
tag, and (2) the remaining internal calls. We note that in the special case that
M = ε and |A| ≤ n there will be only one call to F which returns the tag; hence,
it is considered as the final call.
Internal Calls. We use j ∈ {0, 1, 2} for the internal F -calls as follows.
For i = 1, i.e. the first call to F , the value of j is determined like this:
• if ` > 0 and a′ > 0 then let j = 0,
• if ` > 0 and a′ = 0 then let j = 1,
• if ` = 0 and a∗ > 0 then let j = 2.
For 1 < i < `+ 1 + a∗, depending on the presence of message blocks and AD
blocks to be processed at the ith call to the masked F , we have:
• if both an n-bit AD block and an m-bit message block are present then
j = 0,
• if only an m-bit message block is present (no AD block is processed) then
j = 1,
• if only an (n+m)-bit AD block is present (no message block is processed)
then j = 2.
Final Call. The final call to F , which produces the authentication, tag uses jf ∈
{3, 4, 5, . . . , 14, 15}. If the tag is produced by a call to F with i 6= 1, we have
three main cases depending on the inputs to the final masked F .
• If both an AD block and a message block are present in the final call (see
Case A in Figure 5.1) then jf ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}; we let jf = 4 if |M`| = m
and |A′a′ | = n; let jf = 5 if |M`| < m and |A′a′ | = n; let jf = 6 if |M`| = m
and |A′a′ | < n, and otherwise (|M`| < m and |A′a′ | < n) let jf = 7.
• If only a message block is present but no AD block is processed in the
final call (see Case B in Figure 5.1) then jf ∈ {8, 9, 10, 11}; we let jf = 8
if |M`| = m and |A′a′ | = n; let jf = 9 if |M`| < m and |A′a′ | = n; let
jf = 10 if |M`| = m and |A′a′ | < n, and otherwise let jf = 11 if |M`| < m
and |A′a′ | < n. For the special case where there is no associate data at
all, i.e. A = ε, we let jf = 8 if |M`| = m and let jf = 9 if |M`| < m.
• If only an AD block is present but no message block is processed in the fi-
nal call (see Case C and Case D in Figure 5.1) then jf ∈ {12, 13, 14, 15};
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we let jf = 12 if |M`| = m and |A∗a∗ | = n + m; let jf = 13 if |M`| < m
and |A∗a∗ | = n + m; let jf = 14 if |M`| = m and |A∗a∗ | < n + m, and
otherwise let jf = 15 if |M`| < m and |A∗a∗ | < n+m. For the special case
where there is no message at all, i.e. M = ε, let jf = 12 if |A∗a∗ | = n+m
and let jf = 14 if |A∗a∗ | < n+m.
For i = 1 (meaning that the final call is the same as the first call, which
happens if M = ε AND |A| ≤ n) we need to apply a special treatment:
• if both M = A = ε then jf = 3 (Case F in Figure 5.1),
• if M = ε and 0 < |A| ≤ n then we let jf = 12 if |A| = n, otherwise, let
jf = 14 (Case E box in Figure 5.1).
Note that there is no variable jf in Figure 5.2 as jf corresponds to a special use
of variable j in the last call to F . Specifically, jf corresponds to the calls to the
SWITCH subroutine that use the value of new j of the form const + jA + jM or
the value 3.
Decryption algorithm. Considering that the encryption process of p-OMD is actu-
ally a self-synchronizing stream cipher with an integrated authentication mechanism,
the decryption process proceeds in a very similar way as the encryption process up until
the verification of the tag, which happens at the end of the decryption process where
the newly computed tag T ′ is compared with the provided tag T . If T ′ = T then output
M , otherwise output ⊥.
5.5 Security Analysis
The security analysis for p-OMD is modular and follows similar steps as the analysis of
OMD:
Step 1: We first analyse the security of a generalized variant of p-OMD[F, τ ] where
the masked F gets replaced by an ideal primitive; namely, a (tweakable) random
function R˜. This generalized scheme is called p-OMD[R˜, τ ] and is illustrated in
Figure 5.4. This is the major proof step which differs from and is more involved
than that of OMD.
Step 2: We instantiate the (tweakable) random function R˜ by a (tweakble) PRF F˜ .
This is a standard step and it is the same as for OMD.
Step 3: We instantiate a (tweakable) PRF using a PRF (with a smaller domain) using
the XE method [Rog04a] with the masking sequence based on the canonical Gray
code [RBBK01, KR11]. This step is similar to that of OMD, only the details of
the mask generation function differ.
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The security bound for p-OMD is stated in Theorem 5.1. It is interesting to note that
the security bound is the same as that of OMD, showing that the modifications we made
to OMD to obtain p-OMD are without any loss of security.
Theorem 5.1. Fix n ≥ 1, 0 ≤ τ ≤ n. Let F : K × ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m) → {0, 1}n
be a PRF with 1 ≤ m ≤ n. Let A be a CPA adversary that runs in time t, makes
qe encryption queries that induce no more than σe n calls to F in total, such that no
individual input (AD or message) is more that `max m-bit blocks long. Let further A ′
be a CCA adversary that runs in time t′, makes q′e encryption queries and q′d decryption
queries that induce no more than σ′ calls to F in total, such that no individual input is
more that `′max m-bit blocks long. We have
Advprivp−OMD[F,τ ](A ) ≤ AdvprfF (B) +
3σ2e
2n
Advauthp−OMD[F,τ ](A
′) ≤ AdvprfF (B′) +
3σ2
2n
+
qd`max
2n
+
qd
2τ
for some B that makes 2 · σe queries and runs in time t+ γ · n · σ for some constant γ,
and B’ that makes 2 · σ′ queries and runs in time t′ + γ′ · n · σ′ for some constant γ′.
Proof. The proof is obtained by combining Lemma 5.2 with Lemma 5.3 and Lemma 5.4.
Idealization of p-OMD. The scheme p-OMD[R˜, τ ] is a generalization of p-OMD[F, τ ]
that uses a (tweakable) random function R˜←$ F˜unc(T , 2m+n, 2n) instead of the masked
F . The p-OMD[R˜, τ ] is depicted in Figure 5.4. The tweak space T consists of sixteen
mutually exclusive sets of tweaks T = ⋃15j=0N × N× {j}.
Lemma 5.2. Let p-OMD[R˜, τ ] be the scheme shown in Figure 5.4. Let A be an
information-theoretic CPA adversary that makes qe encryption queries that induce no
more than σe calls to R˜ in total, such that no individual input (AD or message) is more
that `max m-bit blocks long. Let further A ′ be an information theoretic CCA adversary
that makes q′e encryption queries and q′d decryption queries that induce no more than σ
′
calls to R˜ in total, such that no individual input is more that `′max m-bit blocks long.
Then
Advpriv
p-OMD[R˜,τ ]
(A ) = 0
Advauth
p-OMD[R˜,τ ](A
′) ≤ qd`max
2n
+
qd
2τ
Proof. The proof of the PRIV bound is straightforward. Each of the encryption queries
(N1, A1,M1) · · · (N qe , Aqe ,M qe) asked by A has a distinct nonce. Referring to Fig-
ure 5.4, this means that every evaluation of R˜N
x,i,j(·) uses a distinct tweak, hence the
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′
1||10
n−|A′1 |−1
if |A′1| < n and A¯
′
1 = A
′
1 otherwise.
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Figure 5.4 – The p-OMD[R˜, τ ] scheme using a tweakable random function R˜ ←$
F˜unc(T , 2n+m, 2n).
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ciphertexts Cr for 1 ≤ r ≤ qe that the adversary sees are uniform and independent.
The proof of the authenticity bound requires a rather involved case analysis. A visu-
alisation of the hierarchy of the cases as a tree is presented in Figure 5.5 to improve
the clarity of the proof. We first analyse the case where the adversary makes a single
verification query and then we use the generic result of Bellare et al. [BGM04] to get a
bound against adversaries that make multiple verification queries.
Let A ′ be an adversary making qe encryption queries (N1, A1,M1) · · · (N qe , Aqe ,M qe)
and a single decryption query (N,A,C).
Let M i = M i1 · · ·M i`i be the message and Ai = A′
i
1 · · ·A′ia′i ||A∗1
i · · ·A∗a∗i
i be the asso-
ciated data in the ith encryption query. Let Ci = Ci||T i be the ciphertext received for
query (N i, Ai,M i). We let xi = 1+`i+a
∗
i denote the number of calls to the (tweakable)
random function R˜ made while processing the ith query. Note that xi is also the value
of the second tweak component used in the final call to the compression function which
produces T i. We further let jif denote the third component of the tweak used in the
final call to R˜ when processing the ith query.
Let A = A′1 · · ·A′a′ ||A∗1 · · ·A∗a∗ be the associated data, C = C||T the ciphertext where
C = C1 · · ·C` and T ∈ {0, 1}τ be the tag in the decryption query. Let M = M1 · · ·M`
denote the corresponding decrypted message. We let x = 1 + ` + a∗ be the number
of calls to R˜ made while processing the forgery attempt. This is also the value of the
second tweak component in the final call to the compression function that is supposed
to produce the T . We further let jf denote the third component of the tweak used in
the final call to R˜ when processing the alleged forgery.
In the proof we use the intermediate chaining variables that occur in the query pro-
cessing. We let H ir denote the output of the r
th call to the compression function in
the processing of the ith encryption query, so we have H i1 = R˜
N,1,0(A′i1, 〈τ〉m) and
T i = leftτ
(
H ixi
)
. Similarly, we let Hr stand for r
th intermediate chaining value in the
processing of the forgery attempt.
We have the following disjoint cases that can occur upon the decryption query of A ′.
The negation of an event E is denoted as E¯.
Case 1: N /∈ {N1, · · ·N qe}. We let E1 denote the event N /∈ {N1, · · ·N qe} in the
following. The adversary has to find a correct T that is the first τ bits produced
by a call to R˜N,x,jf (·). Because the nonce-component N of the tweak N, x, jf has
not been used in any encryption query, A ′ has not seen any image under R˜N,x,jf (·)
Thus the probability that the adversary can succeed in finding correct value of T
is 2−τ .
All the following cases are conditioned by E¯1, the negation of E1. That is, N = N
i for a
single i ∈ {1, . . . , qe} (noticing that no nonce is reused during encryption queries). We
can ignore all other than the ith query since the corresponding ciphertexts are statistically
independent with the images of R˜ used to process the forgery attempt N,A,C with
N = N i.
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Case1
Case2
Case4.1
Case4.2
Case4.3
All cases
Case3
E1
E¯1
E2
E¯2
E3
E¯3
N is fresh
jf 6= j
i
f
x 6= xi
a′ = ℓ+ 1 = a′i = ℓi + 1; a
∗ = a∗i = 0
a′ < ℓ+ 1 = ℓi + 1 > a
′
i; a
∗ = a∗i = 0
Remaining case
Figure 5.5 – The structure of the proof of p-OMD’s authenticity. A condition
on an edge applies to the whole subtree.
Case 2: E¯1 ∧E2, where E2 is the event that jf 6= jif . Recall that a successfully forged T
must be the first τ bits of a value produced by R˜N,x,jf (·). The inequality jf 6= jif
occurring in this case implies the adversary has not seen any image under R˜N,x,jf (·)
(no matter what are the values of x and xi) and the adversary has to guess the
correct T . The probability of a successful forgery is therefore 2−τ .
We introduce auxiliary notation for the analysis of the remaining cases. Consider the
ith encryption query. Depending on the length of the message |M i| and the length of
AD |Ai|, we can have three situations. In the first situation, we have |M i|m + 1 = |Ai|n
and |M i| > 0 (Case A in Figure 5.4). This means that the compression function call
used to produce T i has a block of message at its m-bit input and an AD block xored
to the chaining variable at its n-bit input. We denote this event as type-1i and we
note that jif ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}. The second possible situation arises if |M i|m + 1 > |Ai|n with
|M i| > 0 (Case B in Figure 5.4). There is no block of the AD xored to the n-bit input
of the final compression function call. We denote this event as type-2i and we note
that jif ∈ {8, 9, 10, 11}. The last possible situation is when either |M i|m + 1 < |Ai|n and
|Ai| > n so there is a block of AD xored to the n-bit input as well as another block fed
directly to the m-bit input in the final call to the compression function (Cases C, D
in Figure 5.4) or 0 < |Ai| ≤ n and M i = ε (Case E in Figure 5.4). We denote this by
type-3i and we note that jif ∈ {12, 13, 14, 15}.
We define type-1, type-2 and type-3 for the forgery attempt in a similar way (note
that |C| = |M |).
In the following, we need to address the event E¯1 ∧ E¯2 i.e., N = N i, jf = jif . We remark
that the condition E¯2 is met for a valid forgery (i.e., (A,M) 6= (Ai,M i)) if and only if
both the ith encryption query and the alleged forgery are
• non-empty, i.e., (A,M) 6= (ε, ε) ∧ (Ai,M i) 6= (ε, ε),
86
Boosting OMD for Almost Free Authentication of Associated Data
• padded in the same way, i.e.,
(|C| ≡ 0 (mod m)⇔ |Ci| ≡ 0 (mod m))
and (|A′| ≡ 0 (mod n)⇔ |A′i| ≡ 0 (mod m))
and (|A∗| ≡ 0 (mod m+ n)⇔ |A∗i| ≡ 0 (mod m+ n))
(in other words, we pad the last block of M iff we pad the last block of M i and
the same applies for associated data),
• of the same “type”, i.e.,(
type-1 ∧ type-1i) ∨ (type-2 ∧ type-2i) ∨ (type-3 ∧ type-3i) .
Case 3: E¯1 ∧ E¯2 ∧ E3 where E3 stands for the event that x 6= xi. Recall that T i is
produced as the τ most significant bits of an image under R˜N,xi,j
i
f (·) for some jif ,
and T is produced as the τ most significant bits of an image under R˜N,x,jf (·) for
some jf . We have two sub-cases.
Case 3a: If x > xi then A ′ has seen no image under R˜N,x,jf (·) regardless of the
value of jf and the probability of a successful forgery (equivalent to guessing
τ random bits) is 2−τ .
Case3b: If x < xi then a single image under R˜
N,x,ji(·) was used in processing
of the ith encryption query. However T is produced by R˜N,x,jf (·), such that
ji 6= jf because the values of ji used for “internal” calls to R˜ are disjoint with
those that produce tags. The probability of a successful forgery (equivalent
to guessing τ random bits) is 2−τ .
Case 4: It remains to address the cases, where we have E¯1∧ E¯2∧ E¯3, i.e., the case, when
the ith encryption query and the alleged forgery (1) share the same nonce, (2) are
padded in the same way, are both non-empty, are of the same “type” so jf = j
i
f
and (3) they are both processed with the same number of calls to the compression
function. We investigate each of the three possible “types” separately.
Case 4.1: E¯1 ∧ E¯2 ∧ E¯3 ∧
(
type-1 ∧ type-1i). This means that a′ = ` + 1 = x = xi =
a′i = `i + 1, a∗ = 0 and a∗i = 0. Both T i and T are produced by the same RF
R˜N,x,4(·). W.l.o.g. assume that both |A′| and |A′i| are a multiple of n and both
|M | and |M i| are a multiple of m. We can make this assumption because E¯2 holds
and because in the other cases the incomplete blocks are injectively padded to full
length.
The adversary can succeed in producing a valid forgery in two ways. Either the
inputs into the last R˜-call in the processing of the ith encryption query and of
the forgery attempt are distinct, i.e., (H ix−1 ⊕ A′ia′ ,M i`) 6= (Hx−1 ⊕ A′a′ ,M`), or
they are equal, i.e., (H ix−1 ⊕ A′ia′ ,M i`) = (Hx−1 ⊕ A′a′ ,M`). In the former case,
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the adversary is left with the task of guessing the output value of a RF on an
input, that has not been evaluated before which is bounded with the probability
pfn = 2
−τ .
In the latter case, the equality (H ix−1⊕A′ia′ ,M i`) = (Hx−1⊕A′a′ ,M`) permits the
adversary to set T = T i. We must have (N,A,M) 6= (N i, Ai,M i), so there is a
position r in which the two queries differ, i.e., we must have an 1 ≤ r < x, such
that (A′r,Mr) 6= (A′ir,M ir) and after which the queries are identical. So A ′ has
surely not seen the image Hr = R˜
N,r,jr(Hr−1 ⊕ A′r,Mr) but he must ensure that
Hr = H
i
r. This happens with a probability of 2
−n for a single r. We bound the
total probability of achieving the final collision by pfe = (x− 1)2−n obtained as a
union bound over r.
The bound of Case 4.1 is finally obtained as the sum
pfn + pfe = (x− 1)2−n + 2−τ ≤ `max · 2−n + 2−τ .
Case 4.2: E¯1 ∧ E¯2 ∧ E¯3 ∧
(
type-2 ∧ type-2i). This implies `+ 1 > |A|n, `i + 1 > |Ai|n
and a∗ = a∗i = 0, so x = x′ = ` + 1 = `i + 1. W.l.o.g. assume that both |A′|
and |A′i| are a multiple of n and both |M | and |M i| are a multiple of m by similar
argument as in Case 4.1. We have two subcases:
Case 4.2a: |A|n = |Ai|n, i.e., a′ = a′i. Analysis of this case is very similar to
Case 4.1. Again we observe, that the adversary’s chance to produce a forgery
is bounded by 2−τ if the inputs to the final RF are distinct. The adversary
can reuse T i if he manages to force the collision on the inputs to the final
RF. The probability that A ′ can succeed in forcing this collision is bounded
in the same way as in Case 4.1 by summing 2−n for 1 ≤ r < x. For r > a′,
we have no more blocks of A′ to consider, which gives the adversary even less
power. We conclude that the probability of forgery in this case is bounded
by 2−τ + `max · 2−n.
Case 4.2b: |A|n 6= |Ai|n, i.e., a′ 6= a′i. The analysis of this case is very similar to
the previous one. We need to additionally consider that if a′ > a′i then there
is at least one r, such that 1 ≤ r < x and there is a block A′r but there is no
block A′ir (or the other way around if a′ < a′i). This implies that A ′ may be
able to force the same data inputs to be fed to the rth call to R˜. However,
these will processed with different tweaks R˜N,r,0(·) and R˜N,r,1(·), ensuring
that the collision on Hr happens with probability 2
−n. Keeping this in mind,
the analysis of this case follows the same structure as the previous case and
we conclude that the probability of forgery is bounded by 2−τ + `max · 2−n
Case 4.3: E¯1 ∧ E¯2 ∧ E¯3 ∧
(
type-3 ∧ type-3i) so ` + 1 < |A|n and `i + 1 < |Ai|n, so
x = x′ = `+ 1 + a∗ = `i + 1 + a∗i. W.l.o.g. assume that both |A∗| and |A∗i| are a
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multiple of n+m and both |M | and |M i| are a multiple of m by similar argument
as in Case 4.1. We have three subcases.
Case 4.3a: 0 < |A| ≤ n, 0 < |Ai| ≤ n and M = M i = ε. W.l.o.g. assume
|A| = |Ai| = n (due to injective padding). Since the alleged forgery must be
different from all encryption queries, we have A 6= Ai and the adversary must
guess the output of a RF on a new input. The probability of forgery is thus
2−τ . In following two subcases we have |A| > n and |Ai| > n.
Case 4.3b: |M |m = |M i|m, i.e., ` = `i and a∗ = a∗i. The analysis is almost
identical as in case 4.2a, with the difference that for r > ` + 1 we have no
more blocks of M to consider but we have n+m blocks of AD instead. The
probability of inner collisions Hr = H
i
r for r > `+ 1 is thus also 2
−n and we
conclude that the probability of forgery is bounded by 2−τ + `max · 2−n.
Case 4.3c: |M |m 6= |M i|m, i.e., ` 6= `i and a∗ 6= a∗i. Similarly as in Case 4.2b
we need to take into account that the adversary can change the length of
message and AD, so that there must be r such that 1 ≤ r < x and such that
there is Mr but no M
i
r (or the other way around). The domain separation by
the j-component of the tweaks again ensures that the probability of internal
collision Hr = H
i
r is 2
−n for such r. We conclude that the probability of
forgery is bounded by 2−τ + `max · 2−n.
Finally, using the results of Bellare et al. [BGM04] we get the bound against adversaries
that make qd decryption queries as
qd
2τ +
qd`max
2n .
Instantiation of Tweakable RFs with Tweakable PRFs. This is a classical step
in which the ideal primitive—tweakable random function R˜—is replaced with a standard
primitive—tweakable PRF F˜ . The security loss induced by this step is stated in the
following lemma.
Lemma 5.3. Let R˜ : T ×({0, 1}n×{0, 1}m)→ {0, 1}n be a RF and F˜ : K×T ×({0, 1}n×
{0, 1}m) → {0, 1}n be a keyed function. Let A be a CPA adversary that runs in time
t, makes qe encryption queries that induce no more than σe n calls to F in total, such
that no individual input (AD or message) is more that `max blocks long. Let further A ′
be a CCA adversary that runs in time t′, makes q′e encryption queries and q′d decryption
queries that induce no more than σ′ calls to F in total, such that no individual input is
more that `′max blocks long. Then
Advpriv
p-OMD[F˜ ,τ ]
(A ) ≤ Advpriv
p-OMD[R˜,τ ]
(B) + Advprf
F˜
(C )
Advauth
p-OMD[F˜ ,τ ](A
′) ≤ Advauth
p-OMD[R˜,τ ](B
′) + Advprf
F˜
(C ′)
B and B′ are information theoretic adversaries that have the same resources (except for
time complexity) as A and A ′ respectively, and where C and C ′ make no more than σ
and σ′ queries respectively and run in time t + γ · n · σe and t′ + γ′ · n · σ′ respectively
with some constants γ, γ′.
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Proof. The proof of this lemma uses the same reductions as the proof of Lemma 3.3.
Instantiation of Tweakable PRFs with PRFs. The last step is to instantiate the
(tweakable) PRFs by means of a (keyed) compression function which is assumed to be
a secure PRF. We use a very similar technique to what is done in OMD and MR-OMD,
inspired by the XE construction [Rog04a].
The difference between the OMD and p-OMD is the way that the masking sequence
∆N,i,j is computed. This difference is introduced because we need more values of the
j-component compared to OMD. In p-OMD, the tweak space is of the form
T = N × {0, 1, . . . , 2n−6} × {0, 1, · · · , 15}.
Lemma 5.4. Let F : K × ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m) → {0, 1}n be a keyed function key
space K. Let F˜ : K × T × ({0, 1}n × {0, 1}m) → {0, 1}n be defined by F˜ 〈T〉K (X,Y ) =
FK((X ⊕∆K(T)), Y ) for every T ∈ T ,K ∈ K, X ∈ {0, 1}n , Y ∈ {0, 1}m and let ∆K(T)
be the masking function of p-OMD as defined in Section 5.4. Let further A be an ad-
versary that runs in time t and makes q queries. Then we have
Advprf
F˜
(A ) ≤ AdvprfF (B) +
3q2
2n
for some B that runs in time t+ γ · q for a constant γ and makes 2q queries.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is an adaptation of the analysis made by Krovetz and
Rogaway [KR11], by similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 3.4.
For the proof to apply, we need to prove that ∆K(T) is a 2
−n-uniform 2−n-AXU hash.
As shown in Appendix A.2, this can be easily verified.
5.6 Performance
One of the goals we sought to achieve with the design of p-OMD was to (significantly)
improve over the performance of OMD. In this section, we investigate what is the exact
improvement.
Predicting the speed-up. The speed-up of p-OMD over the original OMD (see Sec-
tion 3.4) comes from the fact, that in most applications, we can dispense with all com-
pression function calls that needed to be made by OMD to process AD.
Of course, this has to be compensated by a more complicated masking scheme, and
(much) more complicated algorithm that makes sure correct masks are being computed.
However, the computational cost of the saved compression function calls largely out-
weighs the overhead induced by the complicated masking scheme.
We can derive a theoretical upper-bound on the speed-up achieved by p-OMD relative
to OMD. To simplify the analysis, we neglect the overhead induced by the masking, and
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assume the whole algorithm is executed sequentially (i.e. we do not consider parallelism),
and we assume all L∗ and L values are precomputed.
Given an encryption query (N,A,M), OMD needs to make a + ` + 2 calls to the
compression function, where a = |A|m+n, ` = |M |m and the two extra calls are needed
to compute the tag and the initial N -dependent value. For the same query, p-OMD needs
`+ a′ + a∗ + 2 calls to the compression function, where ` = |M |m, a′ = min(`+ 1, |A|n),
a∗ = |right|A|−a′·n (A) |m+n and the 2 extra calls are the same as for OMD.
In most situations AD will not be too long, and we will have a∗ = 0. Based on this
assumption, we can estimate the relative speed-up of p-OMD over OMD as
S =
2 + `+ a
2 + `
,
i.e. p-OMD will be about S times faster than OMD.
We further simplify the analysis by assuming n = m (as is the case for the compression
functions of SHA256 and SHA512). The speed-up will be maximal if a = b(` + 1)/2c.
In that case, we have
S =
2 + `+ a
2 + `
≈ 1.5
if ` is large enough. Thus, we expect that under ideal conditions, p-OMD can be up to
1.5 times faster than OMD.
Experiments. To verify the predicted speed-up of p-OMD over OMD, we implemen-
ted the two algorithms in software and made measurements to determine and compare
their performance.
The comparison is performed on the x86-64 architecture (Intel Core i7-3632QM, with
all measurements carried out on a single core). For OMD, we used the OMD-sha512
instantiation optimised for the AVX1 instruction extension, which achieves the best
performance for OMD (see Section 3.7). We made the necessary modifications (as in
description of p-OMD) to the same code to obtain an implementation of p-OMD. Both
OMD and p-OMD were instantiated with the same parameters: key length=512, nonce
length=256, tag length=256. Both implementations have been built using the gcc com-
piler and setting the -Ofast optimization flag.
We measure the time complexity of the encryption process for varying lengths of
message and associated data. For the rest of this section, let m denote the mes-
sage length and a the AD length in bytes. We measure the encryption time for m ∈
{64, 128, 192, . . . , 4096} and a ∈ {64, 128, . . .m} for every value of m. That is, we con-
sider the typical case when AD is at most as long as the message.
For both OMD and p-OMD and for every pair of values m, a, we measure the time
of one encryption using the rdtsc instruction 200 times to compute the mean time.
This is repeated 91 times and the value we take as the result is the median of these
91 mean encryption times. We additionally apply the same procedure to measure time
91
58
11
14
17
20
0 512 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
(
c
y
c
l
e
s
/
b
y
t
e
)
a (bytes)
 p-OMD (m=4kB) 
 OMD (m=4kB) 
5
8
11
14
17
20
0 512 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
(
c
y
c
l
e
s
/
b
y
t
e
)
m (bytes)
 p-OMD (a = m) 
 OMD (a = m) 
128
1024
2048
3072
4096
128
1024
2048
3072
4096
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
(
c
y
c
l
e
s
/
b
y
t
e
)
m (bytes)
a (bytes)
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
(
c
y
c
l
e
s
/
b
y
t
e
)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
0 512 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096
T
i
m
e
 
(
c
y
c
l
e
s
)
m (bytes)
p-OMD (a = m) 
 OMD (a = m) 
 OMD (a = 0) 
Figure 5.6 – Performance comparisons between OMD and p-OMD. Top left:
encryption complexity with fixed message length. Top right: encryption complexity
with equal message length and AD length. Bottom right: comparison of OMD without
AD to OMD and p-OMD with AD. Bottom left: encryption complexity of p-OMD for
varying message and AD lengths.
complexity of the encryption of OMD with m ∈ {64, 128, . . . , 4096} and a = 0. The
results are shown in Figure 5.6.
The top left graph in Figure 5.6 shows that the relative complexity of encryption
of both OMD and p-OMD decreases as the length of AD increases; however, p-OMD
performs better than OMD. The top right graph demonstrates that if the length of AD
is close to the message length then p-OMD has a clear advantage over OMD, and for
longer messages we observe the speedup close to the predicted 150%. The bottom right
graph confirms that the p-OMD provides an almost free authentication of associated
data compared to OMD.
For both OMD and p-OMD, these measurements exclude the complexity of the pre-
computation step in computing ∆N,i,j (see Section 5.4) which is done only once during
the whole lifetime of a key. As an upper bound, we measure the complexity of the
precomputation step that is sufficient to encrypt messages with length up to 263 blocks.
For OMD the precomputation step takes 5818 cycles while in p-OMD it requires 6863
cycles on average.
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5.7 Follow-up Work
The main shortcoming of p-OMD is the complexity of the algorithm and the amount of
precomputation it requires for an implementation to be truly efficient. The two major
negative consequences of p-OMD’s complexity are the difficulty of verifying the security
proofs, and the difficulty of implementing the encryption and the decryption algorithms
correctly, as pointed out by Ashur and Mennink [AM16].
They proposed an alternative called Spoed, 1 which reduces the complexity of the
algorithms, but achieves slightly better quantitative security, and has the same compu-
tational complexity in most cases. Spoed uses an efficient padding function to injectively
transform a message-AD pair into a sequence of 2n-bit words, which then gets processed
in a similar way to p-OMD’s encryption algorithm. Because the padding scheme encodes
the lengths of the two inputs into the output sequence, the encryption algorithm does
not need to explicitly differentiate as many cases as p-OMD, and is simpler as a result.
Ashur and Mennink further propose Spoednic, which additionally multiples each half-
block (of the output of the padding scheme) that gets xored to a chaining variable by
a secret value. This additional masking lends Spoednic the ability to resist forgery
attempts even in the nonce-misuse scenario.
1Which expands to “Simplified p-OMD encryption and decryption.”
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Chapter6
Full-State Absorption for Sponge-based
Constructions
In this chapter, we introduce two related modes of operation for a cryptographic per-
mutation called Full-state Keyed Sponge (FKS) and Full-state Keyed Duplex (FKD).
While these two are not constructions for authenticated encryption themselves, we show
that highly efficient AE constructions can be built on top of the FKD.
The work presented in this chapter is a result of joint work with Reza Reyhanitabar
and Bart Mennink which was published in ASIACRYPT 2015 [MRV15].
Organization of the Chapter. We first discuss related work in Section 6.1 and list
the contributions in Section 6.2.
We then briefly introduce the basics of the (original) Sponge and Duplex Construction
in Section 6.3 and introduce the new full-state version of the keyed Sponge and keyed
Duplex in Section 6.4.
In Section 6.5, we define the security model for the Full-state Keyed Sponge and
Duplex, and then analyse the security of FKS in Section 6.6 and the security of FKD in
Section 6.7.
Finally, we define the Full-state SpongeWrap (FSW) construction for AE and analyse
its security in Section 6.8.
6.1 Related Work
The Sponge construction for cryptographic hashing was first introduced by Bertoni,
Daemen, Peeters and Van Assche [BDPV07]. The Sponge-based hash function Kec-
cak [BDPV08] was standardised in the SHA3 hashing standard [oST15].
Various keyed constructions based on the Sponge were then proposed: reseedable
pseudorandom number generators [BDPA10], pseudorandom functions and message au-
thentication codes (PRFs/MACs) [BDPV11, BDPV12], Extendable-Output Functions
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(“XOFs”) [Per14] and authenticated encryption (AE) modes [BDPA11a, BDPV12].
The keyed Sponge construction also got adopted in Spritz, a new RC4-like stream
cipher [RS14], and also in 10 out of 57 submissions to the first round of the CAESAR com-
petition [Ber14a, AFL16]: Artemia [AAB14], Ascon [DEMS14], ICEPOLE [MGH+14],
Ketje [BDP+14a], Keyak [BDP+14b], NORX [AJN14], pi-Cipher [GMS+14], PRIM-
ATEs [ABB+14a], Prøst [KLL+14] and STRIBOB [SB14]. An enhanced variant of
the Full-state Keyed Duplex construction described in this chapter was adopted by the
candidate Keyak [BDP+16b].
Bertoni et al. [BDPA08] proved that the keyless Sponge construction is a secure hash
function up to the O(2c/2) birthday-type bound in the indifferentiability framework of
Maurer, Renner and Holenstein [MRH04].
Message Authentication. Bertoni et al. [BDPV11] introduced the keyed Sponge as
a simple evaluation of the Sponge function on the concatenation of the key and the
message, and proved a security bound that quantitatively improved over the indifferen-
tiability result. Chang et al. [CDH+] considered a slight variant of the keyed Sponge
where the key is processed in the inner part of the Sponge, and observed that it can
be seen as the Sponge based on an Even-Mansour blockcipher [EM91, EM97]. At FSE
2015, Andreeva, Daemen, Mennink and Van Assche [ADMA15] considered a generic and
improved analysis of both the outer- and inner-keyed Sponge. We reuse a part of their
security analysis. So far, however, these constructions have only been considered with
the classical r-bit absorption.
The idea of using full-state message absorption for achieving higher efficiency was
first made explicit in the Donkey Sponge MAC construction [BDPV12],1 but without
any formal security proof. The recently introduced Donkey-inspired MAC function Chas-
key [MMH+14] did get a formal security analysis, but its proof is specific to Chaskey
and does not apply to the Donkey Sponge.
A thorough analysis of the full-state message absorption keyed Sponge was done by
Gazˇi, Pietrzak and Tessaro [GPT15], who prove nearly tight security up to O(`q(q +
N)/2b+ q(q+ `+N)/2c), where the adversary makes q queries of maximal length `, and
makes N primitive calls. However, their analysis only applies to the fixed-output-length
variant, and the proof does not directly extend to the original arbitrary-output-length
keyed Sponge. In this work, we provide a direct proof for this more general case.
Authenticated Encryption. Encryption via the Sponge is typically done with the
Duplex construction [BDPA11a]. Bertoni et al. showed that the Duplex allows for au-
thenticated encryption in the form of SpongeWrap [BDPA11a]. This mode is, de facto,
the basis of the majority of Sponge-based submissions to the CAESAR competition.
Jovanovic et al. [JLM14] re-investigated the security of the Sponge-based authenticated
encryption scheme NORX, and proved its beyond birthday-bound (in the capacity c)
1We note that apart from full-state absorption, the Donkey Sponge also uses less rounds in the
underlying iterated permutation during the absorbing phase.
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security. These results are, however, all for the usual r-bit absorption. Yasuda and
Sasaki [SY15] have considered several full-state and partially full-state Sponge-based
authenticated encryption schemes for efficient incorporation of associated data, directly
lifting Jovanovic et al.’s security proofs.2 A technique similar to full-state data ab-
sorption was also proposed by Reyhanitabar, Vaudenay and Viza´r [RVV15] in their
compression function based AE mode p-OMD (see Section 5.3); both p-OMD and the
Full-state keyed sponge were derived from sequential algorithms that maintain secret
states with AXU-like properties, which allow data to be xored into the state without
harming the security.
Later, Daemen et al. [DMA17] improved the construction and security analysis of
Full-state Keyed Duplex presented in this chapter.
6.2 Contribution
We present the Full-state Keyed Sponge, and Full-state Keyed Duplex, two modes of
operation for a cryptographic permutation. Both of these extend the existing results on
sponge-based cryptography. We analyse the security of both FKS and FKD in the ideal
permutation model and show how to construct an efficient AE scheme using FKD.
FKS and FKD are the first sponge-modes that allow the most efficient kind of full-
state absorption, have an arbitrary-length output, and are provably secure at the same
time. Our security analysis is modular, easy to understand, and therefore easy to verify.
We demonstrate the application of FKD to AE through the Full-state SpongeWrap
construction. It uses full-state absorption to process the associated data as efficiently as
possible, in most cases almost for free compared to the original SpongeWrap. Moreover,
most of the existing sponge-based AE schemes can easily switch to full-state absorption
and benefit from our security analysis, thanks its modularity, which uses FKD as an
intermediate step.
6.3 The Sponge and Duplex Constructions
The classical Sponge construction [BDPV07] takes as parameter a cryptographic per-
mutation p : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b, an integer 0 < r < b and an injective padding scheme
padr, which injectively maps any string M ∈ {0, 1}∗ to an M¯ = padr(M) such that
|M¯ | ≡ 0 (mod r) and such that the last r bits of M¯ are non-zero.3 The instance
Sponge[p, r,padr] : {0, 1}∗ × N+ → {0, 1}∗
2The concurrent absorption mode proposed by Yasuda and Sasaki (Fig. 3 in [SY15]) fails to utilize
the full-state absorption when the associated data becomes longer than the message, forcing the mode
switch from a full-state mode to the classical r-bit absorbing Sponge mode; hence, we refer to this as a
partially full-state AE mode.
3The final block of r bits being non-zero is a sufficient condition on the padding scheme, to ensure
the sponge indifferentiable from a random oracle. The precise condition is that for all M 6= M ′ we must
have padr(M) 6= padr(M ′)‖0nr for all n ≥ 0. If this condition was violated for some M,M ′ then for any
`, Sponge[p, r, pad](M, `) would be a suffix of Sponge[p, r, pad](M, `+ nr).
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Figure 6.1 – The computation of Z = Sponge[p, r, padr](M,z).
then allows to map an arbitrary input string M ∈ {0, 1}∗ to a z-bit output string
Sponge[p, r,padr](M, z) for an arbitrary output length z.
An evaluation of the Sponge consists of a sequential application of the permutation p
on a state of b bits. This state is partitioned into an r-bit outer part and a c-bit inner
part, where b = r + c. We call r rate and c capacity of the instance. In the absorption
phase, message blocks of size r bits are absorbed by the outer part and the state is
transformed using p, while in the squeezing phase, digests are extracted from the outer
part, r bits at a time. This is illustrated in Figure 6.1.
The Duplex construction [BDPA11a] is a stateful variant of the Sponge that allows
to extract a limited number of output bits after the processing of each input block. It
also takes as parameter a cryptographic permutation p : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b, an integer
0 < r < b and an injective padding scheme padr which injectively maps any string
M ∈ {0, 1}∗ to an M¯ = padr(M) such that |M¯ | ≡ 0 (mod r) and such that the last r
bits of M¯ are non-zero.
The instance Duplex[p, r,padr] has two interfaces. The first interface
Duplex[p, r,padr].initialize()
takes no input and sets up a state of b zero bits. The interface
Zi = Duplex[p, r,padr].duplexing(Mi, zi)
then takes an input string Mi ∈Mpadr and a non-negative integer 0 ≤ zi ≤ and outputs
a string Zi ∈ {0, 1}zi , where Mpadr = {M ∈ {0, 1}∗ | |padr(M)| = r} is a set of strings
M ∈ {0, 1}∗ for which we have |padr(M)| = r. A sequence of Duplex calls is illustrated
in Figure 6.2.
6.4 Full-State Keyed Sponge and Full-State Keyed Duplex
In this section, we define the Full-state Keyed Sponge and the Full-State Keyed Duplex.
Both constructions generalize over their original predecessors by allowing the blocks of
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Figure 6.2 – A sequence of calls to Duplex[p, r, padr].
the (padded) input to have the same length as the state. This modification obviously
improves the performance of both constructions, allowing more data to be processed per
call to the underlying permutation.
However, the same modification also necessitates the Sponge and the Duplex to be
keyed; without a key and with the control over the full state, these construction will
offer no security as (keyless) hash functions. To emphasise this, we include the word
keyed in the names of both full-state Sponge and Duplex.
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Figure 6.3 – The FKS[p, r, k] construction.
Full-State Keyed Sponge. We define the Full-state Keyed Sponge (FKS) construc-
tion, a mode of operation for a cryptographic permutation that is parameterized by a
public permutation p : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b. It is further parameterized by r, k ∈ N+, which
are required to satisfy r < b and k ≤ b− r. We call k the key length, and r the rate of
the instance and, we define c = b− r and call it capacity. We denote by FKS[p, r, k] an
instance of FKS with parameters fixed to p, r and k, and we let FKSp denote an instance
of FKS using a permutation p; some or even all parameters are sometimes left implicit
if they are clear from the context.
An instance
FKS[p, r, k] : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ × N+ → {0, 1}∗
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is a generalization of a keyed function that allows to choose the length of the output. It
takes a key K ∈ {0, 1}k, a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗, and a natural number z, and it outputs
a string Z ∈ {0, 1}z:
FKS[p, r, k](K,M, z) = FKSpK(M, z) = Z .
It operates on a state t ∈ {0, 1}b, which is initialized using the key K. The message
M is first padded to a length multiple of b bits, using a padding scheme padb defined
by padb(M) = M‖10b−1−|M | mod b. The padded input is then partitioned to m message
blocks M1‖...‖Mm of b bits each. We stress that we make use of the explicitly defined
padding scheme for FKS.4 These message blocks are processed one-by-one, interleaved
with evaluations of p. After the absorption of M , the outer r bits of the state are output
and the state is processed via p until a sufficient number of output bits are obtained.
FKS is depicted in Figure 6.3, and Figure 6.5 provides a formal specification of FKS.
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Figure 6.4 – The FKD[p, r, k] construction.
Full-State Keyed Duplex. We define the Full-state Keyed Duplex (FKD) con-
struction, a generalization of the Duplex of Bertoni et al. [BDPA11a, BDPA11b]. FKD
is a deterministic stateful variant of the FKS that allows to extract a limited number of
output bits after the processing of each input block.
It is parameterized by a public permutation p : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b, the rate r ∈ N+
and the key length k ∈ N+, which are required to satisfy r < b and k ≤ b − r. We call
c = b− r the capacity. We let FKD[p, r, k] denote an instance of FKD with parameters
fixed to p, r, k, and we let FKDp denote an instance that uses a permutation p. Again,
the parametrization can be left implicit if clear from the context.
Let D denote FKD[p, r, k]. D has two interfaces: D.initialize and D.duplexing.
D.initialize is used to set up the state of D, it gets as input a key K ∈ {0, 1}k and
outputs nothing. D.duplexing is used to process one input block and compute output
bits, it gets as input a message block Mi ∈ {M ∈ {0, 1}∗ | |padb(M)| = b} and a natural
number 0 ≤ zi ≤ r, and it outputs a string Zi ∈ {0, 1}zi . Internally, FKD uses the same
4While we could use any padding scheme such that |padb(M)| ≡ 0 (mod b) with the last b bits of
padb(M) non-zero for all M ∈ {0, 1}∗, we fix padb(M) = M‖10b−1−|M| mod b for the sake of concreteness.
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padding scheme as FKS. FKD is illustrated in Figure 6.4, and the formal specification
is given in Figure 6.5.
1: algorithm FKS[p, r, k](K,M, z)
2: t← 0b−k‖K
3: M1‖ · · · ‖Mm b←− padb(M)
4: for i← 1, . . . ,m do
5: s← t⊕Mi
6: t← p(s)
7: end for
8: Z ← leftr (t)
9: while |Z| < z do
10: t← p(t)
11: Z ← Z‖leftr (t)
12: end while
13: return leftz (Z)
14: end algorithm
1: algorithm FKD[p, r, k]
2: interface FKD.initialize(K)
3: t← 0b−k‖K
4: end interface
5: interface FKD.duplexing(M, z)
6: if z > r or |padb(M)| 6= b
then
7: return ⊥
8: end if
9: s← t⊕padb(M)
10: t← p(s)
11: return leftz (t)
12: end interface
13: end algorithm
Figure 6.5 – Definition of FKS[p, r, k] and FKD[p, r, k], both parameterized with
a cryptographic permutation p : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b, a rate r and a keylength k.
Notation. We introduce additional notation for this chapter. Given implicit para-
meters p : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b, r, k of FKS (or of FKD) and a string s ∈ {0, 1}b, we let
outer (s) = leftr (s) denote the “outer” part of the string (used to produce output bits in)
and inner (s) = rightc (s) denote the “inner” part of the string (which is never revealed).
Note that we have s = outer (s) ‖inner (s).
6.5 Security Model
Because the FKS is a generalization of a keyed function, we need to modify the security
model to reflect the changes in syntax and functionality. The same applies to FKD,
which deviates from a keyed function even further.
In addition, the underlying primitive, a cryptographic permutation, is keyless. This
makes a standard model-reduction to its security difficult, because there is no compact
standard-model security definition for keyless permutation.5
We therefore cast our security notions and analysis in the ideal permutation model,
where the underlying cryptographic permutation used by either FKS or FKD is modelled
as a public random permutation p←$ Perm(2b). That is, in addition to the usual oracles,
the adversary has direct oracle access to both p and its inverse p−1. The parameterized
5Some early results in this direction appeared after the present results were published [ST17].
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resources of the adversary are extended to include the total number of calls to either p
or p−1.
The ideal permutation model can be thought of as abstracting away any structural
properties that an actual cryptographic permutation may have. A proof in the model
can then be seen as a sanity check of the construction, which shows that the construction
in question resists to generic attacks. Loosely speaking, an actual instance should be
secure, as long as the used permutation does not have any “serious structural weakness”.
This statement is however very informal, and there is no rigorous link between the result
in the idealized model and the security of actual instances.
Note that because the underlying primitive is modelled as a random permutation, we
do not rely on computational security in any part of the analysis. We can therefore work
with information-theoretic adversaries throughout the whole analysis.
Multiplicity. Following Andreeva et al. [ADMA15], we add the so called multiplicity
to the parameterized resources of an adversary in the context of the ideal permutation
model.
With an implicit integer b, for a set S = {(xi, yi) ∈ ({0, 1}b)2}σi=1 of σ pairs (xi, yi),
and for a rate 0 < r < b, we define the total maximal multiplicity of S as a sum
µ = µfwd + µbwd of the forward multiplicity µfwd and the backward multiplicity µbwd,
where
µfwd = max
a
|{i ∈ {1, . . . , σ} : outer (xi) = a}| and
µbwd = max
a
|{i ∈ {1, . . . , σ} : outer (yi) = a}|
(see Section 6.4 for the definition of outer (·)). In our analysis, the set S will always be be
constructed as a collection of input-output pairs of a permutation p : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b,
so the multiplicity is the maximal number of permutation inputs in the collection S who
share the same value in their leftmost r bits, plus the same for the permutation outputs
in S.
The multiplicity is a quantity that characterises the data that are available to the
adversary during an attack. We have 2 ≤ µ ≤ 2σ per definition (the maximum µ = 2σ
is reached e.g. when p is the identity permutation), however the upper bound 2σ is
never reached in practical applications of sponge-based constructions. We note that
we are always interested in the multiplicity of input-output pairs that were induced by
adversarial queries to a construction, not directly made by the adversary.
Being a sum of forward and backward multiplicities, the total multiplicity can be seen
as a measure of adversary’s ability to control the outer part of the permutation inputs
and outputs respectively. In case of sponge-based designs, the backward multiplicity can
be expected to be approximately σ2−r if σ blocks of data are processed with a single
key while the forward multiplicity varies with concrete applications [ADMA15].
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6.5.1 Security Model for FKS
We first define keyed functions with extendible output, the kind of object that FKS
actually is. A keyed function with extendible output is an efficient algorithm F : K ×
D × N+ → {0, 1}∗ that maps a secret key K, an input M , and a desired output length
z to an output string F (K,M, z) ∈ {0, 1}z. We call K, a finite set, the key space of F .
We let FK(M, z) = F (K,M, z). If F is a mode of operation for a low-level primitive p,
we let F p denote an instance of F using p.
An instance F = FKS[p, r, k] with permutation p : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b, rate r and
key length k is thus a keyed function with extendible output having K = {0, 1}k and
D = {0, 1}∗.
Upon inspection of Figure 6.5, we see that when fed with (K,M, z1) and (K,M, z2)
with arbitrary 1 ≤ z1 < z2, K ∈ {0, 1}k and M ∈ {0, 1}∗, the FKS will always produce
outputs Z1 and Z2 such that Z1 is a prefix of Z2. This is because the output is always
derived from the state right after the processing of the message, which does not depend
on zi.
The PRF security of a keyed function with extendible output is defined with help
of games prfx-R and prfx-I in Figure 6.6. We make sure that the idealized reference
object for the FKS in the game prfx-I in Figure 6.6 does have this inherent property
of the construction, but is random otherwise. For each input (M, z), we first check if
any output bits were generated, and whether their length is smaller than z. If any of
the two occurs, we generate the required number of uniform bits. This way, we always
satisfy the prefix property.
Definition 6.1 (PRF-x security). Given a keyed function with extendible output F
which is a mode of operation for a b-bit cryptographic permutation, and an information-
theoretic adversary A that has black-box access to F , we define the advantage of A in
breaking the security of F as
AdvprfxF (A ) = Pr
[
A prfx-RF ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A prfx-IF ⇒ 1
]
.
If the advantage AdvprfxF (A ) ≤  for every adversary A that makes no more than N
queries to p and p−1 in total, that makes no more than q Eval queries that have the total
maximal multiplicity limited by µ such that each Eval query induces no more than ` calls
to the underlying permutation, we say that F is a (, q, `, µ,N)-secure pseudorandom
function with extendible output (PRF-x).
6.5.2 Security Model for FKD
We now define duplexing keyed functions, which are the kind of object that FKD is. A
duplexing keyed function with a key space K, rate r and input limit b is an efficient,
stateful algorithm F that exposes two interfaces. The interface F.initialize(K) initializes
F with a secret key K ∈ K and returns no output. The interface Z = F.duplexing(M, z)
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proc initialize prfx-RF
 pi ←$ Perm(2b)
p←$ Perm(2b)
K ←$ K
proc p(x), p−1(y)
proc Eval(M, z)
 return F pi(0k,M,Z)
return F p(K,M,Z)
proc initialize prfx-IF
p←$ Perm(2b)
X ←array({0, 1}∗)
proc p(x), p−1(y)
proc Eval(M, z)
if X [M ] = ⊥ then
X [M ]←$ {0, 1}z
elsif z > |X [M ]| then
Z ←$ {0, 1}z−|X [M ]|
X [M ]← X [M ]‖Z
return leftz (X [M ])
proc initialize prfd-RF
 pi ←$ Perm(2b)
p←$ Perm(2b)
K ←$ K
init← false
proc p(x), p−1(y)
proc Initialize()
init← true
F p.initialize(K)
 F pi.initialize(0k)
return ⊥
proc Duplexing(M, z)
if init = false or z > r or |padbM | 6= b then
return ⊥
 return F pi.duplexing(M, z)
return F p.duplexing(M, z)
proc initialize prfd-IF
p←$ Perm(2b)
X ←array(({0, 1}∗)∗)
t← ⊥
proc p(x), p−1(y)
proc Initialize()
t← Λ
return ⊥
proc Duplexing(M, z)
if t = ⊥ or z > r or |padbM | 6= b then
return ⊥
t← t‖M
if X [t] = ⊥
X [t]←$ {0, 1}r
return leftz (X [t])
Figure 6.6 – Games for defining security of keyed functions with extendible
output length (PRF-x security) and security of duplexing keyed functions
(PRF-d). The games prfx-R and prfd-R do not include the lines marked with  (the
full codes, including the lines marked with  respectively define the games prfx-R and
prfd-R). Note that the permutation p is exposed to the adversary. Note that in the
prfd-IF game, the variable t is a list of strings (see Section 2.1 for definition of a list.)
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takes an input string M ∈ {0, 1}<b and the desired output length z ≤ r, and returns the
output value Z ∈ {0, 1}z. If F is a mode of operation for a low-level primitive p, we let
F p denote an instance of F using p.
An instance F = FKD[p, r, k] with permutation p : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b, rate r and
key length k is thus a duplexing keyed function that has a rate r, input limit b and
K = {0, 1}k.
It can be seen from Figure 6.5 that if we initialize the FKD twice with the same key
and then duplex the same sequence of input blocks M1, . . . ,M`, with two sequences of
output lengths z11 , . . . , z
1
` and z
2
1 , . . . , z
2
` such that z
1
i < z
2
i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `, then an
output block Z1i will always be a prefix of the corresponding block Z
2
i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `.
Intuitively, we expect that if we then process M1`+1 6= M2`+1, the corresponding output
blocks Z1`+1 and Z
2
`+1 should be independent.
The PRF security of a duplexing keyed function is defined with help of games prfd-R
and prfd-I in Figure 6.6. The idealized reference object in the game prfd-I in Figure 6.6
formalizes the intuition we just described. The game keeps a list t of all input blocks
queried from the last Initialize query, and keeps an array X that stores r random bits
for every unique value of t that occurred in the game.
Definition 6.2 (PRF-d security). Given a duplexing keyed function F with key space
K, rate r and input limit b, which is a mode of operation for a b-bit cryptographic
permutation, and given an information-theoretic adversary A that has black-box access
to F , we define the advantage of A in breaking the security of F as
AdvprfdF (A ) = Pr
[
A prfd-RF ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A prfd-IF ⇒ 1
]
.
If the advantage AdvprfdF (A ) ≤  for every adversary A that makes no more than N
queries to p and p−1 in total, that makes no more than q Initialize queries, such that
each such query is followed by no more than ` Duplexing queries with the total maximal
multiplicity limited by µ, we say that F is a (, q, `, µ,N)-secure duplexing pseudorandom
function (PRF-d).
6.5.3 Security Model for Even-Mansour
Our proof relies on a reduction to the security of a low-entropy, single-key Even-Mansour
construction [EM91, EM97] that turns a b-bit cryptographic permutation into a b-bit
blockcipher with a key of k < b bits. In more detail, let p : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b be a
permutation, k < b be the key length and K ∈ {0, 1}k be a key. The Even-Mansour
blockcipher Ep : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b is defined as
EpK(M) = p(M ⊕(0b−k‖K))⊕(0b−k‖K).
To analyse the generic PRP security of Ep, we need to re-cast the Definition 2.3 in
the ideal permutation model. In this chapter, we overload the definition of the PRP
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adversarial advantage to
Advprp
Ep
(A ) = Pr
[
K ←$ {0, 1}k, p←$ Perm(2b) : A EpK ,p,p−1 ⇒ 1
]
−
Pr
[
pi, p←$ Perm(2b) : A pi,p,p−1 ⇒ 1
]
.
We remove time t, and add the number of p and p−1 queries and the total maximal
multiplicity µ of all construction queries to the parameterized adversarial resources.
6.6 Security of Full-State Keyed Sponge
We prove the following result for FKS:
Theorem 6.3. Let b, r, c, k > 0 be such that b = r+c and k ≤ c. Let FKS be the scheme
defined in Figure 6.5. Let A be an adversary that makes no more than N queries to p
and p−1 in total, that makes no more than q Eval queries that have the total maximal
multiplicity limited by µ such that each Eval query induces no more than ` calls to the
underlying permutation. Then,
AdvprfxFKS (A ) ≤
2(q`)2
2b
+
2q2`
2c
+
µN
2k
.
The proof of Theorem 6.3 follows to a certain extent the modular approach of An-
dreeva et al. [ADMA15]. In particular we use the fact that the instance FKSpK can
alternatively be viewed as FKS
EpK
0 , where the underlying permutation is replaced by the
low-entropy Even-Mansour blockcipher that also absorbs the key (see Figure 6.7). This
clever observation was used before by Chang et al. [CDH+]. Note that this observation
only works for k ≤ c: it relies on xoring two dummy keys K ⊕K in-between every two
adjacent permutation calls, and if k > c, there would be k− c bits of the FKS-state that
the adversary would see unkeyed.
This trick allows to split the security analysis of FKSpK into two steps; we first do the
security analysis of the Even-Mansour blockcipher and then the security analysis of FKS
instantiated with a secret permutation. This is where we diverge from the approach of
Andreeva et al. [ADMA15], who simply applied the classical indifferentiability result of
[BDPA08] to deal with the security analysis of the Keyed Sponge instantiated with a
secret permutation. Because the indifferentiability bound cannot be used for FKS due
to its full-state absorption, we carry out a new analysis and derive an improved bound.
In addition, applying the indifferentiability result gives a rather loose bound which we
improve with our new analysis.
Throughout the analysis, we will assume, without loss of generality, that the adversary
A makes exactly q queries, such that each query induces exactly ` calls to the underlying
permutation. We further let ∆A (G1;G2) denote the expression
Pr
[
A G1 ⇒ 1]− Pr [A G2 ⇒ 1]
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Figure 6.7 – The equivalence between FKSpK and FKS
E
p
K
0 . Xoring the two dummy
keys to the state between each two p-calls (in red) does not change the value of Z. Two
keys around each p-call are then absorbed by a single EpK evaluation (blue boundary).
Note that since the inner c bits of the state are never revealed, the final copy of the key
that is “left” does not invalidate this claim.
for two games G1 and G2.
Proof of Theorem 6.3. We define the game prfx-R by including the lines marked by 
in the game prfx-R in Figure 6.6. By doing so, we replace the public permutation p by
an independent secret permutation pi in all the primitive calls made by the FKS. We
use this game as an intermediate step in the analysis, and define
AdvprfxFKS (A ) = Pr
[
A prfx-RFKS ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A prfx-IFKS ⇒ 1
]
for the sake of tidiness of the proof.
We have that FKSpK = FKS
EpK
0 (see Figure 6.7). Abusing the ∆-notation for the PRP
security games, it follows that
AdvprfxFKS (A ) = ∆A (prfx-RFKS; prfx-IFKS)
= ∆A (prfx-RFKS; prfx-RFKS) + ∆A (prfx-RFKS; prfx-IFKS)
≤ ∆B
(
p,EpK ; p, pi
)
+ ∆C (prfx-RFKS; prfx-IFKS)
≤ Advprp
Ep
(B) + AdvprfxFKS (C )
for some adversary B that makes q · ` construction queries that have total maximal
multiplicity µ and makes N queries to p and p−1, and some adversary C that makes q
queries such that each query induces at most ` calls to the underlying permutation.
This is because B uses its own construction oracle to simulate FKS for A , forwards
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A ’s p and p−1 queries to its own oracles, and in the end outputs whatever A outputs;
B then perfectly simulates either prfx-RFKS or prfx-RFKS for A .
C only forwards A ’s queries to its own corresponding oracles and forwards A ’s final
output; the simulation for A is trivially perfect.
Note that C also has access to p and p−1, but queries to this oracle are useless as its
Eval oracle is independent of p in both games.
Andreeva et al. proved that Advprp
Ep
(B) ≤ µN
2k
for any B [ADMA15]. In Lemma 6.4,
we prove that AdvprfxFKS (C ) ≤ 2(q`)
2
2b
+ 2q
2`
2c for any adversary C .
Lemma 6.4. Let b, r, c > 0 be such that b = r + c. Let A be an adversary that makes
no more than q Eval queries such that each Eval query induces no more than ` calls to
the underlying permutation. Let FKS be the scheme of defined in Figure 6.5. Then,
AdvprfxFKS (A ) ≤
2(q`)2
2b
+
2q2`
2c
.
Proof. We denote the queries made by A as (M1, ζ1), . . . , (M q, ζq) and the correspond-
ing outputs of the FKS as Z1, . . . , Zq (we switch to ζi because we will use zi to de-
note the number of blocks in Zi). We denote the blocks of the ith input message by
M i1‖ . . . ‖M imi
b← M i with mi = |M i|b. We denote the blocks of the ith output value by
Zi1‖ . . . ‖Zizi
b← Zi with zi = |Zi|r.
Given that the 10∗ padding is applied to every query, publicly known and injective,
we can simplify the analysis and assume that all the queries are already padded. I.e. we
assume that for 1 ≤ i ≤ q, the query M i has length divisible by b and that M imi 6= 0b.
We further assume, that the adversary always asks for output of length divisible by
r, i.e. ζi ≡ 0 (mod r) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ q, and that every query induces exactly ` primitive
calls. This is without loss of generality: we can simply give “free bits” to the adversary
upon every query without decreasing its advantage.
We will denote the b-bit state of FKS just before the jth application of pi is made when
processing the ith query as sij for 1 ≤ j ≤ `. Similarly, we will denote the b-bit state of
FKS just after the jth application of pi in ith query as tij for 1 ≤ j ≤ `. We will call the
former in-states and the latter out-states. Note that every in-state sij is determined by
the out-state tij−1 and the message block M
i
j as s
i
j = t
i
j−1⊕M ij in the absorbing phase
or just by tij in the squeezing phase as depicted in Fig. 6.8.
To aid the simplicity of further analysis, we additionally define initial dummy out-states
ti0 = 0
b and extended queries M¯ i = M i‖0(`−mi)b for 1 ≤ i ≤ q. Now we can express every
in-state, be it absorbing or squeezing, as sij = t
i
j−1⊕ M¯ ij . We will group the out-states
of ith query as T i = (ti0, t
i
1, . . . , t
i
`).
Because each query induces exactly ` calls to pi, we know that a query M i will be
answered by a string Zi = Z
i
1‖ . . . ‖Zizi with zi = `−mi + 1 and |Zij | = r for 1 ≤ j ≤ zi.
In particular, we have that Zij = outer
(
timi+j−1
)
.
108
Full-State Absorption for Sponge-based Constructions
pi0b pi pi pipi pi
b b b
M i
1
M i
2
M imi−1 M
i
mi
b
si
1
b
si
2
b
simi−1
b
s
i
mi
b
simi+1
b
si
ℓ
b b
b
Z2i
b
Z1i
b
Z
ℓ−mi+1
i
b b b
b b b
ti
1
b
ti
2
b
timi−1
b
t
i
mi
timi+1
b
b b
b
ti
ℓ
b
b
b
si
ℓ+1
b
Figure 6.8 – Internal states of the FKS. When processing a query M i (using a secret
permutation pi), the internal state of the FKS takes all of the depicted values.
The RP-RF Switch We define the game prfx-Rf by replacing the random per-
mutation pi ←$ Perm(2b) by a random function f ←$ Func(2b) in the game prfx-R.
We have
Advprfx-RFKS (A ) = ∆A
(
prfx-RFKS; prfx-RfFKS
)
+ ∆A
(
prfx-RfFKS; prfx-IFKS
)
≤ (q`)2/2b + ∆A
(
prfx-RfFKS; prfx-IFKS
)
.
The proof of this claim is a simple hybrid argument, where an RP-RF distinguisher
B simulates either prfx-RFKS or prfx-RfFKS for A using its own oracle instead of
the permutation pi. The distinguishing advantage of B is limited by (q`)2/2b due to
Lemma 2.6.
Patarin’s Coefficient-H Technique We use the coefficient-H technique (see Sec-
tion 2.2) to show that ∆A
(
prfx-RfFKS; prfx-IFKS
)
≤ (q`)2/2b + 2q2`/2c. The two
games the adversary is trying to distinguish are prfx-RfFKS and prfx-IFKS. We will
refer to the former as interchangeably as the “real world” or simply as X, and to the
latter interchangeably as the “ideal world” or simply as Y . In either of the games, the
adversary makes q queries M1, . . . ,M q and learns the responses Z1, . . . , Zq. The trans-
ition from queries M i to M¯ i is injective, and additionally the length M i of M i is implicit
from M¯ i. Therefore, we can summarize the interaction of the adversary with its oracle
(X or Y ) with a transcript (M¯1, . . . , M¯ q, Z1, . . . , Zq).
To facilitate the analysis, we will disclose additional information T 1, . . . , T q to the
adversary at the end of the experiment. In the real world, these are the out-states
T i = (ti0, t
i
1, . . . , t
i
`) for 1 ≤ i ≤ q, as defined at the beginning of the proof.
In the ideal world, these are dummy variables that we generate at the end of the
experiment. For 1 ≤ i ≤ q and 0 ≤ j ≤ `, we set tij ←$ {0, 1}b independently, except for
these cases:
1. ti0 ← 0b for 1 ≤ i ≤ q,
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2. if llcpb
(
M¯ i, M¯ i
′
)
= n for 1 ≤ i′ < i ≤ q then tij ← ti
′
j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
3. force outer
(
tij+mi−1
)
= Zij for 1 ≤ i ≤ q and 1 ≤ j ≤ zi.
Note that in both worlds, Z1, . . . , Zq are fully determined by T 1, . . . , T q, so we can drop
them from the transcript. Thus a transcript of adversary’s interaction with FKS will be
τ = (M¯1, . . . , M¯ q, T 1, . . . , T q).
Recall that to use the Coefficient-H Technique, we define the two distributions of
transcripts DAX and D
A
Y induced by A and the games X and Y . We further consider
the set of attainable transcripts T = {τ |Pr[DAY ] > 0}. Referring to Lemma 2.2, we will
show that there exists a set of bad transcripts Tbad ⊂ T , such that
Pr
[
DAX = τ
]
/Pr
[
DAY = τ
]
= 1
for any τ ∈ Tgood = T \Tbad, and thus ∆A
(
prfx-RfFKS; prfx-IFKS
)
≤ Pr [DAY ∈ Tbad].
Definition of a Bad Transcript We label a transcript τ as bad if
∃(1, 1) ≤ (i′, j′) 6= (i, j) ≤ (q, `) such that:((
j 6= j′) ∨ (llcpb (M¯ i, M¯ i′) < j = j′ ≤ `)) ∧ (tij−1⊕ M¯ ij = ti′j′−1⊕ M¯ i′j′) . (6.1)
The set of bad transcript is then Tbad = {τ ∈ T |τ is bad}. This definition of a bad
transcript comes with an intuitive, informal interpretation; as long as all relevant inputs
sij = t
i
j−1⊕ M¯ ij to the random function f induced by the Sponge function are distinct
the output of the Sponge will be distributed uniformly. We do not require uniqueness of
all in-states because the adversary can trivially force their repetition by issuing queries
with common prefixes. However these collisions are not a problem, because uniqueness
of the queries implies that llcpb
(
M¯ i, M¯ i
′
)
< max{mi,mi′} for any two queries M¯ i, M¯ i′ .
Even if the adversary truncates an old query and thus forces an old absorbing in-state
s to be squeezed for output, it is still not a problem because the adversary has not seen
the image f(s) before. We note that even though in-states do not exist in the ideal
world, they can be defined by the same relation as in the real world, i.e. sij = t
i
j−1⊕ M¯ ij .
Bounding the Ratio of Probabilities of Good Transcripts In the ideal world, the
out-states ti0 = 0
b for 1 ≤ i ≤ q are always assigned their value trivially. We also trivially
assign a single uniform b-bit string to multiple state variables that are affected by the
common prefix of the related queries. The remaining out-states are sampled uniformly
at random. It follows that there are exactly η(τ) =
∑q
i=1 ` − llcpb
(
M i;M1, . . . ,M i−1
)
b-bit values in any transcript τ , that are sampled independently and uniformly. We thus
have Pr
[
DAY = τ
]
= 2−η(τ)b for any τ .
Let ΩX be the set of all possible coins of the real world (i.e. the game prfx-RfFKS).
We have that |ΩX | = 2b2b , because the only source of randomness in the ideal world is
110
Full-State Absorption for Sponge-based Constructions
the sampling of the function f . Let compX (τ) ⊆ ΩX be the set of all coins compatible
with the transcript τ , i.e. the set of the functions f ∈ Func(2b) that are capable of
producing τ in the experiment with A . We will compute the probability of seeing τ
in the real world as Pr
[
DAX = τ
]
= |compX (τ) |/|ΩX |. Note that a real-world oracle is
completely determined by the underlying function f .
If τ ∈ Tgood, then every in-state sij = tij−1 ⊕ M¯ ij that does not trivially collide with
some other in-state si
′
j′ due to common prefix of M¯
i
j and M¯
i′
j′ must be distinct. The
number of domain points of f that have an image determined by τ is easily seen to be
η(τ) =
∑q
i=1 `− llcpb
(
M i;M1, . . . ,M i−1
)
. A compatible function f can therefore have
arbitrary image values on the remaining 2b − η(τ) domain points. Thus we compute
|compX (τ) | = 2b(2
b−η(τ)) and
Pr
[
DAX = τ
]
=
|compX (τ) |
|ΩX | =
2b(2
b−η(τ))
2b2b
= 2−η(τ)b = Pr
[
DAY = τ
]
.
It follows that Pr
[
DAX = τ
]
/Pr
[
DAY = τ
]
= 1 for every τ ∈ Tgood.
Bounding the Probability of a Bad Transcript in the Ideal World We can
bound the probability of τ being bad (cf. (6.1)) by first bounding the probability of
a non-trivial collision of an arbitrary but fixed pair of in-states sij , s
i′
j′ (i.e. the event
sij = s
i′
j′ occurs) and then summing this probability for all possible values of (i, j), (i
′, j′)
with (i′, j′) 6= (i, j). Because this probability varies significantly, we will split all in-states
into three classes, and bound probabilities of individual collisions between these classes.
We will associate to each in-state sij a label stamp
i
j . We set stamp
i
j = free if 1 <
j = llcpb
(
M¯ i; M¯1, . . . , M¯ i−1
)
+ 1 ≤ mi such that mi∗ < j for some i∗ < i. We will set
stamp1i = initial for 1 ≤ i ≤ q and stampij = fixed in the remaining cases.
Informally, we have stampij = free whenever the adversary forces outer
(
tij−1
)
=
Zi
∗
j−mi∗−1 by reusing exactly first j − 1 blocks of a previous query M¯ i
∗
in the query M¯ i
and sets M¯ ij 6= M¯ i
∗
j = 0
b. By doing this, A freely but non-trivially chooses outer
(
sij
)
=
outer
(
si∗j ⊕ M¯ i∗j ⊕ M¯ ij
)
. Note that if the adversary puts M¯ ij = M¯
i∗
j , this is not counted
as a free state (the states will in fact be the same). We have stampij = initial for the
initial in-state of every query.
As the condition (6.1) is symmetrical with respect to (i, j) and (i′, j′), and as it cannot
be satisfied if (i, j) = (i′, j′), it can be rephrased as
∃(1, 1) ≤ (i′, j′) < (i, j) ≤ (q, `) such that:
llcpb
(
M¯ i; M¯1, . . . , M¯ i−1
)
< j ≤ `, sij = si
′
j′ .
(6.2)
Doing so is without loss of generality, as each sij with j ≤ llcpb
(
M¯ i; M¯1, . . . , M¯ i−1
)
is
identical with some previous state that has already been checked for collisions with si
′
j′
for every possible (i′, j′). In the further analysis, we will be working with (6.2) rather
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than with (6.1).
We now bound the probability of collision of an arbitrary pair of in-states (sij , s
i′
j′) =
(tij−1⊕ M¯ ij , ti
′
j′−1⊕ M¯ i
′
j′) with stamp
i
j = fixed. We fix i to an arbitrary value and invest-
igate the following three cases for j. In each case, we treat every (i′, j′) < (i, j).
Case 1: llcpb
(
M¯ i; M¯1, . . . , M¯ i−1
)
+ 1 < j ≤ mi. Here, tij−1 is undetermined when
the adversary issues the query M¯ i. This implies that it will be independent from
all ti
′
j′−1 for any (i
′, j′) < (i, j). The probability of the collision tij−1⊕ M¯ ij =
ti
′
j′−1⊕ M¯ i
′
j′ is easily seen to be 2
−b.
Case 2: max
{
llcpb
(
M¯ i; M¯1, . . . , M¯ i−1
)
+ 1,mi
}
< j ≤ `. We have M¯ ij = 0b and
tij−1 = Z
i
j−M i‖inner
(
tij−1
)
. Although the adversary learns the value of Zi
j−M i
during the experiment, it is generated independently of all si
′
j′ with (i
′, j′) < (i, j)
(because j + 1 > llcpb
(
M¯ i; M¯1, . . . , M¯ i−1
)
). Even if stampj
′
i′ ∈ {free, initial}
and outer
(
si
′
j′
)
= α for some value α chosen by the adversary, the collision between
sij = Z
i
j−M i‖inner
(
tij−1
)
and si
′
j′ = α‖inner
(
si
′
j′
)
happens with probability 2−b.
Case 3: j = llcpb
(
M¯ i; M¯1, . . . , M¯ i−1
)
+ 1. If j = llcpb
(
M¯ i, M¯ i
′
)
+ 1, the in-state
si
′
j′=j , call it a twin-state of s
i
j , cannot collide with s
i
j , as j − 1 = llcpb
(
M¯ i, M¯ i
′
)
implies both that tij−1 = t
i′
j−1 and that M¯
i
j 6= M¯ i
′
j .
We further claim that outer
(
tij−1
)
has not been set and revealed to the adversary
by any previous output value. If there was an i∗ < i with mi∗ ≤ llcpb
(
M¯ i, M¯ i
∗)
=
j−1 and j ≤ mi then we would have stampij = free. If we had the same situation
but with j > mi then M¯
i and M¯ i
∗
would be identical. So outer
(
tij−1
)
has indeed
not been revealed to A , and for any non-twin in-state si
′
j′ , the probability of
collision is at most 2−b by a similar argument as in Case 1.
There are no more than q` choices for (i, j) and no more than q` possible (i′, j′) for every
(i, j) so the overall probability that the condition (6.2) will be evaluated due to a pair
of in-states with stampij = fixed is at most (q`)
2/2b.
If stampij = free, then outer
(
sij
)
is under adversary’s control. However the value of
inner
(
tij−1
)
is always generated at the end of the experiment. By a case analysis similar
to the previous one we can verify that the probability of a collision due to a pair of
in-states with stampij = free is not bigger than 2
−c. It is apparent from the definition
of a free in-state that there is at most one such in-state for each query. Having q`
in-states in total, there are at most q(q`) pairs with stampij = free and the probability
of τ ∈ Tbad due to such a pair is at most q2`/2c.
If stampij = initial then a non-triviall collision between s
i
j and any other initial
in-state is impossible. A collision with a non-initial state si
′
j′ implies that t
i′
j′−1 =
M¯ i
′
j′ ⊕ M¯ i1. If j′ > mi′ or if there is some M i
∗
with mi∗ < j
′ <= llcpb
(
M i
′
, M¯ i
∗
)
+ 1,
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then outer
(
ti
′
j′−1
)
is known to the adversary. However inner
(
ti
′
j′−1
)
is always generated
at the end of the experiment. By a case analysis similar to the one we carried out earlier,
it can be verified that the collision si1 = s
i′
j′ occurs with probability no bigger than 2
−c.
There is exactly one initial in-state in each query, so similarly as with the free in-
states, the overall probability of a transcript being bad due to a pair with an initial
in-state is at most q2`/2c. By summing all the partial collision probabilities we obtain
that Pr
[
DAY ∈ Tbad
] ≤ (q`)2/2b + 2q2`/2c.
6.7 Security of Full-State Keyed Duplex
For FKD, we prove the following result:
Theorem 6.5. Let b, r, c, k > 0 be such that b = r + c and k ≤ c. Let A be an
information-theoretic adversary that makes no more than N queries to p and p−1 in
total, that makes no more than q Initialize queries, such that each such query is followed
by no more than ` Duplexing queries with the total maximal multiplicity limited by µ.
Let FKD be the scheme defined in Figure 6.5. Then,
AdvprfdFKD(A ) ≤
(q`)2
2b
+
(q`)2
2c
+
µN
2k
.
The proof of Theorem 6.5 uses Lemma 6.6 to transform an FKD adversary into an
FKS adversary, similarly as Bertoni et al. did in their analysis of the Duplex construc-
tion [BDPA11a, BDPA11b]. While this would be sufficient to prove the security of the
Duplex construction, the bound induced solely by Lemma 6.6 suffers from a quantitative
degradation: we would have that AdvprfdFKD(A ) ≤ AdvprfxFKS (B) for a B that makes q`
queries, resulting in a bound 2q
2`4
2b
+ 2q
2`3
2c +
µN
2k
according to Theorem 6.3.
In reality, there will be a quantitative gap between the security of FKD construction
and that of FKS present, but it will be smaller. This is because an FKS adversary
constructed from an FKD adversary issues queries of a specific structure which is far
from general. In the following proof for FKD, we use this property; we define a class of
“constrained adversaries” and adjust the proof of Lemma 6.4 to these adversaries.
Proof of Theorem 6.5. We define the game prfd-R by including the lines marked by 
in the game prfd-R in Figure 6.6. By doing so, we replace the public permutation p by
an independent secret permutation pi in all the primitive calls made by the FKD. We
use this game as an intermediate step in the analysis, and define
AdvprfdFKD (A ) = Pr
[
A prfd-RFKD ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A prfx-IFKD ⇒ 1
]
for the sake of tidiness of the proof.
We have that FKSpK = FKS
EpK
0 (see Figure 6.7). Abusing the ∆-notation for the PRP
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security games, it follows that
AdvprfdFKD(A ) = ∆A (prfd-RFKD; prfd-IFKD)
= ∆A (prfd-RFKD; prfd-RFKD) + ∆A (prfd-RFKD; prfd-IFKD)
≤ ∆B
(
p,EpK ; p, pi
)
+ ∆C (prfd-RFKD; prfd-IFKD)
≤ Advprp
Ep
(B) + AdvprfdFKS (C )
for some adversary B that makes q · ` construction queries that have total maximal
multiplicity µ, and makes N queries to p and p−1, and for some adversary C that makes
q Initialize queries, such that each such query is followed by no more than ` Duplexing
queries. This claim is proved by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 6.3.
Andreeva et al. proved that Advprp
Ep
(B) ≤ µN
2k
for anyB [ADMA15]. In Corollary 6.7
we show that any FKD adversary C can be turned into a special “constrained” adversary
B′ against FKS that makes q` queries such that each query induces no more than ` calls
to the permutation, and such that we have
AdvprfdFKD(B) ≤ AdvprfxFKS (B′).
In Lemma 6.8, we prove that AdvprfxFKS (B
′) ≤ (q`)2/2b + (q`)2/2c for any such B′.
We define the mapping QbFKS : ({0, 1}<b)+ → {0, 1}∗ that will be used for the remainder
of the proof. For any b > 0 and for all X1, . . . , Xn ∈ {0, 1}<b we let
QbFKS(X1, . . . , Xn) = padb(X1)‖ . . . ‖padb(Xn−1)‖Xn.
Lemma 6.6 (Duplexing lemma [BDPA11a]). Let b, r, c, k > 0 be such that b = r + c
and k ≤ c. Let p ∈ Perm(2b). Let D = FKDp as defined in Figure 6.5. Let i ∈ N+,
K ∈ {0, 1}k, M1, . . . ,M i ∈ {0, 1}<b and z1, . . . , zi ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Then after executing
D.initialize(K) followed by D.duplexing
(
M j , zj
)
for 1 ≤ j < i, for the ith duplexing
query (M i, zi) we always have
Zi = D.duplexing
(
M i, zi
)
= FKSp(K,QbFKS(M
1, . . . ,M i), zi).
Moreover, the mapping QbFKS : ({0, 1}<b)+ → {0, 1}∗ is injective.
Proof. We will show the first claim by induction. For i = 1, the internal state of FKD is
updated to t1 = p
(
(0b−k‖K)⊕padb(M1)
)
, which is exactly the same as the state of FKS
evaluated on M1 only. Then both FKD and FKS output the same value Z1 = leftz1 (t1).
For every i > 1, FKD updates its state to ti = p
(
ti−1⊕padb(M i)
)
. By the induction
argument, ti−1 is also the state of FKS after processing the first i − 1 padded blocks.
Then the final state of FKS is easily seen to be ti as well. The equality of outputs follows
trivially.
To verify the injectivity of QbFKS, we will show how to invert it. For any image
X = QbFKS(X1, . . . , Xn), we can start recovering the input arguments from the left to
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right.
We have n = d|X|/be. While |X| > b, we keep removing the leftmost b bits of X and
applying the inverse of padb to them to recover the next component Xi. What remains
is the unpadded block Xn.
The result of Lemma 6.6 can be used to reduce any FKD adversary to a constrained FKS
adversary. Given an adversary A against FKD, we define the reduction A ′ = RFKS(A )
as follows. To answer the jth duplexing query (M ij , z
i
j) made by A after the i
th initialize
call, A ′ queries its own oracle with (QbFKS(M
i
1, . . . ,M
i
j), z
i
j). A
′ simply forwards the
output of A at the end of the experiment.
Corollary 6.7. Let A be an adversary against FKD that makes q initialize calls and
duplexes ` blocks after each initialization and RFKS(A ) the constrained FKS adversary
as defined above. It follows from Lemma 6.6, that AdvprfdFKD (A ) ≤ AdvprfxFKS (RFKS(A )).
For the rest of the proof, we will consider FKD adversaries that make exactly q Ini-
tialize queries, such that each of them is followed by exactly ` Duplexing queries. This
is without loss of generality, as any adversary A that makes less queries can be used to
construct another adversary B that uses all the resources and has the same advantage
as A .6 We denote by A′q,` the set of constrained adversaries against FKS, that were
each induced by some FKD adversary that makes q initialize calls and duplexes ` blocks
after each initialization:
A′q,` = {RFKS(A ) : A an FKD adversary with resources exactly (q, `)}.
Lemma 6.8. Let b, r, c > 0 be such that b = r + c. Let FKS be the scheme defined in
Figure 6.5. Then,
AdvprfdFKS (A
′) ≤ (q`)
2
2b
+
(q`)2
2c
,
for any constrained adversary A ′ ∈ A′q,`
Proof. We will to a large extent follow the notation and conventions from the proof of
Lemma 6.4. We assume that for 1 ≤ i ≤ q`, the query M i is already padded and ends
with a non-zero final b-bit block with mi = |M i|b being the number of b-bit blocks in
the query and M i1, . . . ,M
i
mi
b← M i being the blocks. The structure of the queries and
the number of squeezed bits will however differ.
Any adversary A ′ ∈ A′q,` makes exactly q` FKS queries, but these queries comprise at
most q` unique b-bit blocks. Moreover, these queries follow a certain pattern. We have
that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ q:
M `(i−1)+1 = M `(i−1)+11 and M
`(i−1)+j = M `(i−1)+j−1‖M `(i−1)+jj for 2 ≤ j ≤ `,
6B simply runs A , forwards all its queries and makes extra random Duplexing queries to waste
resources. At the end of experiment, B outputs whatever A outputs.
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where all M
`(i−1)+j
j ∈ {0, 1}b are non-zero (due to padding). Note that we have
m`(i−1)+j = j for 1 ≤ i ≤ q and 1 ≤ j ≤ `. For every query, A ′ asks for no more
than r output bits.
Because A ′ now only squeezes one block per query, the extended queries are now
identical with the original queries. I.e. we have for 1 ≤ i ≤ q and 1 ≤ j ≤ ` that
M¯ `(i−1)+j = M `(i−1)+j . The internal in-states sij and out-states t
i
j are defined the same
way as in the proof of Lemma 6.4.
The RP-RF Switch Recall the game prfd-Rf defined in the proof of Lemma 6.4.
We have
Advprfx-RFKS (A
′) = ∆A ′
(
prfx-RFKS; prfx-RfFKS
)
+ ∆A ′
(
prfx-RfFKS; prfx-IFKS
)
≤ (q`)2/2b + ∆A ′
(
prfx-RfFKS; prfx-IFKS
)
.
Although there are q
∑`
j=1 j = q`(` + 1)/2 calls to pi during the prfx-R game when
played by A ′, the structure of the queries implies, that there will be exactly q` calls
to pi with unique input. We obtain the claimed inequality using Lemma 2.6 and a
similar reduction as in the proof of Lemma 6.4, except that now the RP-RF distinguisher
B records every (x, pi(x)) that it learns from its oracle to avoid wasteful queries with
repeated input.
Patarin’s Coefficient-H Technique This part of the proof relies heavily on the
corresponding part of the proof of Lemma 6.4. We will show that
∆A ′
(
prfx-RfFKS; prfx-IFKS
)
≤ (q`)2/2c.
The games a constrained adversary A ′ ∈ A′q,` is trying to distinguish are prfx-RfFKS
and prfx-IFKS. A transcript τ = (M¯
1, . . . , M¯ q`, T 1, . . . , T q`) is defined as in the proof
of Lemma 6.4, where T `(i−1)+j holds all the j+ 1 out-states appearing due to M¯ `(i−1)+j
(including the dummy state t0`(i−1)+j). We will also use the same definition of a bad state
(see the expression (6.1)). This immediately gives us Pr [DX = τ ] /Pr [DY = τ ] = 1 for
any τ ∈ Tgood by a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 6.4. The probability
Pr
[
DY ∈ T bad
]
needs new investigation.
Bounding the Probability of a Bad Transcript in the Ideal World We define
the three possible labels of in-states, free, initial and fixed in the same way as
before and we will work with the re-expressed definition of a bad state (6.2). Since
the definitions of free, initial and fixed states are unchanged, the probabilities of
collision due to a pair of in-states sij , s
j′
i′ with stamp
i
j = free, stamp
i
j = initial and
stampij = fixed do not change. The only thing that really changes is the final counting.
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ q, the query M¯ `(i−1)+1 = M i1 consists of a single block. Thus it only
induces a single in-state with stamp1`(i−1)+1 = initial. Then for any 2 ≤ j ≤ `, we have
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llcpb
(
M¯ `(i−1)+j , M¯ `(i−1)+j−1
)
= j − 1, so there is at most one new in-state induced by
M¯ `(i−1)+j and unaffected by the common prefix with the previous queries. It is sj`(i−1)+j ,
and we always have stampj`(i−1)+j = free.
We see that, with respect to (6.2), there is exactly one state sj`(i−1)+j in the query
M `(i−1)+j that can cause a non-trivial collision, giving us a total amount of q` possible
tuples (i, j).
For every such state, we need to count all other states (visited by (i′, j′) in (6.2))
with which it can collide. For any i′ < i, it suffices to check equality of sj`(i−1)+j
with all ` in-states induced by M¯ `(i
′−1)+`, as every other query M¯ `(i′−1)+j′ is its prefix.
For i′ = i, it suffices to look at in-states induced by M¯ `(i−1)+j−1. Thus for any state
sj`(i−1)+j , there are no more than q` unique states, with which it can collide. Using the
collision probabilities from the proof of Lemma 6.4, we conclude that Pr
[
DY ∈ T bad
] ≤
(q`)2/2c.
6.8 Full-State SpongeWrap and its Security
Our result from Sect. 6.7 can be used to prove security of modified, more efficient versions
of existing Sponge-based AE schemes. As an interesting instance, we introduce Full-state
SpongeWrap, a variant of the authenticated encryption mode SpongeWrap [BDPA11a,
BDPA11b], offering improved efficiency with respect to processing of associated data.
6.8.1 Authenticated Encryption for Sequences of Messages
In this Section, we focus on authenticated encryption schemes that act on sequences of
AD-message pairs, following the approach of Bertoni et al.7 [BDPA11a, BDPA11b].
A nonce-based scheme for authenticated encryption of AD-message sequences (NSAE)
is a pair Π = (K,W ) where the key space K is a finite set andW is a deterministic stateful
algorithm surfacing three interfaces:
• W.initialize : K×N → ∅. Calling this interface will initialize W with a secret key
K ∈ K and a nonce N from the nonce space N ⊆ {0, 1}∗.
• W.wrap : A ×M → C. This interface inputs an AD-message pair (A,M) from
the AD space A ⊂ {0, 1}∗ and the message space M ⊂ {0, 1}∗, and outputs a
ciphertext-tag pair (C, T ) ∈ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}τ , where |C| = |M | and T is a τ -bit
tag authenticating (A,M) and all the queries processed by W so far (since the last
initialization call). We call τ stretch, or ciphertext expansion of Π.
• W.unwrap : A × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}τ → M ∪ {⊥}. This interface accepts a triple
(A,C, T ) of AD, ciphertext and tag from their respective domains, and outputs
either a message M ∈M or an error symbol ⊥.
7Bertoni et al. do not consider an explicit nonce as we do; rather, they require the header of the first
wrapping call to be unique.
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We require that W is initialized before making the first wrapping or unwrapping call.
For a given key K, we will use WK to refer to the corresponding keyed instance, omitting
K from the list of inputs; that is, W.initialize(K,N) = WK .initialize(N).
For the correctness of an NSAE Π = (K,W ), we require that for every key K ∈ K,
N ∈ N , number of wrapping queries q ∈ N+, vectors of bits RL ∈ ({0, 1})q, vectors of
AD A ∈ Aq, and vectors of plaintexts M ∈ Mq, the variable OK remains set to true
throughout the execution of the following code:
1: OK← true
2: W0.initialize(K,N), W1.initialize(K,N) . Note there are two instances of W
3: for i← 1 to q do
4: C, T ←WRL[i].wrap(A[i],M [i]) . RL[i] chooses the “direction” of ith query
5: M ′ ←W(1−RL[i]).unwrap(A[i], C, T )
6: if M [i] 6= M ′ then OK← false
7: end for
In other words, a correct NSAE scheme allows two parties to exchange encrypted AD-
message pairs, such that each party needs only a single instance of W for both encryption
and decryption, and the pattern of (directions of the) communication can be arbitrary.
Security of Authenticated Encryption We follow the approach of Bertoni et
al. [BDPA11a, BDPA11b] for defining the security of AE. We split the twofold secur-
ity goal of AE into two separate requirements, privacy and authenticity. The formal
definition of security of NSAE schemes is given in Definition 6.9.
Definition 6.9 (SPRIV and SAUTH AE security). Given an NSAE scheme Π = (K,W )
with a ciphertext expansion τ and an adversary A , we define the advantage of A in
breaking the confidentiality of Π in a chosen plaintext attack (with help of the games
spriv-R and spriv-I in Figure 6.9) as
AdvsprivΠ (A ) = Pr[A
spriv-RΠ ⇒ 1]− Pr[A spriv-IΠ ⇒ 1].
We define the advantage of an A in breaking the authenticity of Π in a chosen ciphertext
attack (wit help of the game sauth in Figure 6.9) as
AdvsauthΠ (A ) = Pr[A
sauthΠ forges]
where “A forges” denotes the event that any query to the Forge oracle returns a value
different from ⊥.
If AdvsprivΠ (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A that make q Init queries, and after each
Init query do wrapping queries that induce at most ` permutation calls (including the
initialization) and with total maximal multiplicity µ, and that make N direct queries
to the public permutation then we way that Π is a (, q, `, µ,N)-SPRIV-secure NSAE
scheme.
If AdvsauthΠ (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A that make q Init queries, and after each
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proc initialize spriv-RΠ
p←$ Perm(2b)
K ←$ K
X ← ∅
init← false
proc p(x), p−1(y)
proc Init(N)
if N ∈ X then
return false
init← true
X ← X ∪ {N}
W p.initialize(K,N)
return true
proc Wrap(A,M)
if init = false then
return ⊥
(C, T )←W p.wrap(A,M)
return (C, T )
proc initialize spriv-IΠ
p←$ Perm(2b)
X ← ∅
init← false
proc p(x), p−1(y)
proc Init(N)
if N ∈ X then
return false
init← true
X ← X ∪ {N}
return true
proc Wrap(A,M)
if init = false then
return ⊥
(C, T )←$ {0, 1}|M | × {0, 1}τ
return (C, T )
proc initialize sauthΠ
p←$ Perm(2b)
K ←$ K
X ← ∅, Y ← ∅
t← Λ
proc p(x), p−1(y)
proc Init(N)
if N ∈ X then
return false
X ← X ∪ {N}
t← Λ‖N
W p.initialize(K,N)
return true
proc Wrap(A,M)
if t = Λ then
return ⊥
(C, T )←W p.wrap(A,M)
t← t‖(A,C, T )
Y ← Y ∪ {t}
return (C, T )
proc Forge(N, (A1, C1, T1), . . . , (An, Cn, Tn))
if (N, (A1, C1, T1), . . . , (An, Cn, Tn)) ∈ Y then
return ⊥
W¯ p.initialize(K,N)
for i← 1 to n do
M ← W¯ p.unwrap(Ai, Ci, Ti)
return M
Figure 6.9 – Two-requirement definition of security for a nonce-based scheme
for authenticated encryption of AD-message sequences Π = (K,W ) with cipher-
text expansion τ . The variable t is a vector over the set {0, 1}∗ ∪ ({0, 1}∗)3.
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Init query do wrapping queries that induce at most ` permutation calls (including the
initialization), that make N direct queries to the public permutation, that make at most
qv Forge queries such that no Forge query induces more than ` permutation calls, and
that have the total maximal multiplicity µ (for all three types of construction queries),
then we say that Π is a (, q, `, µ,N, qv)-SAUTH-secure nonce-based AE scheme.
Remark 5. We can assume w.l.o.g. that every query to the Forge oracle is either
a fresh nonce followed by a single AD-ciphertext-tag triplet or a sequence of the form
(N, (A1, C1, T1), . . . , (An, Cn, Tn)) with (N, (A1, C1, T1), . . . , (An−1, Cn−1, Tn−1)) having
been learned by the adversary from a sequence of previous wrapping queries.
This is because a single AD-ciphertext-tag triplet (that is not trivially known to be
correct) at the end of the sequence is enough to make the forgery valid. At the same
time, correct unwrapping of the first non-trivial AD-ciphertext-tag triplet is a necessary
condition of the success of the whole query. An adversary A who issues Forge queries
with more than one non-trivial triplet can thus always be used to construct another
adversary B that adheres to the structure of the queries we have just described such that
AdvFSWsauth(B) ≥ AdvFSWsauth(A ).
6.8.2 Full-State SpongeWrap
The Full-State SpongeWrap (FSW) is a permutation mode for authenticated encryption
of AD-message sequences as described in Sect. 6.8.1. It is parametrized by a b-bit
permutation p, the maximal message block size r, the key size k, the nonce size n, and
the tag size τ > 0. We require that k ≤ b − r =: c and n < r. We denote an instance
with all parameters fixed by FSW[p, r, k, n, τ ].
The key space of FSW is K = {0, 1}k and the nonce space is N = {0, 1}n. The FSW
construction internally uses an instance of FKD to process the inputs block by block.
To ensure domain separation of different stages of processing a wrap-query, we use three
frame bits placed at the same position in each duplexing call to FKD as explained in
Table 6.1.
label value usage
FN 000 process nonce, derive initial mask of a query
FAM 001 block of A and M inside query
FM 010 block of M inside query
FA 011 block of A inside query
FAM| 100 last block of A and M inside query
F¯AM 101 last block of A and M , query ends, produces tag
F¯M 110 last block of M , query ends, produces tag
F¯A 111 last block of A, query ends, produces tag
Table 6.1 – Labelling and usage of the frame bits within FSW.
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1: algorithm wrap(A,M) (outline)
2: while there are both AD and message bits to process do
3: take ≤ r bit block of M and ≤ c− 5 bit block of A
4: wrap the message block
5: if both A and M end then
6: produce tag using frame bits F¯AM
7: else if only A ends or only M ends then
8: process the blocks using frame bits FAM|
9: else
10: process the blocks using frame bits FAM
11: end if
12: end while
13: while there are message bits to process do
14: take ≤ r bit block of M
15: wrap the message block
16: if M ends then
17: produce tag using frame bits F¯M
18: else
19: process the blocks using frame bits FM
20: end if
21: end while
22: while there are AD bits to process do
23: take ≤ r + c− 5 bit block of A, split it into r bit and c− 5 bit parts
24: if A ends then
25: produce tag using frame bits F¯A
26: else
27: process the parts using frame bits FA
28: end if
29: end while
30: prepare r random bits for next query using frame bits FN
31: end algorithm
Figure 6.10 – Outline of an FSW[p, r, k, n, τ ] wrap/unwrap(A,M) query
The main motivation of the FSW is concurrent absorption of message and AD to
achieve maximal efficiency through minimizing the number of permutation calls made
to process each wrap-query.
Since we can only process r bits of a message input at a time,8 we can use the remainder
of the state for the frame bits and a block of AD. This implies the lengths of message and
AD blocks processed with each permutation call; r+ 1 bits for padded message block, 3
frame bits and (having in mind that the input to FKD is always padded) this leaves us
at most (b− 1)− (r + 1)− 3 = c− 5 bits for a block of AD.
To minimize the number of permutation calls made in all possible situations, we
further specify special treatment for the wrap/unwrap queries with more AD blocks
8This is because the number of message bits that we can encrypt at a time is limited by the output
size of FKD.
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than message blocks. An informal outline of a wrap query is given in Algorithm 6.10.
This outline nicely illustrates how the frame bits are used for domain separation.
We next give a complete algorithmic description of the FSW. To keep it compact, we
introduce the following notation. For any L ∈ {0, 1}≤r, R ∈ {0, 1}≤c−5 and F ∈ {0, 1}3,
we let
Q(L,F,R) = padr+1(L)‖F‖R. (6.3)
Note that r + 4 ≤ |Q(L,F,R)| ≤ b − 1 for any L,F,R. We let (L,R) = lsplit(X,n)
denote splitting a string X ∈ {0, 1}∗ into two parts such that L = leftmin(|X|,n) (X) and
R = right|X|−|L| (X). In particular, for n ≥ |X| we have (X, ε) = lsplit(X,n). We will use
the abbreviation D.dpx(M, z) for the interface D.duplexing (M, z) of an FKD instance
D. The interfaces of FSW[p, r, k, n, τ ] are defined in Algorithm 6.11.
A schematic depiction of how the wrap interface processes various types of inputs is
given in Figures 6.12 and 6.13.
6.8.3 Security of FSW
The security of FSW is relatively easy to analyse, thanks to the result from Section 6.7.
The main steps of the analysis are to show that FSW injectively maps its wrapping
queries to a sequence of FKD queries, and then to reduce the security of FSW to the
security of FKD.
Theorem 6.10. Let b, r, c, k, n, τ > 0 be such that b = r + c, k ≤ c and n < r. Let
A be an adversary that makes q Init queries, and after each Init query does wrapping
queries that induce at most ` permutation calls (including the initialization) and with
total maximal multiplicity µ, and that makes N direct queries to the public permutation.
Let A ′ be an adversary that makes q Init queries, and after each Init query does wrapping
queries that induce at most ` permutation calls (including the initialization), that makes
at most qv Forge queries such that no Forge query induces more than ` permutation
calls, and that has the total maximal multiplicity µ (for all three types of construction
queries). Let FSW be the scheme defined in Figure 6.11. Then,
AdvsprivFSW (A ) ≤
(q`)2
2b
+
(q`)2
2c
+
µN
2k
,
AdvsauthFSW (A
′) ≤((q + qv)`)
2
2b
+
((q + qv)`)
2
2c
+
µN
2k
+
qv
2τ
.
Proof. We start by defining the games spriv-R and sauth which are respectively
variants of the games spriv-R and sauth created by replacing the instance D of FKD
(internally used by FSW) by a stateful algorithm ROrFKD, which does not use p at all.
The state of ROrFKD consists of two variables, a list S over {0, 1}∗ and an array F .
ROrFKD exposes the same interfaces as FKD: (1) RO
r
FKD.initialize() that initializes the
list S, to the empty list Λ, and (2) ROrFKD.duplexing(X, z) that, on input X ∈ {0, 1}<b
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1: interface W.initialize(K,N)
2: D.initialize(K)
3: S ← padr(N)‖0‖FN‖0c−5
4: Z ← D.dpx(S, r)
5: end interface
1: interface W.wrap(A,M)
2: M1‖ . . . ‖Mm r←M
3: (A′, A∗)← lsplit(A,m(c− 5))
4: A′1‖ . . . ‖A′a′ c−5← A′
5: A∗1‖ . . . ‖A∗a∗ b−5← A∗
6: if m = a′ = a∗ = 0 then
7: T ← ε
8: F ← F¯A
9: end if
10: for i← 1 to a′ − 1 do
11: Ci ←Mi⊕Z
12: Z ← D.dpx(Q(Mi, FAM, A′i), r)
13: end for
14: if 0 < a′ < m or 0 < a′, a∗ then
15: Ca′ ←Ma′ ⊕ left|Ma′ | (Z)
16: Z ← D.dpx(Q(Ma′ , FAM|, A′a′), r)
17: else if 0 < m = a′ and a∗ = 0 then
18: Ca′ ←Ma′ ⊕ left|Ma′ | (Z)
19: T ← D.dpx(Q(Ma′ , F¯AM, A′a′), r)
20: F ← F¯AM
21: end if
22: for i← a′ + 1 to m− 1 do
23: Ci ←Mi⊕Z
24: Z ← D.dpx(Q(Mi, FM, ε), r)
25: end for
26: if a′ < m then
27: Cm ←Mm⊕ left|Mm| (Z)
28: T ← D.dpx(Q(Mm, F¯M, ε), r)
29: F ← F¯M
30: end if
31: for i← 1 to a∗ − 1 do
32: (L,R)← lsplit(A∗i , r)
33: D.dpx(Q(L,FA, R), 0)
34: end for
35: if a∗ > 0 then
36: (L,R)← lsplit(A∗a∗ , r)
37: T ← D.dpx(Q(L, F¯A, R), r)
38: F ← F¯A
39: end if
40: while |T | < τ do
41: T ← T‖D.dpx(Q(ε, F, ε), r)
42: end while
43: Z ← D.dpx(Q(ε, FN, ε), r)
44: C ← C1‖ . . . ‖Cm
45: return C, leftτ (T )
46: end interface
1: interface W.unwrap(A,C, T )
2: C1‖ . . . ‖Cm r← C
3: (A′, A∗)← lsplit(A,m(c− 5))
4: A′1‖ . . . ‖A′a′ c−5← A′
5: A∗1‖ . . . ‖A∗a∗ b−5← A∗
6: if m = a′ = a∗ = 0 then
7: T ′ ← ε
8: F ← F¯A
9: end if
10: for i← 1 to a′ − 1 do
11: Mi ← Ci⊕Z
12: Z ← D.dpx(Q(Mi, FAM, A′i), r)
13: end for
14: if 0 < a′ < m or 0 < a′, a∗ then
15: Ma′ ← Ca′ ⊕ left|Ca′ | (Z)
16: Z ← D.dpx(Q(Ma′ , FAM|, A′a′), r)
17: else if 0 < m = a′ and a∗ = 0 then
18: Ma′ ← Ca′ ⊕ left|Ca′ | (Z)
19: T ′ ← D.dpx(Q(Ma′ , F¯AM, A′a′), r)
20: F ← F¯AM
21: end if
22: for i← a′ + 1 to m− 1 do
23: Mi ← Ci⊕Z
24: Z ← D.dpx(Q(Mi, FM, ε), r)
25: end for
26: if a′ < m then
27: Mm ← Cm⊕ left|Cm| (Z)
28: T ′ ← D.dpx(Q(Mm, F¯M, ε), r)
29: F ← F¯M
30: end if
31: for i← 1 to a∗ − 1 do
32: (L,R)← lsplit(A∗i , r)
33: D.dpx(Q(L,FA, R), 0)
34: end for
35: if a∗ > 0 then
36: (L,R)← lsplit(A∗a∗ , r)
37: T ′ ← D.dpx(Q(L, F¯A, R), r)
38: F ← F¯A
39: end if
40: while |T ′| < τ do
41: T ′ ← T ′‖D.dpx(Q(ε, F, ε), r)
42: end while
43: Z ← D.dpx(Q(ε, FN, ε), r)
44: M ←M1‖ . . . ‖Mm
45: if T = leftτ (T
′) then
46: return M
47: else
48: return ⊥
49: end if
50: end interface
Figure 6.11 – The NSAE scheme FSW[p, r, k, n, τ ]. The instance internally uses an
instance D of FKD[p, r, k]
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and a natural number z, first updates the list S← S‖X, then if F [S] = ⊥ sets F [S]←$
{0, 1}r, and outputs leftz (F [S]).
Note that the algorithm ROrFKD is completely equivalent with the pair of oracles
Initialize and Duplexing in the game prfd-I. We use this to obtain the following in-
equalities:
AdvsprivFSW (A ) = ∆A (spriv-RFSW; spriv-RFSW) + ∆A (spriv-RFSW; spriv-IFSW)
≤ (q`)
2
2b
+
(q`)2
2c
+
µN
2k
+ ∆A (spriv-RFSW; spriv-IFSW) ,
and
AdvsauthFSW (A
′) = Pr
[
A ′sauthFSW forges
]
− Pr
[
A ′sauthFSW forges
]
+ Pr
[
A ′sauthFSW forges
]
≤ ((q + qv)`)
2
2b
+
((q + qv)`)
2
2c
+
µN
2k
+
qv
2τ
+ Pr
[
A ′sauthFSW forges
]
.
Both inequalities are proved by a simple reduction. An FKD adversary B can be
constructed by using A (or A ′) as a subroutine. B simply simulates the spriv-R
game (or the sauth game) using its own Initialize and Duplexing oracles in the place of
D.initialize and D.duplexing calls. If B simulates the spriv-R game for A , it outputs
whatever A outputs. If B simulates the sauth game for A , it outputs 1 if and only if
A ′ forges.
If B is playing prfd-RFKD game, then it perfectly simulates spriv-RFSW for A and
otherwise it perfectly simulates spriv-RFSW (or it perfectly simulates sauthFSW for
A ′ and otherwise it perfectly simulates sauthFSW). If B uses A as a subroutine, it
will make q Initialize queries, while with A ′ it will make (q + qv) initialize queries. The
bounds then follow from Lemma 6.5.
We now bound ∆A (spriv-RFSW; spriv-IFSW) and Pr
[
A ′sauthFSW forges
]
. We know
that a unique sequence of a nonce and AD-message pairs yields unique sequence of
ROrFKD queries thanks to Lemma 6.11.
We have that ∆A (spriv-RFSW; spriv-IFSW) = 0. This is because the uniqueness
of the nonces used in the Init queries implies that every FSW.wrap(A,M) query is
processed using an ROrFKD with a unique internal variable S. This implies that every
ciphertext block and every tag will be produced using independent uniform bits.
It remains to show that Pr
[
A ′sauthFSW forges
]
≤ qv/2τ . We first analyse the ad-
vantage of an adversary who only makes a single forgery attempt.
To forge, the adversary must produce a sequence (N, (A1, C1, T1), . . . , (An, Cn, Tn))
that passes the authentication check. Due to Remark 5, this can either be a fresh
nonce followed by only (A1, C1, T1) or N can be reused and ((C1, T1), . . . , (Cn−1, Tn−1))
were obtained from a sequence of wrapping queries (N, (A1,M1), . . . , (An−1,Mn−1)) but
(Cn, Tn) was not returned by any consequent wrapping query (An,Mn).
In the former case, with a fresh nonce, ROrFKD has a fresh list S when (A1, C1, T1) is
unwrapped and T1 will be compared to τ random bits. The probability of a forgery is
2−τ in this case.
In the latter case, all the triplets ((A1, C1, T1), . . . , (An−1, Cn−1, Tn−1)) are trivially
successfully unwrapped. However freshness of (An, Cn, Tn) implies that either Cn 6= C ′n
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Figure 6.14 – [Framebit-sequences in a FSW query, and mapping to FKD quer-
ies. The tree of all possible frame bits sequences that can occur when processing a single
AD-message pair (top-left). The composition of an FKD query Qi (bottom-right).
or An 6= A n or Tn 6= T ′n for the corresponding (C ′n, T ′n) = Wrap(A′n,M ′n) query, if such
a wrapping query was made at all. If only Tn 6= T ′n, then Tn cannot be correct. In any
other case, the tag Tn is compared to outputs of RO
r
FKD with either a fresh internal list
S or with S that already occurred in the experiment but with fresh inputs. Thus Tn will
be compared to τ uniform bits and the probability of a forgery is bounded by 2−τ .
To obtain a more general result for an adversary that makes up to qv verification
queries, we use a similar reduction as one used by Bellare et al. [BGM04] and get
Pr
[
A ′sauthFSW forges
]
≤ qv/2τ .
Consider an instance (K,W ) = FSW[p, r, k, n, τ ] of FSW. We letQW denote the function
that maps a nonce and a sequence of AD-message pairs (N, (A1,M1), . . . , (An,Mn)) to
QW (N, (A1,M1), . . . , (An,Mn)) 7→ (Q1, . . . , Qd)
such that (Q1, . . . , Qd) ∈ {0, 1}<b is the ordered sequence of all inputs to the D.duplexing
calls made by the W.initialize and the subsequent queries to W.wrap during the pro-
cessing of (N, (A1,M1), . . . , (An,Mn)).
Lemma 6.11. Let (K,W ) = FSW[p, r, k, n, τ ] be an instance of FSW defined in Fig-
ure 6.11. Then the function QW is injective.
Proof. We prove the injectivity of the mapping QW by showing how it can be inverted.
We refer to the mapping Q defined in expression (6.3) to argue that every Qi can be
split into three strings Li, Fi, Ri with |Li| = r + 1, |Fi| = 3 and |Ri| ≤ c − 5 just as
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depicted on the bottom-right of Figure 6.14. The main trick is to use the frame bits
used in FSW to determine boundaries of wrapping queries and their logical parts. We
will refer to the FKD queries Q1, . . . , Qd as “frames”.
The nonce is contained in the very first frame with F1 = FN as L1 = padr(N)‖0. We
can extract it, and discard the frame.
We can then recover the AD-message pairs (in the following just “pairs”) from Q =
(Q1, . . . , Qd) in a left-to-right fashion. Any pair (A,M) is encoded in a subsequence of
Q that starts by a frame with frame bits FN and ends by a frame just before the next
frame with frame bits FN. Depending on the lengths of A and M , the pattern of frame
bits between these boundary frames can differ as depicted in Fig. 6.14.
If both A and M are non-empty, we follow the edge marked as A. If there is the same
number of r-bit blocks in M as there is of c− 5 bit blocks in A, then we follow the path
A.1. Otherwise we follow the path A.2 and then A.21 if there were fewer blocks in A
than in M and the path A.22 if there were in turn more blocks in A than in M .
If M 6= A = ε, then we follow the path B; if A 6= M = ε we follow the path C. In a
special case, where both A = M = ε, we follow path D. We can see, that every possible
case of relative = lengths of M and A in terms of blocks yields a distinct pattern of
frame bit sequences.
Having identified which path in Fig. 6.14 we are following, we can recover A and
M . Every frame Qi with Fi ∈ {FAM, FAM|} holds a padded block of M in Li and an
unpadded block of A in Ri. If Fi = FM, then there is a padded block of M in Li and
Ri = ε. If Fi = FA, then there is a padded block of A in Li and another unpadded block
of A in Ri. The frames with Fi ∈ {F¯AM, F¯M, F¯A} are used to produce the tag and are
thus treated specially. The first frame with F¯χ holds data blocks and the following ones
do not. If χ = AM, then there is a padded block of M in Li and an unpadded block of
A in Ri. If χ = M, then there is only a padded block of M in Li. If χ = A and we are
not on path D then there is a padded block of A in Li and a following unpadded block
of A in Ri. If we are on path D then none of the frames holds any data, since both A
and M are empty.
Once we extract all the blocks of A and M , we concatenate them all in the order in
which they were extracted to obtain A and M .
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Part II
Security Models

Chapter7
Security of Online Authenticated
Encryption
This chapter discusses the security of online authenticated encryption and its nonce-
misuse resistance.
The work presented in this chapter is a result of joint work with Viet Tung Hoang, Reza
Reyhanitabar and Phillip Rogaway that was published in CRYPTO 2015 [HRRV15].
Online encryption. This chapter is centred around online authenticated encryption.
Onlineness is a functional property of an AE scheme, but we will see that it also impacts
its security. When we speak of encryption being online we mean that it can be realized
with constant memory while making a single left-to-right pass over the plaintext, writing
out the ciphertext, also left-to-right, during that pass.
Investigating online encryption has a good reason: there are environments where it
is needed. The designer of an FPGA or ASIC encryption/decryption engine might be
unable to buffer more than a kilobyte of message. An application like SSH needs to
instantaneously send a message every time a character is typed at the keyboard to
emulate an interactive environment. Video-streaming services, such as Netflix need, to
stream a video [Mia14] that is “played” as it is received, never buffering an excessive
amount or incurring excessive delays. A software library might want to support an
incremental encryption and decryption API.
Most of the AE schemes that target the simple nonce-based AE security notion (see
Definition 2.7 or Definition 2.8) do have online encryption, e.g., 19 out of 20 the 2nd
round CAESAR candidates that targeted nonce-based AE security had online encryp-
tion [Viz16].
Nonce Misuse Resistance and Onlineness. As indicated by Rogaway and Shrimp-
ton [RS06b] and later reiterated by Fleischmann, Forler and Lucks, the security of nonce-
based AE schemes is rather fragile in that it is possible—and routine—that all security
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will be forfeit once the nonces get repeated. The MRAE security notion (see Defini-
tion 2.10) was put forward by Rogaway and Shrimpton to limit the impact of nonce
repetition to the bare minimum: having no adverse impact on authenticity, and the
damage to privacy being limited to the detection of complete input-tuple repetitions.
While it is easy to construct MRAE schemes [RS06b] (see also Section 4.3), any such
scheme must share a particular inefficiency: its encryption can’t be online. The reason an
MRAE scheme can’t have online encryption is simple: the security definition demands
that every bit of ciphertext depends on every bit of the plaintext, so one can’t output
the first bit of a ciphertext before reading the last bit of plaintext. Coupled with the
constant-memory requirement, single-pass MRAE becomes impossible.
This limitation, the encryption of any MRAE-secure AE scheme being unavoidably
oﬄine,1 led Fleischmann, Forler, and Lucks (FFL) to define a security notion [FFL12]
that slots between NAE and MRAE. We call it OAE1. FFL claim that their notion
captures the best-possible security for AE schemes with online encryption.
In this chapter, we investigate the security guarantees of OAE1. Based on our obser-
vations, we then formalize a security notion that we believe to come closer to the best
possible security for online AE, and we show how to achieve it.
Organization of the Chapter. We give an overview of related work in Section 7.1
and list the contributions of this chapter in Section 7.2.
We recall the security notion OAE1 in Section 7.3 and in Section 7.4 we present
definitional attacks and discuss shortcomings of the notion.
In Section 7.5, we then formalize our own take on the security of online AE, and in
Section 7.6 we show how to achieve it using existing tools.
7.1 Related Work
The first security notion for nonce-misuse resistant security of online AE proposed by
Fleischmann, Forler and Lucks (FFL) [FFL12] in 2012 induced most of this work. That
result was in turn inspired by the notion of Online Ciphers by Bellare, Boldyreva, Knud-
sen and Namprempre (BBKN) [BBKN01] and by the work on nonce-misuse resistant
AE by Rogaway and Shrimption [RS06b].
Fouque, Joux, Martinet, and Valette (FJMV) defined two notions for online AE, one
for privacy and another for authenticity, as early as in 2003 [FJMV03]. However their
aim was to formalize security against blockwise-adaptive attackers. In their setting,
message space is the set of finite sequences of fixed-size blocks, encryption is online
and probabilistic, but decryption is viewed as an atomic operation. In both notions,
the adversary can mount blockwise-adaptive queries on the encryption oracle. OAE1
resembles a recasting of FJMV’s notions with nonce-based AE syntax; this was later
established formally by Endignoux and Viza´r [EV16].
1For the sake of conciseness, we let “oﬄine” mean “not online” in the rest of the chapter.
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In 2004, Boldyreva and Taesombut (BT) [BT04] independently considered a similar
setting to that of FJMV, in which the adversary can mount blockwise-adaptive attacks
on schemes whose messages consist of fixed-size blocks. What differed from FJMV (and
what is similar to OAE2) is that the adversary could query both encryption and decryp-
tion oracles in a blockwise manner. Their focus is on probabilistic encryption schemes
under chosen-ciphertext-attack, but the full version of their paper [BT04, Section 6] also
speaks of AE.
Tsang, Solomakhin, and Smith (TSS) [TSS09] were the first to sever the association of
the blocksize of some underlying tool and the amount of data (i.e. bits) a user is ready
to operate on, which is one of the key conceptual shifts needed to move beyond BBKN’s
and FFL’s conceptions of online encryption. In their 2009 technical report TSS provided
a definition based on this idea, and they give examples [TSS09, Section 8] of practical
scenarios where the size of (segments of) plaintexts that need to be encrypted due to
latency requirements are well below the block size of any secure primitive. Unlike OAE2,
the security notion by TSS works with schemes in which there is ciphertext expansion
only at the beginning and end. They do not authenticate the segmented plaintext but
the string that is their concatenation. Our formalization of OAE2 also differs from the
notion by TSS in that it lets the adversary run multiple, concurrent sessions of online
encryption and decryption.
Bertoni, Daemen, Peeters, and Van Assche (BDPV) define an object very much like
what we are calling an OAE2 scheme [BDPA11a] (their syntax of an AE scheme that
acts on (ordered) sequences of AD-message pairs is the syntax of NSAE schemes defined
in Section 6.8.1 of this thesis). The security notions for privacy and authenticity put
forward by BDPV (similar to the SPRIV and SAUTH notions of Definition 6.9, except
that a weak form of nonce-repetition is tolerated to the adversary by BDPV) resemble
OAE2. In addition, the approach and correspondence with BDPV inspired our inclusion
of vector-valued AD.
Andreeva, Bogdanov, Luykx, Mennink, Mouha, and Yasuda (ABLMMY) [ABL+14a]
study OAE definitions and schemes that are meant to withstand the release of unverified
plaintext (RUP). Their motivations overlap with our own—a desire to support decrypt-
ing devices with insufficient memory to store the entire plaintext, or to allow prefixes
of the decrypted plaintext to be revealed as soon as required, according to application’s
real-time needs. The authors define a variety of new security notions that capture useles-
ness of the prematurely released unverified plaintext for attacks against confidentiality,
and those against authenticity of an AE scheme. Despite intersecting motivations, our
definitional approach and theirs diverge. Unlike ABLMMY, our own notion works with
user-segmented plaintext, avoids the use of knowledge extractors, and keeps the focus
on encryption and decryption being online. When OAE2 is used in its intended man-
ner, with reasonable segment-expansion τ , the notion is simultaneously stronger than
RUP notions in the sense of ensuring that all decrypted segments are authentic; weaker
than RUP notions in the sense that plaintext-extractors are in no way mandated; and
incomparable in the sense that the extensive syntactic mismatch makes any meaningful
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implications or separations infeasible.
Around the time of the beginning of CAESAR competition, numerous AE designs
appeared that targeted the OAE1-security, or weakened variants of it. In a relatively
short amount of time, we witnessed a divergence between the rhetoric used to make
security claims and the actual security guarantees provided by certain AE schemes, the
actual guarantees themselves being spread over a wide spectrum. We discuss this further
in Appendix B.1.
7.2 Contribution
We present two definitional attacks that help illustrate the actual (in)security captured
by the OAE1 security notion of FFL. We also discuss broader shortcomings of the form-
alism used by FFL related to their choice of syntax.
We define segmented AE schemes, whose syntax improves over that of FFL in all
points that we identified, and define the OAE2 security of such AE schemes. In our
opinion, the OAE2 notion better approximates the phrase “best possible security under
nonce-misuse” in the context of online schemes. At the same time, we are being clear
about the inherent limitations of any online AE scheme.
We demonstrate the feasibility of OAE2-security by designing the CHAIN construction
based on an existing tool, and proving that it is OAE2-secure. In addition, we map the
deterioration of the OAE1-like guarantees offered by AE schemes that appeared around
the start of the CAESAR competition.
7.3 Security Notion OAE1
While there are several variations of the online-AE security notion used throughout the
AE literature (see Appendix B.1), they all spring from FFL [FFL12], who modelled the
(supposedly) ideal online AE scheme by combining the definition of an online cipher from
Bellare, Boldyreva, Knudsen, and Namprempre [BBKN01] with the definition of authen-
ticity of ciphertexts (also called integrity of ciphertexts) [BR00, KY00, RBBK01]. In
this section we recall the FFL definition, staying true to the original exposition as much
possible, but necessarily deviating from it to correct an error. We call the (corrected)
definition OAE1.
Syntax. For any positive integer n let Bn = {0, 1}n denote the set of n-bit blocks,
let B+n =
⋃∞
i=1{0, 1}i·n denote the set of all nonempty strings of n-bit blocks and let
B∗n = B+n ∪ {ε}. A block-based AE scheme is a triple Π = (K, E ,D) where the key
space K is a nonempty set with an associated distribution and where the encryption
algorithm E and decryption algorithm D are deterministic algorithms with signatures
E : K ×H × B∗n → {0, 1}∗ and D : K ×H × {0, 1}∗ → B∗n ∪ {⊥}. The set H associated
to Π is the header space. FFL assume that it is H = B+n = N × A with N = Bn and
A = B∗n the nonce space and AD space. The value n associated to Π is its blocksize.
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Note that the message space M of Π must be M = B∗n and the blocksize n will play a
central role in the security definition. We demand that D(K,N,A, E(K,N,A,M)) = M
for all K ∈ K, N ∈ N , A ∈ A, and M ∈ B∗n.
To keep things simple, we further assume that the ciphertext expansion |E(K,H,M)|−
|M | is a constant τ ≥ 0 rather than an arbitrary function of H and |M |. We let
EHK = EK(H,M) = E(K,H,M).
Security. Let OPerm[2n] be the set of all length-preserving permutations pi on B∗n
where ith block of pi(M) depends only on the first i-blocks of M ; more formally, a
length-preserving permutation pi : B∗n → B∗n is in OPerm[2n] if for all X,Y, Y ′ ∈ B∗n we
have that
left|X| (pi(X‖Y )) = left|X|
(
pi(X‖Y ′)) ,
i.e. the first |X| bits of pi(XY ) and pi(XY ′) coincide. Despite its being infinite, one can
endow OPerm[2n] with a “uniform” distribution in a natural way: sampling a random
pi ←$ OPerm[2n] is equivalent to sampling piM ←$ Perm(2n) for all M ∈ B∗n and letting
pi(M ′) = piε(M ′1)‖piM ′1(M ′2)‖ . . . ‖piM ′1‖...‖M ′|M′|n−1(M
′
|M ′|n)
for every M ′ ∈ B+n where M ′1‖ . . . ‖M ′|M ′|n
n← M ′, and letting pi(ε) = ε. Note that for a
small number of queries, a random pi ←$ OPerm[2n] can be implemented efficiently with
lazy sampling.2
Definition 7.1 (OAE1 security [FFL12]). Given a block-based AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D)
with blocksize n, header space H and a constant ciphertext expansion τ , and given an
adversary A , we define the advantage of A in breaking the OAE1 security of Π in a
chosen ciphertext attack (with help of the games oae1-R and oae1-I in Figure 7.1) as
Advoae1Π (A ) = Pr[A
oae1-RΠ ⇒ 1]− Pr[A oae1-IΠ ⇒ 1].
If Advoae1Π (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A whose running time is limited by t, and whose
encryption and decryption query complexity is bounded by qe and qd respectively, and
whose data complexity (in bits) in all queries is limited by σ then we say that Π is a
(, t, qe, qd, σ)-secure OAE1 scheme.
As usual, the exact resource parameters of the adversary may be adjusted to suit the
analysis of a particular scheme. We can also speak of OAE1[n] security to emphasize
the central role in defining security of the scheme’s blocksize n.
2The implementation represents pi as an initially empty 2n-ary tree, whose vertices correspond to
(partially defined) elements of Perm(2n) and whose edges are labelled with elements of Bn. To evaluate
a query pi(M1‖ . . . ‖Mm), one applies the permutation at the root of the tree to M1 to get C1, then
follows the edge labelled with M1 and applies the corresponding permutation to M2 to get C2, follows
the edge labelled with M2 and so on, and returns C1‖ . . . ‖Cm. Whenever an edge does not exist, it is
created together with the corresponding vertex which is initialized to an undefined permutation, and
then lazily sampled according to the queries.
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proc initialize oae1-RΠ
K ←$ K
Y ← ∅
proc Enc(H,M)
C ← E(K,H,M)
Y ← Y ∪ {(H,C)}
return C
proc Dec(H,C)
if (H,C) ∈ Y then
return ⊥
return D(K,H,C)
proc initialize oae1-IΠ
for H ∈ H do piH ←$ OPerm[2n]
for (H,M) ∈ H × B∗n do RH,M ←$ {0, 1}τ
proc Enc(H,M)
return piH(M)‖RH,M
proc Dec(H,C)
return ⊥
Figure 7.1 – OAE1 security. Defining security for a block-based AE scheme Π =
(K, E ,D) with header space H, blocksize n, and ciphertext expansion τ .
Deviation from the original definition. Definition 7.1 effectively says that, with
respect to privacy, a ciphertext must resemble the image of a plaintext under a random
online permutation (tweaked by the nonce and AD) followed by a τ -bit random string
(the authentication tag). However, the original definition from FFL [FFL12, Definition
3] only modelled ciphertexts as images under a random online permutation, with no
tag following. Such a definition does not make sense, as E must be length-increasing
to provide authenticity. Necessarily, the scheme proposed by FFL (which did output a
tagged ciphertext) could not conform with their definition. Definition 7.1 is a result of
discussions between the author of this dissertation and the co-authors of the correspond-
ing publication [HRRV15], and of checking with one of the FFL authors [Luc14].
LCP leakage. We say that a block-based AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) with blocksize n
is LCP[n] (for “longest common prefix”) if for all K ∈ K, H ∈ H and M,M ′ ∈ B∗n we
have
llcpn
(
M,M ′
)
= llcpn
(EK(H,M), EK(H,M ′)) .
While all schemes we know claiming to be OAE1[n] are also LCP[n], an OAE1[n]-
secure scheme isn’t necessarily LCP[n]. This is because the requirement for OAE1[n]
security is to be computationally close to an object that is LCP[n], and something being
computationally close to an object with a property P doesn’t mean it has property P .
Indeed it is easy to construct an artificial counterexample; for example, we can start
with an OAE1[n]-secure scheme Π = (K, E ,D) that is LCP[n], and define Π¯ = (K ×
{0, 1}n, E¯ , D¯) with
E¯((K,K ′), H,M) =
 E
(
K,H, leftn (M) ‖reverse(right|M |−n (M))
)
if leftn (M) = K
′
E
(
K,H,M
)
otherwise
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where the function reverse(X) takes a string X and returns its bits in reversed order.
OAE1 security of Π¯ is only slightly degraded; if the adversary guesses K ′, E¯ will no
longer behave as an online permutation, but guessing K ′ is unlikely. The scheme Π¯ is no
longer LCP[n], because for each key, there exist messages on which the common prefix
is not preserved.
Despite such counterexamples, any OAE1[n]-secure scheme must be close to being
LCP[n], in the sense that it will preserve the LCP[n] property for an overwhelming
majority of the inputs. Fix a block-base AE scheme Π as defined above and consider an
adversary A that is given an oracle EK(·, ·) for K ←$ K. Consider A to be successful if
it outputs H ∈ H and X,Y, Y ′ ∈ B∗n such that
llcpn
(EHK (XY ), EHK (XY ′)) < |X|n
(i.e., the adversary found non-LCP behavior).
Let AdvlcpΠ (A ) be the probability that A is successful. Then it’s easy to transform A
into an equally efficient adversary B (in the sense that B will have the same data
and query complexity as A and will run in similar time) for which Advoae1Π (B) =
AdvlcpΠ (A ). Because of this, there is no real loss of generality, when discussing OAE1[n]
schemes, to assume them LCP[n]. In the next section we will do so.
7.4 Shortcomings of OAE1
In this section, we give our critique of the OAE1 notion. We first describe two definitional
attacks on OAE1. We call them the trivial attack and the CPSS attack. These attacks
are definitional in the sense that they cannot be used to invalidate OAE1-security of a
block-based AE scheme, but instead apply to every OAE1-secure scheme, and even to
the idealized reference object implemented by the game oae1-I.
We then further discuss certain characteristics of the OAE1 notion that we find ill-
conceived. These observations are then applied when we define our own notion in Sec-
tion 7.5.
7.4.1 Definitional Attacks
The trivial attack. We first observe that as the blocksize n decreases, OAE1 becomes
weaker: an adversary that has the ability to ask chosen-plaintext queries can decrypt
the ciphertext of an arbitrary m-block plaintext with (2n − 1)m encryption queries.
More precisely, we claim that an adversary that has access to a (properly keyed)
encryption oracle Enc and is given a ciphertext C = EHK (M) with M sampled from Bmn
with an arbitrary distribution can always recover M with (2n− 1)m encryption queries.
We now describe what we call the trivial attack. Fix a ciphertext C = C1 · · ·Cm T =
EK(H,M) with Ci ∈ Bn. Using just the encryption oracle Enc, we want to recover C’s
plaintext M = M1 · · ·Mm with Mi ∈ Bn. The attack proceeds as described in Figure 7.2.
Informally, it recovers the ith plaintext block, by iterating over the values Mi ∈ Bn and
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1: algorithm TrivialAttack(H,C‖T )
2: C1‖ . . . ‖Cm n← C
3: M ← ε
4: for i← 1 to m do
5: for Mi ∈ Bn\{1n} do
6: query C ′ ← Enc(H,M)
7: if C ′ = C1‖ . . . ‖Ci then
8: M ←M‖Mi
9: break
10: end if
11: end for
12: if |M |n < i then
13: M ←M‖1n
14: end if
15: end for
16: return M
17: end algorithm
Figure 7.2 – The trivial attack against a block-based AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) with
blocksize n.
encrypting M1 · · ·Mi−1 Mi until one reply matches C1 · · ·Ci or there’s only a single
value Mi remaining. It is easy to verify that the trivial attack works with the worst-case
complexity of (2n − 1)m encryption queries, even if the Enc oracle is implemented as
in the game oae1-I. This attack is therefore unavoidable whenever n is small and the
adversary can repeat the headers.
The CPSS attack. Even with the trivial attack taken into account, one might hope for
OAE1 security as long as the blocksize is fairly large, like n = 128. We dash this hope by
describing another header-repeating attack, one we call the chosen-prefix / secret-suffix
(CPSS) attack, which works for any blocksize. The attack is simple, yet devastating. It is
inspired by the well-known BEAST (Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS) attack [DR11].
Let Π = (K, E ,D) be a block-based AE scheme with blocksize n satisfying LCP[n].
We consider a setting where messages M that get encrypted can be logically divided
into a prefix P that is controlled by an adversary, then a suffix S that is secret, fixed,
and not under the adversary’s control, i.e. where M = P‖S. The goal of the adversary
is to learn S.
More formally, the adversary gets access to a special oracle defined as Enc′(H,P ) =
EHK (P‖S) for any P , for a properly sampled secret key K and for an S sampled from
{0, 1}|S| according to some distribution. The corresponding game is sketched in Fig-
ure 7.3.
To be realistic, we insist that the length of P be a multiple of b bits for some small
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proc initialize
K ←$ K
S ←$ X ({0, 1}|S|)
proc Enc′(H,P )
return E(K,H,P‖S)
proc finalize
return S′ = S
S
PH
EK
P
C
Enc
′
Figure 7.3 – The setting of the CPSS attack. The security game is parameterized
by a block-based scheme Π with a block size n, a secret size |S| and a distribution
X ({0, 1}|S|). The goal of the adversary is to output S′ = S at the end of the game. The
game is outlined on the left, the special encryption oracle illustrated on the right.
positive integer b. This is assumed for S too. Typically P and S must be byte strings,
whence b = 8; for concreteness, let us assume this is the case. Also for concreteness,
assume a blocksize of n = 128 bits. Assume further that E can in fact operate on
arbitrary byte-length strings, but suffers LCP leakage on block-aligned prefixes (this is
what happens if one pads and then applies an OAE1-secure scheme). Finally, assume |S|
is a multiple of the blocksize. We claim that an adversary can recover the secret S with
|S|b · (2b) encryption queries, irrespective of the blocksize n and the distribution with
which S is sampled.
To recover S, the adversary proceeds as follows. First it selects an arbitrary string P 1
whose byte length is one byte shorter than p blocks, for an arbitrary p ≥ 1. (For
example, it would be fine to have P 1 = 0120.) The adversary queries C1 = Enc′(H,P 1) =
EHK (P 1‖S). This will be used to learn S1, the first byte of S. To do so, the adversary
queries C1,B = Enc′(H,P 1‖B) = EHK (P1‖B‖S) for all-but-last one-byte values B (i.e. 255
queries). Due to LCP leakage, there will be at most one value of B for which we will
have llcpn
(
C1, C1,B
)
= p: the one with B = S1. If there is none, S1 is equal to the only
unqueried value of B. At this point the adversary knows the first byte of S, and has
spent 256 queries to get it.
Now the adversary wants to learn S2, the second byte of S. It selects an arbitrary
string P 2 that is two bytes short of p blocks, for any p ≥ 1. The adversary makes the
query C2 = Enc(H,P 2) = EHK (P 2‖S); and it then queries C2,B = Enc′(P 2‖S1‖B) =
EHK (P 2‖S1‖B‖S) for all-but-last one-byte values B. Due to LCP leakage and the fact
that we have recovered the first byte S1 of S already, at most one of these 255 values
will give llcpn
(
C2, C2,B
)
= p, which will allow us to recover S2, as before with S1. At
this point the adversary knows S2, the second byte of S. It has used 256 more queries
to get this.
Continuing in this way, the adversary recovers all of S in 256 · |S|/8 queries. In
general, we need 2b · |S|b queries to recover S, as we claimed. The general CPSS attack
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1: algorithm CPSS(|S|)
2: p← d|S|/ne
3: Pick an H ∈ H
4: S′ ← ε
5: for i← 1 to |S|/b do
6: Pick a P i ∈ {0, 1}p·n−i·b
7: Ci ← Enc′(H,P i)
8: Si ← ⊥
9: for B ∈ {0, 1}b\{1b} do
10: Ci,B ← Enc′(H,P i‖B)
11: if llcpn
(
Ci,B, Ci
)
= p then Si ← B
12: end for
13: if Si = ⊥ then Si ← 1b
14: S′ ← S′‖Si
15: end for
16: return S′
17: end algorithm
Figure 7.4 – The CPSS attack against a block-based AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) with
blocksize n, and data granularity of b bits.
is described in pseudocode in Figure 7.4.
Note that the CPSS attack also works if the values that prefix S are not completely
chosen by the adversary. It is enough that it be a known, fixed value, followed by the
byte string that the adversary can fiddle with. That is, the attack applies when the
adversary can manipulate a portion R of values L‖R‖S that get encrypted, where L is
known and S is not.3
How practical? It is not uncommon to have protocols where there is a predictable
portion L of a message, followed by an adversarially mutable portion R specifying details,
followed by further information S, some or all of which is sensitive. This happens in
HTTP, for example, where the first portion of a request specifies a method, such as
GET, the second specifies the requested resource, such as /img/scheme.gif/, and the
final portion encodes information such as the HTTP version number, an end-of-line
character, and a secret session cookie. If an LCP-leaking encryption scheme is used in
such a setting, one is asking for trouble: the session cookie may be recovered by an
adversary.
We do not suggest that LCP leakage will always lead to a real-world break. But if
giving adversaries the ability to manipulate the middle portion R of plaintexts L‖R‖S
is sufficient for the nonce misuse to result in a practical attack, one has strayed very far
3A variant of this attack works even if the encrypted messages are of the form L‖P‖R‖S, where the
adversary knows L,R and only controls P .
140
Security of Online Authenticated Encryption
indeed from genuine misuse-resistance.
MRAE and CPSS. In Appendix B.2 we show that any MRAE-secure AE scheme
resists the CPSS attack; establishing formally that there is a significant gap between
the nonce misuse resistance guaranteed by OAE1 and that guaranteed by MRAE.
7.4.2 Broader OAE1 Critique
The CPSS attack suggests that it is inaccurate to label OAE1-security as nonce-misuse
resistance, because OAE1-secure schemes deployed in common protocols are susceptible
to realistic nonce-reusing attacks. In this section we further examine OAE1 and identify
issues which we consider to be more fundamental. Because of these, the definition of
OAE1 does, in our opinion, fail to capture the intuition about what something called
“online-AE” ought to do.
The blocksize should not be a scheme-dependent constant. The motivation
for making an AE scheme online is that in certain applications, the implementation of
encryption can only buffer some limited number of bits of the plaintext at a time, be it
due to the constraints of the platform or latency requirements. This in turn implies that
the ciphertext must necessarily be composed of segments of some limited size, such that
ith ciphertext segment only depends on the first i corresponding plaintext segments.
OAE1[n] simply enforces “some” to be n, and demands that the ith block depends
only on the first i blocks of plaintext. Each of these blocks has a fixed blocksize, some
number n associated to the scheme and its security definition. This implies that we
always have to buffer exactly n bits to output the next segment of the ciphertext. It is
not clear if this fixed amount of buffering is done as a matter of efficiency, simplicity,
or security. In schemes targeting OAE1-security, the blocksize is usually small, like 128
bits, the value depending on the width of some underlying blockcipher or permutation
used in the scheme’s construction.
The conceptual problem with this design choice is, that the number of bits that are
reasonable to buffer is application-environment specific. One application might need to
limit the blocksize to 128 KB, so as to fit comfortably within the L2 cache of some CPU.
Another application might need to limit the blocksize to 1 KB, to fit compactly on some
ASIC or FPGA. Another application might need to limit the blocksize to a single byte,
to ensure bounded latency despite bytes of plaintext arriving at unpredictable times.
The problem is that the designer of a cryptographic scheme is in no position to know
the implementation-environment’s constraints that would motivate the selection of a
suitable blocksize. By choosing some fixed blocksize n, a scheme’s designer simultan-
eously hinders an implementation’s potential need to buffer less than n bits and an
implementation’s potential ability to buffer more than n bits of plaintext. Any choice of
a blocksize replaces a user’s environment-specific constraint by a hardwired choice from
a primitive’s designer.
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Remark 6 (Blocksize vs. memory constraints). Before moving on let us point out that,
if it is the amount of memory available to an implementation that is an issue, the right
constraint is not the blocksize n, where block Ci depends only on prior blocks, but the
requirement that an implementation be achievable in one pass and n bits of memory.
These are not the same thing [RZ11, p. 241]. And the former is a poor substitute for
the latter since context sizes vary substantially from scheme to scheme. While one could
build an OAE notion with the amount of memory as an explicit parameter, we find it
preferable to avoid such approach.
Security must be defined for all plaintexts. The original OAE1[n] notion only
defines security when messages are a multiple of n bits. Yet, such a message space is
far from practical in a vast majority of AE applications, which work with a smaller, or
simply different, data granularity than a typical value of n (e.g., n = 128, or perhaps
n = 64 in legacy applications). In general, we think that an online-AE definition is
not really meaningful (in practice) until one has specified what security means on the
message space M = {0, 1}∗.
We note that saying “we pad first, there is no need to deal with strings that aren’t
multiples of the blocksize” does not really solve the raised issue, as it still leaves unspe-
cified what is the goal one is aiming to achieve for the “incomplete” messages by applying
the padding.4
Decryption too must be online. If one is able to produce ciphertext blocks in an
online fashion one had better be able to decrypt them in the same fashion as they arrive.
Perhaps the message was too long to be stored on the encrypting device. Then the same
will likely hold on the decrypting device. Or perhaps there are timeliness constraints
due to which one needs to act on a message fragment now, before the remainder of it
arrives. For example, a video streaming service such as Netflix or YouTube needs to
accommodate for such a constraint; it would be pointless to encrypt a video in an online
fashion only to have to buffer the entire thing at the receiver’s side before it could play.
But online decryption is not required by OAE1 security, and it is routine that online
decryption of each provided block would be fatal. We conjecture that it is an unusual
scenario where it is only important for encryption be computable online.
The OAE1 reference object is not ideal. The reference object for OAE1[n] security
pre-supposes that encryption resembles an online-cipher followed by a random-looking
tag. But it is wrong to think of this as capturing ideal behavior.
First, it implicitly assumes that all authenticity is taken care of at the very end. But if
a plaintext is long and one is interested in encryption being online to ensure timeliness,
then waiting until the entire ciphertext arrives to check authenticity makes no sense.
4There are natural ways to try to extend OAE1[n] security to a larger message space; see, for example,
the approach used for online ciphers on {0, 1}≥n [RZ11]. This can be extended to OAE1. But it is not
the only approach, and there will still be issues for dealing with strings of fewer than n bits.
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Then, if one is going to act on a prefix of a plaintext as soon as it is recovered, it better
be authenticated.
Second, it is simply irrelevant, from a security point of view, if, prior to receipt of an
authentication tag, encryption amounts to length-preserving permutation. Doing this
may minimize ciphertext length, but that is an efficiency issue, not a basic goal. And
achieving this particular form of efficiency is at odds with possible authenticity aims.
7.5 Reformalizing Online AE
We remodel the online-AE and reformalize its security in a new notion. We will call it
OAE2. To accurately model the underlying goal, not only must the security definition
depart from (the games used in) NAE and MRAE, but so too must a scheme’s basic
syntax. In particular, we adopt an API-motivated view in which the segmentation of a
plaintext is determined by the caller.
After defining the syntax we offer three ways to quantify the advantage an adversary
gets in attacking an OAE2 scheme. We term these advantage measures OAE2a, OAE2b,
OAE2c. The notions are essentially equivalent. We provide quantitative results to make
this essentially precise.
We define the quantification of OAE2 security in three different advantage measures
mainly to clarify what OAE2 really is. The measures have different characteristics. The
first, OAE2a, is a vector-oriented formulation. It compares a scheme to a fairly easy-to-
understand reference object. The second advantage measure, OAE2b, is a string-oriented
formulation. It uses a tighter and more realistic accounting of the adversarial resources.
The third advantage measure, OAE2c, is also string-oriented and is more aspirational in
character. Yet it is the easiest notion to work with, at least for proving schemes OAE2-
secure. The OAE2c measure only makes sense, however, if the segment-expansion τ is
fairly large.
Segmented strings. In this chapter, we use the term segmented-strings to denote the
vectors (or lists) of strings. Thus we call {0, 1}∗∗ = ({0, 1}∗)∗ the set of segmented-
strings, a segmented string X ∈ {0, 1}∗∗ is a vector of strings, and the segmented-string
with zero components is the empty list Λ. Note that Λ is not the same as the empty string
ε. We call the strings that are components of a segmented string segments. We refer
the reader to the Section 2.1 for further notation used for vectors. We emphasize that
a segmented string is not a string (and that an empty string and an empty segmented
string are not the same thing, i.e. Λ 6= ε).
Online AE syntax. A segmented-AE scheme is a tuple Π = (K, E ,D) where the
key space K is a nonempty set with an associated distribution and both encryption
E = (E .init, E .next, E .last) and decryption D = (D.init,D.next,D.last) are specified by
triples of deterministic algorithms. Associated to Π are its nonce space N ⊆ {0, 1}∗
and its state space S. For simplicity, a scheme’s AD space A = {0, 1}∗, message space
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algorithm E(K,N,A,M)
m← |M |; if m = 0 or |A| 6= |M |
then return Λ
(A1, . . . , Am)← A
(M1, . . . ,Mm)←M
S0 ← E .init(K,N)
for i← 1 to m− 1 do
(Ci, Si)← E .next(Si−1, Ai,Mi)
Cm ← E .last(Sm−1, Am,Mm)
return (C1, . . . , Cm)
algorithm D(K,N,A,C)
m← |C|
if m = 0 or |A| 6= |C| then return Λ
(A1, . . . , Am)← A; (C1, . . . , Cm)← C
S0 ← D.init(K,N)
for i← 1 to m− 1 do
if D.next(Si−1, Ai, Ci) = ⊥ then
if m = 1 return Λ
else return (M1, . . . ,Mi−1)
else (Mi, Si)← D.next(Si−1, Ai, Ci)
Mm ← D.last(Sm−1, Am, Cm)
if Mm=⊥ then
return (M1, . . . ,Mm−1)
else return (M1, . . . ,Mm)
Figure 7.5 – Operating on segmented strings. The figure shows the algorithms E
and D that are induced by the segmented encryption scheme Π = (K, E ,D).
M = {0, 1}∗, and ciphertext space C = {0, 1}∗ are all strings. While an AD will be
provided with each plaintext segment, a single nonce is provided for the entire sequence
of segments. The signatures of the components of E and D are as follows:
E .init : K ×N → S D.init : K ×N → S
E .next : S ×A×M→ C × S D.next : S ×A× C → (M×S) ∪ {⊥}
E .last : S ×A×M→ C D.last : S ×A× C →M∪ {⊥}
When an algorithm takes or produces a point S ∈ S from its state space, it is understood
that a fixed encoding of S is employed.
Given a segmented-AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) there are induced encryption and de-
cryption algorithms
E : K×N×{0, 1}∗∗×{0, 1}∗∗ → {0, 1}∗∗ and D : K×N×{0, 1}∗∗×{0, 1}∗∗ → {0, 1}∗∗
(note the change to bold font) that operate, all at once, on vectors of plaintext, cipher-
text, and AD. These algorithms are defined in Figure 7.5. Observe how Dec(K,N,A,C)
returns a longest M whose encryption (using K, N , and A) is a prefix of C; in essence,
we stop at the first decryption failure, so |C| = |M | if and only if C is entirely valid.
We require the following validity (or else correctness) condition for any segmented-
AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) with induced (E ,D): if K ∈ K, N ∈ N , A ∈ {0, 1}∗∗,
M ∈ {0, 1}∗∗, and C = E(K,N,A,M), then M = D(K,N,A,C).
Ciphertext expansion. We focus on segmented-AE schemes with constant segment-
expansion, defined as follows: associated to Π is a number τ ≥ 0 such that if K ∈ K,
N ∈ N , A ∈ {0, 1}∗∗, M ∈ {0, 1}∗∗, m = |A| = |M |, and C = E(K,N,A,M), then
|C[i]| = |M [i]| + τ for all i ∈ [1..m]. Thus each segment grows by exactly τ bits, for
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some constant τ . We call τ the segment-expansion of Π.
We favor constant segment-expansion because we think that the same level of au-
thenticity ought to be guaranteed for the interior segments and for the final segment.
After all, much of the point of online-AE is to allow a decrypting party to safely act
on a ciphertext segment as soon as it is available. Still, there is an obvious price (in
terms of efficiency) to pay for expanding every segment. See the paragraph “Multival-
ued segment-expansion” for the case where the amount of segment-expansion is position
dependent.
Online computability. We say that a segmented-AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) has
online-encryption if its state space S is finite and there is a constant w such that E .next
and E .last use at most w bits of working memory. The value w excludes memory used
for storing an algorithm’s inputs or output; we elaborate below.
Similarly, scheme Π has online-decryption if its state space S is finite and there’s a
constant w′ such that D.next and D.last use at most w′ bits of working memory. A
segmented-AE scheme is online if it has online-encryption and online-decryption.
In accounting for memory above, we assume a model of computation in which the
input values are provided on a read-only input tape; the input’s length is not a part
of the working memory accounted for by w. Similarly, algorithms produce outputs by
writing to a write-only output tape in a left-to-right fashion. The number of bits written
out has nothing to do with the working memory w.
Our security definitions do not care if a segmented-AE scheme is online: that is an
efficiency requirement, not a security requirement. Yet a good part of the purpose of
the segmented-AE syntax is to properly model schemes that aim to comply with such
efficiency constraints.
7.5.1 First OAE2 Definition: OAE2a
We begin by defining the ideal behavior for an OAE2 scheme. For any τ ∈ N, we endow
the set of τ -expanding injections Inj(τ) with a“uniform”distribution: sampling a random
τ -expanding injection f ←$ Inj(τ) is equivalent with sampling fm ←$ Inj(2m, 2m+τ ) for
every m ∈ N and letting f(M) = f|M |(M) for all M ∈ {0, 1}∗. We define a distribution
on functions F ←$ IdealOAE(τ) as follows:
for m ∈ N, N ∈ {0, 1}∗, A ∈ ({0, 1}∗)m, M ∈ ({0, 1}∗)m−1 do
fN,A,M ,0 ←$ Inj(τ); fN,A,M ,1 ←$ Inj(τ)
for m ∈ N, A ∈ ({0, 1}∗)m, X ∈ ({0, 1}∗)m, δ ∈ {0, 1} do
F (N,A,X, δ)← (fN,A[1..1],Λ,0(X[1]), fN,A[1..2],X[1..1],0(X[2]),
fN,A[1..3],X[1..2],0(X[3]), . . . , fN,A[1..m−1],X[1..m−2],0(X[m− 1]),
fN,A[1..m],X[1..m−1],δ(X[m]))
return F
Thus F ←$ IdealOAE(τ) grows by accretion, the ith component of F (N,A,X, 0) de-
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proc initialize oae2a-RΠ
K ←$ K
oracle Enc(N,A,M)
if N 6∈N or |A| 6= |M | then
return ⊥
return E(K,N,A,M)
oracle Dec(N,A,C)
if N 6∈N or |A| 6= |M | then
return ⊥
return D(K,N,A,C)
proc initialize oae2a-IΠ
F ←$ IdealOAE(τ)
oracle Enc(N,A,M)
if N 6∈ N or |A| 6= |M | then
return ⊥
return F (N,A,M , 1)
oracle Dec(N,A,C)
if N 6∈ N or |A| 6= |C| then
return ⊥
if ∃M s.t. F (N,A,M , 1) = C then
return M
M ← LongestValidSubvector(F,N,A,C)
return M
Figure 7.6 – OAE2a security. The segmented-AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) has nonce
space N and segment-expansion τ . It induces algorithms E,D as per Figure 7.5.
The notation LongestValidSubvector(F,N,A,C) stands for the longest vector in {M :
F (N,A,M , 0)[i] = C[i] for i ∈ [1..|M |−1]}. The distribution IdealOAE(τ) is described
in Section 7.5.1.
pending on N , A[1..i], and X[1..i]. It must be decryptable (hence the injectivity) and
have the mandated length. The final input to F , the flag δ, indicates if the argument X
is complete: a 1 means it is, a 0 means it’s not. Figure 7.6 defines games oae2a-RΠ and
oae2a-IΠ for a τ -expanding segmented-AE scheme Π. We note that a sampled function
F ←$ IdealOAE(τ) can be efficiently implemented by lazy sampling.5
Definition 7.2 (OAE2a security). Given a segmented-AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) with
ciphertext expansion τ ∈ N, and given an adversary A , we define the advantage of A
in breaking the OAE2a AE security of Π in a chosen ciphertext attack (with help of the
games oae2a-R and oae2a-I in Figure 7.6) as
Advoae2aΠ (A ) = Pr[A
oae2a-RΠ ⇒ 1]− Pr[A oae2a-IΠ ⇒ 1].
If Advoae2aΠ (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A whose running time is limited by t, whose
queries contain no more than q segments in total, and whose data complexity (in bits)
in all queries is limited by σ then we say that Π is a (, t, q, σ)-secure OAE2a scheme.
Discussion. We now explain the intuition behind the notion OAE2a. A user of online
AE wants to encrypt a segmented message M = (M1, . . . ,Mm) into a ciphertext C =
(C1, . . . , Cm) using K,N,A. He/she wants to do this as well as possible subject to
5A random τ -expanding injection can be implemented similarly as a random online permutation. A
function F ←$ IdealOAE(τ) can then be implemented as a dynamically extendible collection of random
injections.
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the constraint that segments grow by exactly τ bits and M1 · · ·Mi are recoverable from
K,N, (A1, . . . , Ai), (C1, . . . , Ci) (to allow online decryption).
Similarly as the security notion of robust-AE [HKR15], we target an achievable (in-
stead of aspirational) goal, which is signalled by the phrase “as well as possible” . Spe-
cifically, our goal is formalized by comparing a real scheme to a random element from
IdealOAE(τ) and its inverse, the latter understood to invert as many components as
possible, stopping at the first point one can’t proceed.
The definition of IdealOAE(τ) is complex enough that an example may help. Consider
encrypting a segmented plaintext M = (A,B,C,D) with a fixed key, nonce, and AD.
Let (U, V,X, Y ) be the result. Now encrypt M ′ = (A,B,C). We want the encryption
algorithm to return (U, V, Z), not (U, V,X), as the final segment is special: processed
by E .last instead of E .next, it is as though M = (A,B,C,D) means (A,B,C,D$), while
M = (A,B,C) means (A,B,C$), where the $-symbol is an end-of-message sentinel.
Written like this, it is clear that the two segmented ciphertexts should agree on the first
two components but not the third. Correspondingly, possession of (U, V,X, Y ) ought
not enable a forgery of (U, V,X). All of this understanding gets quietly embedded into
the definition of IdealOAE(τ), whose member functions get a final argument δ with
semantics indicating if the message is complete. Thus F (N,A, (A,B,C), 0) is what
M = (A,B,C) should map to if more segments are to come, while F (N,A, (A,B,C), 1)
is what it should map to if C is the final segment of M .
7.5.2 Second OAE2 Definition: OAE2b
The games in Figure 7.7 provide a more fine-grained and string-oriented measure for
OAE2 security. The adversary, instead of querying N,A,M and getting a vector C =
Enc(N,A,M), can adaptively grow A and M one component at a time. Similarly,
instead of providing a segmented ciphertext N,A,C and getting M = Dec(N,A,C), it
can adaptively grow A,C.
Definition 7.3 (OAE2b security). Given a segmented-AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) with
ciphertext expansion τ ∈ N, and given an adversary A , we define the advantage of A
in breaking the OAE2b AE security of Π in a chosen ciphertext attack (with help of the
games oae2b-R and oae2b-I in Figure 7.7) as
Advoae2bΠ (A ) = Pr[A
oae2b-RΠ ⇒ 1]− Pr[A oae2b-IΠ ⇒ 1].
If Advoae2bΠ (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A whose running time is limited by t, who
make no more than q calls to any of the interfaces of both encryption and decryption,
and whose data complexity (in bits) in all queries is limited by σ then we say that Π is
a (, t, q, σ)-secure OAE2b scheme.
The OAE2a and OAE2b measures are essentially equivalent. The meaning of “essen-
tially” is made precise by a simple result explaining how to convert an adversary for one
definition into an adversary for the other. This is stated formally in Proposition 7.4.
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proc initialize oae2b-RΠ
I, J ← 0; K ←$ K
oracle Enc.init(N)
if N 6∈ N then
return ⊥
I ← I + 1; SI ← E .init(K,N)
return I
oracle Enc.next(i, A,M)
if i 6∈ [1..I] or Si = ⊥ then
return ⊥
(C, Si)← E .next(Si, A,M)
return C
oracle Enc.last(i, A,M)
if i 6∈ [1..I] or Si = ⊥ then
return ⊥
C ← E .last(Si, A,M)
Si ← ⊥
return C
oracle Dec.init(N)
if N 6∈ N then
return ⊥
J ← J + 1; S′J ← D.init(K,N)
return J
oracle Dec.next(j, A,C)
if j 6∈ [1..J ] or S′j = ⊥ then
return ⊥
(M,S′j)← D.next(S′j , A,C)
return M
oracle Dec.last(j, A,C)
if j 6∈ [1..J ] or S′j = ⊥ then
return ⊥
M ← D.last(S′j , A,C)
S′j ← ⊥
return M
proc initialize oae2b-IΠ
I, J ← 0; F ←$ IdealOAE(τ)
oracle Enc.init(N)
if N 6∈ N then return ⊥
I ← I + 1; NI ← N
AI ← Λ; MI ← Λ
return I
oracle Enc.next(i, A,M)
if i 6∈ [1..I] or Mi = ⊥ then return ⊥
Ai ← Ai‖A; Mi ←Mi‖M
m← |Mi|; C ← F (Ni,Ai,Mi, 0)
return C[m]
oracle Enc.last(i, A,M)
if i 6∈ [1..I] or Mi = ⊥ then return ⊥
Ai ← Ai‖A; Mi ←Mi‖M
m← |Mi|; C ← F (Ni,Ai,Mi, 1)
Mi ← ⊥
return C[m]
oracle Dec.init(N)
if N 6∈ N then return ⊥
J ← J + 1; N ′J ← N
A′j ←$ Λ; CJ ← Λ
return J
oracle Dec.next(j, A,C)
if j 6∈ [1..J ] or Cj = ⊥ then return ⊥
A′j ← Aj‖A; Cj ← Cj‖C; m← |Cj |
if ∃M s.t. F (N ′j ,A′j ,M , 0) = Cj then
return M [m]
else
Cj ← ⊥; return ⊥
oracle Dec.last(j, A,C)
if j 6∈ [1..J ] or Cj = ⊥ then return ⊥
A′j ← A‖A; Cj ← Cj‖C; m← |Cj |
if ∃M s.t. F (N ′j ,A′j ,Mj , 1) = Cj then
Cj ← ⊥; return M [m]
else
Cj ← ⊥; return ⊥
Figure 7.7 – OAE2b security. The segmented-AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) has nonce
space N and segment-expansion τ . The distribution IdealOAE(τ) is defined in Sec-
tion 7.5.1.
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Proposition 7.4 (OAE2a ≈ OAE2b). Let Π be a segmented-AE scheme with ciphertext
expansion τ . For any OAE2a adversary A1 hat runs in time t1 and queries σ1 segments
in total, there is an adversary B1 that has
Advoae2aΠ (A1) ≤ Advoae2bΠ (B1)
such that B1 runs in time t1 +γ1 ·σ1 for some constant γ1, and queries the same number
of segments in total as does A1.
For any OAE2b adversary B2 that runs in time t2 and queries up to σ2 segments in
total, there is an adversary A2 that has
Advoae2bΠ (B2) ≤ Advoae2aΠ (A2)
such that A2 runs in time t2 +γ2 ·σ22 for some constant γ2, and queries up to σ22 segments
in total.
Proof. First, given an OAE2a adversary A1 we construct an equally effective OAE2b
adversary B1: it translates each query Enc(N, (A1, . . . , Am), (M1, . . . ,Mm)) asked by
adversaryA1 into an Enc.init, thenm−1 Enc.next calls, then an Enc.last call, assembling
the answers into a segmented ciphertext (C1, . . . , Cm). Similarly, it translates any query
Dec(N, (A1, . . . , Am), (C1, . . . , Cm)) into a sequence of Dec.init, Dec.next, Dec.last calls.
Adversary B1 gets exactly the OAE2b-advantage that A1 had as OAE2a-advantage. It
runs in almost the exact same time.
Simulation in the other direction is less efficient. Given an adversary B2 attacking the
OAE2b-security of a Π, we construct an adversary A2 for attacking the OAE2a-security
of the same scheme. Adversary A2 maintains lists Ni,Ai,Mi that are initialized in the
natural way with each Enc.init call (incrementing i, initially zero, with each Enc.init).
Calls of the form Enc.next(i, A,M), when valid, result in appending A to Ai and M to
Mi, making an Enc(Ni,Ai‖ε,Mi‖ε) call, and returning its |Mi|-th component. Calls of
the form Enc.last(i, A,M) result in making an Enc(Ni,Ai‖A,Mi‖M) call, returning its
last component, resetting Mi to ⊥ before doing so. Calls of the form Dec.init, Dec.next,
and Dec.last are treated analogously, maintaining N ′i , A
′
i,Ci values. Once again the
simulation is perfect, so Advoae2aΠ (A2) = Adv
oae2b
Π (B2). But now there is a quadratic
slowdown in running time: the argument lists can grow long, as can return values, only
one component of which is used with each call.
While the OAE2a definition is more compact, the adversary’s ability to ask segmentwise
adaptive queries in the OAE2b definition ultimately makes it preferable, particularly as
this better models the real-world semantics; an adversary might be able to incrementally
grow a plaintext or ciphertext with the unwitting cooperation of some encrypting or
decrypting party. 6
6We note that we could grant the adversary with even greater ability to adapt its queries that would
allow it to grow a tree, and not just a chain of segments. But this would not seem to model anything
meaningful in the real-world.
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There are a couple of further reasons to favor OAE2b. One is that it more directly
captures the possibility of “infinite” (non-terminating) plaintexts (an infinite “stream”
of messages). This is simply the setting where Enc.last and Dec.last are never called.
Second, the OAE2b definition makes it easier to define nonce-respecting adversaries for
the OAE setting. Such adversaries may adaptively grow a plaintext based on a single
nonce, but it may grow only one plaintext for any given nonce. Building on the OAE2a
formulation this is awkward to say, but building on the OAE2b formulation, it is natural.
7.5.3 Third OAE2 Definition: OAE2c
Let Π be a segmented-AE scheme with segment-expansion τ and nonce-space N . Our
final formulation of OAE2 security uses a two-part definition, separately defining privacy
and authenticity requirements with help of the games defined in Figure 7.8.
Definition 7.5 (OAE2c security). Given a segmented-AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) with
ciphertext expansion τ ∈ N, and given an adversary A , we define the advantage of A
in breaking the confidentiality of Π in a chosen plaintext attack (with help of the games
oae2c-R and oae2c-I in Figure 7.8) as
Advoae2-privΠ (A ) = Pr[A
oae2c-RΠ ⇒ 1]− Pr[A oae2c-IΠ ⇒ 1].
Given an adversary A ′, we define the advantage of A ′ in breaking the authenticity of Π
in a chosen ciphertext attack (with help of the game oae2c-F in Figure 7.8) as
Advoae2-authΠ (A
′) = Pr[A oae2c-FΠ ⇒ true]
where A oae2c-FΠ ⇒ true denotes the event that A ′ returns a value that, when provided
as input to the procedure finalize, evaluates to true.
If Advoae2-privΠ (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A whose running time is limited by t, who
make no more than q calls to any of the interfaces of both encryption and decryption,
and whose data complexity (in bits) in all queries is limited by σ then we say that Π is
a (, t, q, σ)-privacy-secure OAE2c scheme.
If Advoae2-authΠ (A
′) ≤ ′ for all adversaries A ′ whose running time is limited by t′,
who make no more than q′ calls to any of the interfaces of both encryption and decryption,
and whose data complexity (in bits) in all queries is limited by σ′ then we say that Π is
a (′, t′, q′, σ′)-authenticity-secure OAE2c scheme.
Definition OAE2c is simpler than the prior two in the sense that, for privacy, no decryp-
tion oracles are provided and the reference experiment simply returns the right number
of uniformly random bits. For the authenticity portion of the definition, forgeries are
defined to allow any (N,A,C) that the adversary does not trivially know to be valid,
the adversary marking if C has terminated (b = 1) or not (b = 0). The set Y records
the tuples that the adversary knows to be trivially correct from its encryption queries.
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proc initialize oae2c-RΠ oae2c-FΠ
I ← 0; K ←$ K
Y ← ∅
oracle Enc.init(N)
if N 6∈ N then
return ⊥
I ← I + 1; SI ← E .init(K,N)
NI ← N ; AI ←MI ← CI ← Λ
return I
oracle Enc.next(i, A,M)
if i 6∈ [1..I] or Si = ⊥ then
return ⊥
(C, Si)← E .next(Si, A,M)
Ai ← Ai‖A; Mi ←Mi‖M
Ci ← Ci‖C; Y ← Y ∪ {(Ni,Ai,Ci, 0)}
return C
oracle Enc.last(i, A,M)
if i 6∈ [1..I] or Si = ⊥ then
return ⊥
C ← E .last(Si, A,M); Si ← ⊥
Ai ← Ai‖A; Mi ←Mi‖M
Ci ← Ci‖C; Y ← Y ∪ {(Ni,Ai,Ci, 1)}
return C
proc finalize (N,A,C, b)
if N /∈ N or (N,A,C, b)∈Y then
 return false
if |A| 6= |C| or |A|=0 then
 return false
S ← D.init(K,N); m← |C|
for i← 1 to m− b do
 (M,S)← D.next(S,A[i],C[i])
 if M = ⊥ then return false
if b = 1 and D.last(S,A[m],C[m]) = ⊥
 then return false
return true
proc initialize oae2c-IΠ
I ← 0
E(x)← ⊥ for all x
oracle Enc.init(N)
if N 6∈ N then
return ⊥
I ← I + 1
NI ← N ; Ai ←Mi ← Λ
return I
oracle Enc.next(i, A,M)
if i 6∈ [1..I] or Ni = ⊥ then
return ⊥
Ai ← Ai‖A; Mi ←Mi‖M
if E(Ni,Ai,Mi, 0) = ⊥ then
E(Ni,Ai,Mi, 0)←$ {0, 1}|M |+τ
C ← E(Ni,Ai,Mi, 0)
return C
oracle Enc.last(i, A,M)
if i 6∈ [1..I] or Ni = ⊥ then
return ⊥
Ai ← Ai‖A; Mi ←Mi‖M
if E(Ni,Ai,Mi, 1) = ⊥ then
E(Ni,Ai,Mi, 1)←$ {0, 1}|M |+τ
C ← E(Ni,Ai,Mi, 1); Ni ← ⊥
return C
Figure 7.8 – OAE2c security. Privacy and authenticity are separately defined, the
first by comparing games oae2c-R and oae2c-I, and the second using game oae2c-F,
which includes the additional lines indicated by .
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The following propositions show that OAE2b and OAE2c are close, assuming that the
segment-expansion τ is fairly large.
Proposition 7.6 (OAE2c⇒ OAE2b). Let Π be a segmented-AE scheme with ciphertext
expansion τ . For any adversary A that runs in time t, makes no more than q individual
queries and starts no more than p decryption chains, such that it queries no more than
σ bits of data in total, there are adversaries B1 and B2 for which
Advoae2bΠ (A ) ≤ Advoae2-privΠ (B1) + p ·Advoae2-authΠ (B2) + q2/2τ .
For each i ∈ {1, 2}, adversary Bi runs in time t+γi ·σ for some constant γi, and queries
at most σ bits in total.
proc Enc.init(N)
I ← I + 1; NI ← N ; SI ← ε
MI ,AI ,CI ← Λ
return Enc.init(N)
proc Enc.next(i, A,M)
if i > I or Si = ⊥ then return ⊥
C ← Enc.next(i, A,M)
Mi ←Mi‖M ; Ai ← Ai‖A
Ci ← Ci‖C; H[Ni,Ai,Ci, 0]←Mi
return C
proc Enc.last(i, A,M)
if i > I or Si = ⊥ then return ⊥
C ← Enc.last(i, A,M); Si ← ⊥
Mi ←Mi‖M ; Ai ← Ai‖A
Ci ← Ci‖C; H[Ni,Ai,Ci, 1]←Mi;
return C
proc Dec.init(N)
J ← J + 1; N ′J ← N ; S′J ← ε
A′J ,C
′
J ← Λ
return J
proc Dec.next(j, A,C)
if j > J or S′j = ⊥ then return ⊥
A′j ← A′j‖A; C ′j ← C
if H[N ′j ,A
′
j ,C
′
j , 0] 6= ⊥ then
M ← H[N ′j ,A′j ,C ′j , 0]
return M [|M |]
Y ← Y ∪ {(N ′j ,A′j ,C ′j , 0)}; S′j ← ⊥;
return ⊥
proc Dec.last(j, A,C)
if j > J or S′j = ⊥ then return ⊥
A′j ← A′j‖A; C ′j ← C; S′j ← ⊥
if H[N ′j ,A
′
j ,C
′
j , 0] 6= ⊥ then
M ← H[N ′j ,A′j ,C ′j , 1]
return M [|M |]
Y ← Y ∪ {(N ′j ,A′j ,C ′j , 1)}
return ⊥
Figure 7.9 – The procedures that Bi (with i ∈ {1, 2}) runs in the proof of Pro-
position 7.6 to simulate A ’s oracles. The procedures Enc.init,Enc.next,Enc.last are
the encryption oracles of Bi. There is an implicit procedure initialize() that initializes
I, J ← 0, Y ← ∅ and H to an empty array.
Proof. We construct the adversary B1 from A as follows. The former runs the latter,
implementing A ’s oracles as indicated in Figure 7.9, and outputs the same guess as A .
Next, we create adversary B2 from A as follows. The former runs the latter, imple-
menting A ’s oracles as indicated in Figure 7.9. When A terminates, B2 will process the
resulting set Y. For (N,A,C, 0) and (N,A′,C ′, δ) in Y, we’ll delete the former vector if
m = |A| < |A′|, and A[i] = A′[i] and C[i] = C ′[i] for every i ≤ m. Now the set Y will
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proc Enc.init(N)
I ← I + 1; NI ← N
SI ← E .init(K,N); MI ,AI ,CI ← Λ
return I
proc Enc.next(i, A,M)
if i > I or Si = ⊥ then return ⊥
C ← E .next(Si, A,M)
Mi ←Mi‖M ; Ai ← Ai‖A
Ci ← Ci‖C; H[Ni,Ai,Ci, 0]←Mi;
return C
proc Enc.last(i, A,M)
if i > I or Si = ⊥ then return ⊥
C ← E .last(Si, A,M); Si ← ⊥
Mi ←Mi‖M ; Ai ← Ai‖A
Ci ← Ci‖C; H[Ni,Ai,Ci, 1]←Mi;
return C
proc Dec.init(N) Games G1, G2
J ← J + 1; N ′J ← N
S′J ← D.init(K,N); M ′J ,A′J ,C ′J ← Λ
return J
proc Dec.next(j, A,C)
if j > J or S′j = ⊥ then return ⊥
A′j ← A′j‖A; C ′j ← C ′j‖C
if H[N ′j ,A
′
j ,C
′
j , 0] 6= ⊥ then
M ← H[N ′j ,A′j ,C ′j , 0]
return M [|M |]
(M,S′j)← D.next(S′j , A,C)
if M 6= ⊥ then bad← true; S′j ,M ← ⊥
return M
proc Dec.last(j, A,C)
if j > J or S′j = ⊥ then return ⊥
A′j ← A′j‖A; C ′j ← C ′j‖C
if H[N ′j ,A
′
j ,C
′
j , 0] 6= ⊥ then
M ← H[N ′j ,A′j ,C ′j , 1]; S′j ← ⊥
return M [|M |]
if M 6= ⊥ then bad← true; M ← ⊥
S′j ← ⊥;
return M
proc Enc.init(N)
I ← I + 1; NI ← N
SI ← ε; MI ,AI ,CI ← Λ
return I
proc Enc.next(i, A,M)
if i > I or Si = ⊥ then return ⊥
Ai ← Ai‖A; C ← ρNi,Ai,Mi,0(M)
Mi ←Mi‖M ; Ci ← Ci‖C
H[Ni,Ai,Ci, 0]←Mi
return C
proc Enc.last(i, A,M)
if i > I or Si = ⊥ then return ⊥
Ai ← Ai‖A; C ← ρNi,Ai,Mi,1(M)
Si ← ⊥; Mi ←Mi‖M
Ci ← Ci‖C; H[Ni,Ai,Ci, 1]←Mi
return C
proc Dec.init(N) Game G3
J ← J + 1; N ′J ← N
S′J ← ε; M ′J ,A′J ,C ′J ← Λ
return J
proc Dec.next(j, A,C)
if j > J or S′j = ⊥ then return ⊥
A′j ← A′j‖A; C ′j ← C ′j‖C
if H[N ′j ,A
′
j ,C
′
j , 0] 6= ⊥ then
M ′j ←M ← H[N ′j ,A′j ,C ′j , 0]
return M [|M |]
M ← ρ−1N ′j ,A′j ,M ′j ,0(C)
if M = ⊥ then S′j ← ⊥
else M ′j ←M ′j‖M fi
return M
proc Dec.last(j, A,C)
if j > J or S′j = ⊥ then return ⊥
A′j ← A′j‖A; C ′j ← C; S′j ← ⊥
if H[N ′j ,A
′
j ,C
′
j , 0] 6= ⊥ then
M ← H[N ′j ,A′j ,C ′j , 1]
return M [|M |]
M ← ρ−1N ′j ,A′j ,M ′j ,1(C)
return M
Figure 7.10 – Games G1–G3 in the proof of Proposition 7.6. Game G2 contains
the boxed statements, but game G1 doesn’t. There is an implicit procedure initialize()
that initializes I, J ← 0 and Z ← ∅, and samples ρN,A,M ,δ ←$ Inj(τ) for every N ∈
N , δ ∈ {0, 1}, and A,M ∈ {0, 1}∗∗ such that |A| = |M |+ 1.
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have only p elements that correspond to the p decryption chains. Adversary B2 then
outputs a random element of Y as its forgery attempt.
Consider games G1–G3 in Figure 7.10. Game G1 corresponds to game oae2b-RΠ.
Game G2 is identical to game G1, except that Dec.next and Dec.last always return ⊥.
The two games are identical-until-bad, and thus by Lemma 2.1
Pr[A G1 ⇒ 1]− Pr[AG2 ⇒ 1] ≤ Pr[A G2 sets bad]
≤ p · Pr[Boae2c-FΠ2 ]
≤ p ·Advoae2-authΠ (B2) .
Game G3 is identical to game G2, except that instead of calling Enc.next(i, A, ·) and
Enc.last(i, A, ·), we use ρNi,Ai,Mi,0 ←$ Inj(τ) and ρNi,Ai,Mi,1 ←$ Inj(τ) respectively.
Moreover, Dec.next(i, A, ·) and Dec.last(i, A, ·) are also replaced by ρ−1Ni,Ai,Mi,0 and
ρ−1Ni,Ai,Mi,1 respectively.
We have Pr[A G2 ⇒ 1] = Pr[Boae2c-R1 ⇒ 1]. In addition, Pr[Boae2c-I1 ⇒ 1] −
Pr[A G3 ⇒ 1] is exactly the gap between PRI and MRAE, which is upper-bounded
by q2/2τ+1 + 4q/2τ ≤ q2/2τ [RS06b, Theorem 7]. Finally, game G3 coincides with game
oae2b-IΠ. Summing up,
Advoae2bΠ (A ) = Pr[A
G1 ⇒ 1]− Pr[AG3 ⇒ 1]
≤ Advoae2-privΠ (B1) + p ·Advoae2-authΠ (B2) + q2/2τ .
Proposition 7.7 (OAE2b⇒ OAE2c). Let Π be a segmented-AE scheme with ciphertext
expansion τ . For any adversaries A1 that runs in time t+ 1 and makes no more than q
individual queries with σ1 bits of data in total, and A2 that runs in time t2, queries at
most σ2 bits of data in total and outputs ` segments in its forgery attempt, there exist
adversaries B1 and B2 for which
Advoae2-privΠ (A1) ≤ Advoae2bΠ (B1) + q2/2τ and
Advoae2-authΠ (A2) ≤ Advoae2bΠ (B2) + `/2τ .
For each i ∈ {1, 2}, adversary Bi runs in time ti + γi · σi for some constant γi, and the
total length of its queries is at most σi.
Proof. Constructing B1 is trivial: it ignores its decryption oracles and runs A1 on its
encryption oracles. Then Pr[Boae2b-RΠ1 ⇒ 1] = Pr[A oae2c-RΠ1 ⇒ 1], and Pr[Boae2b-I1 ⇒
1]− Pr[A oae2c-I1 ⇒ 1] is the gap between PRI and MRAE, which is upper-bounded by
q2/2τ+1 + 4q/2τ ≤ q2/2τ [RS06b, Theorem 7]. Hence
Advoae2bΠ (B1) = Adv
oae2-priv
Π (A1) + q
2/2τ .
We create the adversary B2 from A2 as follows. The former runs the latter on its en-
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cryption oracles and maintains the set Y of the partial decryption chains (Ni,Ai,Ci, δi)
as in game oae2c-FΠ. When A2 outputs (N,A,C, b), adversary B2 runs the following
code:
if |A| 6= |C| or (N,A,C, b) ∈ Y or |C| = 0 then return 0
Dec.init(N); m← |C|
for i← 1 to m− b do
(M,S)← Dec.next(1,A[i],C[i])
if M = ⊥ then return 0
if b = 1 and Dec.last(1,A[m],C[m]) = ⊥ then return 0
return 1
Then Pr[Boae2b-IΠ2 ⇒ 1] ≤ `/2τ and Advoae2-authΠ (A2) = Pr[Boae2b-RΠ2 ⇒ 1]. Hence
Advoae2-authΠ (A2) ≤ Advoae2bΠ (B2) + `/2τ .
7.5.4 Discussion
Multivalued segment-expansion. It is easy to extend the definitions of this section
to schemes for which the segment-expansion varies according to segment position. In
particular, one could use one expansion value, σ, for plaintext components other than
the last, and a different expansion value, τ , at the end. For such a (σ, τ)-expanding
scheme, distribution IdealOAE(τ) would be adjusted to IdealOAE(σ, τ) in the natural
way.
The main reason for considering multivalued segment-expansion is to clarify how
OAE2 security relates to prior notions in the literature. In particular, OAE2 resembles
OAE1 where the segment-expansion is (0, τ) and where all segments are required to
have some fixed length n. Yet even then the definitions would be very different: the
OAE2 version would be stronger, since an online decryption capability is not allowed to
compromise OAE2 security, whereas the capability may compromise OAE1 security. It
is easy to give a separating example; see Appendix B.3.
Another potential reason to consider multivalued segment-expansion is as a way to
save on bits; obviously one will use fewer total bits, over a sequence of two or more
segments, if only the last is expanded. But we suspect that this benefit is rarely worth
its cost. If segments are 1 KByte (which is fairly short) and tags are 128 bits (which
is fairly long), the difference (in total number of needed bits) between authenticating
every segment and authenticating only the last one will always be less than 2%. In most
application, this seems a small price to pay to have each and every segment properly
authenticated.7
Why vector-valued AD. When modelling OAE, we were unsure if one ought to
think of the AD as a fixed string that is known before the plaintext begins to arrive, or
if, instead, one should think of the AD as vector-valued, its ith segment available when
the ith segment of plaintext is. We adopted the second view (switching from the first at
7At the same time, we recognize that in some very constrained applications, e.g. battery-powered
sensors, saving 2% on communication complexity may lead to a non-negligible increase of battery life.
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the urging of the Keyak team) for closer concordance with prior work [BDPA11a] and
for greater generality: a string-valued AD of A can be regarded as a vector-valued AD
of A = (A, ε, ε, . . .). More philosophically, the two conceptions correspond to whether
one thinks of breaking up a fixed plaintext M into a sequence of segments Mi or one
regards the Mi values as more autonomous, each encrypted when available, each with its
own associated context. With plaintexts and AD both vector-valued, one conceptually
extends across time a channel that securely transmit pairs of strings, one component with
privacy and both with authenticity. All that said, the actual utility of the vector-valued
choice over string-valued AD is uncertain.
The impact of nonce reuse. One of our main objections against FFL’s notion of
OAE1 was that it was advertised as capturing nonce-misuse resistance, while the nonce-
reusing CPSS attack suggests that this label is not that accurate. But the CPSS attack,
once accordingly adjusted, also applies to any OAE2-secure scheme. It applies even if
the attacker does not control the segmentation, it is enough that a plaintext always gets
segmented with the same pattern, starting from the left.
In fact, if the encryption is online, and if the setting is such that a secret value is
prepended with a prefix that is under adversarial control, and if nonce-reuse can occur,
a variant of the CPSS attack will apply. It easy to see why; using the controlled prefix,
the adversary can always shift the secret around the boundaries of ciphertext-segments
to apply a divide-and-conquer brute force strategy, as long as the segmentation pattern
is sufficiently predictable and repetitive.
This is why we refrain from referring to OAE2 as a notion for nonce-misuse resistance:
because no AE scheme with online encryption can deliver on the intuition of resisting
the nonce reuse. We prefer the term “best-possible security.”
7.6 Achieving OAE2
In the special case that each segmented-string has only one component, OAE2 (spe-
cifically OAE2a and OAE2b) degenerates to the notion of a τ -expanding pseudorandom
injection (Definition 2.11). The notion is close to MRAE (Definition 2.10), with a gap
q2/2s+τ +q/2τ where q is the number of queries and s is the length of the shortest plain-
text queried. We construct an OAE2-secure scheme from a PRI-secure scheme. The
scheme could be SIV [RS06b] if τ is large, say τ = 128, or AEZ scheme [HKR15], for
arbitrary τ .
The construction. Fix integers n ≥ τ ≥ 0. Let 〈·〉 denote an efficient injective
encoding that maps a pair (A, d) ∈ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} to a string 〈A, d〉 ∈ {0, 1}∗.
For example, one can represent d by a three-bit string, and append this to A. Let Π =
(K,E,D) be a nonce-based AE scheme of ciphertext-expansion τ , nonce space {0, 1}n,
and AD space {0, 1}∗. Figure 7.11 defines a segmented-AE scheme CHAIN[Π, 〈·〉, n] =
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(K, E ,D) with segment expansion τ , nonce space {0, 1}n, AD space {0, 1}∗, and state
space K× {0, 1}n.
The intuition behind the construction is best characterized by its name. A sequence
of E .next calls terminated by an E .last call is implemented as a sequence of evaluations
of the nonce-based AE-encryption E, chained by a value derived from each plaintext
and ciphertext segment that is fed to the nonce input. We use the AD-input of E to
ensure proper domain separation between the E .next and E .last calls. We give a formal
statement about the OAE2 security of CHAIN in Theorem 7.8.
Remark 7 (A flaw in CHAIN.). During the writing of this dissertation, a flaw in the
CHAIN construction (call the flawed version CHAIN′) was discovered by its authors.
More precisely, the domain separation constants “d” that get encoded into the AD input
of the underlying PRI did not differentiate the processing of the first segment in a chain
from the processing of all the other “interior” segments. This gave rise to an attack that
easily distinguishes CHAIN′ from the idealized reference objects with two queries.
The key property used in the attack is that whenever the segmented plaintext M =
(0n, 0n, 0n) got encrypted to C = (C[1],C[2],C[3]) (with some nonce and empty AD
segments) by CHAIN′, then the segmented plaintext M = (0n, 0n) encrypted with the
nonce C[1] (and empty AD segments) necessarily got encrypted to C = (C[2],C[3]).
In this chapter, we present the corrected construction.
Discussion. In E .next and D.next, the state is computed via leftn (M)⊕ leftn (C).
One might instead xor the n-bit suffix of M and C; this makes no difference. On the
other hand, suppose one uses just leftn (C), eliminating the xor with leftn (M). Call
this variant CHAIN1[Π, 〈·, 〉, n]. The method is insecure for small τ . Here is an attack
for the case τ = 0. The adversary makes a single query (N,A,C) to the decryption
oracle, where N is arbitrary, A = (ε, ε, ε) and C = (0n, 0n, 0n, 0n). Let the answer
be M = (M1,M2,M3,M4). The adversary will output 1 only if M2 = M3. In the
oae2b-I game the strings M2 and M3 are independent random strings. However, in
game oae2b-R we always have M2 = M3 = DK(0
n, 〈ε, 0〉, 0n). Hence the adversary
can win with advantage 1− 2−n. In contrast, for large τ , scheme CHAIN1[Π, 〈·, 〉, n] is
OAE2 secure.
To achieve OAE2 with multivalued segment-expansion, use an RAE-secure under-
lying scheme [HKR15], a generalization of PRI that allows one to select an arbitrary
ciphertext-expansion for each query. The construction is modified in the natural way.
Theorem 7.8. Let Π be a nonce-based AE scheme with stretch τ . Let further 〈·〉 :
{0, 1}∗ × {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} → {0, 1}∗ be an efficient injective encoding, let n ≥ τ , and let
CHAIN[Π, 〈·〉, n] be as defined in Figure 7.11. Let A be an adversary that runs in
time t, makes no more than q ≤ 2n−1 queries in total, such that their data complexity is
limited by σ bits. Then
Advoae2bCHAIN[Π,〈·〉,n](A ) ≤ AdvpriΠ (B) + 2q2/2n
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1: algorithm E .init(K,N)
2: return (K,N, 0)
3: end algorithm
1: algorithm E .next(S,A,M)
2: (K,V, d)← S
3: C ← EK(V, 〈A, d〉,M)
4: if |M | ≥ n then
5: V ← (leftn (C)⊕ leftn (M))
6: else
7: V ← leftn (EK(V, 〈A, 3〉,M‖0n))
8: end if
9: return (C, (K,V, 1))
10: end algorithm
1: algorithm E .last(S,A,M)
2: (K,V, d)← S
3: if d = 0 then
4: d← 4
5: else
6: d← 2
7: end if
8: return EK(V, 〈A, d〉,M)
9: end algorithm
1: algorithm D.init(K,N)
2: return (K,N, 0)
3: end algorithm
1: algorithm D.next(S,A,C)
2: (K,V, d)← S
3: M ← DK(V, 〈A, d〉, C)
4: if M = ⊥ then
5: return (⊥,⊥)
6: end if
7: if |M | ≥ n then
8: V ← leftn (C)⊕ leftn (M)
9: else
10: V ← leftn (EK(V, 〈A, 3〉,M‖0n))
11: end if
12: return (M, (K,V, 1))
13: end algorithm
1: algorithm D.last(S,A,C)
2: (K,V, d)← S
3: if d = 0 then
4: d← 4
5: else
6: d← 2
7: end if
8: return DK(V, 〈A, d〉, C)
9: end algorithm
N
M1
EK
C1
τ
M2
EK
C2
M3
EK
C3
0
τ τ
A1 A2 A31 2
Figure 7.11 – The CHAIN construction for OAE2. Top: Encryption scheme
Π = (K,E,D), secure as a PRI with expansion τ , is turned into a segmented-AE scheme
CHAIN[Π, 〈·〉, n] = (K, E ,D) with K = K. Bottom: Illustration of the scheme. Each
segment of (M1,M2,M3) has at least n bits. Trapezoids represent truncation to n bits.
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for some B that runs in time t + γ · qn for some constant γ, and makes no more than
2q queries that have a total data complexity limited by 5qn bits.
Proof. We construct the adversary B from A as follows. The former runs the latter
and simulates game oae2b-RCHAIN[Π,〈·〉,n], but each call to EK(·) or DK(·) is replaced
by the corresponding query to the Enc or Dec oracle of B, respectively. Adversary B
then outputs the same guess as A .
Consider the games G1–G3 in Figure 7.12. Game G1 is identical with the game
oae2b-RCHAIN[Π,〈·〉,n]. We now analyse the transitions between the games. In all three
games, we sample piV,〈A′,3〉 ←$ Inj(τ) for every V ∈ {0, 1}n and every A′ ∈ {0, 1}∗, and
ρN,A,M ,δ ←$ Inj(τ) for every N ∈ {0, 1}n, δ ∈ {0, 1}, and A,M ∈ {0, 1}∗∗ such that
|A| = |M |+ 1 in the procedure initialize.
Game G2 is identical to game G1, except that instead of using E
V,A
K and D
V,A
K , we’ll
use an injective function piV,A and its inverse pi
−1
V,A respectively. We ensure that piV,A ←$
Inj(τ): If piV,A is not defined, we’ll implement it via ρN,A,M ,δ, where (N,A,M , δ) is
created right before we call Map(V,A,M) or MapInv(V,A,C). Note that piV,A will be
independent for each (V,A), because different pairs (V,A), because (V,A) is computed
as a function of (N,A,M , δ) in G2, so (V,A) 6= (V ′, A′) will necessarily have two distinct
preimages (N,A,M , δ) 6= (N ′,A′,M ′, δ′). Then if B plays pri-I it perfectly simulates
G2 for A and we have
Pr[A G1 ⇒ 1]− Pr[A G2 ⇒ 1] = AdvpriΠ (B) .
Game G3 is identical to game G2 except that, we make sure that the state V
′ never
repeats, while maintaining the following consistency: (i) calling Map with the same
(V,A,M) always results in the same (C, V ′), (ii) calling MapInv with the same (V,A,C)
always result in the same (M,V ′), and (iii) if (C, V ′)← Map(V,A,M) then necessarily
MapInv(V,A,C) returns (M,V ′), and (iv) if (M,V ′) ← MapInv(V,A,C) and M 6= ⊥
then Map(V,A,M) returns (C, V ′). The two games are identical-until-bad, and thus (by
Lemma 2.1)
Pr[A G2 ⇒ 1]− Pr[A G3 ⇒ 1] ≤ Pr[G2 sets bad] .
We now bound the chance that game G2 sets bad. Terminate the game immediately
when bad gets set; it doesn’t change the probability that G2 sets bad. Observe that
(1) In Map(V,A,M) and MapInv(V,A,C), we’ll have A of the form 〈A′, d〉, with d ∈
{0, 1, 2, 4}.
(2) In Map(V,A,M), we compute C ← piV,A(M) and invoke Ev to compute L ←
piV,〈A′,3〉(M‖0n). The second call is made only if |M | < n, d ∈ {0, 1, 2, 4}, and
there is no prior call Map(V,A,M) or MapInv(V,A,C).
(3) In MapInv(V,A,C), we compute M ← pi−1V,A(C) and invoke Ev to compute L ←
piV,〈A′,3〉(M‖0n). The second call is made only if |M | < n, d ∈ {0, 1, 2, 4}, and
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proc Enc.init(N)
I ← I + 1; MI ← Λ; AI ← Λ
SI ← (K,N, 0); Ni ← N
return I
proc Enc.next(i, A,M)
if i > I or Si = ⊥ then return ⊥
(K,V, d)← Si; Ai ← Ai‖A
(N,A,M , δ)← (Ni,Ai,Mi, 0)
(C, V )← Map(V, 〈A, d〉,M)
Si ← (K,V, 1); Mi ←Mi‖M
return C
proc Enc.last(i, A,M)
if i > I or Si = ⊥ then return ⊥
(K,V, d)← Si; Ai ← Ai‖A
if d = 0 then d← 4 else d← 2
(N,A,M , δ)← (Ni,Ai,Mi, 1)
(C, V )← Map(V, 〈A, d〉,M); Si ← ⊥
return C
proc Dec.init(N)
J ← J + 1; M ′J ← Λ; A′J ← Λ
S′J ← (K,N, 0); N ′j ← N
return J
proc Dec.next(j, A,C)
if j > J or S′j = ⊥ then return ⊥
(K,V, d)← S′j ; A′j ← A′j‖A
(N,A,M , δ)← (N ′j ,A′j ,M ′j , 0)
(M,V )← MapInv(V, 〈A, d〉, C)
if V 6= ⊥ then
S′j ← (K,V, 1)
else
S′j ← ⊥
M ′j ←M ′j‖M
return M
proc Dec.last(j, A,C)
if j > J or Sj = ⊥ then return ⊥
(K,V, d)← S′j ; Aj ← Aj‖A
(N,A,M , δ)← (N ′j ,A′j ,M ′j , 1)
if d = 0 then d← 4 else d← 2
(M,V )← MapInv(V, 〈A, d〉, C)
S′j ← ⊥
return M
proc Map(V,A,M) Game G1
C ← EV,AK (M)
if H[V,A,M ] 6= ⊥ then V ′ ← H[V,A,M ]
else V ′ ← Ev(V,A,M,C); H[V,A,M ]← V ′
return (C, V ′)
proc MapInv(V,A,C)
M ← DV,AK (C)
if M = ⊥ then return (⊥,⊥)
if H[V,A,M ] 6= ⊥ then V ′ ← H[V,A,M ]
else V ′ ← Ev(V,A,M,C); H[V,A,M ]← V ′
return (M,V ′)
proc Ev(V,A,M,C)
if |M | ≥ n then V ′ ← leftn (C)⊕ leftn (M)
elsif A = 〈A′, d〉 then
L← EK(V, 〈A′, 3〉,M‖0n); V ′ ← leftn (L)
Dom← Dom ∪ {V ′}
return V ′
proc Map(V,A,M) Games G2, G3
if piV,A = ⊥ then piV,A ← ρN,A,M,δ
C ← piV,A(M)
if H[V,A,M ] 6= ⊥ then V ′ ← H[V,A,M ]
else V ′ ← Ev(V,A,M,C); H[V,A,M ]← V ′
return (C, V ′)
proc MapInv(V,A,C)
if piV,A = ⊥ then piV,A ← ρN,A,M,δ
M ← pi−1V,A(C)
if M = ⊥ then return (⊥,⊥)
if H[V,A,M ] 6= ⊥ then V ′ ← H[V,A,M ]
else V ′ ← Ev(V,A,M,C); H[V,A,M ]← V ′
return (M,V ′)
proc Ev(V,A,M,C)
if |M | ≥ n then V ′ ← leftn (C)⊕ leftn (M)
elsif A = 〈A′, d〉 then
L← piV,〈A′,3〉(M‖0n); V ′ ← leftn (L)
if (V ′ ∈ Dom) then
bad← true; V ′ ←$ {0, 1}n\Dom
Dom← Dom ∪ {V ′}
return V ′
Figure 7.12 – Games G1–G3 used in the proof of Theorem 7.8. Game G3 contains the
corresponding boxed statements but game G2 doesn’t. The games share the common procedures
Enc.init,Enc.next,Enc.last,Dec.init,Dec.next, and Dec.last, and each game uses private proced-
ures Map, MapInv, and Ev that are inaccessible to the adversary. In each game, there is an
implicit procedure initialize() that initializes Dom ← ∅ and I, J ← 0, and samples K ←$ K,
piV,〈A′,3〉 ←$ Inj(τ) for every V ∈ {0, 1}n and every A′ ∈ {0, 1}∗, and ρN,A,M ,δ ←$ Inj(τ) for
every N ∈ {0, 1}n, δ ∈ {0, 1}, and A,M ∈ {0, 1}∗∗ such that |A| = |M |+ 1.
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there is no prior call Map(V,A,M) or MapInv(V,A,C).
Recall that 1 < q ≤ 2n−1. otherwise the bound is trivial. The flag bad is triggered only
if the state V ′ repeats one of its prior values in the Ev procedure In the following case
analysis we bound the probability that the ith value V ′ computed in G2 triggers bad, i.e.
that the value V ′ sampled in ith query falls into Dom.
Case 1: V ′ ← leftn (L), where L ← piV,〈A′,3〉(M‖0n). From (1), (2), and (3), since
there is a one-to-one correspondence between M and M‖0n, there is no prior call to
piV,〈A′,3〉(M‖0n) or pi−1V,〈A′,3〉(L). Then L is chosen uniformly random from a subset of
{0, 1}n+τ that has at least 2n+τ − q elements and |Dom| ≤ (i− 1). The collision of the
ith V ′ in this case occurs with probability bounded by (i− 1)/(2n − q).
Case 2: V ′ ← leftn (C)⊕ leftn (M). There must be no prior Map call of the same
(V,A,M) or MapInv call of the same (V,A,C), otherwise we’ll return the consistent
state, and bad won’t be triggered. First suppose that V ′ collides during the execution
of Map. Let s = |C|. From (1), (2), and (3), there is no prior call to piV,A(M) or
pi−1V,A(C). We have |Dom| ≤ (i − 1). Since we sample C uniformly from a subset of
{0, 1}s that has at least 2s − q elements, the collision of ith V ′ occurs with probability
at most (i− 1)2s−n/(2s− q) ≤ 2(i− 1)/(2n− q). Next, consider the case that V ′ collides
during the execution of MapInv. Again, we have |Dom| ≤ (i−1). Let s = |M |. By using
the same analysis as above, the probability of V ′ ∈ Dom is bounded by (i− 1)/(2n− q).
Because there will be no more than q values V ′ sampled during the game, by union
bound the probability that bad is triggered is bounded by
q∑
i=1
2(i− 1)
2n − q ≤
q2
2n − q ≤
2q2
2n
;
the last inequality is due to the assumption that q ≤ 2n−1.
In game G3, distinct tuples (N,A,M , δ) will correspond to different pairs (V,A); we
will justify the claim later. Hence piV,A in Map/MapInv coincides with ρN,A,M ,δ. Then
game G3 is equivalent to game oae2b-ICHAIN[Π,〈·〉,n], and thus
Advoae2bCHAIN[Π,〈·〉,n](A ) = Pr[A
G1 ⇒ 1]− Pr[A G3 ⇒ 1] ≤ AdvpriΠ (B) +
2q2
2n
.
What remains is to justify the claim above. Suppose that there exists at least one pair of
distinct tuples (N1,A1,M1, δ1) and (N2,A2,M2, δ2) that correspond to the same pair
(V,A). Among such pairs of tuples, consider the one that minimizes |M1|. Consider the
following cases.
Case 1: |M1|, |M2| > 0. Let M∗1 be the prefix of M∗ that consists of |M1| − 1
components. Define M∗2 for M2, A∗1 for A1, and A∗2 for A∗2 analogously. Then it means
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that (N1,A
∗
1,M
∗
1 , 0) and (N2,A
∗
2,M
∗
1 , 0) correspond to the same pair (V
∗, A∗) as well,
but that contradicts the minimum of |M1|.
Case 2: |M1| = 0 and |M2| > 0. But then this is a contradiction: (1) since
(N1,A1,M1, δ1) corresponds to (V,A), it means that A is of the form 〈A′, 0〉 or 〈A′, 4〉,
but (2) since (N2,A2,M2, δ2) corresponds to (V,A), it means that A is of the form
〈A′′, 1〉 or 〈A′′, 2〉.
Case 3: |M1| > 0 and |M2| = 0. This is similar to Case 2.
Case 4: |M1| = |M2| = 0, meaning that M1 = M2 = Λ. Note that in this case, since
(N1,A1,M1, δ1) corresponds to (V,A) and |M1| = 0, we must have V = N1. Likewise,
since (N2,A2,M2, δ2) corresponds to (V,A) and |M2| = 0, we must have V = N2. In
other words, N1 = N2. Let d1 = 0 if δ1 = 0, and d1 = 4 otherwise. Define d2 for
δ2 analogously. Since (N1,A1,M1, δ1) corresponds to (V,A) and |M1| = 0, we have
A = 〈A1[1], d1〉. Likewise, since (N2,A2,M2, δ2) corresponds to (V,A) and |M2| = 0,
we have A = 〈A2[1], d2〉. In other words, A1 = A2, and δ1 = δ2. Hence the two tuples
(N1,A1,M1, δ1) and (N2,A2,M2, δ2) are the same, which is a contradiction.
7.6.1 Weakened OAE2
In the original publication, we also proposed two variants of the OAE2 notion that are
weaker with respect to nonce-reuse. The first, called nOAE, is essentially a purely nonce-
based version of OAE2. The second, called dOAE, is halfway between nOAE and OAE2,
in that it allows an adversary to repeat the nonce in order to extend an encryption chain
that has already been finalized; this notion resembles the the security definition used by
Bertoni et al. [BDPA11a, BDPV12], and we included it as a nod to the Keccak team,
acknowledging that they set off in the right direction. Finally, we also provided a very
natural nOAE-secure construction called STREAM.
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Chapter8
Authenticated Encryption with Variable
Stretch
In this chapter, we address the problem of securely using nonce-based AE schemes with
variable-length tags (variable stretch) under the same key.
The work presented in this chapter is a result of joint work with Reza Reyhanitabar
and Serge Vaudenay which was published in ASIACRYPT 2016 [RVV16].
Organization of the Chapter. We first discuss related work in Section 8.1 and list
the contributions in Section 8.2.
We then discuss the problem we study in more detail in Section 8.3 and we describe
attacks that illustrate the dangers of stretch misuse in Section 8.4.
In Section 8.5, we proceed to formalizing the security of nonce-based AE schemes
when used with variable stretch. We also establish relations with existing notions, and
explain how to interpret the security bounds in our model.
Finally, we demonstrate how to construct efficient AE schemes that are secure in the
sense of our new notion in Section 8.6.
8.1 Related Work
The use of a nonce-based AE scheme with varying amount of stretch per key can be seen
as a misuse of the scheme, and thus our security notions can be interpreted as capturing
resistance to this particular type of misuse. Other existing notions treat resistance of
AE against misuse: MRAE by Rogaway and Shrimpton [RS06b], online nonce-misuse
resistant AE by Fleischmann et al. [FFL12], AE under the release of unverified plaintext
(AE-RUP) by Andreeva et al. [ABL+14a], robust AE (RAE) by Hoang et al. [HKR15],
online AE (OAE2) by Hoang et al. [HRRV15], and the notions that consider leakage by
misuse of AE in protocols by Barwell et al. [BMOS17, BPS15]. None of these notions
captures what should be the security of AE when one varies the stretch with the same
163
key, except for RAE.
RAE aims to capture the “best-possible” AE security [HKR15]. Similar to the MRAE
and Pseudorandom Injection (PRI) notions [RS06b], it targets robustness to nonce-
misuse, but also robustness to decryption misuse and the security with variable stretch.
However, the cost to pay for achieving such a strong goal is that any RAE scheme incurs
a particular inefficiency: neither encryption nor decryption can be online. Our goal is
different; rather than aiming at the best-possible security, we provide an enhancement
to the popular NAE model that only adds robustness to tag-length variation under the
same key, without sacrificing desirable features, such as onlineness of encryption.
The possibility of AE schemes’ misbehaviour due to the use of variable-length tags
has been discussed before. A thread in the CFRG forum discusses this for OCB [Man],
and another discussion thread exists in the CAESAR competition mailing list [Iwa15].
Several schemes received ad-hoc measures that attempt to make their ciphertexts
tag-dependent [KR14, Iwa15, Min15, Rey].
The attack presented in Section 8.4.2 is a generalization of the tag-length misusing
attack on OMD (see Section 3.3) by the Ascon team [DEMS].
8.2 Contribution
We discuss the trivial security issues that arise from varying the stretch with nonce-based
AE schemes and describe a stretch-misusing forgery attack that applies to a large class
of nonce-based AE schemes, even with certain ad-hoc measures in place.
We define the security of nonce-based AE schemes with variable stretch through the
notion NVAE. We establish the relations between NVAE, other notions defined in this
chapter and previously existing notions. We show that, surprisingly, when variable tags
are allowed, the all-in-one and the two-requirement security definitions are no longer
equivalent. We additionally define the KESS notion as a useful, albeit strong, property
that facilitates modular security proofs of NVAE security for AE schemes whose NAE
security has already been established.
We demonstrate the feasibility of NVAE-security by designing OCBv, a variant of
the well-known AE scheme OCB [RBBK01, Rog04a, KR11]. The modifications that
transform OCB into OCBv and the security analysis are generic enough to be applied
to other schemes based on tweakable blockciphers, or other tweakable primitives (e.g.
compression functions), which represents a large subset of current nAE schemes.
8.3 Why Consider AE with Variable Stretch
Providing authenticity requires any AE scheme to grow the ciphertexts by a non-zero
amount of stretch (see Section 2.4 for definition of stretch). All the known security
notions for AE schemes [Rog02, Rog04b, RS06b, FFL12, ABL+14a, HRRV15] and con-
structions thereof, with the exception of RAE [HKR15], assume that the stretch τ is
a constant, or a parameter of the scheme which must be fixed per key, and security is
164
Authenticated Encryption with Variable Stretch
proved under this assumption. A correct usage of such a scheme shall ensure that two
instances of the same scheme with different stretches τ1 and τ2 always use two independ-
ently chosen keys K1 and K2. However, this rigid correct-use mandate may be violated
in practice for various reasons.
Misuse. AE schemes may be used with variable-length tags per key due to misuse
and poorly engineered security systems. With the increasing scale of deployment of
cryptography, various types of misuse of cryptographic tools (i.e. their improper use
that leads to compromised security) occur routinely in practice [LZLG14, EBFK13,
Hot10, Wu05, BGW01, Lan14]. Identifying potential ways of misuse and mitigating
their impact by sound design is therefore of great importance, while waving such a
potential misuse off, because there have been no cases of occurrence yet, is a dangerous
practice. Prior “Disasters” [Ber14b] have shown that it’s a question of when, not if, a
misuse will eventually happen in applications of (symmetric-key) cryptographic schemes.
The ongoing CAESAR competition [Ber14a] has explicitly listed a set of conventional
confidentiality and integrity goals for AE, but has left “any additional security goals
and robustness goals that the submitters wish to point out” as an option. Among the
potential additional goals, robustness features (and in particular, different flavours of
misuse-resistance to nonce reuse [RS06b, FFL12]) have attracted a lot of attention.
While the recent focus has been mainly on nonce misuse, proper characterization and
formalization of other potential misuse dimensions seems yet a challenge to be further
investigated. The current literature lacks a systematic approach to formalizing an ap-
propriate notion of AE with misuse-resistance to tag-length variation under the same
key, without sacrificing interesting functional and efficiency features, such as onlineness
of encryption.
Efficiency Constraints. Second, there are use cases, such as resource-constrained
communication devices, where the support for variable-length tags is desired, but chan-
ging the key per tag length and renegotiating the system parameters is a costly process
due to bandwidth and energy constraints. In those cases, supporting variable stretch per
key while still being able to provide a “sliding scale” authenticity is deemed to be a useful
feature, as pointed out by Struik [Str]. For instance, de Meulenaer et al. demonstrate
that in the case of wireless sensor networks, communication-related energy consumption
is substantially higher than the consumption caused by computation [dMGSP08]. Slid-
ing scale authenticity could significantly extend the lifetime of such sensors, especially
if processed plaintexts are very short, while only a handful of them requires a very high
level of authenticity.
Discussions and measures. The problem has appeared to be highly interesting from
both theoretical and practical perspectives as evidenced by the relatively long CFRG
forum thread on issues arising from variable-length tags in OCB [Man], followed by
ongoing discussions in the CAESAR competition mailing list [Iwa15], which in turn has
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motivated several second-round CAESAR candidates to be tweaked [Iwa15, Min15, Rey]
with the aim of providing some heuristic measures for addressing the problem.
Terminology. Most standard AE schemes adopt a syntax in which the ciphertex is
explicitly partitioned as C = Ccore||Tag with Ccore as the ciphertext core (decryptable to
a putative plaintext) and Tag as the authentication tag (used for verifying the decrypted
message). In this chapter, we will use the terms ciphertext expansion, stretch and tag
length interchangeably unless the syntax of an AE scheme (e.g. an RAE scheme) does
not allow partitioning of the ciphertext to a core part and a tag part, in which case we
use the general term stretch.
8.4 The Dangers of Stretch Misuse
Lack of support for variable-length tags per key in conventional AE security mod-
els, in particular in the popular NAE security model, is not just a theoretical and
definitional complaint. All known standard AE schemes such as the widely-deployed
CCM [Dwo04, WHF03a], GCM [MV04, Dwo07], and OCB do misbehave in one way
or another if misused in this way [RW03, Man, Rog13]. Depending on the application
scenario, the consequences of such a misbehavior may range from a degraded security
level to a complete collapse.
8.4.1 Trivial Issues and Heuristic Fixes
A CFRG forum discussion thread initiated by Manger [Man] has raised concerns with an
“Attacker changing tag length in OCB”. While the discussion deals with issues identified
for OCB, they apply to all nonce-based AE schemes Π = (K, E ,D) whose encryption
algorithm outputs a core ciphertext and an authentication tag E(K,N,A,M) = C‖T
such that C = f1(K,N,A,M) and T = leftτ (f2(K,N,A,M)) for some functions f1 and
f2, and a parameter τ ∈ N (note that the output of f2 is truncated to τ bits). The
discussion can be summarized as follows:
• Assume that different instances of Π with several different tag lengths are defined
and used. Under the same key, shorter tags are simply a truncation of longer tags.
The tag length is clearly not mixed into the ciphertext. Consequently, given a
valid output C‖T = E(K,N,A,M) with e.g. 128-bit tag, it is trivial to produce
a valid output C‖left64 (T ) for an instance of Π with 64-bit tags under the same
key, by just dropping the last 8 bytes.
• An attacker wanting to change the associated data A to A′ (e.g. from saying “TOP
SECRET” to “PUBLIC”) while keeping the same plaintext M as encrypted by the
originator for a ciphertext C‖T = E(K,N,A,M) (with |T | being e.g. 128 bits)
only has to defeat the shortest accepted tag length (e.g. 64 bits) by trying to forge
with N,A,C‖T ′ with every possible T ′ (of 64 bits). This only applies if AD is not
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used when computing core ciphertext, i.e. if f1(K,N,A,M) = f
′(K,N,M) for
some function f ′. It is the case in OCB, GCM, or OMD.
• Would it be better if the instances of the same algorithm with different tag lengths
could not affect each other?
Heuristic Measures. The CFRG discussions concluded when the designers of OCB
adopted the heuristic measure proposed by Manger: “just drop the tag length into the
nonce” [Rog13]. For example, if the original nonce space N = {0, 1}ν , one may use an
effective nonce N ′ of ν − t bits and encode τ in t bits, so that the encryption has the
structure E(K,N ′‖〈τ〉t, A,M). One may call this method nonce stealing for tag length
akin to nonce stealing for associated data (AD), proposed by Rogaway [Rog02] to convert
a message-only AE scheme to an AE scheme with AD.
In a recent CAESAR competition discussion, Nandi [Nan] has raised the question
whether including the tag length in the associated data can resolve the problem. For
example, we may simply encode τ in t bits and prepend it to the AD, so that we encrypt
as in E(K,N, 〈τ〉t‖A,M).
A natural extension would then be to combine both the measures, i.e., including the
tag length as part of both the nonce and the associated data. But in the absence of a
definitional and provable-security treatment, the proposed heuristic measures and claims
for added security in the tweaked schemes are informal, and only limited to preventing
some specific type of misbehavior by the schemes.
8.4.2 Failure of Inserting Stretch into Nonce and/or AD
Intuitively, one might hope that an AE scheme will guarantee τc-bit authenticity to the
recipient whenever a received ciphertext with a τc-bit tag is decrypted, irrespective of
the parallel existence other instances of the same algorithm, using the same key but
different (shorter or longer) τ -bit tags. With the two heuristic measures described in
Section 8.4.1 in place, one might even expect this intuition to be true.
Using a generic forgery attack, we show that the said heuristic measures fail to deliver
on this expectation when applied to a large class of NAE schemes, including e.g. GCM
and OCB. The class of schemes in question consists of all AE schemes that follow the
“ciphertext translation” design paradigm of Rogaway [Rog02].
Ciphertext translation method transforms a message-only nonce-based AE scheme
Π¯ = (K¯, E¯ , D¯) with stretch τ and a keyed function H : K′×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n with n ≥ τ
into a general nonce-based AE scheme Π = (K¯ × K′, E ,D). A message-only AE scheme
is one that does not accept any AD input, i.e. it has A¯ = ∅. The ciphertext translation
is defined in Figure 8.1.
The attack. We present a stretch-misusing forgery attack. We call it VTag-Forgery.
It is a generalization of the tag-length misusing attack on OMD version 1 proposed by
the Ascon team [DEMS]. OMD also follows the ciphertext translation method.
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algo EK¯,K′(N,A,M) :
CM ← E¯K¯(N,M)
TA ← leftτ (HK′(A))
C ← CM ⊕ 0|M |‖TA
return C
algo DK¯,K′(N,A,C) :
TA ← leftτ (HK′(A))
CM ← C ⊕ 0|M |‖TA
M ← D¯K¯(N,CM )
return M
E¯K¯
N
M
A HK′
CM
0
|M|
C
τ
|M| + τ
Figure 8.1 – Ciphertext translation. We construct a general nonce-based AE scheme
Π = (K¯ × K′, E ,D) with stretch τ from a message-only nonce-based AE scheme Π¯ =
(K¯, E¯ , D¯) also with stretch τ and a keyed function H : K′ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n with
n ≥ τ . The encryption and decryption algorithms E and D are defined on the top, the
encryption illustrated on the bottom.
We target any nonce-based AE scheme Π constructed with ciphertext translation and
parameterized by stretch τ . We assume that there are instances of Π defined with each
amount of stretch from a set IT = {τ1, . . . , τr} with τ1 < τ2 < . . . < τr.
We assume the adversary has oracle access to encryption and decryption algorithms,
such that the amount of stretch can be chosen for every query independently. Note
that this is equivalent to r co-existing instances of Π sharing the same key. The goal of
the adversary is to forge a ciphertext for a given AD-message pair (A,M) expanded by
τg ∈ IT bits, with g > 1.
To find the forgery, the adversary first makes an encryption query with M , arbitrary
nonce N1 and some arbitrary A
∗ 6= A to the instance with the shortest stretch τ1, and
consequently finds a forgery for N1, A and M with 2
τ1 decryption queries. Because of
the ciphertext translation structure, all of the ciphertext, except the last τ − 1 bits, will
be the same. From the forgery and the encryption query, the adversary will be able to
learn the first τ1 bits of the xor-difference of HK(A) and HK(A
∗).
Then, the adversary proceeds in a similar way with the second-shortest stretch τ2,
except when making the forgery for N2, A, and M , it already knows the first τ1 bits of
HK(A)⊕HK(A∗), and only needs to guess the remaining τ2 − τ1, which means at most
2τ2−τ1 decryption queries. The attacker then continues in a similar manner, making
2τi−τi−1 decryption queries with τi bits of stretch for i = 1, . . . , τg. An algorithmic
description of the attack is given in Figure 8.2.
Applicability. With no measures for mixing the stretch in the encryption in place,
the attack always succeeds. The keyed function HK(·) must fulfil some mild conditions
for the attack to work against the described heuristic countermeasures [Rog13, Nan],
namely:
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1: algorithm VTag-Forgery(τg, A,M)
2: ∆A ← ε; A∗ ←$ A\{A}
3: for i← 1 to g do
4: pick fresh nonce Ni
5: C∗i ← Enc(Ni, A∗, τi,M)
6: do
7: pick fresh δ ∈ {0, 1}τi−τi−1
8: Ci ← C∗i ⊕ 0|Ci|−τi‖∆A‖δ
9: Mi ← Dec(Ni, A, τi, Ci)
10: while Mi = ⊥
11: ∆A ← rightτi (Ci⊕C∗i )
12: end for
13: return Ng, A,Cg
14: end algorithm
Figure 8.2 – Ciphertext forgery for a nonce-based AE scheme constructed with cipher-
text translation with associated data A and message M in presence of variable stretch.
Here τ0 = 0.
• If the stretch is only encoded in the nonce, the attack works with arbitrary HK(·).
• For inclusion of the tag length in the AD or a combination of this method and nonce
stealing, the attack works if two conditions are met. First, if the keyed function H
can be described as HK(A) = H1K (A1)⊕H2K (A2)⊕· · ·⊕HmK (Am), for arbitrary
functions HiK : {0, 1}µ → {0, 1}n, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, where A = A1||A2|| · · · ||Am for
Aj ∈ {0, 1}µ for some positive integer µ. We note that this is the case for both
GCM1 and OCB. Second, the value of stretch τ must only influence one µ-bit block
of A (or a limited number thereof). This is the case if, for example, we prepend
the AD with an encoding of τ as in E(K,N, 〈τ〉t‖A,M), and if at the same time
t ≤ µ.
Then the attack works, but we always pick A∗, so that the block(s) of AD that are
actually affected by τ are the same in the queries on lines 5 and 9 in Figure 8.2.
In either of the two cases the attack will succeed: whenever we encrypt a message M with
two different associated data A,A∗, first with τi and then with τj > τi bits of stretch,
then Ci⊕C∗i will be a prefix of Cj ⊕C∗j , as the xor cancels out the core ciphertext, and
if the hash H is implemented as an xor-sum of sub-functions Hi then the block(s) of AD
that are impacted by τ will cancel out as well.
Complexity. The complexity of the attack in terms of decryption queries will be
2τ1 +
∑g
i=2 2
τi−τi−1 , which is dominated by 2α with α = max{τ1, τ2 − τ1, . . . , τg − τg−1}.
For example, an adversary having access to four instances of an AE encryption algorithm
with 32-bit, 64-bit, 96-bit and 128-bit tags under the same key will only need a total
decryption query complexity 4·232 to forge a message with a 128-bit tag, which is in stark
contrast with the 2128 decryption queries expected to be necessary to forge a ciphertext
with 128 bits of stretch.
1Although the authentication tag is computed directly using AD and the ciphertext, each monomial
evaluated in the polynomial hash used in GCM can be seen as HiK
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8.5 Formalizing Nonce-based AE with Variable Stretch
Our goal in this section is to formalize the security of nonce-based AE schemes with
variable stretch, or else their security in presence of stretch misuse. This turns out to be
a non-trivial task, as evidenced by the previously mentioned discussions [Man, Rog13,
RW03].
Allowing the adversary to choose the amount of stretch freely from a set IT =
{τmin, . . . , τmax} will inevitably enable it to produce forgeries with a high probability
2−τmin , by targeting the shortest allowed stretch; a forgery is sure to be found with at
most 2τmin verification queries. This is inherent to any AE scheme.
Despite this limit to its global security guarantees, there is a meaningful security
property which can be expected from an variable-stretch AE scheme by a user: the
scheme must guarantee τ bits of security for ciphertexts with τ bits of stretch, regardless
of adversarial access to other instances with the same key but other (shorter and/or
longer) amount of stretch than τ . For example, forging a ciphertext with τ -bit stretch
should require ≈ 2τ verification queries with τ -bit stretch, regardless of the number of
queries made with different amounts of stretch.
This non-interference between different instances that use the same key but different
stretch (tag length) is the intuition that we capture in our security notion for nonce-
based, variable-stretch AE schemes.
Syntax. We augment the syntax of nonce-based AE schemes to include an input that
allows to control the amount of stretch applied upon every encryption individually. We
will call such augmented AE schemes variable-stretch AE schemes.
A variable-stretch AE scheme is a triplet Π = (K, E ,D) where the key space K is
a set endowed with a probabilistic distribution, and E : K × N × A × IT ×M → C
and D : K ×N ×A× N × C → M∪ {⊥} are the encryption and decryption algorithm
respectively, both deterministic and stateless. The nonce spaceN , AD spaceA, plaintext
space M, and ciphertext space C are all subsets of {0, 1}∗. We call the finite set IT
stretch space of Π (i.e. the set of ciphertext expansion values that can be applied upon
encryption), and we require that IT ⊆ N.
We require for every M ∈ {0, 1}∗ that if M ∈M then M ′ ∈M for all M ′ ∈ {0, 1}|M |.
We further require that any variable-stretch scheme is correct ; for every (K,N,A, τ,M) ∈
K×N ×A×IT ×M, we require that if E(K,N,A, τ,M) = C then D(K,N,A, τ, C) =
M . Finally, we require that the scheme applies the requried stretch, i.e. for every
(K,N,A, τ,M) ∈ K × N × A × IT ×M, we require that for E(K,N,A, τ,M) = C we
have |C| = |M |+ τ .
The variable-stretch AE syntax is easily seen to be an extension of the nonce-based AE
syntax: an instance of the conventional nonce-based AE scheme Π with the ciphertext
expansion fixed to some constant value τ is equivalent to modelling Π as a variable-
stretch AE scheme and setting IT = {τ}. We sometimes create an ordinary nonce-based
AE scheme Π′ from a nonce-based AE scheme with variable stretch Π by fixing the
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expansion value for all queries to some value τ ∈ IT . We will denote this as Π′ = Π[τ ].
8.5.1 NVAE Security
We define a new security notion called NVAE as an extension to the all-in-one definition
of NAE security. In contrast to NAE, the new security games and the advantage function
of NVAE are parameterized by the challenge stretch value τc ∈ IT , which models the
intentions of the adversary to target the ciphertexts treated with precisely τc bits of
stretch. We first describe the security model informally, before proceeding to the formal
definition.
Let Π = (K, E ,D) be a variable-stretch AE scheme. An NVAE adversary A gets to
interact with games nvae-R(τc)Π (left) and nvae-I(τc)Π (right) in Figure 8.3, defining
respectively the real and ideal behaviour of such a scheme. The adversary has access to
two oracles Enc and Dec determined by these games and its goal is to distinguish the
two games. We stress that these oracles now allow to choose the stretch.
The adversary must respect a relaxed nonce-requirement ; it must use a unique pair of
nonce and stretch for each encryption query. Compared to the standard nonce-respecting
requirement in NAE schemes, here a nonce may be reused, provided that the stretch
does not repeat simultaneously.
In the ideal game nvae-I(τc)Π, only the encryption and decryption queries with τc-bit
stretch are answered in the same idealized way as in the “ideal” game of NAE notion
(Figure 2.2). The queries with stretch other than τc are treated with the real encryp-
tion (or decryption) algorithm. This lets the adversary to issue arbitrary queries (e.g.
repeated forgeries) for any stretch τ 6= τc and leverage the information thus gathered to
attack the challenge expansion. At the same time, only queries with τc bits of stretch
can help the adversary to actually distinguish the two games, capturing the exact level
of security for ciphertexts treated with τc bits of stretch, in presence of variable stretch.
The NVAE security is formally stated in Definition 8.1.
Adversarial resources. The adversarial resources of interest for the nvae notion are
(t,qe,qd,σ), where t denotes the running time of the adversary, qe = (qe[τ ]|τ ∈ IT )
denotes an array indexed by stretch that holds the number of encryption queries qe[τ ]
made with stretch τ for every stretch τ ∈ IT ,‘ qd = (qd[τ ]|τ ∈ IT ) denotes the same
for the decryption queries, and σ = (σ[τ ]|τ ∈ IT ) denotes the array that holds the total
amount of data σ[τ ] processed in all queries with stretch τ for every τ ∈ IT .
Despite being focused on queries stretched by τc bits, we watch adversarial resources
for every stretch τ ∈ IT in a detailed, vector-based fashion. This approach appears to be
most versatile with respect to the security analysis. However, in a typical case, we will be
interested in the resources related to τc (i.e. qe[τc],qd[τc],σ[τc]) and cumulative resources
of the adversary qe, qd, σ with qe =
∑
τ∈IT qe[τ ], qd =
∑
τ∈IT qd[τ ] and σ =
∑
τ∈IT σ[τ ].
Definition 8.1 (NVAE(τc) security). Given a variable stretch AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D)
with a stretch space IT , a challenge amount of stretch τc ∈ IT and an adversary A , we
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define the advantage of A in breaking the NVAE(τc) security of Π in a chosen ciphertext
attack (with help of the games nvae-R(τc) and nvae-I(τc) in Figure 8.3) as
Adv
nvae(τc)
Π (A ) = Pr[A
nvae-R(τc)Π ⇒ 1]− Pr[A nvae-I(τc)Π ⇒ 1].
If Adv
nvae(τc)
Π (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A whose resources are limited by (t, qe,qd,σ),
then we say that Π is a (, τc, t, qe,qd,σ)-secure variable-stretch AE scheme.
General NVAE security. By parameterizing the definition of NVAE security by τc,
we have only postponed the difficult question: how do we evaluate the overall security
of a variable-stretch scheme? This is where we make use of the parametrization of the
notion. We will use it to state a comprehensible, albeit informal definition of general
NVAE security.
We note that a similar informal definition can be made for all further security notions
parameterized by stretch that we introduce in this chapter.
Definition 8.2 (NVAE-security (informal)). We say that a variable-stretch scheme Π is
NVAE-secure if for every τc ∈ IT , and for all adversaries A with “reasonable” resources
(t, qe,qd,σ), the advantage Adv
nvae(τc)
Π (A ) is reasonably “small” with respect to τc.
The key phrase in this informal definition is “with respect to τc”: the Adv
nvae(τc)
Π (A )
adversarial advantage will inevitably be lower-bounded by qd[τc]/2
τc , which will be big
if τc is small. However, this is expected. What we want is that the τc-specific advant-
age never departs too far from this unavoidable lower bound. We further discuss the
interpretation of the nvae bounds in Section 8.5.5.
Remark 8 (Relation to NAE). The notion of nvae is indeed an extension of the clas-
sical all-in-one security notion for nonce-based AE schemes. If for a variable-stretch
AE scheme Π with a stretch-space IT the advantage Advnvae(τc)Π (A ) is small for every
reasonable A and for every τc ∈ IT , then it will be small for any τc in a smal-
ler stretch-space I ′T ⊆ IT , including I ′T = {τc}. If a scheme has a trivial stretch-
space IT = {τc}, then NVAE becomes the classical NAE notion. It easily follows,
that NVAE(τc) security of a scheme Π tightly implies security of Π[τc]. In particular,
AdvnaeΠ (t, qe[τc],qd[τc],σ[τc]) ≤ Advnvae(τc)Π[τc] (t′,qe,qd,σ).
Parameterized CCA security. An NAE-secure AE scheme is also IND-CCA-secure.
This follows from the equivalence of the all-in-one and dual AE notions (Lemma 2.9)
and a well-known implication PRIV ∧ AUTH ⇒ IND-CCA established by Bellare and
Namprempre [BN00] (see the definition of IND-CCA security in Appendix B.4).2 It
is natural to ask: Does the NVAE(τc)-security also provide a privacy guarantee against
2Even though the result of Bellare and Namprempre applies to randomized schemes, simply citing
it in the context of deterministic nonce-based schemes has become folklore. We commit the same act
of negligence here, but we note that a very similar analysis to that of Bellare’s and Namprempre’s
performed with the corresponding notions for nonce-based AE schemes would yield a very similar result.
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proc initialize nvae-R(τc)Π
K ←$ K
X ← ∅, Y ← ∅
oracle Enc(N,A, τ,M)
if (N, τ) ∈ X then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {(N, τ)}
C ← E(K,N,A, τ,M)
if τ = τc then
Y ← Y ∪ {(N,A,C)}
return C
oracle Dec(N,A, τ, C)
if τ = τc and (N,A,C) ∈ Y then
return ⊥
return D(K,N,A, τ, C)
proc initialize nvae-I(τc)Π
K ←$ K
X ← ∅
oracle Enc(N,A, τ,M)
if (N, τ) ∈ X then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {(N, τ)}
if τ = τc then
C ←$ {0, 1}|M |+τc
return C
return E(K,N,A, τ,M)
oracle Dec(N,A, τ, C)
if τ = τc then
return ⊥
return D(K,N,A, τ, C)
Figure 8.3 – AE security with variable stretch. Security games for defining AE
security of a variable-stretch AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D).
chosen ciphertext attacks? We define IND-VCCA, an extension of the IND-CCA security
notion for variable stretch AE schemes with τc-parameterized security games and answer
this question positively.
The parameterized games of IND-VCCA notion capture the exact privacy level guar-
anteed by an variable-stretch AE scheme for encryption queries stretched by τc bits, in
presence of arbitrary queries with expansions τ 6= τc and non-trivial decryption queries
stretched by τc bits. The notion builds on the intuition that privacy level of τc-expanded
queries should not be affected by any adversarial queries made with other amounts of
stretch.
Let Π = (K, E ,D) be a variable-stretch AE scheme. We let an adversary A interact
with the games ind-vcca-R(τc)Π and ind-vcca-I(τc)Π defined in Figure 8.4 and its goal
is to distinguish them. In the “ideal” game ind-vcca-I(τc)Π, the τc-stretched encryption
queries are answered with random strings while the decryption queries are processed
with the real decryption algorithm. A must respect the relaxed nonce-requirement and
is prevented to win the game trivially (i.e. by re-encrypting output of decryption query
with τc bits of stretch and vice-versa).
The adversarial resources of interest for the IND-VCCA notion are the same as for
the NVAE notion, i.e. (t,qe,qd,σ).
Definition 8.3 (IND-VCCA(τc) security). Given a variable stretch AE scheme Π =
(K, E ,D) with a stretch space IT , a challenge amount of stretch τc ∈ IT and an adversary
A , we define the advantage of A in breaking the IND-VCCA(τc) security of Π in a
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chosen ciphertext attack (with help of the games ind-vcca-R(τc) and ind-vcca-I(τc) in
Figure 8.4) as
Adv
ind-vcca(τc)
Π (A ) = Pr
[
A ind-vcca-R(τc)Π ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A ind-vcca-I(τc)Π ⇒ 1
]
.
If Adv
ind-vcca(τc)
Π (A ) ≤  for every adversary A with resources limited by (t, qe,qd,σ),
then we say that Π is (, τc, t, qe,qd,σ)-IND-VCCA secure.
Remark 9 (Relations to IND-CCA and NVAE(τc)). Similarly as in the case of NVAE
and NAE, IND-VCCA security with some stretch space IT implies IND-CCA security
with any stretch space I ′T ⊆ IT , among others IT = {τc}. It follows that IND-VCCA(τc)
security of a scheme Π implies the classical IND-CCA security of Π[τc].
The notions IND-VCCA and NVAE differ in the way the “ideal” games treat the
decryption queries expanded by τc bits; the IND-VCCA notion does not capture integrity
of ciphertexts. E.g. a scheme that concatenates output of a length-preserving, nonce-
based, ind-cca-secure encryption scheme (using encoding of the nonce and stretch as a
“nonce”) and an image of the nonce and stretch under a PRF would be secure in the sense
of IND-VCCA, but insecure in the sense of NVAE. Thus IND-VCCA(τc); NVAE(τc).
We formally treat the relation between the two notions in the opposite direction in
Theorem 8.4. We would like to stress that the result in Theorem 8.4 holds for any
variable-stretch AE scheme, and in particular for any stretch space IT .
Theorem 8.4 (NVAE(τc) ⇒ IND-VCCA(τc)). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an arbitrary
variable-stretch AE scheme, and A be an adversary with resources (t,qe,qd,σ). We
have that
Adv
ind-vcca(τc)
Π (A ) ≤ 2 ·Advnvae(τc)Π (B),
for some B with resources (t′,qe,qd,σ) where t′ = t + γ ·
(∑
τ∈IT σ[τ ]
)
and γ is a
constant.
Proof. Let A be an IND-VCCA adversary with indicated resources. We define the
game ind-vcca-I(τc)
⊥
Π as an intermediate step in the proof; it is exactly the same as
ind-vcca-I(τc)Π, except that the decryption queries with τc bits of stretch are always
answered with ⊥. We have that
Adv
ind-vcca(τc)
Π (A ) = Pr[A
ind-vcca-R(τc)Π ⇒ 1]− Pr[A ind-vcca-I(τc)⊥Π ⇒ 1]
+Pr[A ind-vcca-I(τc)
⊥
Π ⇒ 1]− Pr[A ind-vcca-I(τc)Π ⇒ 1].
We start by showing that
Pr[A ind-vcca-R(τc)Π ⇒ 1]− Pr[A ind-vcca-I(τc)⊥Π ⇒ 1] ≤ Advnvae(τc)Π (B)
for an NVAE adversary B with the resources (t′,qe,qd,σ). The reduction of A to B is
straightforward: B simply answers A ’s queries with its own oracles, making sure that
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proc initialize ind-vcca-R(τc)Π
K ←$ K
V ← ∅, X ← ∅, Y ← ∅
oracle Enc(N,A, τ,M)
if (N, τ) ∈ X then return ⊥
if τ = τc and (N,A,M) ∈ V then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {(N, τ)}
C ← E(K,N,A, τ,M)
if τ = τc then
Y ← Y ∪ {(N,A,C)}
return C
oracle Dec(N,A, τ, C)
if τ = τc and (N,A,C) ∈ Y then
return ⊥
M ← D(K,N,A, τ, C)
if τ = τc and M 6= ⊥
V ← V ∪ {(N,A,M)}
return M
proc initialize ind-vcca-I(τc)Π
K ←$ K
V ← ∅, X ← ∅, Y ← ∅
oracle Enc(N,A, τ,M)
if (N, τ) ∈ X then return ⊥
if τ = τc and (N,A,M) ∈ V then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {(N, τ)}
if τ = τc then
C ←$ {0, 1}|M |+τc
Y ← Y ∪ {(N,A,C)}
return C
return E(K,N,A, τ,M)
oracle Dec(N,A, τ, C)
if τ = τc and (N,A,C) ∈ Y then
return ⊥
M ← D(K,N,A, τ, C)
if τ = τc and M 6= ⊥
V ← V ∪ {(N,A,M)}
return M
Figure 8.4 – Games for defining IND-VCCA security of a variable-stretch AE
scheme Π = (K, E ,D).
the trivial-win preventing restrictions of ind-vcca games are met. At the end of the
experiment, B outputs whatever A outputs. This ensures perfect simulation of both
games for A .
It remains to show that
Pr[A ind-vcca-I(τc)
⊥
Π ⇒ 1]− Pr[A ind-vcca-I(τc)Π ⇒ 1] ≤ Advnvae(τc)Π (C )
for an NVAE adversary C with resources (t′,qe,qd,σ). We reduce A to C as follows.
C answers all A ’s queries directly with its own oracles (again making sure to enforce all
the restrictions of ind-vcca games), except for encryption queries expanded by τc bits.
For those, C ignores its encryption oracle and answers with |M |+ τc random bits if A ’s
query has a fresh nonce-stretch pair and is not a re-encryption of the output of a previous
decryption query. At the end of experiment, C outputs the inverse of A ’s output. If C
interacts with nvae-R(τc)Π, then it perfectly simulates ind-vcca-I(τc)Π for A while if
C interacts with nvae-I(τc)Π, then it perfectly simulates ind-vcca-I(τc)
⊥
Π.
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proc initialize vpriv-R(τc)Π
K ←$ K
X ← ∅
oracle Enc(N,A, τ,M)
if (N, τ) ∈ X then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {(N, τ)}
return E(K,N,A, τ,M)
proc initialize vpriv-I(τc)Π
K ←$ K
X ← ∅
oracle Enc(N,A, τ,M)
if (N, τ) ∈ X then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {(N, τ)}
if τ = τc then
C ←$ {0, 1}|M |+τc
return C
return E(K,N,A, τ,M)
proc initialize vauth(τc)Π
K ←$ K
X ← ∅, Y ← ∅
oracle Enc(N,A, τ,M)
if (N, τ) ∈ X then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {(N, τ)}
C ← E(K,N,A, τ,M)
if τ = τc then
Y ← Y ∪ {(N,A,C)}
return C
oracle Dec(N,A, τ, C)
if τ = τc and (N,A,C) ∈ Y then
return ⊥
return D(K,N,A, τ, C)
Figure 8.5 – Security games for defining VPRIV and VAUTH security of a
variable-stretch AE scheme Π = (K, E,D).
8.5.2 No Two-Requirement Notion
The equivalence of the two-requirement security definition and the all-in-one security
definition for AE security is among the best known results in the field [RS06b] (see
Lemma 2.9). One may wonder whether such an equivalence also holds in the setting
of variable-stretch AE schemes, for the natural τc-parameterized extensions of these
notions. Surprisingly, we answer this question negatively. We consider the conventional
confidentiality and authenticity notions for AE schemes [BN00, Rog02] and define their
extensions with variable stretch, the notions VPRIV and VAUTH, as natural extensions
of their conventional counterparts.
Let Π = (K, E ,D) be a variable-stretch AE scheme. An adversary A against confid-
entiality of Π interacts with games vpriv-R(τc)Π (real scheme) and vpriv-I(τc)Π (ideal
behaviour) defined in Figure 8.5, both parameterized by the challenge stretch τc, and
tries to distinguish them. An adversary A that attacks authenticity of Π with target
stretch τc is left to interact with the game vauth(τc)Π defined in Figure 8.5 and its goal
is to find a valid forgery (i.e. produce a decryption query returning M 6= ⊥) with the
target stretch of τc bits.
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Definition 8.5 (VPRIV(τc) and VAUTH(τc) security). Given a variable stretch AE
scheme Π = (K, E ,D) with a stretch space IT , a challenge amount of stretch τc ∈ IT
and an adversary A , we define the advantage of A in breaking the VPRIV(τc) security
of Π in a chosen plaintext attack (with help of the games vpriv-R(τc) and vpriv-I(τc)
in Figure 8.5) as
Adv
vpriv(τc)
Π (A ) = Pr[A
vpriv-R(τc)Π ⇒ 1]− Pr[A vpriv-I(τc)Π ⇒ 1].
Given an adversary A ′, we define the advantage of A in breaking the VAUTH(τc) se-
curity of Π in a chosen ciphertext attack (with help of the game vauth(τc) in Figure 8.5)
as
Adv
vauth(τc)
Π (A
′) = Pr
[
A ′vauth(τc)Π forges with τc
]
.
where A forges denotes the event that the Dec oracle returns a value different from ⊥.
If Adv
vpriv(τc)
Π (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A whose resources are limited by (t, qe,σ),
then we say that Π is (, τc, t, qe,σ)-VPRIV secure. If Adv
vauth(τc)
Π (A
′) ≤ ′ for all
adversaries A ′ whose resources are limited by (t′, q′e, q′d,σ
′), then we say that Π is
(′, τc, t′, q′e, q′d,σ
′)-VAUTH secure.
Remark 10 (Relations with NVAE, PRIV and AUTH notions). As before, if a scheme
Π is VPRIV(τc) (respectively VAUTH(τc)) secure with stretch-space IT , then it will be
secure for any stretch-space I ′T ⊆ IT including I ′T = {τc}, implying the PRIV (respect-
ively AUTH) security of the scheme Π[τc].
We can easily verify that the NVAE(τc) security of a scheme Π implies both the
VPRIV(τc) security and the VAUTH(τc) of Π, by adapting the reductions for corres-
ponding conventional notions [RS06b] slightly. In Proposition 8.6, we show that the
converse of this implication does not hold.
B˜K1
N
FK2
n
M
τ
F ′
K3
A
〈·〉
〈·〉
Z
Tleft(·)
Figure 8.6 – The encryption algorithm of the scheme Π¬cca. Here 〈·〉 is an
efficiently computable, injective encoding scheme.
Proposition 8.6. Assuming the existence of secure tweakable blockciphers and PRFs,
there exists a variable-stretch AE scheme, that is secure in the sense of the VPRIV(τc)
notion and the VAUTH(τc) notion but insecure in the sense of IND-VCCA(τc) notion,
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i.e.
VPRIV(τc) ∧VAUTH(τc);IND-VCCA(τc).
Corollary 8.7. There exists a variable-stretch AE scheme, that is secure in the sense
of both the VPRIV(τc) notion and the VAUTH(τc) notion but insecure in the sense of
NVAE(τc) notion, i.e.
VPRIV(τc) ∧VAUTH(τc);NVAE(τc).
Proof. To support the claim in Proposition 8.6, we define the variable-stretch AE scheme
Π¬cca = (K¬cca, E¬cca,D¬cca) constructed from a TPRP-secure tweakable blockcipher
E˜ : K1×N ×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and two PRF-secure keyed functions F : K2×{0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}n and F ′ : K3 × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}m. We define K¬cca = K1 × K2 × K3, M¬cca =
{0, 1}n, A¬cca = {0, 1}∗, N¬cca = N and the encryption and decryption algorithms as
in Figure 8.7. We require that |IT ¬cca| ≥ 2 and that m ≥ max(IT ¬cca). The encryption
algorithm E¬cca is illustrated in Figure 8.6.
algo E¬cca(K,N,A, τ,M)
Parse K as K1,K2,K3
W ←M ⊕F (K2, 〈τ〉)
Z ← E˜(K1, N,W )
T ← leftτ (F ′(K3, 〈N,A, τ, Z〉))
return Z‖T
algo D¬cca(K,N,A, τ, C)
Parse K as K1,K2,K3
Parse C as Z‖T with |T | = τ
if leftτ (F
′(K3, 〈N,A, τ, Z〉)) 6= T then
return ⊥
W ← E˜−1(K1, N, Z)
return W ⊕F (K2, 〈τ〉)
Figure 8.7 – Encryption and decryption algorithms of the variable-stretch AE
scheme Π¬cca = (K¬cca, E¬cca, E¬cca). Here 〈·〉 is an efficiently computable, injective
encoding scheme.
The scheme Π¬cca is by far no real-life AE construction (mainly due to its limited
message space), its purpose is merely to act as a counter example. It can be verified,
that for any adversary A with resources (t,qe,qd,σ)
Adv
vauth(τc)
Π¬cca (A ) ≤ Adv
prf
F ′ (t, qe + qd, σ) + qd[τc]/2
τc
for some B that runs in time t+ γ · σ for some constant γ, makes no more than qe + qd
queries such that their data complexity is limited by σ. Here qe =
∑
τ∈IT qe[τ ], qd =∑
τ∈IT qd[τ ] and σ =
∑
τ∈IT σ[τ ]. This is because every forgery attempt equals to
guessing τc bits of an output of F
′, evaluated on a fresh input.
For confidentiality, we have that for any adversary A with resources (t,qe,σ)
Adv
vpriv(τc)
Π¬cca (t,qe,qd,σ) ≤ Adv
prf
F (B) + Adv
prf
F ′ (B
′) + Advp˜rp
E˜
(C ) + 2q2e/2
n
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for some B and B′ that both run in time t + γ · σ for some constant γ, make no more
than qe queries such that their data complexity is limited by σ, and for some C that
runs in time t+ δ · σ for some constant δ and makes no more than qe queries, with the
same qe, qd and σ as before.
The term 2q2e/2
n is composed of q2e/2
n that comes from the RP-RF switch for the
tweakable blockcipher and another q2e/2
n that comes from extending the tweakspace to
include stretch, using F (similar to Rogaway’s XE construction [Rog04a]).
However, we can construct an adversary A¬cca, that achieves IND-VCCA(τc) advant-
age close to 1. The strategy of A¬cca is as follows:
1. query Z1‖T1 ← Enc(N1, A1, τc,M1) with arbitrary N1, A1,M1,
2. iterate through T ∗1 ∈ {0, 1}τmin until M∗1 ← Dec(N1, A1, τmin, Z1‖T ∗1 ) returns M∗1 6= ⊥,
3. query Z2‖T2 ← Enc(N2, A2, τc,M2) with arbitrary N2, A2,M2,
4. iterate through T ∗2 ∈ {0, 1}τmin until M∗2 ← Dec(N2, A2, τmin, Z2‖T ∗2 ) returns M∗2 6= ⊥,
5. return 1 iff M1⊕M∗1 = M2⊕M∗2 (otherwise return 0),
where τmin = min(IT \{τc}). A¬cca achieves Advind-vcca(τc)Π¬cca (A¬cca) = 1−2−n and makes
2 · 2τmin decryption and 2 encryption queries, all of fixed length.
As the amount of stretch τ has no effect on the encryption by E˜, we can verify that
M1⊕F (K2, 〈τc〉) =M∗1 ⊕F (K2, 〈τmin〉)
M2⊕F (K2, 〈τc〉) =M∗2 ⊕F (K2, 〈τmin〉)
The final condition in the if -statement verified by the adversary is always true for the real
scheme. The probability of the same event in the “ideal” game is 2−n. As a consequence
of Theorem 8.4 and Proposition 8.6, we can state Corollary 8.7.3
8.5.3 Key-Equivalent Separation by Stretch
The notion of NVAE captures the immediate intuition about the security goal one ex-
pects to achieve using a nonce-based AE scheme with variable stretch. We now introduce
a modular approach to achieving the notion.
Assume that an AE scheme is already known to be secure in the sense of the NAE
model. What additional security property should such a scheme possess on top of NAE-
security, so that it can achieve the full aim of being a NVAE-secure scheme? We formalize
such a desirable property, naming it key-equivalent separation by stretch (KESS), which
captures the intuition that for each value of stretch the scheme should behave as if keyed
with a fresh secret key. The adversary must respect the relaxed nonce-requirement. The
resources of interest for the KESS notion are (t,qe,qd,σ), as defined for the NVAE(τc)
notion in Section 8.5.1.
Definition 8.8 (KESS property). Given a variable stretch AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D)
with a stretch space IT and an adversary A , we define the advantage of A in breaking
3The same attack strategy yields also Adv
nvae(τc)
Π¬cca (A¬cca) = 1− 2−n.
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proc initialize kess-RΠ
K ←$ K
X ← ∅
oracle Enc(N,A, τ,M)
if (N, τ) ∈ X then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {(N, τ)}
return E(K,N,A, τ,M)
oracle Dec(N,A, τ, C)
return D(K,N,A, τ, C)
proc initialize kess-IΠ
for τ ∈ IT do
Kτ ←$ K
oracle Enc(N,A, τ,M)
if (N, τ) ∈ X then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {(N, τ)}
return E(Kτ , N,A, τ,M)
oracle Dec(N,A, τ, C)
return D(Kτ , N,A, τ, C)
Figure 8.8 – Games defining KESS property of a variable-stretch AE scheme
Π = (K, E,D). Note that the independent keying for each τ ∈ IT in game kess-IΠ
can be done by lazy sampling if needed.
the KESS property of Π in a chosen ciphertext attack (with help of the games kess-R
and kess-I in Figure 8.8) as
AdvkessΠ (A ) = Pr
[
A kess-RΠ ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A kess-IΠ ⇒ 1
]
.
If AdvkessΠ (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A whose resources are limited by (t, qe,qd,σ),
then we say that Π has the (, t, qe,qd,σ)-KESS property.
We note that KESS property on its own says nothing about AE security of a scheme.
Indeed, a scheme whose encryption algorithm would simply output the message M
followed by τ zeroes upon input (K,N,A, τ,M) would have perfect KESS property,
but would be anything but AE secure in any sense. However, we show in Theorem 8.9
that when coupled with NAE security, KESS implies NVAE security. Informally, the
kess notion takes care of interactions between queries with different values of stretch.
Once this is done, we are free to argue that the queries with τc bits of stretch are
“independent” of those with other values of stretch and will “inherit” the security level
of Π[τc].
Theorem 8.9 (KESS ∧ NAE ⇒ NVAE). Let Π = (K, E ,D) be a variable-stretch AE
scheme and A and adversary with resources (t,qe,qd,σ). We have that
Adv
nvae(τc)
Π (A ) ≤ AdvkessΠ (B) + AdvnaeΠ[τc](C ),
for some B with resources (t′,qe,qd,σ) and some C that runs in time t′′, makes qe[τc]
and qd[τc] encryption and decryption queries respectively with a total data complexity
bounded by σ[τc], such that t
′ = t+ β · q and t′′ = t+ γ · σ for some constants β and γ,
q =
∑
τ∈IT (qe[τ ] + qd[τ ]) and σ =
∑
τ∈IT σ[τ ].
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proc initialize G
for τ ∈ IT do
Kτ ←$ K
X ← ∅, Y ← ∅
oracle Dec(N,A, τ, C)
if τ = τc and (N,A,C) ∈ Y then
return ⊥
return D(Kτ , N,A, τ, C)
oracle Enc(N,A, τ,M)
if (N, τ) ∈ X then
return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {(N, τ)}
C ← E(Kτ , N,A, τ,M)
if τ = τc then
Y ← Y ∪ {(N,A,C)}
return C
Figure 8.9 – Security game nvae(τc)-GΠ.
Proof. Consider the security game nvae(τc)-G defined in Figure 8.9. We have that
Adv
nvae(τc)
Π (A ) = Pr[A
nvae-R(τc)Π ⇒ 1]− Pr[A nvae(τc)-GΠ ⇒ 1]
+ Pr[A nvae(τc)-GΠ ⇒ 1]− Pr[A nvae-IΠ(τc) ⇒ 1].
We first show that Pr[A nvae-R(τc)Π ⇒ 1] − Pr[A nvae(τc)-GΠ ⇒ 1] ≤ AdvkessΠ (B). The
NVAE adversary A can be straightforwardly reduced to B. Any query of A is directly
answered with B’s own oracles, except for decryption queries with expansion of τc bits,
whose output is trivially known from previous encryption queries; here B returns ⊥ to
A . At the end, B outputs whatever A outputs. If B interacts with kess-RΠ then it
perfectly simulates nvae-R(τc)Π for A . If B interacts with kess-IΠ then it perfectly
simulates nvae(τc)-GΠ.
We next show that Pr[A nvae(τc)-GΠ ⇒ 1]−Pr[A nvae-IΠ(τc) ⇒ 1] ≤ AdvnaeΠ[τc](C ). The
adversary A can be reduced to C in the following way. When A issues a query with
expansion τc, C answers it with its own oracles. For other amounts of stretch τ 6= τc, C
first checks if there were previous queries with τ bits of stretch. If not, it samples a fresh
key Kτ . C then processes the query with the real (encryption or decryption) algorithm
of Π and the key Kτ , making sure that encryption queries comply with the relaxed nonce
requirement. If C interacts with nae-RΠ[τc] then it perfectly simulates nvae(τc)-GΠ for
A . If C interacts with nae-IΠ[τc] then it perfectly simulates nvae-I(τc)Π. This yields
the desired result.
Remark 11. An RAE secure scheme Π will always have the kess property (see Ap-
pendix B.4 for definition of RAE security). To see why, note that replacing Π by a
collection of random injections in both the kess-RΠ and kess-IΠ games will not in-
crease the advantage significantly, as that would contradict Π’s RAE security. After the
replacement, the two games will be indistinguishable. On the other hand, kess property
does not guarantee RAE security; the scheme OCBv described in Section 8.6 can serve
as a counter-example, because it does not tolerate nonce reuse.
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8.5.4 Relations among Notions
We address the relations between the notions that are newly defined in Chapter 8 and
the previously existing notions throughout the Section 8.5. The summary of established
relations can be found in Figure 8.10.
naepriv ∧ auth
ind− cca
nvae vpriv ∧ vauth
ind− vcca
kess∧nae
Variable-stretch AE notions Conventional AE notions
rae
a
b
cd
e f
g
h i
Figure 8.10 – Relations among notions for nonce-based AE with and without variable
stretch. Previous works: a[RS06b], b[BN00]. This paper: c (Remark 10, attacks in Sec-
tion 8.4), d (Remark 10, Corollary 8.7), e (Theorem 8.4, Remark 9), f (Proposition 8.6),
g (Theorem 8.9), h, i (Remark 11 together with[HKR15]).
8.5.5 A Short Guide to NVAE
Interpretation of the NVAE(τc) security advantage. The games defining the
notion of NVAE are parameterized by a constant, but arbitrary amount of stretch τc
from the stretch space IT of the AE scheme Π in question. In the nvae(τc)-IΠ security
game, only queries expanded by τc bits will be subjected to “idealization”. For all
other expansions, we give the adversary complete freedom to ask any queries it wants
(except for those breaking the nonce-requirement), but their behaviour is the same in
both security games. An NVAE security bound that is expressed as a function of τc
and assumes no particular value or constraint for τc will therefore tell us, what security
guarantees can we expect from queries stretched by τc bits specifically, for any τc ∈ IT .
Looking at the security bound itself, we are able to tell if there are any undesirable
interactions between queries with different amounts of stretch. This is best illustrated
by revisiting the problems and forgery attack from Section 8.4 in the NVAE security
model.
Attacks in NAE model. With the formal framework defined, we revisit the attacks
from Section 8.4 and analyse the advantage they achieve, as well as the resources they
require. Consider the original, unmodified scheme OCB [KR11], that produces the tag by
truncating an n-bit (with n > τ) to τ bits. In case of simultaneous use of two (or more)
amounts of stretch τ1 < τ2 with the same key, we can forge a ciphertext stretched by τ1
bits by truncating an existing ciphertext stretched by τ2 bits. This would correspond to
an attack with an nvae(τ1) advantage of 1 and constant resources.
If the same scheme is treated with the heuristic measures, e.g., nonce-stealing or
encoding τ in AD, from Section 8.4.1 (let’s call it hOCB), we consider the forgery attack
from Section 8.4.2. Assume that there are four instances of hOCB, with 32, 64, 96 and
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128 bit tags. To make a forgery with 128-bit tag, we have to forge a ciphertext with 32
bits of expansion and then exhaustively search for three 32-bit extensions of this forgery.
This gives us an nvae(128) advantage equal to 1, requiring 4 encryption queries, 3 · 232
verification queries with stretch other than 128 bits and 232 decryption queries stretched
by 128 bits. The effort necessary for such a forgery is clearly smaller than we could hope
for, especially in the amount of verification queries stretched by the challenge amount
of bits (i.e. 128).
“Good” bounds. After seeing examples of attacks, one may wonder: what kind of
NVAE security bound should we expect from a secure variable-stretch scheme? For
every scheme, it must be always possible to guess a ciphertext with probability 2−τc .
Thus the bound must always contain a term of the form c ·(qd[τc])α/2τc for some positive
constants c and α, or some more complicated function of this.
Even though the security level for τc-stretched queries should be independent of any
other queries, it is usually unavoidable to have a gradual increase of advantage with
every query made by the adversary. This increase can generally depend on all of the
adversarial resources, but should not depend on τc itself.
An example of a secure scheme’s NVAE(τc) bound can be found in Theorem 8.15. It
consist of the fraction (qd[τc] · 2n−τc)/(2n − 1) ≈ qd[τc]/2τc , advantage bounds for the
used blockcipher and a birthday-type term that grows with the total amount of data
processed. We see, that queries stretched by τ 6= τc bits will not unexpectedly increase
adversary’s chances to break OCBv, and that the best attack strategy to forge with τc
bits of stretch is simple tag-guessing.
8.6 Achieving AE with Variable Stretch
We demonstrate that the security of AE schemes in the sense of the NVAE notion is
easily achievable by introducing a practical and secure scheme. Rather than constructing
a scheme from the scratch, we modify an existing, well-established scheme and follow a
modular approach to analyse its security in presence of variable stretch. The modification
we propose is general enough to be applicable to most of the AE schemes based on a
tweakable primitive (e.g. a tweakable blockcipher).
OCB mode for tweakable blockcipher The Offset Codebook mode of operation for
a tweakable blockcipher (ΘCB) is a nonce-based AE scheme proposed by Krovetz and
Rogaway [KR11] (there are subtle differences from the prior versions of OCB [RBBK01,
Rog04a]). It is parameterized by a tweakable blockcipher E˜ : K×T × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
(we will denote the inverse of E˜ as E˜−1 = D˜) and a tag length 0 ≤ τ ≤ n. The tweak
space of E˜ is of the form T = N × N0 × {0, 1, 2, 3} ∪ N0 × {0, 1, 2, 3} for a finite set
N . The encryption and the decryption algorithms of ΘCB[E˜, τ ] are described in Figure
8.11. The AE security of ΘCB is formally stated in Lemma 8.10.
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101: procedure EK(N,A,M)
102: if N /∈ N then
103: return ⊥
104: end if
105: M1‖M2 · · ·Mm‖M∗ n←M
106: Sum← 0n, C∗ ← ε
107: for i← 1 to m do
108: Ci ← E˜N,i,0K (Mi)
109: Sum← Sum⊕Mi
110: end for
111: if M∗ = ε then
112: Final← E˜N,m,2K (Sum)
113: else
114: Pad← E˜N,m,1K (0n)
115: C∗ ←M∗⊕ left|M∗| (Pad)
116: Sum← Sum⊕M∗‖10∗
117: Final← E˜N,m,3K (Sum)
118: end if
119: Auth← HASHK(A)
120: T ← leftτ (Final⊕Auth)
121: return C1‖C2‖ · · · ‖Cm‖C∗‖T
122: end procedure
301: procedure HASHK(A)
302: Sum← 0n
303: A1‖A2 · · ·Am‖A∗ n←A
304: for i← 1 to m do
305: Sum← Sum⊕ E˜i,0K (Ai)
306: end for
307: if A∗ 6= ε then
308: Sum← Sum⊕ E˜m,1K (A∗‖10∗)
309: end if
310: return Sum
311: end procedure
201: procedure DK(N,A,C)
202: if N /∈ N or |C| < τ then
203: return ⊥
204: end if
205: C ← left|C|−τ (C) ; T ← leftτ (C)
206: C1‖C2 · · ·Cm‖C∗ n← C
207: Sum← 0n, M∗ ← ε
208: for i← 1 to m do
209: Mi ← D˜N,τ,i,0K (Ci)
210: Sum← Sum⊕Mi
211: end for
212: if C∗ = ε then
213: Final← E˜N,m,2K (Sum)
214: else
215: Pad← E˜N,m,1K (0n)
216: M∗ ← C∗⊕ left|C∗| (Pad)
217: Sum← Sum⊕M∗‖10∗
218: Final← E˜N,m,3K (Sum)
219: end if
220: Auth← HASHK(A)
221: T ′ ← leftτ (Final⊕Auth)
222: if T = T ′ then
223: return C1‖ · · · ‖Cm‖C∗‖T
224: else
225: return ⊥
226: end if
227: end procedure
Figure 8.11 – Definition of ΘCB[E˜, τ ].
Lemma 8.10 (Lemma 2, [KR11]). Let E˜ : K × T × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a tweakable
blockcipher with T = N ×N0 × {0, 1, 2, 3} ∪N0 × {0, 1, 2, 3}. Let τ ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Let A
be an adversary that runs in time t and makes qe encryption queries of no more than σ
bits. Let further A ′ be an adversary that runs in time t, makes qe encryption queries
and qd decryption queries of no more than σ bits in total. Then we have that
Advpriv
ΘCB[E˜,τ ]
(A ) ≤Advs˜prp
E˜
(B),
Advauth
ΘCB[E˜,τ ]
(A ′) ≤Advs˜prp
E˜
(B′) + qd · 2
n−τ
2n − 1 ,
for some A that runs in time t + γ · σ for a constant γ and makes at most qp queries,
and some A ′ that runs in time t+ γ′ · σ for a constant γ′ and makes at most qa queries
where qp ≤ dσ/ne+ 2 · qe, and qa ≤ dσ/ne+ 2 · (qe + qd).
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Thanks to Lemma 2.9, we state as a corollary of Lemma 8.10 that Advnae
ΘCB[E˜,τ ]
(A ) ≤
Advs˜prp
E˜
(B) + qd
2n−τ
2n−1 for an A with resources as in Lemma 8.10, and a B that runs in
time t+ γ · σ for a constant γ and makes at most dσ/ne+ 2 · (qe + qd) queries.
OCB mode with variable-stretch security We introduce ΘCBv (variable-stretch-
ΘCB), a variable-stretch AE scheme obtained by slightly modifying ΘCB.
The tweakable blockcipher mode of operation ΘCBv is parameterized by a tweakable
blockcipher E˜ : K × T × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and a stretch-space IT ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , n}. The
current tweak space T is different than the one for ΘCB; it is of the form T = N ×IT ×
N0×{0, 1, 2, 3}∪IT×N0×{0, 1, 2, 3}. The encryption and decryption algorithms of ΘCBv
are exactly the same as those of ΘCB, except that they now allow selectable stretch and
that every call to E˜ is now tweaked by τ , in addition to the other tweak components.
Both algorithms are described in Figure 8.12. An illustration of the encryption algorithm
is depicted in Figure 8.13.
Thanks to Theorem 8.9, establishing the NVAE security of ΘCBv requires little effort.
The corresponding result is stated in Theorem 8.11.
Theorem 8.11. Let E˜ : K × T × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a tweakable blockcipher with
T = N × IT × N0 × {0, 1, 2, 3} ∪ IT × N0 × {0, 1, 2, 3}. Let A be an NVAE-adversary
with resources bounded by (t,qe,qd,σ). Then we have that
Adv
nvae(τc)
ΘCBv[E˜]
(A ) ≤Advs˜prp
E˜
(B) +
∑
τ∈IT
Advs˜prp
E˜
(Cτ ) + Adv
s˜prp
E˜
(Cτc) + qd[τc] ·
2n−τc
2n − 1 .
for some B that runs in time t+β ·q and makes q queries, and some Cτ that runs in time
t+γτ ·q[τ ] and makes q[τ ] queries for τ ∈ IT , where q[τ ] = dσ[τ ]/ne+ 2 · (qe[τ ] +qd[τ ])
for τ ∈ IT , and q =
∑
τ∈IT q[τ ], and β and γτ for τ ∈ IT are constants.
Proof. We observe that if we fix the expansion value to τc in all queries, the nonce-based
AE scheme (ΘCBv[E˜])[τc] that we get will be identical with the scheme ΘCB[E˜, τc].
The result follows from this observation and the results of Lemmas 8.10 and 8.12, and
Theorem 8.9.
Lemma 8.12. Let E˜ : K × T × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a tweakable blockcipher with
T = N ×IT ×N0×{0, 1, 2, 3}∪ IT ×N0×{0, 1, 2, 3}. Let A be a KESS-adversary with
resources bounded by (t,qe,qd,σ). Then we have that
Adv
nvae(τc)
ΘCBv[E˜]
(A ) ≤Advs˜prp
E˜
(B) +
∑
τ∈IT
Advs˜prp
E˜
(Cτ )
for some B that runs in time t+β ·q and makes q queries, and some Cτ that runs in time
t+γτ ·q[τ ] and makes q[τ ] queries for τ ∈ IT , where q[τ ] = dσ[τ ]/ne+ 2 · (qe[τ ] +qd[τ ])
for τ ∈ IT , and q =
∑
τ∈IT q[τ ], and β and γτ for τ ∈ IT are constants.
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101: procedure EK(N,A, τ ,M)
102: if N /∈ N then
103: return ⊥
104: end if
105: M1‖M2 · · ·Mm‖M∗ n←M
106: Sum← 0n, C∗ ← ε
107: for i← 1 to m do
108: Ci ← E˜N,τ,i,0K (Mi)
109: Sum← Sum⊕Mi
110: end for
111: if M∗ = ε then
112: Final← E˜N,τ,m,2K (Sum)
113: else
114: Pad← E˜N,τ,m,1K (0n)
115: C∗ ←M∗⊕ left|M∗| (Pad)
116: Sum← Sum⊕M∗‖10∗
117: Final← E˜N,τ,m,3K (Sum)
118: end if
119: Auth← HASHK(A)
120: T ← leftτ (Final⊕Auth)
121: return C1‖C2‖ · · · ‖Cm‖C∗‖T
122: end procedure
301: procedure HASHK(A, τ)
302: Sum← 0n
303: A1‖A2 · · ·Am‖A∗ n←A
304: for i← 1 to m do
305: Sum← Sum⊕ E˜τ,i,0K (Ai)
306: end for
307: if A∗ 6= ε then
308: Sum← Sum⊕ E˜τ,m,1K (A∗‖10∗)
309: end if
310: return Sum
311: end procedure
201: procedure DK(N,A, τ ,C)
202: if N /∈ N or |C| < τ then
203: return ⊥
204: end if
205: C ← left|C|−τ (C) ; T ← leftτ (C)
206: C1‖C2 · · ·Cm‖C∗ n← C
207: Sum← 0n, M∗ ← ε
208: for i← 1 to m do
209: Mi ← D˜N,τ,i,0K (Ci)
210: Sum← Sum⊕Mi
211: end for
212: if C∗ = ε then
213: Final← E˜N,τ,m,2K (Sum)
214: else
215: Pad← E˜N,τ,m,1K (0n)
216: M∗ ← C∗⊕ left|C∗| (Pad)
217: Sum← Sum⊕M∗‖10∗
218: Final← E˜N,τ,m,3K (Sum)
219: end if
220: Auth← HASHK(A)
221: T ′ ← leftτ (Final⊕Auth)
222: if T = T ′ then
223: return C1‖ · · · ‖Cm‖C∗‖T
224: else
225: return ⊥
226: end if
227: end procedure
Figure 8.12 – Definition of ΘCBv[E˜]. Changes from ΘCB highlighted in red.
Proof. Let A be a KESS adversary with indicated resources. We define the games
k˜ess-R and k˜ess-I by replacing the tweakable blockcipher E˜ by an ideal primitive in
kess-R and the kess-I respectively; i.e. we sample an independent random tweakable
permutation piK ←$ P˜erm(T , 2n) for every K ∈ K and use piK instead of E˜K for each
K.
We have that
Adv
nvae(τc)
ΘCBv[E˜]
(A ) = Pr
[
A kess-R ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A
˜kess-R ⇒ 1
]
+ Pr
[
A
˜kess-R ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A k˜ess-I ⇒ 1
]
+ Pr
[
A k˜ess-I ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A kess-I ⇒ 1
]
.
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The gap Pr
[
A kess-R ⇒ 1]−Pr [A ˜kess-R ⇒ 1] is bounded by Advs˜prp
E˜
(B) by a standard
reduction.
To bound the gap Pr
[
A k˜ess-I ⇒ 1
]
− Pr [A kess-I ⇒ 1], we observe that the replace-
ment can be done gradually, for one value of stretch at a time. We define games kess-Ii
for i = 0, . . . , |IT |. In the game kess-Ii, we replace the calls to E˜Kτj by calls to
piKτj for j = 1, . . . , i (using some fixed ordering of elements of IT ). Thus kess-I0 =
kess-I and kess-I|IT | = k˜ess-I. For each i = 1, . . . , |IT |, the gap Pr
[
A kess-Ii ⇒ 1] −
Pr
[
A kess-Ii ⇒ 1] is bounded by Advs˜prp
E˜
(Cτi). Thus, by a standard hybrid argument,
the cumulative gap will be bounded by
∑
τ∈IT Adv
s˜prp
E˜
(Cτ ).
Once E˜ is replaced by a collection of random tweakable permutations in both games,
we observe that both k˜ess-R and k˜ess-I produce identical distributions. This is because
both in k˜ess-R and in k˜ess-I, any two queries with any two unequal amounts of stretch
τ1 and τ2 will be processed by two independent collections of random permutations
(thanks to the separation of queries with different amounts of stretch by tweaks).
Instantiating E˜. In order to obtain a real-world scheme, we need to instantiate the
tweakable blockcipher E˜. The scheme OCB uses the XEX construction [Rog04a] that
turns an ordinary blockcipher E : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n into a tweakable blockcipher
E˜ = XEX[E] with E˜ : K×T ×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. A call to E˜ = XEX[E] is evaluated in
two ways, depending on the tweak:
E˜N,i,jK (X) = EK(X ⊕∆N,i,j)⊕∆N,i,j , or E˜i,jK (X) = EK(X ⊕∆i,j).
In each call, the input (and in some cases also the output) of the blockcipher E is
masked with special ∆-values, derived from the tweak and the secret key. A function
H : K×{0, 1}<n → {0, 1}n defined as H(K,N) = EK(N‖10∗) is used in the computation
of the masking values.4 In the following, all multiplications are done in GF(2n) with some
fixed representation. The masking ∆-values of the original OCB are computed as follows:
∆N,0,0 = H(K,N),
∆N,i+1,0 = ∆N,i,0⊕L[ntz(i+ 1)] for i ≥ 0,
∆N,i,j = ∆N,i,0⊕ j · L∗ for j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},
∆0,0 = 0
n,
∆i+1,0 = ∆i,0⊕L[ntz(i+ 1)] for i ≥ 0,
∆i,j = ∆i,0⊕ j · L∗ for j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},
where L∗ = EK(0n), L[0] = 22 · L∗, L[`] = 2 · L[` − 1] for ` > 0 and ntz(i) denotes
the number of trailing zeros function (see Section 2.1 for definition). The security of the
XEX construction is stated in Lemma 8.13.
4A function is used in the latest version of OCB [KR11], we opted for EK(·) for the sake of simplicity.
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Lemma 8.13 (Lemma 3, [KR11]). Let E : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a blockcipher and
T = N ×N0×{0, 1, 2, 3} ∪N0×{0, 1, 2, 3}. Let A be an adversary that runs in time at
most t, asks at most q queries, never asks queries with i-component exceeding 2n−5 and
never asks decryption queries with tweaks from N0 × {0, 1, 2, 3}. Then
Advs˜prpXEX[E](A ) ≤ Adv±prpE (B) +
6q2
2n
for an adversary B that makes at most 2q queries and runs in time bounded by t+ γ · q
with some constant γ.
Extending the tweaks with τ . In order to instantiate ΘCBv, we need to extend
the tweaks of E˜ with a fourth component: τ . To this end, we propose XEX′, which is
obtained by a slight modification of the XEX construction. Informally, we expand the
domain of the “j-part” of tweaks and represent it as IT × {0, 1, 2, 3}, compensating for
this by decreasing the maximal value of i.
The tweakable blockcipher E˜′ = XEX′[E] is defined as follows. We again use the
function H(K,N). We uniquely label each element of IT by an integer with a bijection
λ : IT → {0, 1, . . . , |IT |−1}. We define m = dlog2 |IT |e, L∗ = EK(0n), Lτ = λ(τ) ·22 ·L∗
for τ ∈ IT , L[0] = 22+m ·L∗, and L[`] = 2 ·L[`− 1] for ` > 0. The masking ∆-values are
computed as follows:
∆N,0,0,0 = H(K,N),
∆N,τ,0,0 = ∆N,0,0,0⊕Lτ ,
∆N,τ,i+1,0 = ∆N,τ,i,0⊕L[ntz(i+ 1)] for i ≥ 0,
∆N,τ,i,j = ∆N,τ,i,0⊕ j · L∗ for j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},
∆τ,0,0 = Lτ ,
∆τ,i+1,0 = ∆τ,i,0⊕L[ntz(i+ 1)] for i ≥ 0,
∆τ,i,j = ∆τ,i,0⊕ j · L∗ for j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
A call to E˜′ is evaluated as follows:
E˜′N,τ,i,jK (X) =EK(X ⊕∆N,τ,i,j)⊕∆N,τ,i,j , or E˜′τ,i,jK (X) = EK(X ⊕∆τ,i,j).
The security result for XEX′ construction is stated in Lemma 8.14.
Lemma 8.14. Let E : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a blockcipher and T = N × IT × N0 ×
{0, 1, 2, 3} ∪ IT × N0 × {0, 1, 2, 3} for some finite, non-empty IT ⊆ N0. Let A be an
adversary that runs in time at most t, asks at most q queries, never asks queries with
i-component exceeding 2n−(5+dlog2 |IT |e) and never asks decryption queries with tweaks
from IT ×N0 × {0, 1, 2, 3}. Then
Advs˜prp
XEX′[E](A ) ≤ Adv
±prp
E (B) +
6q2
2n
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for an adversary B that makes at most 2q queries and runs in time bounded by t+ γ · q
for some constant γ.
The treatment of the τ -tweak component in XEX′ construction is equivalent to a one
where we would injectively encode τ, j into a single integer j′ = 22τ + j < 22+m. This is
the same approach that was used to extend the tweak space of XE construction for MR-
OMD and p-OMD in Sections 4.5 ans 5.5, where it is shown that the essential properties
of the masking values necessary for the security proof of [KR11] are preserved. The same
arguments apply here, so we omit the proof of Lemma 8.14.
OCBv: practical AE with variable stretch. We define the blockcipher mode of
operation OCBv, a variable-stretch AE scheme. OCBv is parameterized by a blockcipher
E and a stretch space IT . It is obtained by instantiating the tweakable blockcipher in
ΘCBv by the XEX′ construction, i.e. OCBv[E] = ΘCBv[XEX′[E]] and the claim on its
security is stated in Theorem 8.15.
Theorem 8.15. Let E˜ : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a blockcipher. Let A be an NVAE
adversary with resources bounded by (t,qe,qd,σ). We have that
Adv
nvae(τc)
OCBv[E](A ) ≤Advs˜prpE (B) +
∑
τ∈IT
Advs˜prpE (Cτ )
+ Advs˜prpE (Cτc) +
28.5q2
2n
+ qd[τc]
2n−τc
2n − 1 .
for some B that runs in time t+β·q and makes 2q queries, and some Cτ that runs in time
t+γτ ·q[τ ] and makes 2q[τ ] queries for τ ∈ IT , where q[τ ] = dσ[τ ]/ne+2 ·(qe[τ ]+qd[τ ])
for τ ∈ IT , and q =
∑
τ∈IT q[τ ], and β and γτ for τ ∈ IT are constants.
Proof. The result in Theorem 8.15 follows from Theorem 8.11 and Lemma 8.14. The
fraction (28.5q2)/(2n) upper bounds the sum of all the terms that arise from all applic-
ations of Lemma 8.14.
If we further make the reasonable assumption that all the adversaries are “optimal”,
i.e. the advantage Advs˜prpE (Cτ ) does not decrease when we increase q[τ ], then we can
further simplify the bound to the form
Adv
nvae(τc)
OCBv[E](A ) ≤ (|IT |+ 2) ·Advs˜prpE (B) +
28.5q2
2n
+ qd[τc]· 2
n−τc
2n − 1 .
Performance of OCBv The performance of OCBv can be expected to be very sim-
ilar to that of OCB, as the two schemes only differ in the way the masking ∆-values
are computed. In addition to the operations necessary to compute ∆-offsets in OCB,
the computation of the Lτ -values has to be done for OCBv. However, these can be
precomputed at the initialization phase and stored, so the cost of their computation will
be amortized over all queries. The only additional processing that remains after dealing
189
with Lτ -s is a single xor of a precomputed Lτ to a ∆-value, necessary in every query.
This is unlikely to impact the performance significantly.
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Figure 8.13 – Illustration of the encryption algorithm of ΘCBv (inspired by
the original illustration for OCB3 [KR11]) instantiated with a tweakable blokcipher
E˜ : K × T × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. The top part depicts the encryption of a message with
four complete blocks (top) with Sum=
⊕4
i=1Mi and the encryption of a message with
three complete blocks and an incomplete block (bottom) with Sum=
⊕3
i=1⊕M∗‖10∗.
The bottom part of the picture shows processing of associated data of three complete
blocks (left) or two complete blocks and an incomplete block (right).
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Part III
Cryptanalysis

Chapter9
Robustness of 3rd Round CAESAR
Candidates to Nonce Reuse and Key
Overuse
In this chapter, we switch from definitional work and design to cryptanalysis. We target
the 3rd round CAESAR candidates, and the AE schemes CCM and GCM. For each of
these, we attempt to find the most efficient nonce-reusing and/or high data-complexity
decryption and/or forgery attack to determine to what degree they actually resist to
attackers.
The work presented in this chapter is a result of joint work with Serge Vaudenay. It
is available in IACR ePrint archive [VV17].
Organization of the Chapter. We briefly address related work in Section 9.1 and
discuss the contributions in Section 9.2.
We give a motivation for finding attacks on all candidates in Section 9.3 and describe
our attack model in Section 9.4. We summarize the results in Section 9.5.
In Section 9.6, we describe attacks that each apply to several AE schemes that share
some common design element. We then give dedicated attacks on GCM and some of the
3rd round CAESAR candidates in Sections 9.7 to 9.19.
In Appendix C, we give a brief description of each scheme analysed in this chapter.
9.1 Related Work
The (in)security of GCM mode was investigated in a number of works [IOM12, Saa12,
HP08, PC15], in particular Joux authored the“forbidden”nonce misusing attack [Jou06].
Collision attacks similar to ours, or inspiring ours, were described for previous versions
of AEZ by Fuhr et al. [FLS15], and Chaigneau and Gilbert [CG16]. Collision attacks
on OCB were given by Ferguson [Fer02] and Sun et al. [SWZ13]. Reusable forgery
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attacks on OCB, OTR and COLM were described by Forler et al. [FLLW17]. Collision-
based attacks on COPA and ELmD (the predecessors of COPA) were described by
Bay et al. [BEK16] and Lu [Lu17]. Bost and Sanders found a flaw in the masking
scheme of an earlier version of OTR [BS16], Huang and Wu described a collision-based
forgery attack on the same scheme [HW14]. Mileva et al. describe a nonce misusing
distinguisher attack for MORUS [MDV16]. The collision-based forgeries on NORX,
Ascon and Keyak described in this chapter are matching Lemma 2 of the work on
provable generic security of full-state keyed duplex by Daemen et al. [DMV17]. The
possibility of a low-complexity nonce reusing attack is mentioned in the AEGIS v1.1
specifications [WP16]. The designers of Ketje point at the possibility of nonce-reusing
key recovery [BDP+16a]. Kales, Eichlseder and Mendel independently mounted state-
or-key recovery attacks on Tiaoxin, AEGIS and MORUS with similar complexities our
attacks [KEM17].
9.2 Contribution
The work presented in this chapter may be seen as a hybrid of a survey and cryptanalysis:
our goal is to assemble an overview of attacks on all 3rd round CAESAR candidates, but
we describe many of those attacks ourselves, whenever there were no attacks existing
previously.
A collection of concrete attacks gives a tangible assessment of the actual impact of
nonce-reuse/high-data-complexity attacks on the individual candidates, and provides
extra information on top of the guarantees provided by the schemes’ designers.
We show that the resilience of schemes with similar security claims can vary greatly.
This can be useful to break ties at the end of the 3rd round of CAESAR competition.
Some of these attacks, especially the low-complexity nonce-misuse attacks, can be viewed
as disturbingly powerful. Consequently, some of the candidates may be revealed to be
too brittle for general-purpose use.
The collection of generic attacks in Section 9.6 also helps to identify common security
phenomena related to similar construction principles shared by certain candidates.
A remark on the selection of CAESAR finalists. During the 2nd round, the
CAESAR committee has introduced the use cases [Ber16]. These were supposed to rep-
resent the main types of application of AE schemes, each of them loosely describing a
set of design goals. Each candidate was then supposed to specify which use case(s) does
it target. The proposed use cases were (1) “Lightweight applications” for resource con-
strained environments, (2) “High-performance applications” for high-performance soft-
ware implementation on general-purpose CPUs, and (3)“Defense in depth”for AE robust
to various kinds of misuse. In particular, “robustness” was only explicitly required in use
case (3).
In March 2018, the 3rd round of CAESAR finished, and 7 finalists were announced.1
1We note that the final portfolio was yet to be announced at the time of writing of this dissertation,
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Three of the finalists, namely ACORN, AEGIS and MORUS, succumb to low-complexity
key-or-state recovery attacks that fit well within the scope of accidental nonce reuse, as
shown in this chapter and independently by Kales, Eichlseder and Mendel [KEM17].
Although none of these three candidates targeted use case (3), the author of this
dissertation is not certain whether they should have been included among the finalists.
While it is understood that the use cases make it clear that only the schemes targeting
the case (3) can be expected to possess any kind of robustness, promoting schemes that
possess absolutely no robustness against nonce reuse may be dangerous. Not just because
of users who may use one of the three brittle candidates incorrectly, but also because the
schemes in the final portfolio will become a reference for future designs. And ACORN,
AEGIS and MORUS will be setting the bar very low with respect to resistance to key
recovery attacks.
9.3 Motivation
Complementing provable security. The results presented in the previous chapters
were done in the spirit of provable security. We either worked towards achieving some
formal definitions of AE security when designing AE schemes, or we sought to capture
some novel security properties in new definitions. Targeting a properly defined security
notion when designing an AE scheme has many benefits. It reassures both the designer
and the user that the scheme in question will (very likely) deliver on some meaningful,
and typically pretty strong set of security properties. It is also made quite clear when
do these guarantees apply, and when do they become void.
Take a nonce-based AE scheme that comes with a proven NAE security bound (see
Definition 2.8) as an example. The user knows that if the scheme is used correctly,
the produced ciphertexts will look close to uniform strings to third parties, and that
it is very unlikely that an adversary will be able to forge any ciphertext. What “use
correctly” means here is “do not repeat nonces, and do not process too much data,” the
amount being implied by the security bound.2 As soon as any of these usage conditions
is violated, the user should assume that all the security is forfeit. This is the conservative
practice that any user should adopt.
Yet, the security claims related to some well-established notion give no indication
about what happens after the guarantees are void. This is information that may not be
useful for all the users of AE, but it may be of value to experienced security engineers or
members of standardisation (or competition) committees. For example, when choosing
between two nonce-based AE schemes Π1 and Π2 with similar performance on the target
platform, similar memory footprint and similar NAE security bounds, the knowledge that
Π2 succumbs to a key recovery when nonces repeat, while for Π1 only existential forgery
and may not contain all the 7 finalists.
2We note that the meaning of the phrase “use correctly” is in reality much more complicated, and
possibly not yet completely understood. Nevertheless, we simplify its meaning to keep the discussion
focused.
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attacks are known under the same setting, will make the choice rather easy.
In this chapter, we aim at providing fine-grained information beyond what is implied
by the security claims made by the 3rd round CAESAR candidates. Our method is to
analyse each candidate, CCM and GCM, and report the best attacks we can find. The
type of attack, its complexity and adversarial powers necessary to break each candidate
will then shed more light on its actual resilience.
64-bit bound and nonce-misuse. The main goal of the CAESAR competition was
set to “identify a portfolio of authenticated ciphers that offer advantages over AES-
GCM and are suitable for widespread adoption” [Ber14a]; GCM instantiated with the
AES blockcipher was taken to be a reference that ought to be surpassed by the CAESAR
candidates, while the name of the competition spells out the properties the candidates
are expected to guarantee: security, applicability and robustness.
For this chapter, we take the liberty to interpret robustness of AE schemes as the abil-
ity to resist powerful attacks, possibly beyond the limitations imposed by their designers.
We focus on nonce reuse and high data complexity, simply because every candidate must
make a claim about security with respect to these specific usage conditions.
Only three candidates guarantee security beyond nonce reuse. AEZ and Deoxys II
guarantee no degradation of authenticity, and the minimal (and unavoidable [RS06b]) de-
gradation of confidentiality even if the nonces are repeated. COLM guarantees a weaker
version of confidentiality protection in the presence of nonce misuse, OAE1 [FFL12]
security.
Concerning the data that can be processed with a single key, most CAESAR candid-
ates guarantee security up to the so called birthday-bound; for AES-based AE schemes,
this means processing no more than about 264 blocks of data per key and making no more
than 264 encryption queries. In this chapter, we use the 64-bit data/query complexity
as a reference threshold for comparison of candidates, denoted by 64-bit-bound.
In Table 9.1, we categorize the 3rd round candidates, as well as CCM and GCM, based
on their security claims with respect to the nonce misuse and quantitative security. We
consider a scheme to claim security against nonce reuse if it claims security in the sense
of MRAE [RS06b], OAE1 [FFL12] or RAE [HKR15]. For each candidate, we consider
an instance with a 128-bit secret key.
9.4 Notation and Security Model
When presenting the CAESAR candidates, we try to respect the original notations but
deviate a bit to unify the notation of the common input/output values. Hence, the secret
key is denoted by K, the nonce (or IV) is denoted by N , the associated data (AD) is
denoted by A, the plaintext is denoted by M , the ciphertext is denoted by C, and the tag
(if any) is denoted by T . We further use τ to denote the ciphertext expansion/stretch,
which is in most cases the same as the tag length.
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up to 64-bit-bound beyond 64-bit-bound
unique nonces OCB, NORX, Jambu,
CLOC&SILC
Tiaoxin, Morus, Keyak, Ketje,
Deoxys I&II, Ascon, AEGIS,
ACORN
nonce misuse Deoxys II, COLM, AEZ -
Table 9.1 – An overview of 3rd round CAESAR candidates based on their
claimed security guarantees w.r.t the nonce misuse and quantitative security; 64-
bit-bound refers to about 264 processed bits. For security in presence of nonce misuse,
we consider MRAE [RS06b], OAE [FFL12] or RAE [HKR15]. For each candidate, we
consider an instance with 128-bit secret key.
Each of the candidates internally partitions the inputs into blocks of constant size.
We use several symbols to denote the length of the blocks, e.g. n, r or ν, in order to
respect the notation of each candidate as much as possible. We use subscript to index
blocks in a query and superscript to index queries, e.g. M ji is the i
th message block in
jth query.
With a slight abuse of notation, we let X0∗1 denote extending a string X with the
smallest number of zero bits followed by a “1” that will yield a string whose length is a
multiple of the block size, when a block size is implicit from the context. For blockcipher-
based schemes, we let E denote the underlying blockcipher. We let
∥∥j
i=1
Mi denote the
concatenation M1‖ . . . ‖Mj for any M1, . . . ,Mj ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Syntax. In this chapter, each CAESAR candidate is viewed as nonce-based AE scheme
(see Section 2.4). We note that most of the candidates internally compute an encryption
of the message C and an authentication tag T , and output C‖T as the final ciphertext.
We refer to C as the core ciphertext and call T authentication tag, or simply tag.
Attack model. We focus on three types of attacks: decryption attacks, (semi) uni-
versal forgeries and key recovery attacks. To make the results comparable, for each
candidate we attack an instance that uses 128-bit keys (i.e. K = {0, 1}128), and we
define our attack models to correspond to the 128-bit security level.
In each attack on a scheme Π, an attacker A has blackbox oracle access to an instance
of the encryption and the decryption algorithms EK ,DK of Π that use a secret key K
unknown to A . We call A nonce respecting if each encryption query it makes uses a
distinct nonce. We say that A mounts a chosen plaintext attack (CPA) if it never makes
a decryption query, otherwise we say A mounts a chosen ciphertext attack (CCA).3
For each attack, we keep track of the data complexity (in blocks of some constant
size) and/or the query complexity, and of the maximal number of encryption queries
that reuse the same (but arbitrary) nonce.
3Note that this distinction does not make sense for forgeries.
199
(Semi)-universal forgery. A EK ,DK (N,A,M) receives a nonce, AD and a message
and tries to produce a decryption query (N,A,C) that will correctly decrypt to M ,
such that C was not an output of a previous encryption query made with N,A. We
call the forgery semi-universal if the adversary only gets target AD and message (i.e.
A EK ,DK (A,M)) or only a target message (i.e. A EK ,DK (M)) and is allowed to use arbit-
rary values for the remaining inputs.
Decryption attack. A EK ,DK (N,A,C) receives a nonce, AD and ciphertext-tuple that
is an encryption of a secret random message M of fixed length µ ≥ 128, and tries to
produce M .
Key recovery. A EK ,DK () tries to compute K.
Reusable attacks We call a forgery (resp. decryption) attack reusable if, after having
forged (resp. decrypted) for the first time, the query and computational complexity of
the consequent forgeries (resp. decryptions) are“significantly lower” than the complexity
of the initial forgery (resp. decryption).
9.5 Results
We sort the CAESAR candidates into six categories based on the adversarial powers
necessary to break them: (A) Those for which we have a nonce-respecting universal for-
gery and a decryption attack at the 64-bit-bound. (B) Those others for which we have a
nonce-respecting universal forgery and a decryption attack beyond the 64-bit-bound, but
below exhaustive search. (C) Those for which we have a reusable forgery and a reusable
decryption attack with small complexity, possibly with nonce-misuse. (D) Those others
for which we have a forgery or a decryption attack with small complexity, possibly with
nonce-misuse. (E) Those others for which we have a forgery or a decryption attack at
the 64-bit-bound, possibly with nonce-misuse. (F) Remaining ones.
Our results are summarized in Table 9.2, where the categories (A), (B), (C), (D), (E)
and (F) are listed in this order. For each candidate, we indicate the type of attack, the
query complexity4, whether the attack needs nonce misuse, and whether it is reusable.
The comments “(N,A)”, “(N)” and “(A)” mean that the reusability is limited to a fixed
pair of nonce and AD, a fixed nonce or a fixed AD, respectively. All attacks presented
in Table 9.2 succeed with high probability.
The categories can be ordered by a decreasing level of resilience: (F)≥(E)≥(D)≥(C)
and (F)≥(E)≥(B)≥(A). The categories (A) and (C) are incomparable (same for (B)
and (D)), as the impacted schemes succumb to different kinds of misuse. However, the
attacks in category (C) may be seen as a more serious threat than those in category (A),
as they are much more likely to occur in practice.
4The time and memory complexities of the attacks mentioned in the Table 9.2 are small multiples/s-
mall powers of the query complexity.
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algorithm source(s) type of attack nonce-reuse # queries reusable
A
AES-GCM# [MV04] 9.7 univ. forgery 1 3 · 264 yes
AEZ [HKR17] 9.8, [CG16] key recovery 1 3 · 264
OCB [KR16] 9.9, [Fer02] univ. forgery & CCA decryp. 1 2 (one w/ 264 blocks) yes
AES-OTR [Min16] 9.6, 9.10 univ. forgery & CPA decryp. 1 2 (one w/ 264 blocks) yes
B CLOC [IMG+16] 9.11 univ. forgery & CPA decryp. 1 280 yes
C
AES-GCM [MV04] 9.6, 9.7, [Jou06] univ. forgery & CPA decryp. 2 2 yes
DEOXYS-I [JNP16] 9.6 univ. forgery & CCA decryp. 3 3 yes (A)
OCB [KR16] 9.6 univ. forgery & CCA decryp. 2 2 yes (A)
Tiaoxin [Nik16] 9.13 key recovery 30 30
AEGIS-128 [WP16] 9.14 univ. forgery & CPA decryp. 15 15 yes (N,A)
ACORN-128 [Wu16] 9.15 univ. forgery & CPA decryp. 586 586 yes (N,A)
Ketje Sr [BDP+16a] 9.16 key recovery 50 50
MORUS 640 [WH16a] 9.17 univ. forgery & CPA decryp. 8 8 yes (N)
D
AES-CCM [WHF03b] 9.6 CPA decryp. 2 1
CLOC & SILC [IMG+16] 9.6 CPA decryp. 2 1 no
JAMBU [WH16b] 9.6 CPA decryp. 1 + |C|/64 |C|/64 no
NORX32-4-1 [AJN16] 9.6 CPA decryp. 1 + |C|/384 |C|/384 no
Ascon-128 [DEMS16] 9.6 CPA decryp. 1 + |C|/64 |C|/64 no
Lake Keyak [BDP+16b] 9.6 CPA decryp. 1 + |C|/1344 |C|/1344 no
E COLM [ABD+16] 9.6 semi-univ. forgery 1 + q 264 yes (N,A)
F Deoxys-II [JNP16] 9.19 semi-univ. forgery & CCA decryp. 2m 2128−m yes (A)
Table 9.2 – A summary of attacks on 3rd round CAESAR candidates and their clustering based on
the type of attack. The categories (A), (B), (C), (D), (E) and (F) are listed from top to bottom.
The column “source” lists the sections and/or bibliography references that describe the relevant attacks.
The comments “(N,A)”, “(N)” and “(A)” in the reusability column (see Section 9.4) mean that the
reusability is limited to fixed values of the listed parameters. The values in the column “nonce-reuse”
indicate maximal number of times any nonce is used (so 1 means nonce respecting), q denotes the number
of independent forgeries made in a single attack, and m is used as a parameter.
#The attack applies only if |N | > 128.
Disclaimer. We understand that none of the attacks we present violates the security
claims of any of the CAESAR candidates. That is not the goal of our work. Our goal is
to determine to what degree will the security of respective candidates deteriorate after
the guarantees become void. Each of the attacks we present breaks the usage conditions
imposed by the authors of the corresponding candidate, either by reusing the nonces, or
by processing too much data.
9.6 Generic Attacks
In this section, we list attacks that trivially apply to certain construction principles,
rather than being construction-specific.
CPA decryption: streamciphers (nonce reuse, constant complexity) candid-
ates that produce a core ciphertext C and a tag T such that C = M ⊕ f(K,N, |M |)
(or C = M ⊕ f(K,N,A, |M |)), i.e. the message is xored with a sequence of masking
bits derived as a function of the nonce and the secret key (or the nonce, secret key and
AD) will necessarily succumb to this attack. To decrypt (N,A,C‖T ), we make a single
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encryption query f(K,N,A, |M |)‖T ′ = EK(N,A, 0|C|) that reveals the key stream and
compute M = C ⊕ f(K,N,A, |M |). This attack applies to CCM, GCM.
CPA decryption: self-synchronizing streamciphers (nonce reuse, tiny com-
plexity) The previous attack can be adapted to AE schemes that produce the core
ciphertext C block by block, by xoring the current message block with masking bits
dependent on the key, the nonce, AD and the previous message blocks. I.e. given
a partitioned message M1, . . . ,M`
n← M they compute the ith block of ciphertext as
Ci = Mi⊕ f(K,N,A,M1‖ . . .Mi−1, |Mi|) (where the value of n depends on the scheme).
To mount a decryption attack with an input tuple (N,A,C‖T ), we make |C|n encryp-
tion queries as follows:
1: Compute C1, . . . , C`
n← C.
2: for i← 1 to ` do
3: Query C ′‖T ′ ← EK(N,A,M1‖ . . . ‖Mi−1‖0|Ci|).
4: Compute C ′1, . . . , C ′i
n← C ′ and then Mi ← C ′i⊕Ci.
5: end for
6: return M1‖ . . . ‖M`
This attack applies to CLOC, SILC, AEGIS, ACORN, MORUS, Ketje, NORX,
Ascon, Keyak and JAMBU.
Semi-universal forgery: AD preprocessing (nonce reuse, varying complex-
ity). Several candidates internally process an encryption query E(K,N,A,M) by first
computing a value V = f(K,N,A) dependent on the key, nonce and the AD, and then
compute the (tagged) ciphertext as a function of the secret key, the message and the
value V as C = g(K,V,M), such that |V | = v for constant v. If |N | ≥ 2v/2, then it
is possible to find a pair (N1, A1), (N2, A2) such that f(K,N1, A1) = f(K,N2, A2) in a
nonce-respecting birthday attack, and then use it to forge a ciphertext for a challenge
message M (hence this yields a semi-universal forgery):
1: Initialize empty table T, pick arbitrary Mˆ ∈ {0, 1}2v.
2: for i← 1 to 2v/2 do
3: Pick (N ′, A′) with a fresh N ′ randomly.
4: Query C ′ ← EK(N ′, A′, Mˆ), then insert (C ′, (N ′, A′)) to T.
5: end for
6: Find entries (C ′, (N1, A1)), (C ′, (N2, A2)) (with collision on C ′) in T.
7: Query C ← EK(N1, A1,M) and forge with (N2, A2, C).
The attack succeeds with a probability close to 1/2, in particular choosing Mˆ ∈ {0, 1}2v
ensures that a C ′ collision implies a V collision with overwhelming probability. It is
reusable with the same (N1, A1), (N2, A2), and uses every nonce no more than 1 + q
times, with q the number of desired forgeries.
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The attack applies with 64-bit-bound complexity (as v = 128) to, AEZ, CLOC,
SILC, COLM and with some care to CCM.5
Semi-universal forgery: sponges (nonce reuse, varying complexity). In all
sponge-based modes, the processing can again be expressed with two functions f and
g in a similar way as in the previous attack on AD preprocessing. However, nonce
reuse allows the attacker to force an arbitrary value to r bits of the sponge state
after the processing the first message block. The processing of an encryption query
E(K,N,A,M) by a sponge-based scheme can be modelled as follows: first partition the
message M1, . . . ,M`
r← M , then compute V = f(K,N,A) with |V | = b, then compute
the first cipertext block as C1 = leftr (V )⊕M1, and compute the rest of the tagged
ciphertext as C2‖ . . . ‖C`‖T = g(K,V ⊕(M1‖0c),M2‖ . . . ‖M`), where c = b− r.
Using this, the previous attack can be adapted to work with query complexity 2c/2
(where c is the capacity of the given sponge-based scheme) to forge a ciphertext for
arbitrary (A,M):
1: Initialize empty table T, pick arbitrary Mˆ ∈ {0, 1}c.
2: for i← 1 to 2c/2 do
3: Pick a fresh N ′ randomly.
4: Query C ′‖T ′ ← EK(N ′, A, 0r), then query C ′′‖T ′′ ← E(N ′, A,C ′‖Mˆ).
5: Compute C ′′1 , . . . , C ′′`
r← C ′′, then insert (C ′′2 ‖ . . . ‖C ′′` ‖T ′′, (N ′, C ′)) to T.
6: end for
7: Find entries (C ′′‖T ′′, (N1, C1)), (C ′′‖T ′′, (N2, C2)) (with collision on C ′′‖T ′′) in T.
8: Query C‖T ← EK
(
N1, A,M ⊕((C1⊕C2)‖0|M |−r)
)
and forge with (N2, A,C‖T ).
The success probability is close to 1/2. The second query in the attack forces the internal
state of the sponge to become 0r‖S for some S ∈ {0, 1}c, hence the birthday complexity
in c. We xor the difference of C1 and C2 to the first block of M to force the repetition
of the r outer bits of the state during forgery.
The attack is reusable with the same (N1, A), (N2, A),
6 and uses every nonce no more
than 2 + q times, with q the number of desired forgeries.
The attack applies with 64-bit-bound complexity (as c = 128) to NORX and with
beyond 64-bit-bound complexity (as c = 256) to Keyak and Ascon. We note that for
Keyak and Ascon, the exhaustive key search has the same time complexity as this attack,
but needs only a single query.
Universal forgery and CCA decryption: ciphertext translation (nonce mis-
use, tiny complexity). Some candidates use so called ciphertext translation [Rog02]
to incorporate the authentication of AD with a message-only encryption core E¯ . The
method is described in Figure 8.1. It can be briefly described as follows. Schemes based
5For CCM with τ = 128, we must use A′ of 240 bits to make sure that the encoding of the nonce and
AD for the CBC MAC is block-aligned.
6For Keyak, the attack can be reused with arbitrary AD, because it processes AD and message
simultaneously.
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on ciphertext translation compute the tagged ciphertext as
EK(N,A,M) = E¯K(N,M)⊕ 0|M |‖HK(A)
where E¯K(N,M) returns a core-ciphertext and a τ -bit tag and H is a keyed function
with τ -bit output. To forge for (N,A,M), we pick arbitrary Nˆ 6= N , Mˆ 6= M and
A′ 6= A and we do:
1: Query C1‖T 1 ← EK(Nˆ , A, Mˆ) and C2‖T 2 ← EK(Nˆ , A′, Mˆ).
2: Compute ∆← T 1⊕T 2.
3: Query C ′‖T ′ ← EK(N,A′,M) and forge with (N,A,C ′‖(T ′⊕∆)).
It is easily verified that the forgery is correct. This attack can be modified to decrypt
a ciphertext N,A,C‖T ; knowing ∆, we query N,A′, C‖(T ⊕∆) and learn the message
M . This attack applies to OCB, AES-OTR and Deoxys-I.
9.7 AES-GCM
A brief description of GCM can be found in Appendix C.2.
Universal forgery (nonce misuse, tiny complexity). This attack was first de-
scribed by Joux as the “forbidden attack” [Jou06]. The main idea is that recovering the
authentication key L makes forging very easy. We assume that τ = 128. To forge for
N,A,M , we pick random N¯ and M1 6= M2 ∈ {0, 1}128 and do:
1: Query C1‖T 1 ← EK(N, ε,M1) and C2‖T 2 ← EK(N, ε,M2).
2: Compute L as root of P (Λ) = (C11 ⊕ C21 ) · Λ2⊕(T 1⊕T 2) over GF(2128).
3: Query C ′‖T ′ ← EK(N,A′,M ′) with arbitrary A′ and M ′ s.t. |M ′| = |M |.
4: Forge with (N,A, (C ′⊕M ′⊕M)‖(T ′⊕GHASHL(A′, C ′)⊕GHASHL(A,C))).
We note that L will be the only root of P (Λ) as squaring yields a bijection over GF(2128).
Once L is computed, forgeries become easy.
Universal forgery (nonce respecting, 64-bit-bound, |N | > 128). If nonces longer
than 128 bits are allowed, it is possible to recover the authentication key L in a nonce-
respecting birthday attack. We note, however, that the use of nonce length other than
96 bits is uncommon and discouraged [IOM12]. Assuming that τ = 128, for each i
we use distinct N i of 256 bits and M i = B‖M i2 for a fixed B ∈ {0, 1}128 and distinct
M i2 ∈ {0, 1}128, and do:
1: for i← 1 to 264 do query Ci‖T i ← EK(N i, ε,M i).
2: For i 6= j s.t. Ci1 = Cj1 find L as root of P (Λ) = (Ci2 ⊕ Cj2) · Λ2⊕(T 1⊕T 2).
3: Forge using L.
Note that the collision in line 2 must imply GHASHL(ε,N
i) = GHASHL(ε,N
i′), so if
it occurs, the attack succeeds. We note that a forgery allows to mount a similar CCA
decryption attack as for the ciphertext translation-based AE schemes (by changing AD
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and the tag accordingly).
9.8 AEZ v5
We present three nonce-respecting attacks that respectively recover the subkeys I, J
and L, each at the 64-bit-bound complexity. A brief description of AEZ is given in
Appendix C.3. The same appendix explains the notations E and AES4.
J-recovery attack. The Chaigneau-Gilbert attack [CG16] on AEZ v4.1 can be ap-
plied to AEZ v5 to extract J by a nonce-respecting chosen message attack at the birth-
day bound. When N and A are single blocks, then based on the AEZ v5 specifica-
tion [HKR17] the function H becomes
hk(τ,N,A) = E
3,1
K (τ)⊕E4,1K (N)⊕E5,1K (A)
= E3,1K (τ)⊕AES4k(N ⊕ 4J ⊕ 2I ⊕L)⊕AES4k(A⊕ 5J ⊕ 2I ⊕L).
If we limit ourselves to queries with A = N ⊕ c for a fixed block c and variable nonces,
a ciphertext collision with the pair (N,N ′) will mean that N ′ = N ⊕ c⊕ J . The attack
runs as follows:
1: Initialize an empty table T.
2: Pick an arbitrary block c ∈ {0, 1}128 and message M ∈ {0, 1}2·128.
3: for i← 1 to 264 do
4: Pick a fresh N randomly, set A← N ⊕ c.
5: Query C ← EK(N,A, τ,M), store (C,N) in T.
6: end for
7: Find (C,N), (C ′, N ′) in T with C = C ′, compute J = N ⊕N ′⊕ c.
The Chaigneau-Gilbert attack requires a little effort to be adapted to AEZ v5 but it can
recover I and L with nonce-misuse. A nonce respecting recovery of I and L is possible
if we can use nonces of several blocks (a feature of AEZ [HKR17]), to have a similar
attack as the one above.
L-recovery attack. If |N |128 = 2 and A = ε, then following the AEZ v5 specifications
the function H becomes
hk(τ, (N1, N2)) = E
3,1
K (τ)⊕E4,1K (N1)⊕E4,2K (N2)
= E3,1K (τ)⊕AES4k(N1⊕ 4J ⊕ 2I ⊕L)⊕AES4k(N2⊕ 4J ⊕ 2I ⊕ 2L).
We modify the J-recovery attack to use 2-block nonces with N2 = N1⊕ c for a fixed
block c. A ciphertext collision with N and N ′ will then yield L = N1⊕N ′1⊕ c:
1: Initialize an empty table T.
2: Pick arbitrary block c ∈ {0, 1}128 and message M ∈ {0, 1}2·128.
3: for i← 1 to 264 do
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4: Pick a fresh N1 randomly, set N2 ← N1⊕ c.
5: Query C ← EK(N, ε, τ,M), store (C,N1) in T.
6: end for
7: Find (C,N1), (C
′, N ′1) in T with C = C ′, compute L = N1⊕N ′1⊕ c.
Thus we recover L in a similar attack as before.
I-recovery attack. Next, we see that when |N |128 = 9, the hash function H becomes
hk(τ, (N1, . . . , N9)) = E
3,1
K (τ)⊕E4,1K (N1)⊕ · · ·⊕E4,9K (N9)
= E3,1K (τ)⊕AES4k(N1⊕ 4J ⊕ 2I ⊕L)⊕ · · ·⊕
AES4k(N7⊕ 4J ⊕ 2I ⊕ 7L)⊕AES4k(N8⊕ 4J ⊕ 2I)⊕
AES4k(N9⊕ 4J ⊕ 4I ⊕L).
We again modify the J-recovery attack to use 9-block nonces with N2, . . . , N8 constant
and N9 = N1⊕ c for a fixed block c. A ciphertext collision with N and N ′ yields
6I = N1⊕N ′1⊕ c:
1: Initialize an empty table T.
2: Pick arbitrary c ∈ {0, 1}128, N2‖ . . . ‖N8 ∈ {0, 1}7·128 and message M ∈ {0, 1}2·128.
3: for i← 1 to 264 do
4: Pick a fresh N1 randomly, set N9 ← N1⊕ c.
5: Query C ← EK(N, ε, τ,M), store (C,N1) in T.
6: end for
7: Find (C,N1), (C
′, N ′1) in T with C = C ′, compute I = (N1⊕N ′1⊕ c) · 6−1.
So, we recover I, J, L with a nonce-respecting chosen message attack at the 64-bit-bound.
For AEZ, this is equivalent to recovering the secret key.
9.9 OCB3 (OCB v1.1)
We give a brief description of OCB in Appendix C.4.
L-recovery attack. An attack by Ferguson [Fer02] allows to recover the derived key
L. Essentially, it encrypts a very long random message and looks for collisions of the
values Mi ⊕Ci. If such a collision occurs for i 6= j, we deduce Mi ⊕ γi ·L = Mj ⊕ γj ·L.
Indeed, if Mi⊕ γi ·L = Mj ⊕ γj ·L, we have Mi⊕∆i = Mj ⊕∆j so Mi⊕Ci = Mj ⊕Cj .
With this equation, we deduce L. This attack is nonce-respecting and works at the
birthday bound.
Querying a huge message can be avoided in the nonce-misuse setting: make many
queries (N,Ai,M) with M = ε empty and Ai = Ai1‖Ai1 of two equal blocks. Then, if
Ai1 = A
j
1 ⊕ (γ1 ⊕ γ2) · L for some i 6= j, we observe a collision T ′ = T . This allows us to
recover L.
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Universal forgery (tiny complexity, using L). Using L, we can make a universal
forgery for (N,A,M ′). If |M ′|128 = ` > 1, we do:
1: Define a permutation pi : {1, . . . , `} → {1, . . . , `} as pi(i) = (i+ 1 mod `) + 1.
2: for i← 1 to ` do Mi ←M ′pi(i)⊕ γi · L⊕ γpi(i) · L.
3: Query C‖T ← EK(N,A,M).
4: for i← 1 to ` do C ′i = Cpi−1(i) ⊕ γi · L⊕ γpi−1(i) · L.
5: Forge with (N,A,C ′‖T ).
This attack is nonce-respecting and using a single encryption query, but needs L.
If |M ′|128 = 1, we construct M = M ′‖(γ1⊕ γ2) · L, make a query with (N,A,M) to
get C‖T , and take C ′ = C1, which again gives a valid encryption C ′‖T of (N,A,M ′).
EK oracle (tiny complexity, using L). We can also implement an EK oracle,
i.e. evaluate the underlying blockcipher on any plaintext. This can be used to e.g.
mount universal forgeries or bootstrap the CCA decryption presented in this section.
To compute yi = EK(xi) for arbitrary x1, . . . , xs ∈ {0, 1}128 set ` = 214, and do:
1: Pick M ∈ {0, 1}`·128 with ⊕i>1Mi = (2−1 ⊕ γ1 ⊕ γ`) · L randomly.
2: Query C‖T ← EK(N, ε,M), compute R← C1⊕T ⊕ γ1 · L.
3: Find i s.t. Mi⊕R⊕ γi · L = 07‖1‖N ′′‖06 for N ′ ∈ {0, 1}114.
4: Set N ′ ← N ′′‖06, compute R′ = Ci⊕R⊕ γi · L.
5: for i← 1 to s do set M ′i ← xi⊕R′⊕ γi · L.
6: Query C ′‖T ′ ← EK(N ′, ε,M ′).
7: for i← 1 to s do compute yi ← C ′i⊕R′⊕ γi · L.
The R computed on line 2 is correct as T = EK(M1⊕R⊕ γ1 ·L) = C1⊕R⊕ γ1 ·L. We
can also add an unused nonce to the list of xi-s to avoid making the 2
14 ·128bit= 256KB
query more than once. Then the attack uses a single encryption query per list of blocks
x1, . . . , xs, of size s+ 1 blocks.
CCA decryption attack (odd number of blocks, tiny complexity, using L).
Assume that we want to decrypt (N,A,C, T ) (let M be its decryption). We can first
compute R associated with N with the above EK oracle, as well as some fresh N
′ and its
associated R′ with tiny complexity. The tuple (N ′, A,M ′), with the message M ′ defined
by M ′i = Mi ⊕ R ⊕ R′, encrypts into (C ′, T ′) such that C ′i = Ci ⊕ R ⊕ R′ and T ′ = T
when ` is odd and the length of M is a multiple of the blocksize. So, a CCA decryption
query with (N ′, A,C ′, T ) gives M ′ from which we deduce M = M ′⊕R‖ . . . ‖R.
9.10 AES-OTR v3.1
The described attacks apply to OTR with parallel processing of AD. A brief description
of OTR can be found in Appendix C.5.
L-recovery attack. If we use the same nonce N 264 times, we can recover L:
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1: for i← 1 to 264 do query C‖T ← EK(N, ε,M i) with fresh M i ∈ {0, 1}4·128.
2: Find i 6= j s.t. Ci1⊕M i2 = Cj3 ⊕M j4 , compute L = (M i1⊕M j3 ) · (1⊕ 2)−1.
To avoid nonce reuse, we can encrypt a huge random message (with |M |128 ≈ 264) with
a nonce N and look for an internal collision with i 6= j:
C2i⊕M2i−1 = C2j ⊕M2j−1 implying C2i−1⊕ 2i−1 · 2 · L = C2j−1⊕ 2j−1 · 2 · L,
revealing L for this N . We further expect to find many values of 1 ≤ i ≤ |M |128/2 for
which 2i−1 · L⊕M2i−1 (or 2i−1 · 3 · L⊕C2i−1) will be a string of the form (τ)‖1‖N ′.
For any such N ′ we can use L′ = C2i−1 (or L′ = C2i) to bootstrap the following attack.
EK oracle (using (N,L) pair). Assuming that we know an (N,L) pair (either from
the L-recovery attack or from a previous execution of the present EK oracle), by a single
encryption query with nonce N we can obtain EK(x1), . . . , EK(xr) for a list x1, . . . , xr
as follows:
1: for i← 1 to r do set M2i−1 ← xi⊕ 22i−1 · L and pick M2i arbitrarily.
2: Query C‖T ← EK(N, ε,M).
3: for i← 1 to r do compute EK(xi) = M2i⊕C2i−1.
In each execution of this attack, we can add one block to the list of xi-s to prepare a
fresh pair N ′, L′ for the next execution of the attack, allowing for its nonce respecting
repetition. The oracle EK can be used to mount universal forgeries and CPA decryption
attacks with tiny complexity (but needs L).
9.11 CLOC
A description of CLOC can be found in Appendix C.6.
EK oracle in CLOC (nonce-respecting, beyond birthday bound). In CLOC,
the processing of AD and nonce has the form V = f1(f2(K,A)⊕ ozp(param‖N)) where
the function f1 is easy to invert. To compute EK(x) for an x ∈ {0, 1}128, we pick fixed
AD A and do:
1: for i← 1 to 264 do query Ci‖T i ← EK(N i, A,M i) with random M i ∈ {0, 1}2·128.
2: Find i 6= j s.t. M i1⊕Ci1 = M j2 ⊕Cj2 , compute W ← f−11 (fix1(Cj1))⊕ ozp(param‖N i).
3: if f−11 (x)⊕W of the form ozp(param‖N¯) query EK(x)‖T ← EK(N¯ , A, 0128).
4: else abort.
The attack works because the collision on line 2 implies that V i = fix1(Cj1) so we deduce
the V i value for a random nonce N i with A. This allows us to recover W = f2(K,A).
If x is not of the correct form, it is bad luck. When using nonces of 112 bits, which
is the maximum, the probability to have the correct form is 2−16. But we can run this
attack 216 times to get many W i = f2(K,A
i) with complexity 280. Then at least one
W i will be such that f−11 (x)⊕Wi is of the correct format for any x.
This attack does not work on SILC, in which W depends on both N and A.
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Universal forgery and CPA decryption attack in CLOC (nonce-respecting,
beyond birthday bound). With the previous EK oracle, we can simulate the encryp-
tion or the decryption process and thus mount universal forgeries and CPA decryption.
9.12 Jambu
A brief description of Jambu is given in Appendix C.17.
Universal forgery (number of decryption queries at 64-bit-bound). Because
the tags of Jambu are only 64-bit long, the trivial tag guessing attack only requires
264 decryption queries. We can make a forgery for any target triplet (N,A,M) (with
|M |64 = m) with a single encryption query, but requiring many decryption queries:
1: Pick M ′m ∈ {0, 1}|Mm| s.t. Mm 6= M ′m, set M ′ ←M1‖ . . . ‖Mm−1‖M ′m
2: Query C ′‖T ′ ← EK(N,A,M ′), set Cm ← C ′m⊕Mm⊕M ′m
3: for T ∈ {0, 1}64 do try forging with (N,A,C ′1‖ . . . ‖C ′m−1‖Cm‖T )
Semi-universal forgery (beyond 64-bit-bound, nonce-misusing). As Jambu uses
a state of 192 bits, collision-based attacks always require a data complexity of about 296
queries. We can therefore forge a ciphertext for N,M with about 296 encryption queries,
but we cannot choose the AD and the attack is nonce-misusing. We pick M ′ ∈ {0, 1}128
and do:
1: for i← 1 to 296 do query Ci‖T i ← EK(N,Ai,M ′) with distinct Ai ∈ {0, 1}127
2: Find i 6= j s.t. Ci, T i = Cj , T j
3: Query C‖T ← EK(N,Ai,M), forge with (N,Aj , C‖T )
In the two queries with colliding ciphertexts the internal states just after the AD pro-
cessing must collide, allowing the forgery. A natural question that arises is whether such
attack cannot be done in a nonce respecting way, using single-block ADs. The answer is
no, because we need about 296 queries to find the internal collision with good probability,
but there are only 264 values of the nonce in Jambu, so this approach is impossible.
Existential forgery (beyond 64-bit-bound, nonce-respecting). The problem of
having too few nonces in the previous attack can be circumvented if we fold many
subqueries into every encryption query. We pick a 64-bit constant string P . We then
do:
1: for i← 1 to 248 do query Ci‖T i ← EK(N i, Ai,M i) with M i =
∥∥248
j=1
Qij‖P‖P
2: Find (i, j) 6= (i′, j′) such that j ≡ j′ ≡ 2 (mod 3) and Cij‖Cij+1 = Ci
′
j′‖Ci
′
j′
3: Forge with (N i, Ai, Ci1‖ . . . ‖Cij−1‖Ci
′
j′‖ . . . ‖Ci
′
248‖T i
′
)
The collision on line 2 implies that the ith and i′th queries had an internal state-collision
Rij‖U ij‖V ij = Ri
′
j′‖U i
′
j′‖V i
′
j′ on the j
th and j′th state respectively with overwhelming prob-
ability. Because of this, the forgery succeeds. We managed to forge with only 248
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encryption queries, but we still have to process about 296 blocks of data in those queries.
A big drawback if this strategy is that it cannot be used for a universal forgery.
9.13 Tiaoxin-346
We give a brief description of Tiaoxin in Appendix C.8. Note that we change the meaning
of subscript and square brackets compared to the original Tiaoxin description [Nik16],
i.e. T [j] denotes a vector of j 128-bit strings and T [j]i with i ≤ j denotes ith block of
the vector T [j].
Nonce-misuse key recovery. We pick M,M¯, M˜ ∈ {0, 1}4·128 such that Mi⊕ M¯i = ∆
and Mi⊕ M˜i = ∆˜ for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 with ∆ 6= ∆˜. We pick arbitrary N and A and recover
two 128 bit words T ′[4]0 and T ′[3]0 of the internal state right after processing of N , A
and the first two blocks of M by:
1: Query C‖T ← EK(N,A,M), C¯‖T¯ ← EK(N,A, M¯) and C˜‖T˜ ← EK(N,A, M˜).
2: for i← 2, 3 do set γi ← ShiftRows−1(MixColumns−1(C¯i⊕Ci)).
3: for i← 2, 3 do set γ˜i ← ShiftRows−1(MixColumns−1(C˜i⊕Ci)).
4: for byte index j ← 0 to 15 do
5: for i← 2, 3 do Find set of solutionsXi,j of γi,j = SubBytes(x)⊕SubBytes(x⊕∆).
6: for i← 2, 3 do Find set of solutions X˜i,j of γ˜i,j = SubBytes(x)⊕SubBytes(x⊕ ∆˜).
7: Set T ′[4]0,j ← X2,j ∩ X˜2,j and T ′[3]0,j ← X3,j ∩ X˜3,j .
8: end for
The above works, as we can verify that in the encryption of M we have
1. T ′[3] = R(T [3],M0),
2. T ′[4] = R(T [4],M1),
3. T ′[6] = R(T [6],M0⊕M1),
4. C0 = T
′[3]0⊕T ′[3]2⊕T ′[4]1
⊕(T ′[6]3&T ′[4]3),
5. C1 = T
′[6]0⊕T ′[4]2⊕T ′[3]1
⊕(T ′[6]5&T ′[3]2),
6. T ′′[3] = R(T ′[3],M2),
7. T ′′[4] = R(T ′[4],M3),
8. T ′′[6] = R(T ′[6],M2⊕M3),
9. C2 = T
′′[3]0⊕T ′′[3]2⊕T ′′[4]1
⊕(T ′′[6]3&T ′′[4]3),
10. C3 = T
′′[6]0⊕T ′′[4]2⊕T ′′[3]1
⊕(T ′′[6]5&T ′′[3]2).
In the encryption of M¯ we have the following (and similar for M˜ and ∆˜)
1. T¯ ′[3] = R(T [3],M0⊕∆),
2. T¯ ′[4] = R(T [4],M1⊕∆),
3. T ′[6] = R(T [6],M0⊕M1),
4. C¯0 = T¯
′[3]0⊕ T¯ ′[3]2⊕ T¯ ′[4]1
⊕(T ′[6]3&T¯ ′[4]3),
5. C¯1 = T
′[6]0⊕ T¯ ′[4]2⊕ T¯ ′[3]10
⊕(T ′[6]5&T¯ ′[3]2),
6. T¯ ′′[3] = R(T¯ ′[3],M2⊕∆),
7. T¯ ′′[4] = R(T¯ ′[4],M3⊕∆),
8. T ′′[6] = R(T ′[6],M2⊕M3),
9. C¯2 = T¯
′′[3]0⊕ T¯ ′′[3]2⊕ T¯ ′′[4]1
⊕(T ′′[6]3&T¯ ′′[4]3),
10. C¯3 = T
′′[6]0⊕ T¯ ′′[4]2⊕ T¯ ′′[3]1
⊕(T ′′[6]5&T¯ ′′[3]2).
We can easily see that
T¯ ′[3]⊕T ′[3] = (∆, 0, 0) and T¯ ′′[3]⊕T ′′[3] = (0, A(T ′[3]0)⊕A(T ′[3]0⊕∆), 0),
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and that
T¯ ′[4]⊕T ′[4] = (∆, 0, 0, 0) and T¯ ′′[4]⊕T ′′[4] = (0, A(T ′[4]0)⊕A(T ′[4]0⊕∆), 0, 0).
It follows that the differences of ciphertext blocks used in the lines 5 and 6 are a result
of a differential equation for a single round of AES. This can be reduced to a collection of
16 differential equations for AES Sbox, allowing to recover the parts of the secret state
as intersections of solutions found in the said lines (we can check that we always have
|Si,j ∩ S˜i,j | = 1).
We can then repeat this process with longer messages to obtain T [3] and T [4] and we
recover T ′[4] and T ′[3] with 12 queries (3 queries per 128-bit word of T [4]). The state
T [6] follows in a similar method using 18 queries. Once the state (T [3], T [4], T [6]) is
recovered, we invert the initialization and obtain K.
9.14 AEGIS v1.1
A brief description of AEGIS is given in Appendix C.9.
Universal forgery and decryption attack (tiny complexity, nonce-misuse).
To forge for (N,A,M) or to decrypt (N,A,C, T ), we only need to recover the secret
state S after processing A with nonce N , the rest of encryption/decryption can then be
reconstructed.
We pick three messages M ′, M¯ , M˜ ∈ {0, 1}3·128 with the same criteria as for Tiaoxin
(with ∆ 6= ∆˜). To recover S′0, a part of the state S′ right after processing M ′1 with N
and A, we:
1: Query C ′‖T ′ ← EK(N,A,M ′), C¯‖T¯ ← EK(N,A, M¯) and C˜‖T˜ ← EK(N,A, M˜).
2: Set γ ← ShiftRows−1(MixColumns−1(C¯3⊕ M¯3⊕C ′3⊕M ′3)).
3: Set γ˜ ← ShiftRows−1(MixColumns−1(C˜3⊕ M˜3⊕C ′3⊕M ′3)).
4: Recover bytes of S′0 using γ, γ˜,∆, ∆˜ in differential equations as with Tiaoxin.
The attack works because the difference (C ′3⊕M ′3)⊕(C¯3⊕ M¯3) (associated to M ′1 6= M¯1)
is equal to the difference R(R(S4)⊕S0⊕M ′1)⊕R(R(S4)⊕S0⊕M¯1) (where R(S4)⊕S0 =
S′0), withR just a single AES round. We can repeat this strategy to recover the remaining
four 128-bit words of S′1, . . . , S′4 with 3 queries each. Then we can recover S, having done
15 nonce reusing queries. The possibility of a low-complexity nonce reusing attack is
mentioned in the AEGIS v1.1 specifications [WP16].
9.15 ACORN v3
A brief description of ACORN is given in Appendix C.10.
Universal forgery and decryption attack (tiny complexity, nonce-misuse). To
forge the encryption of (N,A,M) or to decrypt (N,A,C, T ), we only need to recover the
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internal state So after processing N,A, which allows to finish the rest of encryption/de-
cryption. We sketch the main idea of the attack.
We make two encryption queries C1‖T 1 ← EK(N,A, 0‖B) and C2‖T 2 ← EK(N,A, 1‖B)
for any B ∈ {0, 1}58. We can see that ksji+o is constant for j = 1, 2 and i = 0, . . . , 57
and that ks158+o⊕ ks258+o = S58+o,61 ⊕ S58+o,193, which is a linear equation in the bits of
So. We recover 292 more equations by making 292 pairs of (longer) queries that differ
only in a single bit, and solve the system for So. The knowledge of So allows arbitrary
forgeries and decryptions with N,A.
9.16 Ketje
Key recovery (tiny complexity, nonce-misusing). The authors of Ketje them-
selves point at the possibility of this attack. Because Ketje uses only a single round of
the Keccak−f function [BDP+16a], the diffusion between two consecutive sponge states
is low. In addition, the algebraic degree of a single round of Keccak−f is only 2. We
use this to recover the internal state S after processing of N and A, and then the secret
key K by inverting the processing of N,A. We sketch the main idea of the attack.
We make queries Ci‖T i ← EK(N,A,M i) with some fixed (N,A) andM i ∈ {0, 1}2·(r−4)
s.t. M i2 = 0
r for i = 1, . . . , θ. For each i we can use M i1 and C
i
2 to derive degree-2
polynomial equations with the bits in the inner (capacity) part of S (marked red in
Figure C.1) as unknowns. Each bit in Ci2 depends on 31 bits of the previous state on
average [BDPVA09], so we expect an overwhelming majority of the bits of the attacked
state to be covered by the derived equations. We need the number of nonce misusing
queries θ to be a small multiple of b−r+4r−4 = 11, 5 in order to fully determine the system.
Moreover, no more than a single unique monomial of degree 2 per every bit of the state
appears in the system, so with θ = 60, we should be able to linearize and solve the
system for S.
9.17 Morus
We give a brief description of Morus 640 in Appendix C.12.
Nonce-misuse universal forgery and CPA decryption. If we recover the state S
right after the initialization with N , we can forge ciphertexts with this N and decrypt
any ciphertext using this N . We sketch the S recovery attack.
We first recover S2 and S3 by querying C
i‖T i ← EK(N, ε,M i) with M i ∈ {0, 1}256
for i = 1, . . . , 4. Letting δi = M
1
0 ⊕M i0 with i 6= 1, we have that
(C1⊕M1)⊕(Ci⊕M i) =(Rotl(δi, b1)<<<(w3 + 96))⊕S2&Rotl(δi⊕Rotl(δi, b1), b3)
⊕S3&(Rotl(δi, b2)<<<w4)
⊕(Rotl(δi, b2)<<<w4)&Rotl(δi⊕Rotl(δi, b1), b3),
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where Rotl is a linear function, <<< denotes a circular rotation, and all br-s and wt-s
are constants. Each δi provides 128 linear equations in 256 binary unknowns, so with
δ1, δ2, δ3, we are able to recover the values of S2 and S3 with high probability. Once S2
and S3 are known, C
1
1 ⊕M11 can be expressed as a linear function of S0 and S1 and we
learn their xor-difference.
We still need to recover S0, S1, S4, i.e. 384 bits, and have 128 linear equations (so 256
unknown bits). We query C¯j‖T¯ j ← EK(N, ε, M¯ j) with M¯ j = M10 ‖M¯ j1‖0128 and M¯ j1 ∈
{0, 1}128 for j = 1, . . . , θ. Each C¯j2 will supply 128 polynomial equations in S0, S1, S4 of
degree at most 3. By examining the StateUpdate and the keystream generation functions
of Morus, we verify that there will be no more than 19 · 128 unique monomials of degree
higher than 1 present in all equations in the worst case and only 9.25 · 128 on average.
Thus by taking θ = 16, we should be able to linearise the system and recover S0, S1 and
S4 with high probability, using 20 queries for the entire attack.
9.18 COLM
We briefly describe COLM in Appendix C.16.
Below, we first observe that an L-recovery attack would allow to easily make universal
forgeries and CCA decryption attacks. Next, we will see two methods to extract L. One
is nonce-respecting with complexity beyond the birthday bound. The other has nonce-
misuse, at the 64-bit-bound complexity. We conclude with an easy nonce-respecting
existential forgery attack as the birthday bound complexity.
CCA decryption attack (tiny complexity, using L). To decrypt (N,A,C) where
|A|128 ≥ 2 we do:
1: Set A′1 = A2 + 3 · 6 · L and A′2 = A1 + 3 · 6 · L and A′i = Ai for i = 3, . . . , |A|128
2: Query M ← DK(N,A′, C)
3: return M
The attack works with a single decryption query because AA′1 = A′1 + 3 · 2 ·L = A2 + 3 ·
4 ·L = AA2 and AA′2 = A′2 + 3 · 4 ·L = A1 + 3 · 2 ·L = AA1, so A′ produces the same IV
as A.
Universal forgery (tiny complexity, using L). To make a forgery, we construct
an EK oracle in a CPA attack (using the knowledge of L). This allows us to simulate the
encryption process and create a valid ciphertext for arbitrary (N,A,M). To compute
EK(x), we start with arbitrary N¯ 6= N and do:
1: Set A¯ = N¯‖param⊕ 32 · L.
2: for i← 1 to 135 do set M¯i ← 2i · L and Y¯i ← 2i−1 · L.
3: Query C¯ ← EK(N¯ , A¯, M¯).
4: for i← 1 to 135 do set C¯Ci ← C¯i⊕ 2i · L.
5: Find {(xi, yi)}128i=1 ⊂ {(Y¯j , C¯Cj)}135j=1 with yi-s linearly independent.
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6: Find S = {s1, . . . , s|S|} ⊆ {1, . . . , 128} s.t. x = 3 ·
⊕
i∈S yi⊕L.
7: Pick an N , set A1 ← N‖param⊕ 32 · L and M ← 2 · L.
8: for i← 1 to |S| do Ai+1 ← xsi ⊕ 3 · 2i+1 · L.
9: Query C ← EK(N,A,M), compute EK(x)← C1⊕ 2 · L.
In the query made in line 3, A¯ is constructed to make sure that ¯AA1 = A¯A0, forcing
I¯V = 0, and M makes sure that MM consists of 135 = 128+log2(128) zero blocks. Hence
X¯i = L and Y¯i = L + 3 · (2i−1 − 1) · L = 2i−1 · L for i = 1, . . . , 135. Each Y¯i will be
distinct (because 2 is a primitive root of GF(2128) in COLM) and C¯Ci = EK(Y¯i). We
find 128 linearly independent values y1, . . . , y128 among C¯C1, . . . , C¯C135 with probability
close to 1.
With the obtained list, we can find the set S (in line 6) for an arbitrary x. In the query
made in line 9, we force IV =
∑
i∈S yi. and MM1 = 0, and Y1 = X1 + 3 · IV = x. The
total query complexity is small: there is one encryption query for precomputation, and
then, to forge an encryption, we need one query per EK evaluation, so 1 + a+ 2(`+ 1)
encryption queries. This is negligible compared to the complexity of getting L.
L-recovery attack (low success probability). This attack must guess the last 64
bits of 32 · L because param is a constant for a fixed instance of COLM. We pick a
constant message M ∈ {0, 1}128 and a random block B{0, 1}128 (the last 64 bits of B
are our guess). With distinct N1, . . . , N2
32
we do:
1: for i← 1 to 232 do query Ci ← EK(N i, Ai,M) with Ai = (N i‖param)⊕B.
2: Find i 6= j s.t. Ci = Cj , compute L = ((N i‖param)⊕(N j , param)⊕B) · (32)−1.
Clearly, AA0 +AA1 = B+3
2 ·L. If the guess B is correct, AA0, AA1, and 3 ·L always end
with the same 64 bits. Due to the birthday attack (on the remaining bits), we must have
i 6= j s.t. AAi0 = AAj1, so (N i, param) + 3 · L = AAi0 = AAj1 = (N j‖param) +B + 3 · 2 · L
and thus AAj0 = (N
j‖param) + 3 · L = (N i, param) + B + 3 · 2 · L = AAi1. This means
that N i, Ai and N j , Aj produce the same IV, and this collision on IV induces a collision
on C. The total complexity is 232 encryptions (with messages of one block and A of 1
block).
We note that the attack is nonce-respecting, although the probability of success is
only 2−64. This can be improved if we assume parameter misuse, i.e. existence of
several instances using the same key with different parameters.
L-recovery attack (nonce-misuse, beyond birthday bound). We mount a sim-
ilar attack, assuming that every nonce can be repeated 2m times. We use 2128−2m distinct
nonce N1, . . . , N2
128−2m
, AD of two blocks and a random block B ∈ {0, 1}128 to do:
1: for i← 1 to 2128−2m do
2: for j ← 1 to 2m do query Ci,j ← EK(N i, Ai,j ,M) s.t. Ai,j2 = Ai,j1 ⊕B.
3: end for
4: Find i, j 6= j′ s.t. Ci,j = Ci,j′ , compute L← (Ai,j1 ⊕Ai,j
′
1 ⊕B) · (3 · 6)−1.
We note that when m = 64, this attack has birthday complexity.
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9.19 Deoxys v1.41
A brief description of Deoxys-II is given in Appendix C.7.
Semi-universal forgery and CCA decryption attack on Deoxys-II (reusable,
nonce-misuse). The encryption algorithm of Deoxys-II has the form EK(N,A,M) =
E¯(K,N, f2(f1(K,A),M),M) where E¯ produces a (stretched) ciphertext and f1 and f2
are keyed functions with constant-size output. The attack is based on finding a collision
on f1. Assuming each nonce can be used up to 2
m times, to forge for (N,M) we use
N1, . . . , N2
128−2m 6= N all distinct and M ′ 6= M of 2 blocks, and do:
1: for i← 1 to 2128−2m do
2: for j ← 1 to 2m do query Ci,j‖T i,j ← EK(N i, Ai,j ,M ′) with random Ai,j .
3: end for
4: Find i, j 6= j′ s.t. Ai,j 6= Ai,j′ and T i,j = T i,j′ .
5: Query C‖T ← EK(N,Ai,j ,M) and forge with (N,Ai,j′ , C‖T ).
We can modify this attack to decrypt (N,Ai,j , C‖T ) by making a CCA decryption query
on (N,Ai,j
′
, C, T ). This can only decrypt messages using Ai,j as associated data. The
total complexity of the attack is 2128−m queries. Note that if m = 64, the complexity
becomes birthday bounded.
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Chapter10
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we present a rather diverse collection of results from the field of AE.
Although these results are mostly unrelated to one another, they all spring from the same
motivation: to push the state of the art towards efficient, provably secure authenticated
encryption that is relevant for practical applications.
This is a not-so-concrete aspirational goal, and there are many milestones along the
way to achieving it.1 We contribute our bit to several paths that lead to our goal.
Design of AE schemes. The most obvious way of converging to our goal is the
design of efficient, provably secure schemes. While the design of such schemes appears
in every chapter (except Chapter 9), Chapters 3 to 6 are specifically dedicated to design
of provably secure AE schemes.
We present OMD, a “basic” nonce-based AE scheme, in Chapter 3. The main pros
of (the instances of) OMD, as the author sees them, are its contribution to crypto-
graphic diversity, its low overhead beyond the compression function calls, and the high
quantitative security level combined with decent performance.
The misuse-resistant variants of OMD inherit most of the enumerated properties, and
add nonce-reuse resistance. The most interesting component of MR-OMD (and PMR-
OMD) is perhaps the highly efficient, parallelizable PRF dedicated to the domain of a
nonce-based AE scheme.
The work on p-OMD was inspired by the question whether it is possible to construct a
secure nonce-based AE scheme purely based on the masked Merkle-Damg˚ard iteration,
but more efficiently than by the obvious sequential “first-AD-then-message” approach.
We proved that the AE processing can be dealt with by “absorbing” the blocks of AD
into the intermediate chaining values of the Merkle-Damg˚ard iteration. This simple
algorithmic modification brought a substantial boost in performance: in a typical situ-
ation, the cost of processing AD became almost free of charge.
1It would be more precise to say “converging to it” instead of “achieving it.” The author believes that
a necessary condition for advancing towards this ambitious goal is accepting that a perfect solution may
not exist.
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We quickly realized, that such a modification can also be applied to sponge-based AE
schemes. Unlike others who investigated full-state absorption, we proved the security
of the general variable output-length FKS and the FKD constructions, and showed how
AE schemes can benefit from this by a modular security analysis. We also put a lot of
effort in making the proof as concise and easily verifiable as possible, because this aspect
of provable security is as important as the correctness of the proof itself.
Design of new notions. Another crucial component, some may even say the most
important component,2 of achieving the goal of secure and useful AE is the design and
critical evaluation of security notions.
Our work on the nonce-misuse resistance of online authenticated encryption was in-
duced by a sudden surge of popularity of the OAE1 notion around the start of CAESAR
competition. Our concerns were about not-yet understood properties captured by OAE1,
coupled with strong verbal claims of security that accompanied it. We attempted to dis-
sect the tangle of claims that advertised the security and usefulness of OAE1 schemes
from the actual constraints implied by an “online” setting. We presented two attacks
that shed light on the information leakage of OAE1, and proposed a definition that bet-
ter captures the intuition of best possible security in the online setting. It is noteworthy
that the new notion of OAE2 is not some strengthened generalization of OAE1; it has
a completely different syntax and philosophy, both of them attempting to capture what
is really relevant in a setting, when onlineness of encryption would be needed.
The security notions we propose for variable stretch AE are also based on the struggle
to capture what is relevant for practice. We argue that an extension of basic NAE
security that tolerates variation of ciphertext expansion is of practical interest. We define
a suite of notions, but most of them only serve the purpose of establishing relations, and
as verification that we are on a right track. Only two notions are assumed to be“exposed”
to a designer: NVAE and KESS, the latter being a tool for easier tweaking of existing
schemes. The NVAE notion itself is unusual in that it is parameterized. Although a
bound is always a function of some fixed stretch τc, there is an informal, but natural
definition of general NVAE security.
Cryptanalysis. While the author considers the provable security approach indispens-
able, it should always be taken with a grain of salt. For instance, it is debatable whether
a nonce-based AE scheme that is perfectly secure with non-repeating nonces, but suc-
cumbs to a low-complexity key recovery attack if nonces accidentally repeat, is fit for
widespread adoption. The problem is that this information is invisible if one only looks
at the security claims with respect to the NAE notion.
Given a relatively large number of schemes that make very similar security claims,
this kind of information can be very useful if one needs to, say, pick only a few to form
2See a short commentary on the importance of provable security in paragraph “Controversy surround-
ing provable security.”
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a portfolio.3 Thus motivated, we compile Table 9.2 that provides just such information.
Controversy surrounding provable security. The provable security treatment has
both its supporters and critics. The critics, e.g. Koblitz and Menezes [KM04, KM06,
KM11], claim that the provable security analysis is of limited, or even no use to the real
world applications of cryptography. The criticism has been succinctly summarised by
Damg˚ard [Dam07]:
• “A proof of security never proves security in an absolute sense, it relates security
to an unproven assumption that some computational problem is hard.” [Dam07,
p. 4]
• “The quality of a security reduction should not be ignored – it matters how tight
it is, and how strong the underlying assumption is.” [Dam07, p. 4]
• “A security reduction only proves something in a particular model specifying what
the adversary has access to and can do.” [Dam07, p. 4]
The author of this thesis agrees with Damg˚ard, in that the security reductions are a
useful tool as long as their interpretation is done carefully, and that precise formal
definitions of security should always be a design goal of any cryptographic primitive.
After all, how is one supposed to find a good solution to a problem if one does not know
what problem is he/she exactly solving?
Future work. One of the reasons that made OMD finish in the 2nd round of CAESAR
was probably its rather average performance. Yet, the measurements that were produced
by the end of the 2nd round did not reflect OMD’s full potential, as there was no hardware
available to run OMD implemented with the Intel SHA Extensions. Nowadays, this
instruction extension set is already deployed, and it would be interesting to see the
exact improvement of OMD’s performance. The same applies to p-OMD, which could
become a very attractive AE scheme one implemented with Intel SHA Extension.
Anther improvement that could be done to p-OMD would be its simplification. We
note that results already exist in this direction, as such a simplification has already been
proposed by Ashur and Mennink [AM16].
There is another possible research avenue suggested to the author by Peter Gazˇi,
namely to check whether the security bounds of OMD are tight, and possibly perform a
dedicated non-modular analysis to improve the bounds.
As mentioned in Chapter 6, our results for FKS are done in the ideal-permutation
model. Revisiting the analysis of FKS and FKD in the standard model, e.g. using the
framework of Soni and Tessaro [ST17], would be of interest.
3A small caveat occurs if all candidates that are very fast also succumb to nonce-misusing key
recoveries.
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The OAE2-secure construction CHAIN is based on a modular design, that uses a
nonce-based AE scheme as a blackbox subroutine. It may be interesting to design a
dedicated construction, based on e.g. tweakable blockciphers.
Finally, it would also be interesting to extend the security notions for variable-stretch
AE to additionally capture security against re-forgeries for the target stretch τc.
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AppendixA
Performance and Security of Compression
Function-based AE
A.1 Performance of OMD in Software
We provide a visualization of the complete sets of performance measurements for the ref-
erence implementation (Figures A.1 and A.4), SSE4-based implementation (Figures A.2
and A.5) and AVX1-based implementation (Figures A.3 and A.6) of OMD-sha256 and
OMD-sha512 carried out on a 64-bit 2.4GHz dual-core Intel Core i5-2415M processor
running Ubuntu 12.10.
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Figure A.1 – 3D surface plot of the performance of the OMD-sha256 reference
implementation with increasing message and AD length. Graph from Ankele and
Ankele [AA14].
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Figure A.2 – 3D surface plot of the performance of the OMD-sha256 SSE4
implementation with increasing message and AD length. Graph from Ankele and
Ankele [AA14].
A.2 The Rational behind the Masking Sequence ∆N,i,j
In this section, we explain the design of the masking function ∆K(N, i, j) in p-OMD and
show that it fulfils the required security properties.
p-OMD uses the XE construction [Rog04a] to instantiate a (tweakable) PRF F˜ :
K×T × ({0, 1}n×{0, 1}m)→ {0, 1}n using a regular PRF F : K× ({0, 1}n×{0, 1}m)→
{0, 1}n by defining F˜TK(X,Y ) = FK((X ⊕ ∆K(T)), Y ) for every T ∈ T ,K ∈ K, X ∈
{0, 1}n , Y ∈ {0, 1}m where T = {0, 1}ν × N+ × N+ and ∆K(T) is the masking function
of p-OMD.
The purpose of the masking function is to compute masking offsets ∆N,i,j that are
tweak-dependent and key-dependent in such a way that
1. ∆K(·) is a 2−n-uniform 2−n-AXU hash,
2. the masking offsets should be computable efficiently in the order they appear in
the scheme.
We need to efficiently compute ∆N,i+1,j if we have previously computed ∆N,i,j for 0 ≤ i
(i.e. “increment” the i component), and also we need to efficiently compute ∆N,i,j′
if we have previously computed ∆N,i,j for any j, j
′ ∈ {0, . . . , 15} (i.e. “switch” the j
component). To achieve this, we adapt the approach based on standard Gray Code
sequence from [KR11], described in the proof of Lemma 3.4. We repeat the definition
for the convenience of the reader.
Gray Code sequence. For a fixed positive r > 0 the Gray Code sequence is a special
ordering a : {0, 1, · · · , 2r − 1} → {0, 1}r of the set or r bit strings. It can be defined
recursively as γ0 = 0
r and γi = γi−1 ⊕ 2ntz(i) if i ≥ 1, where ntz(i) denotes the number
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Figure A.3 – 3D surface plot of the performance of the OMD-sha256 AVX1
implementation with increasing message and AD length. Graph from Ankele and
Ankele [AA14].
of trailing zeros in the binary representation of i. The basic facts are that a is a bijection
and 0 ≤ γi ≤ 2i (if represented as integer) for all i. We stress that we therefore have
that (1) γi ≤ 2r+1 for all i, and (2) γi 6= γj for all i 6= j.
Construction of the masking function and security properties. First recall
that we only need to use 16 different values of the j component in p-OMD, i.e., all of its
values are representable with 4 bits. Keeping this in mind, we first define the sequence
of Galois field elements Γ(i, j) ∈ GF (2n) as Γ(i, j) = 24 · γi ⊕ j for 0 ≤ j ≤ 15 (we
represent j by as an n bit string) and 0 ≤ i < 2n−6 where γi is the ith word of the
canonical Gray code and the multiplications are in the Galois field. Referring to the
properties of the Gray Code sequence, we can verify that for all i, we have left5 (γi) = 0
5
and right4
(
24 · γi
)
= 04. This implies that for every allowed pair i, j the value Γ(i, j)
will be a unique element of GF (2n).
Finally, we define the masking function as
∆K(N, i, j) = FK (N ||10n − |N | − 1, 0m)⊕ Γ(i, j) · FK (0n, 0m)
where F is the PRF used in p-OMD.
We can now easily verify that the required security properties are met under the
assumption that F is a good PRF. ∆K(N, i, j) being a bitwise xor of two independent
random n bit strings, we trivially have Pr[∆K(N, i, j) = H] ≤ 2−n for any (N, i, j).
To see if Pr[∆K(N, i, j) ⊕ ∆K(N ′, i′, j′) = H] ≤ 2−n for (N, i, j) 6= (N ′, i′, j′), we
consider two cases, either N = N ′ or not. In the latter case, N 6= N ′ implies that
∆K(N, i, j) ⊕ ∆K(N ′, i′, j′) = H is equivalent to the event that a bitwise xor of two
independent random n-bit strings is equal to some specific value and we conclude that the
required property is verified in this case. In the former case, FK(N ||10n−|N |−1, 0m) =
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Figure A.4 – 3D surface plot of the performance of the OMD-sha512 reference
implementation with increasing message and AD length. Graph from Ankele and
Ankele [AA14].
FK(N
′||10n−|N ′|−1, 0m) so ∆K(N, i, j)⊕∆K(N ′, i′, j′) = H occurs iff (Γ(i, j)⊕Γ(i′, j′))·
FK(0
n, 0m) = H. Note that we must have (i, j) 6= (i′, j′) which together with properties
listed above imply that the multiplier (Γ(i, j)⊕Γ(i′, j′)) is non-zero. Thus, we conclude
that the second condition is met in this case as well.
Compact representation. Let L∗ = FK(0n, 0m). Then we have
∆K(N, i, j) = FK (N ||10n − |N | − 1, 0m)⊕ Γ(i, j) · L∗
= FK (N ||10n − |N | − 1, 0m)⊕ γi · 24 · L∗ ⊕ j · L∗.
We further define L∗[j] = j · L∗ for 0 ≤ j ≤ 15 and L[`] = 24+` · L∗ for 0 ≤ ` < n − 6.
Note that L∗[1] = L∗, L∗[0] = 0n and L[0] = 24 · L∗. Thus we can write ∆K(N, i, j) =
FK(N ||10n − |N | − 1, 0m)⊕ γi · L[0]⊕ L∗[j]. We can derive two rules. First, keeping in
mind the way we have defined the Gray Code sequence we can see that
∆K(N, i, j) = FK (N ||10n − |N | − 1, 0m)⊕ γi · L[0]⊕ L∗[j]
= FK (N ||10n − |N | − 1, 0m)⊕
(
γi−1 ⊕ 2ntz(i)
)
· L[0]⊕ L∗[j]
= FK (N ||10n − |N | − 1, 0m)⊕ γi−1 · L[0]⊕ 2ntz(i) · L[0]⊕ L∗[j]
= ∆K(N, i− 1, j)⊕ 2ntz(i) · L[0]
= ∆K(N, i− 1, j)⊕ L[ntz(i)].
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Figure A.5 – 3D surface plot of the performance of the OMD-sha512 SSE4
implementation with increasing message and AD length. Graph from Ankele and
Ankele [AA14].
Secondly, for any j, j′ from the acceptable range we have
∆K(N, i, j
′) = FK (N ||10n − |N | − 1, 0m)⊕ γi · L[0]⊕ L∗[j′]
= FK (N ||10n − |N | − 1, 0m)⊕ γi · L[0]⊕ L∗[j]⊕ L∗[j]⊕ L∗[j′]
= ∆K(N, i, j)⊕ j · L∗ ⊕ j′ · L∗
= ∆K(N, i, j)⊕ (〈j〉n ⊕ 〈j′〉n) · L∗
= ∆K(N, i, j)⊕ L∗[str2num (〈j〉n ⊕ 〈j′〉n)].
These are the two rules we use in the specification of p-OMD in Section 5.4.
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AppendixB
Additional Notions, Separations and a
Survey of OAE-like claims
B.1 Divergence of OAE1-like Claims
All that is reported in this section is based on what was published by early 2015.
A survey of the literature (published by 2015) shows increasingly strong rhetoric sur-
rounding nonce-reuse security of online schemes. We document this trend. In doing
so we identify some of the notions (all quite weak, in our view) that have come to be
regarded as nonce-reuse misuse-resistant.
Shifting language The paper defining MRAE [RS06b] never suggested that nonce-
reuse was OK; it said that an MRAE scheme must do “as well as possible with whatever
IV is provided” [RS06b, p. 1]. Elaborating, the authors “aim for an AE scheme in which
if the IV is a nonce then one achieves the usual notion for nonce-based AE; and if the
IV does get repeated then authenticity remains and privacy is compromised only to the
extent that [one reveals] if this plaintext is equal to a prior one, and even that . . . only
if both the message and its header have been used with this particular IV” [RS06b,
p. 12–13].
The FFL paper indicates that the authors wish “to achieve both simultaneously: se-
curity against nonce-reusing adversaries . . . and support for on-line-encryption” [FFL12,
p. 197]. While the authors understood that they were weakening MRAE, they saw the
weakening as relatively inconsequential: they say that their scheme, McOE, “because
of being on-line, satisfies a slightly weaker security definition against nonce-reusing ad-
versaries” [FFL12, p. 198] (emphasis ours). The paper did not investigate the definitional
consequences of this weakening.
An early follow-on to FFL, the COPA paper, asserts that OAE1 schemes are distin-
guished by “not relying on the non-reuse of a nonce” [ABL+13, p. 438]. Andreeva et al.
classify AE schemes according to the type of initialization vector (IV) one needs: either
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OAE1 Leaks equality of block-aligned prefixes, formalized by comparing EK with: a
random n-bit-blocksize online permutation tweaked by the nonce, AD and plaintext;
followed by a random τ -bit function of the nonce, AD, and plaintext. Schemes1:
COPA [ABL+14c], Deoxys [JNPS14a], Joltik [JNPS14b], KIASU [JNPS14c], Marble[Guo14b],
McOE [FFL12], SHELL [Wan14], POET [AFF+14a, AFF+14b], Prøst-COPA [KLL+14]
Schemes2: ++AE [Rec14]
OAE1a Leaks equality of block-aligned prefixes, formalized by comparing EK with: a
random n-bit-blocksize online function tweaked by the nonce, AD and plaintext; followed
by a random τ -bit function of the nonce, AD, and plaintext. Schemes1: APE[ABB+14c],
ELmD[DN14a], ELmE[DN14b], Prøst-APE[KLL+14]
OAE1b Leaks equality of block-aligned prefixes, formalized by comparing EK with: a ran-
dom n-bit-blocksize online function tweaked by the nonce and plaintext (but not the AD);
followed by a random τ -bit function of the nonce, AD, and plaintext. The relaxation enables a
compliant scheme to process the plaintext before the AD is presented. However it also renders
a compliant scheme vulnerable to CCA, CPSS, and NM attacks even if AD values are unique.
Schemes1: COBRA[ALMY14, ABL+14b]
OAE1c Leaks equality of any blocks at the same position. E.g., if ciphertexts C and C ′
arise from 4-block plaintexts P = A‖B‖C‖D and P ′ = E‖B‖F‖D then C2 = C ′2 and C4 = C ′4.
Security is formalized by comparing EK with: a function from n bits to n bits tweaked by the
nonce and an integer, the position; followed by a random tag. Schemes1: Minalpher [STA+14]
OAE1d Leaks equality of block-aligned prefixes and the XOR of the block directly following
this prefix. E.g., if C,C ′ arise from 4-block plaintexts P = A‖B‖C‖D and P ′ = A‖B‖E‖F
we always have C1 = C
′
1, C2 = C
′
2, and C3 ⊕ C ′3 = C ⊕ E. Ciphertexts C,C ′ arising from
4-block plaintexts P = A‖B‖C‖D and P ′ = E‖F‖G‖H will have C1⊕C ′1 = A⊕E. Schemes2:
Artemia [AAB14] CBEAM [Saa14], ICEPOLE [MGH+14], iFeed [ZWHS14], Jambu [WH14b],
Keyak [BDP+14b], MORUS [WH14a], NORX [AJN14], STRIBOB [SB14]
NAE1 Retains full security as long as all (N,A) pairs are unique among the encryption
queries. If a pair repeats, all privacy is lost, but authenticity remains unchanged. Schemes1:
CLOC [IMG+14a], SILC [IMG+14b]
NAE0 Retains full security as long as all (N,A) pairs are unique among the encryption
queries. If a pair repeats, all security is forfeit. Schemes1: NORX [AJN14], Trivia-ck [AC14]
Schemes2: OTR [Min14b, Min14a]
Figure B.1 – A menagerie of OAE notions and schemes. All of the schemes are
CAESAR submissions except ElmE and McOE. Schemes1 lists proposals that claim
some flavor of nonce-reuse misuse resistance. Schemes2 lists proposals that didn’t, yet
are or were marked as such in the AE Zoo [AKL+14] or AFL survey [AFL16].
random, nonce, or arbitrary. A scheme satisfying OAE1 is understood to be an arbitrary-
IV scheme, where “no restrictions on the IV are imposed, thus an adversary may choose
any IV for encryption” [ABL+14a, p. 9]. The authors add that “Often a deterministic
AE scheme does not even have an IV input” [ABL+14a, p. 9]. The linguistic progression
reaches its logical conclusion in the rebranding of OAE1-secure schemes as nonce-free,
as seen, for example, in talks of Guo [Guo14a, slide 2] and Lauridsen [BLT14, Slides 4,
6].
We have thus seen a transformation in language, played out over eight years, taking
us from a strong definition (MRAE) pitched as trying to capture the best one can do
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when a nonce gets reused to a comparatively weak definition (OAE1) nowadays pitched
as being so strong so as to render nonces superfluous. Meanwhile, the best-one-can-do
positioning of MRAE was mirrored in the online setting. The COPA authors indicate
that their mode achieves “the maximum attainable for single pass schemes” [ABL+14c,
p. 7]. Identical language is found in the COBRA submission [ABL+14b, p. 7]. In our
view, such claims are wrong; there would seem to be a gap between OAE1 and OAE2
security, what we illustrate in Appendix B.3.
Weaker notions Concurrent with the rhetoric for what OAE1 delivers being ratcheted
up, weakened variants of OAE1 have proliferated. We document this trend in Figure B.1,
which introduces a variety of OAE notions. They are all weaker than OAE1 except
for OAE1a; by standard arguments, OAE1 and OAE1a are quantitatively close if the
blocksize is reasonably large. In this race to the bottom, it may seem as though the
scheme comes first and whatever properties it provides is branded as some form misuse
resistance.
The number of different OAE definitions, and their meanings, has never been clear.
The evolution of what has been indicated in the Nonce-MR column in the AE Zoo
website [AKL+14] illustrates the struggle of researchers trying to accurately summarize
the extent of nonce-reuse misuse-resistance for tens of AE schemes.1 Our own attempt
at sorting this out, Figure B.1, is not definitive. We do not formalize the notions in this
table except for OAE1. (Some of the definitions are obvious, some are not.) The table
is based on both author assertions (Schemes1) and assertions of others (Schemes2). The
OAE1x notions only consider security for messages that are blocksize multiples.
B.2 MRAE Resists CPSS
We evidence that MRAE-secure schemes, unlike OAE1-secure schemes, resist CPSS
attack. The MRAE notion is much stronger still, but a result like what we give is a
starting point.
Suppose that the secret suffix S is generated by an efficient sampler S. Let AdvguessS
denote the min-entropy of the distribution generated by S. Let A be a CPSS adversary
attacking an AE scheme Π. Consider the following MRAE adversary B attacking Π.
It generates the suffix S ←$ S and runs A . For each prefix P that A produces, if A
repeats a prior prefix then B gives the consistent answer. Otherwise, it queries P‖S
to its encryption oracle, and returns the answer to A . If A can reproduce S then B
outputs 1; otherwise it outputs 0. If B’s oracle returns random strings (B is playing
the game mrae-IΠ) then A can guess S with probability at most Adv
guess
S , since it
only receives random answers independent of S. Hence the chance that A can guess S
in the CPSS attack against Π is at most AdvmraeΠ (B) + Adv
guess
S .
1We note that after the publication of the paper corresponding to this chapter, AE Zoo significantly
updated their Nonce-MR column.
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B.3 Separating OAE1[n] and OAE2[0, n]
OAE1 is weaker than OAE2 in the sense that the former does not support arbitrary
segmentation or demand security over arbitrary strings. This brief section argues a
more specific claim: that OAE1 with blocksize and tagsize n remains weaker than OAE2
with a (0, n)-expanding scheme and all segments required to have exactly n bits. (To
address the syntactic mismatch, we’ll assume that every A satisfies A[i] = ε for every
1 < i ≤ |A|, so that OAE2 can be viewed as operating on a single AD string, instead of
an AD vector.) This is true even if we fix a reasonably large value of n, say n = 128.
We ignore mundane matters of mismatched syntax that would have to be dealt with in
a more formal treatment (i.e., that OAE1 and OAE2 schemes are very different kinds of
objects).
So consider an OAE1-secure scheme Π = (K,E,D) of blocksize n. Assume that all
keys output by K also have n bits, which is the most common case for n = 128. Suppose
that for scheme Π one can recover the m-th block of the (putative) plaintext from
K,N,A, and the first m blocks of ciphertext, which again holds for typical schemes,
like COPA [ALMY14] and McOE [FFL12]. Now consider the following scheme Π˜ =
(K, E˜, D˜). For any X ∈ ({0, 1}∗)n, let E˜N,AK (K‖X) = EN,AK (M0‖X), where M0 is the
first block of the putative plaintext obtained from decrypting 02n under key K with
nonce N and AD A; and let E˜N,AK (M0‖X) = EN,AK (K‖X). Let E˜N,AK coincide with
EN,AK on all other points. Then the scheme Π˜ ought still to be OAE1-secure. For given
an adversary A attacking Π˜, one can transform it to an equally efficient adversary B
attacking Π that outputs 1 if the first block of some ciphertext is 0n, and the probability
that A can query some M0‖X to the encryption oracle is at most Advoae1Π (B). But Π˜
is not OAE2-secure, as an adversary can query 02n to the decryption oracle to learn K.
In brief, we can adjust an OAE1-secure scheme to fail miserably in the presence of a
decryption capability, the adjustment irrelevant for OAE1 security.
We emphasize that the above counterexample does not imply that common OAE1-
secure schemes with expansion τ fail to be OAE2-secure with expansion (0, τ) once
reconceptualized and restricted. Such a determination would have to be made on a
case-by-case basis, asking if supplementing the adversary’s capabilities with an online
decryption oracle would violate indistinguishability. We haven’t carried out such in-
vestigations because even when an OAE1 scheme is OAE2-secure once restricted and
reconceptualized, we are not suggesting this would make it a desirable way to address
online-AE: in particular, expansion parameters of (0, τ) are likely to be a poor choice
in most settings, since they provide no authenticity assurance until a ciphertext’s end.
This is why our focus has been on τ -expanding schemes, where all segments are afforded
the same authenticity guarantees. It also seems undesirable to insist on segmenting mes-
sages along n-bit boundaries for some small, fixed n, and to fail to define security for
messages that are not blocksize multiples.
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B.4 IND-CCA and RAE Security of AE Schemes
proc initialize ind-cca-RΠ
K ←$ K
V ← ∅, X ← ∅, Y ← ∅
oracle Enc(N,A,M)
if N ∈ X then return ⊥
if (N,A,M) ∈ V then return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {N}
C ← E(K,N,A,M)
Y ← Y ∪ {(N,A,C)}
return C
oracle Dec(N,A,C)
if (N,A,C) ∈ Y then return ⊥
M ← D(K,N,A, τ, C)
if M 6= ⊥
V ← V ∪ {(N,A,M)}
return M
proc initialize ind-cca-IΠ
K ←$ K
V ← ∅, X ← ∅, Y ← ∅
oracle Enc(N,A,M)
if N ∈ X then return ⊥
if (N,A,M) ∈ V then return ⊥
X ← X ∪ {N}
C ←$ {0, 1}|M |+τ
Y ← Y ∪ {(N,A,C)}
return C
oracle Dec(N,A,C)
if (N,A,C) ∈ Y then return ⊥
M ← D(K,N,A, τ, C)
if M 6= ⊥
V ← V ∪ {(N,A,M)}
return M
Figure B.2 – IND-CCA security. Games for defining IND-CCA security of a nonce-
based AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) with stretch τ .
Here we define the IND-CCA security of the nonce-based AE schemes (defined in Sec-
tion 2.4) and RAE [HKR15] security of variable-stretch schemes (defined in Section 8.5).
Definition B.1 (IND-CCA security). Given a nonce-based AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D)
with ciphertext expansion τ and an adversary A , we define the advantage of A in
breaking the IND-CCA security of Π in a chosen ciphertext attack (with help of the
games ind-cca-R and ind-cca-I in Figure B.2) as
Advind-ccaΠ (A ) = Pr
[
A ind-cca-RΠ ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A ind-cca-IΠ ⇒ 1
]
.
If Advind-ccaΠ (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A run in time t, and make no more than qe
encryption queries and no more than qd decryption queries such that their total data
complexity is no more than σ bits, then we say that Π is (, t, qe, qd, σ)-IND-CCA secure.
Definition B.2 (RAE security). Given a variable-stretch AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D) and
an adversary A , we define the advantage of A in breaking the robust-AE security of Π
in a chosen ciphertext attack (with help of the games rae-R and rae-I in Figure B.2)
as
AdvraeΠ (A ) = Pr[A
rae-RΠ ⇒ 1]− Pr[A rae-IΠ ⇒ 1].
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If AdvraeΠ (A ) ≤  for all adversaries A run in time t, and make no more than qe
encryption queries and no more than qd decryption queries such that their total data
complexity is no more than σ bits, then we say that Π is a (, t, qe, qd, σ)-secure robust
AE scheme.
proc initialize rae-RΠ
K ←$ K
proc Enc(N,A, τ,M)
return E(K,N,A, τ,M)
proc Dec(N,A, τ, C)
return D(K,N,A, τ, C)
proc initialize rae-IΠ
for N,A, τ ∈ N × {0, 1}∗ × N do
piN,A,τ ←$ Inj(τ)
proc Enc(N,A, τ,M)
return piN,A,τ (M)
proc Dec(N,A, τ, C)
if ∃M ∈ {0, 1}∗ s.t. piN,A,τ (M) = C then
return M
return ⊥
Figure B.3 – RAE security. Defining security for a robust AE scheme Π = (K, E ,D)
with nonce space N . Inj(()τ) denotes the set of all injective, τ -expanding functions from
{0, 1}∗ to {0, 1}≥τ .
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AppendixC
Descriptions of 3rd Round CAESAR
Candidates
In this appendix, we briefly outline CCM, GCM and the 3rd round CAESAR candidates.
C.1 AES-CCM
CCM [WHF03b] combines encrypted CBC MAC for authentication with CTR mode
for message encryption. We assume the blockcipher E is AES. To encrypt a query
(N,A,M), CCM first computes the value U = CBCMACK(B) where the string B is an
injective, prefix-free encoding of N,A,M, τ and other parameters, s.t. 128 divides |B|.
In particular, N and |M | is encoded in B0 and |A| is encoded in B1. The ciphertext
is computed as Ci = Mi⊕EK(I(N, i)) for i = 1, . . . , |M |128 where I(N, i) is a 128-bit
injective encoding of N and i, such that I(N, i) 6= B0 for i ≥ 0. The tag is computed as
T = leftτ (U ⊕EK(I(N, 0))).
C.2 AES-GCM
AES-GCM [MV04] combines counter mode for message encryption with a Wegman-
Carter MAC (based on a polynomial AXU hash called GHASH) for authentication. It
uses AES as the blockcipher E, and derives a key for GHASH as L = EK(0). GHASH
takes two strings as input and computes
GHASHL(A,C) =
⊕`
i=1
L`−i+1 ·Xi, with X = A‖0∗‖C‖0∗‖〈|A|〉64‖〈|C|〉64,
where ` = |A|128 + |C|128 + 1 and the multiplications are done in GF(2128). To encrypt
a query (N,A,M), we first set I ← N‖0311 if |N | = 96 and to I ← GHASHL(ε,N) if
|N | 6= 96. Then we compute the ciphertext C as counter mode encryption of M , using1
1We abuse the notation slightly; the incrementation is done with integer representation of right32 (Y ).
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inc(Y ) 7→ left96 (Y ) ‖(right32 (Y ) + 1) as the incrementation function and inc(I) as the
initial counter value. Then we compute the tag as T = leftτ (GHASHL(A,C)⊕EK(I)).
C.3 AEZ v5
AEZ encryption [HKR17] (in the AEZ-core case, i.e. the general one for |M | ≥ 256) has
the following structure
Encrypt(K,N,A, τ,M) = f(I, J, L,∆,M),
where (I, J, L) = KDF(K) and the value ∆ = H(I, J, L, τ,N,A) is computed using a
dedicated hash function H. So, getting (I, J, L) is equivalent to getting K in terms of
key recovery attacks. All binary inputs can have an arbitrary length and are internally
processed in blocks of 128 bits.
We note that, whenever we encrypt the same message M with the same key K, any
collision on the hash function necessarily results in a collision on the ciphertext. So, it
is easy to detect collisions on the hidden variable ∆ in a chosen message attack.
In the context of AEZ, we denote by k = (0, J, I, L, 0) a sequence of 5 blocks which
are used as round keys in AES4, a subroutine of H based on AES [DR02] reduced to
4 rounds. We further denote H(I, J, L, τ,N,A) = hk(τ,N,A). We will use another
subroutine Ej,iK defined by
Ej,iK (X) = AES4k(X ⊕ jJ ⊕ 2di/8eI ⊕ (i mod 8)L)
for j ≥ 0 and where integer-block multiplication denotes the classical GF(2128) multi-
plication.
C.4 OCB (OCB v1.1)
OCB [KR16] (a.k.a. OCB3) uses AES as the blockcipher E and derives two secret offset
values: L from the secret key K only, and R from K, the nonce N (a string of no more
than 120 bits), and the stretch τ . Each plaintext block Mi is encrypted into Ci by
Ci = EK(Mi ⊕∆i)⊕∆i with ∆i = R⊕ γi · L,
where · denotes the multiplication in GF(2128) and γi is a 128-bit block that takes a
unique value for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 2120. The nonce N has up to 120 bits. We have that
L = 4·EK(0). The way to compute R is a bit complicated but there is a simple particular
case: when the 6 least significant bits of N are all zero, then R = EK(0
∗1‖N).
When the last blocks M` of M and Aa of A (with m = |M |128 and a = |A|128) are
complete and τ = 128, the tag is computed as
T = EK
(
2−1 · L⊕∆` ⊕
⊕`
i=1
Mi
)
⊕HK(A) where HK(A) =
⊕
i
EK(Ai ⊕ γi · L)
and · denotes the multiplication in GF(2128). The attacks we describe in Section 9.9 can
be easily generalized to the case when the last block of M and the last block of A are
not 128 bits long.
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C.5 AES-OTR v3.1
AES-OTR v3.1 with parallel AD processing [Min16] produces a tag T = leftτ (TA⊕ TE)
where TA and TE are partial tags for A and the pair (N,M), respectively. We assume
that |N | = 120. Note that TA does not depend on the nonce N . When |A| is a multiple
of 128, it is computed as
TA = EK
((
a−1⊕
i=1
EK(Ai ⊕ 2i ·Q)
)
⊕Aa ⊕ 2a−1 · 33 ·Q
)
where a = |A|128, EK is AES with key K, Q = EK(0) and · denotes the multiplication in
GF(2128). When |M |128 = 2` and |M2`| = 128, blocks are encrypted in pairs (M2i−1,M2i)
into (C2i−1, C2i) by a two-round Feistel scheme
C2i−1 = EK(2
i−1 · L⊕M2i−1)⊕M2i C2i = EK(2i−1 · 3 · L⊕ C2i−1)⊕M2i−1
where L = EK((τ)‖0∗1‖N) and (τ) is a 7-bit encoding of τ . The tag TE is obtained
by
TE = EK
(
7 · 2`−1 · 3 · L⊕
⊕`
i=1
M2i
)
.
C.6 CLOC and SILC
CLOC and SILC v3 [IMG+16] use nonces of 96 bits with AES as the blockcipher E. They
compute V = HASHK(N,A), then C = ENCK(V,M), and finally T = PRFK(V,C). In
ENC, we compute C1 = M1 ⊕ EK(V ). Then, C2, . . . , Cm is a function of K, C1, and
M2, . . . ,Mm only (where m = |M |128). More precisely, we have
Ci = Mi ⊕ EK(fix1(Ci−1))
for i > 0, where fix1 just forces the most significant bit to 1.
C.7 Deoxys v1.41
Deoxys v1.41 [JNP16] has two instantiations: Deoxys-I, which claims no nonce-misuse
security, and Deoxys-II, which claims to resist nonce misuse attacks. The internal design
of Deoxys-I is very similar to OCB, except that it relies on an ad-hoc tweakable encryp-
tion ETK instead of AES with the input and output masks ∆. The block size of E is 128
bits. In both instances we have
HK(A) =
⊕
i
E
2‖(i−1)
K (Ai)
(when the last block of A is complete) which is nonce-independent. In Deoxys-I, we have
T = E
1‖N‖`
K
(⊕`
i=1
Mi
)
⊕HK(A) and Ci = E0‖N‖(i−1)K
(when the last block M` of M is complete). In Deoxys-II, we have (when the last block
M` of M is complete)
T = E
1‖04‖N
K
(
HK(A)⊕
⊕`
i=1
E
0‖(i−1)
K (Mi)
)
andCi = Mi ⊕ E1‖(T⊕(i−1))K (08‖N).
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C.8 Tiaoxin-346
Tiaoxin-346v2.1 [Nik16] loads the key K and the nonce N in a state, then applies
a reversible transformation. The state consists of three arrays T [3], T [4], and T [6], of
respectively 3, 4, and 6 blocks. Each block is represented by a 4×4 matrix of bytes. Given
a (K,N -initialized) state (T [3], T [4], T [6]), we load the plaintext by pairs (M2i,M2i+1) of
blocks and output two blocks (C2i, C2i+1) for i = 0, . . . , |M |2·128. This operation works
in five steps:
1. T [3]← R(T [3],M2i),
2. T [4]← R(T [4],M2i+1),
3. T [6]← R(T [6],M2i ⊕M2i+1),
4. C0 ← T [3]0 ⊕ T [3]2 ⊕ T [4]1 ⊕ (T [6]3&T [4]3),
5. C1 ← T [6]0 ⊕ T [4]2 ⊕ T [3]1 ⊕ (T [6]5&T [3]2).
The R(T [s],M) operation consists of
R(T [s],M) = (A(T [s]s−1)⊕ T [s]0 ⊕M,A(T [s]0)⊕ Z0, T [s]1, . . . , T [s]s−2)
where Z0 is a constant and A is one AES round without round key:
A(x) = MixColumns(ShiftRows(SubBytes(x))).
C.9 AEGIS v1.1
AEGIS v1.1 [WP16] uses the notion of state. In the AEGIS-128 version (the lightest of
the three proposed ones), one state consists of five AES states, i.e. five 4× 4 matrices of
bytes. AEGIS first computes an initial state which depends on the key K and the nonce
N . Then, neither K nor N is used any more. It processes A and M as a sequence of
4× 4 matrices of bytes. Each matrix X is processed to update the state S0, . . . , S4 into
S0
S1
S2
S3
S4
 =

R(S4)⊕X ⊕ S0
R(S0)⊕ S1
R(S1)⊕ S2
R(S2)⊕ S3
R(S3)⊕ S4

where R is a single AES round function without the addition of a round key. Before
this transformation, X ⊕S1⊕(S2&S3)⊕S4 is revealed for encryption, if X is a message
block. After all blocks are processed, a function transforms the state using the length of
A and M , and a tag is extracted from the result.
C.10 ACORN v3
ACORN v3 [Wu16] uses the notion of state and processes the bits of A and M iteratively,
i.e. the “block” size is 1 bit. ACORN-128 has a state S of 293 bits. First, ACORN
initializes a state depending on the key K and the nonce N . Then, it processes each bit
of A iteratively by
Si+1 = StateUpdate128(Si,mi, cai, cbi)
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where mi is a new bit of A, cai is a control bit set to 1, and cbi is a control bit set to
1. After processing A, the process continues for 128 more iterations with mi set to 1
in the first iteration and to 0 in the remaining 127 iterations. It continues again with
mi = 0 and cai = 0 for 128 more iterations. Encryption can then start with the same
iterative process, where mi is a new bit of M , then set to 1 once, then set to 0 255 times.
One difference is that cbi is set to 0. The other difference is that there is one output
bit produced for encryption per state update when bits of the message are processed.
Namely, we have
o = |A|+ 256
Si+1+o = StateUpdate128(Si+o,Mi, 1, 0)
Ci = Mi ⊕ ksi+o
ksi+o = Si+o,12 ⊕ Si+o,154 ⊕maj(Si+o,235, Si+o,61, Si+o,193)
⊕ch(Si+o,230, Si+o,111, Si+o,66)
where o is an offset, and maj and ch are two boolean functions of algebraic degree
two. After processing the message bits, there are two sets of 128 iterations like for
processing A. Then, there are 768 more iterations with various control bits and mi = 0
before a tag is computed from the state. Another observation from the specifications
shows that Si+1,[0···j] is a linear function of Si,[0···j+1] for j < 292 and that the last bit
Si+1,292⊕mi⊕maj(Si+o,244, Si+o,23, Si+o,160) is also linear in Si. So, Si+j,[0···k] is a linear
function of Si,[0···k+j] for k + j ≤ 292.
C.11 Ketje
Ketje v2 [BDP+16a] is a sponge-based mode for an iterated cryptographic permutation
f : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b with a tunable number of rounds, aggressively optimized for low
computational cost. We focus on the main recommendation Ketje Sr (further simply
Ketje) with 400-bit permutation, but the observations are easily generalised to the three
remaining named instances.
Ketje operates over byte strings, and works with a rate r = 36 bits, capacity c = 364
bits, and tags of 64 bits. We assume the use of secret key and nonces of 128 bits.In
an encryption query (K,N,A,M), Ketje first sets the state to the value Init(K,N) =
〈32〉8‖K‖10119‖N‖10∗1 and applies nstart = 12 rounds of the permutation f . Both the
message M and AD A are partitioned into blocks of r − 4 bits, the last block of each
possibly being shorter. The blocks are then processed using nstep = 1-round calls to
f , as illustrated in Figure C.1, treated with two-bit domain separation flags and 10∗1
padding. The tag is derived using two calls to f , first of which uses nstride = 6 rounds.
C.12 Morus
Morus 640 v2 [WH16a] loads the key K and the nonce IV in a state and does a non-
invertible initialization. The state consists of five 128-bit blocks S0, . . . , S4 (for Morus,
we start indexing blocks at 0). Then, the plaintext blocks Mi are processed iteratively
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fInit(K,N) f f
A1‖0‖11
tr[r − 4]
C1
M1‖11‖11
f
M2‖10‖10
∗
1
C2
f
T1 T2
nstart nstep nstep nstepnstride
tr[|M2|]
0‖10∗1
tr[r − 4] tr[r − 4]
f
A2‖01‖10
∗
1
nstep
r
c
recover
Figure C.1 – The encryption algorithm of Ketje [BDP+16a] with two-block A and two-
block M as input. We let tr[x] denote truncation to x leftmost bits.
in two steps:
1. Ci = Mi⊕S0⊕(S1<<< 96)⊕(S2&S3),
2. (S0, . . . , S4)← StateUpdate(S0, . . . , S4,Mi).
The StateUpdate function is illustrated in Figure C.2.
C.13 NORX v3.0
NORX [AJN16] is a sponge-based mode which computes a “state” (R,S) from the secret
key, the nonce N , and the parameters, then follows the sponge structure to absorb the
associated data A, the message (at the same time it produces the ciphertext), the trailer
data, then finally uses the key again to produce the tag. When processing one block of
message Mi, NORX replaces (R,S) by a new state (C, S) with C = Mi ⊕ R. We focus
on an instance of NORX with a state size of 512 bits, with |R| = 384 and |S| = 128.
The encryption algorithm of NORX is illustrated in Figure C.3.
C.14 Ascon
Ascon-128 v1.2 [DEMS16] is a sponge-based mode for an iterated cryptographic per-
mutation p : {0, 1}320 → {0, 1}320 with tunable number of rounds (denoted as pa for
initialization and tag generation and pb for the rest of the processing). Ascon works over
a state S of 320 bits. We denote the outer (or the rate) part of the state Sr and the inner
(or the capacity part) as Sc with |Sr| = r, |Sc| = c and S = Sr‖Sc (so r+ c = 320). The
keys, tags and nonces of Ascon are 128 bits long. We focus on Ascon128, with r = 64,
c = 256, a = 12 and b = 6
When processing an encryption query (K,N,A,M), the associated data and message
are both padded with 10∗ padding so that |M‖10∗| and |A‖10∗| are both a multiple of
r. The encryption algorithm is illustrated in Figure C.4.
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Figure C.2 – The StateUpdate function of Morus [WH16a].
C.15 Keyak
Keyak v2.2 [BDP+16b] is a sponge-based mode for an iterated cryptographic permuta-
tion f : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b. Keyak allows to tune many parameterssuch as degree of
parallelism, a result of which the general description of Keyak is rather complicated and
layered. We therefore focus on the main recommendation Lake Keyak with 1600-bit
permutation and no parallelism (further simply Keyak).
Keyak operates over byte strings. It works with a state of b = 1600 bits, with capacity
c = 256 bits, and tags of 128 bits. Keyak uses the whole state (including the inner
part) to absorb data, working with absorption rate Ra = 1536 bits and squeezing rate
Figure C.3 – The encryption algorithm of NORX [AJN16].
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Figure C.4 – The encryption algorithm of Ascon [DEMS16]. Here P is the plaintext.
fInit(K,N) f f
M1‖A1‖0
∗‖F1
tr[Rs]
C1
Ma‖Aa‖0
∗‖Fa
Ca
b b b f
Ma+1‖0
∗‖Fa+1
Ca+1
tr[Rs] tr[Rs]
b b b f
Mm‖0
∗‖Fm
Cm
tr[|Mm|]
T
tr[|T |]
Figure C.5 – The encryption algorithm of Keyak [BDP+16b] when A is processed before
M is. We let tr[x] denote truncation to x leftmost (outer) bits.
Rs = 1344 bits, which say how many bits can be absorbed and used (for encryption or
tag) per call to f , respectively. We assume the use of nonces of 1200 bits and a secret
key of 128 bits.
In an encryption query (K,N,A,M), Keyak first initializes the state to the value
Init(K,N) = 〈40〉8‖K‖10183‖N‖〈1〉8‖〈0〉8‖F0 and applies the permutation f , where F0
is a 32-bit flag for domain separation. The message M is partitioned into blocks M =
M1‖ . . . ‖Mm of Rs bits (the last block possibly being shorter) and the AD is partitioned
into blocks A = A1‖ . . . ‖Aa‖Aˆ1‖ . . . ‖Aˆaˆ such that |Ai| = (Ra −Rs) for i = 0, . . . , a− 1,
|Aa| ≤ (Rs−Ra), and the Aˆ part can only be non-empty if a = m and |Aa| = (Ra−Rs).
Depending of the length of M and A, three cases can occur; we illustrate the case when
all bits of A are processed before the entire M is processed in Figure C.5. The flags
Fi are 32 bit strings that encode (a) if the next evaluation of f produces a tag and the
length of the tag, (b) the offset at which plaintext bytes end, (c) the offset at which AD
bytes start and (d) the offset at which the AD bytes end. These flags ensure proper
domain separation for all possible inputs.
C.16 COLM v1
COLM [ABD+16] first derives a secret L from the secret key L by L = EK(0), where
E is AES [DR02]. Again, we use the notation in which the integer-by-block product
is the GF(2128) multiplication. The COLM encryption takes a 64-bit nonce N , encodes
some parameters param into 64 bits (these include the tag length), some associated data
A and a plaintext M to produce a ciphertext C. Here, we restrict to A’s and M ’s
being sequences of full-length blocks, although COLM allows more flexibility in lengths.
There is normally a padding scheme to transform a message M1, . . . ,M`−1,M∗` into the
sequence M1, . . . ,M`+1, but it will play no role in the attack. We only have to keep in
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mind that it appends an additional block M`+1 which is equal to the last one M`. We
let a = |A|128 and ` = |M |128 (the redundant block M`+1 is appended by the encryption
algorithm).
First, COLM computes sequences AA and MM as
AA0=(N‖param)⊕ 3 · L, MMi=Mi ⊕ 2i · L (i = 1, . . . , `− 1),
AAi=Ai ⊕ 3 · 2i · L (i = 1, . . . , a), MM`=M` ⊕ 7 · 2`−1 · L,
MM`+1=M`+1 ⊕ 7 · 2` · L.
Then we compute Zi = EK(AAi) for i = 0, . . . , a and Xi = EK(MMi) for i = 1, . . . , `+1.
Then, IV = Z0⊕· · ·⊕Za. There is a function ρ mapping a chaining value st and an input
x to a chaining value st′ and an output y defined by st′ = x ⊕ 2 · st and y = x ⊕ 3 · st.
We use IV as an initial chaining value and transform the sequence X iteratively with ρ
to produce the sequence Y . Then, CCi = EK(Yi) for i = 1, . . . , `+ 1, and finally,
Ci=CCi ⊕ 32 · 2i · L (i = 1, . . . , `− 1), C`=CC` ⊕ 32 · 7 · 2`−1 · L,
C`+1=CC`+1 ⊕ 32 · 7 · 2` · L.
C.17 Jambu
Jambu v2.1 [WH16b] instantiated with the blockcipher AES works over ν = 64-bit
blocks. It works with a state of 3ν bits, that is iteratively updated with a function
F : {0, 1}k × ({0, 1}ν)5 → ({0, 1}ν)3 which maps a secret key K, a state R‖U‖V , a
domain separation constant γ and a message block M to an updated state R′‖U ′‖V ′ =
FK(R‖U‖V, γ,M), and which internally uses AES. The nonces in Jambu are 64 bits
long.
Jambu first uses the nonce to initialize the state R0‖U0‖V0 ← FK(0ν‖0ν‖N, 5, 0ν).
Then the always padded (with 10∗ padding) AD is processed in ν-bit blocks, computing
Ri‖Ui‖Vi ← FK(Ri−1‖Ui−1‖Vi−1, 1, Ai) for i = 1, . . . , a with |A‖10∗| = aν.
The plaintext is partitioned in ν-bit blocks and encrypted by letting Ra+i‖Ua+i‖Va+i ←
FK(Ra+i−1‖Ua+i−1‖Va+i−1, 0,Mi) and Ci ← (Mi⊕Va+i) for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 with m =
b|M |/νc + 1. Then the final block of plaintext Mm is processed (if |M | mod ν = 0, we
set Mm = ε) by Ra+m‖Ua+m‖Va+m ← FK(Ra+m−1‖Ua+m−1‖Va+m−1, 0,Mm‖10∗) and
Cm ← trunc|Mm|(Mm‖10∗⊕Va+m).
Finally we compute Ra+m+1‖Ua+m+1‖Va+m+1 ← FK(Ra+m‖Ua+m‖Va+m, 3, 0ν), and
the tag as T ← Ra+m+1⊕T1⊕T2 with T1‖T2 ← EK(Ua+m+1‖Va+m+1).
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